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AUTHOR: 


MANSEL,  HENRY 
LONGUEVILLE 


TITLE: 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA 
AN  INQUIRY  INTO  THE... 

PLACE: 

BOSTON 

DA  TE : 

1860 


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I 

PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA: 


In 


/ 


<  !>!..eui.i. 


iJ'Q'JI^.IliKAKY 


INTO 


N  \ORK. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  CHARACTER  OF 
LOGICAL  PROCESSES.j 


BT 


HEXRY  LONGUEVTLLE  MANSEL,  B.D.,  LL.D. 

WAYNFLETE  PR0FE880B  OF  MORAL  AND  METAPHYSICAL  PHILOSOPHY,  OXFOM)  J 

ZDITOa  OF  SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  LECTURES;  AUTHOB  OF 

*'  LIMITS  OF  BKUQIOUS  THOUGHT,"  ETC  ETC. 


La  Logique  n'ert  qu'un  retour  de  la  P»ychologie  na  eHe-mfeine. 

Coosiir. 


FIRST  AMERICAN,   FROM   THE   SECOND    ENGLISH    EDITION, 
CORRECTED  AND  ENLARGED. 


BOSTON: 

GOULiD     AND     LINCOLN, 

69    WASHIKOTOir     8TKBBT. 

NEW  YORK:   SHELDON  AND   COMPANY. 
CINCINNATI:  GEORGE  8.  BLANCHARD. 

18G0. 


PREFACE 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Cong««,,  in  th.  ye«.  J880,  by 

GOULD  AND  LINCOLN, 

In  the  C.e*..  Offlc  of  the  DUtWct  Con«  for  the  DWric  of  M««,ohu,c.,. 

Q 


Andovtr : 
£Uctrotyped  ami  Printed  Ay  W.  F.  Draper. 


ti?-  •*» 


A  PORTION  of  the  foUowing  pages  has  already  appeared  in 
two  Articles  contributed  by  the  Author  to  the  Mrth  British 
Review}     The  present  Work  is  an  attempt  to  exhibit  more 
fully  the  relations  there  intimated  as  existing  between  Logic 
and  Psychology,  with  some  additional  matters,  which  could  not 
be  included  within  the  limits  of  a  Review.     The  title  of  the 
work  is  not  meant  to  hnply  that  it  contains  an  introduction  to 
Logic,  or  is  designed  for  the  use  of  those  unacquainted  with 
its  rudiments.     On  the  contrary,  without  some  previous  knowl- 
edge of  the  elementary  portion  of  that  science,  the  greater 
part  of  the  present  volume  wiU  not  be  intelligible.     But  it 
is  intended  as  an  inquiry  into  that  which  in  the  order  of 
nature  is  prior  to  Logic ;  though  in  the  order  of  time  it  is 
of  later  scientific  development,  and  in  the  order  of  study 
should  be  postponed  till  after  an  acquaintance  at  least  with 
the  elements  of  logical  science;  — an  inquiry  into  a  subject 
which  is  indicated  by  every  page  of  Logic  in  which  mind  and 

>  No.  27;  Art  PhUoaophy  of  Language.    No.  29:  Art.  Becent  Extensiom 
<lf  Formal  Logic, 


15032 


IV 


PREFACE. 


Its  opemtions  are  mentioned,  and  which  is  the  touchstone  by 
which  the  whole  truth  and  scientific  value  of  Logic  must  ulti- 
mately  be  tested; -an  inquiry  into  the  constitution  and  lawg 
of  the  thinking  faculty,  such  as  they  are  assumed  by  the 
Logician  as  the  basis  of  his  deductions.     It  may,  therefore, 
be  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  prt,secute,  in  relation  to  Lo-nc 
the  mquir^  instituted  by  the  Prt.legomena  of  Kant  in  «laL 
to  Metaphysics ;  namely.  What  are  the  psychological  condi- 
tions under  which  a  scientific  system  is  possible,  and  what,  in 
conformity  to  those  conditions,  are  the  chamcteristic  features 
which  such  a  system  must  exhibit  ?    It  is  not  intended  asl 
a  complete  treatise,  either  on  Psychology  alone,  or  on  Logic 
alone ;    but  as   an  exposition   of  Psychology  in  relation  to 
Logic,  containing  such  portions  of  the  fonner  as  are  abso- 
lately  necessary  to  the  vindication  and  even  to  the  under-   / 
Standing  of  the  latter. 


That  something  of  the  kind  is  not  altogether  mmeeded,  wfll 
be  acknowledged  by  those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  litera- 
ture of  the  subject.     During  the  last  and  present  centurv 
under  the  influence  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  For. 
n>al  Logic,  in  itself  and  in  its  relations  to  Psychology,  has 
been  elaborated  by  numbers  of  eminent  write,^  in  GeLany 
fiom  whose  labors  the  English  student  has,  as  yet.  derived' 
hardly  any  benefit.    Misconceptions  are  still  aUowed  to  prevaQ 
concerning  the  nature  and  office  of  Logic,  which  the  slightest 
acquaintance  with  the  actual  constitution  of  human  thought 
and   its   Uws  would  suffice  to  dissipate  forever.      Matte« 


PREFACE.  V 

treated  of  by  different  logicians  are  alternately  expelled  from 
and  restored  to  the  province  of  the  science,  without  the  ap- 
pearance of  anything  like  a  sound  canon  of  criticism  to  deter- 
mine what  is  logical  and  what  is  not  Attack  and  defence  of 
the  study  have  been  conducted  on  grounds  equally  untenable ; 
and  a  conception  of  Logic  as  it  might  be  were  the  human 
mind  constituted  as  it  is  not,  is  frequently  tossed  to  and  fro 
between  contending  parties,  to  the  exclusion  of  Logic  as  it 
must  be  while  the  human  mind  is  constituted  as  it  is. 


But  if  an  exposition  of  Psychology  in  relation  to  Logic  is 
thus  needed  for  a  distinct  conception  of  the  latter  science  in 
itself,  it  is  not  less  needed  when  we  look  to  the  conditions 
under  which  that  science  may  be  most  profitably  employed  as 
a  branch  of  academical  study.  Few  who  are  acquainted  with 
the  various  logical  systems  of  modem  times  will  hesitate  to 
give  a  decided  preference  over  all  others  to  the  formal  view 
of  tlie  science,  which  from  the  days  of  Kant  has  gradually 
been  advancing  to  perfection.  Whether  we  regard  the  unity 
and  scientific  completeness  of  the  system  itself,  the  great 
names  by  which  it  is  supported,  the  valuable  works  that 
might  easily  be  made  available  for  its  communication,  or 
the  facihty  with  which  it  might  be  introduced  into  the  exist- 
ing course  of  study,  in  all  it  possesses  unquestionable  advan- 
tages, as  the  basis  of  logical  instruction.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  its  compass  is  small ;  and  its  contents,  though  clear  and 
definite,  are,  taken  by  themselves,  too  meagre  to  be  an  ade- 
quate  substitute   for  the  miscellaneous   reading  which  is  so 

1* 


w 


VI 


PREPACB. 


often  nusnamed  Logical.    To  supply  this  defect,  two  co„,.es 
«e  open.     The  study  of  Formal  Logic  may  be   combined 
euher  with  its  objecUve  or  with  its  subjective  applications. 
We  may  treat,  that  is  to  say,  a  system  of  Logic,  either  in 
connection  with  some  of  the  various  objects  of  thought  to 
which  ,t  may  in  practice  be  applied,  or  in  relation  to  the 
thmkmg  mind,  and  to  that  mental  philosophy  of  which  it  forms 
a  portion.     The  former  method  has  been  abundantly  tried, 
and  has  abundantly  faUed  in  the  trial     A  system  of  Logic 
treated  in  its  objective  application  has  no  alternative  between 
an  mipossible  universality  or  an  arbitnuy  exdusiveness.     By 
whatever  right  one  iota  of  the  matter  of  thought  can  claim 
admission  into  the  system,  by  the  same  right  the  whole  uni- 
verse of  human  knowledge  is  entitled  to  follow.      Such  a 
method  can  only  be  employed  as  a  bad  means  of  collecting 
desultory  information  on  unconnected  subjecU.     As  a  system 
It  postulates  its  own  failure. 

It  is  in  connection,  not  in  confusion,  with  cognate  sciences 

as  a  branch  of  mental  phUosophy,  that  Logic  may  and  ought 

to  be  studied.  [One  of  the  objects  of  the  present  work  is  to 

8how  that  Logic  as  a  science  cam.ot  be  rightly  understood  and 

appreciated,  except  in  relation  to  Psychology?!  '^'^  neglect 

of  tins  relation  has  been  acknowledged  as  the  weak  side  of 

the  Kantian  Philosophy-  its  recognition  has  been  impezu- 

tively  demanded  by  the  ablest  modem  writers  on  the  subject. 

'  See  Fries,  S,„Uem  der  LogOc,  p.  22. 


PREFACE. 


vn 


"Selon  moi,"  says  M.  Duval^ouve,  "I'objet  de  la  logique 
n'est  pas  seulement  la  directim  de  I'intelligence,  mais  encore 
Tetud^  de  I'intelligence;  la  direction  apres  I'^tude;  et  un  traite 
de  logique  doit  comprendre  la  description  du  fait  intellcctuel, 
k  thA>rie  de  ses  lois,  I'expos^  des  regies  qu'il  doit  reconnaltre,' 
eoit  dans  son  ^tat  psychologique  et  de  pure  pens^e,  soit  dans  sa 
manifestation   par  k  parole."'    The  propriety  of  including 
these  psychological  matters  in  a  Treatise  on  Logic  may  be 
questioned ;  but  to  the  necessity  of  including  them  in  a  phi- 
losophical  course,  of  which  Logic  should  form  a  portion,  the 
whole  history  of  the  science  bears  witness.  '  The  alliance 
estabUshed  of  old  between  Logic  and  Metaphysics  was  dis- 
solved by  the   Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  and  cannot  be 
restored,  except  by  identifying  the  two,  with  Hegel.     To  those 
who  reject  this  alternative  a  blank  is  made  in  philosoplucal 
study,  which  can  only  be  adequately  supplied  by  a  well-con- 
nected course  of  Mental  Science,  embracing,  as  its  constituent 
portions,  the  three  cognate  subjects  of  Logic,  Ethics,  and 
Psychology. 

To  Ethics,  as  well  as  to  Logic,  Psychology  is  an  indispensa- 
ble supplement.  The  science  of  man  as  he  ought  to  be  must 
be  based  on  that  of  man  as  he  is.  In  Moral  PhUosophy,  as  in 
Logic,  questions  of  a  psychological  character  meet  us  at  every 
stage  of  our  course ;  and  the  value  of  every  ethical  system 
must  ultimately  be  tested  on  psychological  gromids.    Perhaps 

>  TiuiUde  IxHptjue,  Preface,  p.  viii. 


VIII 


PR£F  ACE. 


PREFACE. 


it  is  not  too  much  to  saj,  that  half  the  ethical  systems  which 
have  been  at  different  times  in  vogue,  have  started  from  a 
psychological  assumption,  which,  consistently  carried  out,  would 
make  Ethical  Philosophy  impossible. 

May  I  be  allowed  to  suggest  a  stiU  higher  application  of 
the  same  criterion  ?     L,  the  veiy  conception  of  Revealed 
Religion,  as   a  communication   from  an   Infinite  to  a  finite 
Intelligence,  is  impUed  the  existence  of  certain  ideas  of  a 
purely  negative  character,  the  purpose  of  which  is  not  spec- 
ulative but  regulative  truth ;  which  are  designed,  not  to  sat- 
isfy our  reason,  but  to  guide  our  practice.     These,  from  their 
very  nature,  are  beyond  the  criticism  of  reason.     But  in  order 
to  discriminate  accurately  between  the  provinces  of  reason 
and  faith,  to.determme  what  we  may  and  what  we  may  not 
seek  to  comprehend  as  a  speculative  truth,  an  examination  of 
the   limits   of  man's   mental  powers  is  indispensable.     The 
ground  of  many  a  controversy  might  be  considerably  nar- 
rowed were  we  to  inquire  at  the  outset  what  are  the  mental 
powers  that  can  be  brought  to  the  solution  of  the  question,  and 
how  are  they  related  to  the  daU  on  which  they  must  operate. 
Fichte  made  his  earliest  attempt,  as  a  disciple  of  the  Kantian 
philosophy,  by  an  Essay  towards  a  Critique  of  every  Revela- 
tion.    The  positive  portion  of  his  principles  of  criticbm  (for 
many  of  them  have  a  negative  character  only)  might  be  better 
applied  to  a  Critique  of  every  Critique  of  Revelation ;- an 
inquiry,  that  is  to  say,  what  portion  of  the  contents  of  Revela- 


nc 


tion,  as  addressed  to  human  minds,  can  be  wrought  by  human 
interpretation  into  the  form  of  speculative  dogmas. 

"  La  psychologic,"  says  M.  Cousin,  « n'est  assur^ment  pas 
tonte  la  philosophic,  mais  elle  en  est  le  fondement."  If  there 
be  any  truth  in  this  saying  of  one  of  the  highest  philosophical 
authorities  of  our  own  or  of  any  age,  it  will  follow  of  neces- 
sity that  a  course  of  instruction  in  this  fundamental  branch 
must  be  an  integral  and  indispensable  portion  of  any  system 
of  philosophical  teaching. 

The  psychological  criticisms  of  the  present  work  are  mainly 
limited  to  logical  questions,  and  are  designed  to  throw  some 
light  on  matters  which,  almost  from  the  commencement  of  my 
logical  studies,  have  appeared  to  me  to  stand  in  especial  need 
of  elucidation.     Much  of  what  has  been  acquired  from  foreign 
sources,  with  much  labor  and  little  guidance  in  the  search, 
might  have  been  learned  in  an  easier  and  more  direct  manner, 
had  the  course  which  I  have  ventured  to  recommend  been 
adopted  in  relation  to  my  own  early  studies.     The  numerous 
obligations  which  the  work  is  under  to  previous  writers  are 
most  of  them  acknowledged  as  they  occur.     One  or  two,  how- 
ever, demand  an  express  mention  here.     The  reader  who  is 
familiar  with  Kant's  writings  will  probably  discern  obligations 
to  the  Critical  Philosophy  in  ahnost  every  page  ;  even  where 
the  language  of  Kant  has  been  departed  from,  and  the  differ- 
ence in  detail  is  such  as  would  not  justify  a  direct  reference  to 
,his  works.     The  method  and  material  for  thinkmg  derived 


X  PREFACE. 

from  the  study  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  is  in  many  respects 
far  more  valuable  than  the  direct  information  communicated. 
This  is  especially  the  case  with  a  student  who  views  that 
philosophy  from  the  psychological  rather  than  the  metaphys- 
ical side,  in  its  relation  to  Hume  and  Locke  rather  than  to 
Wolf  and  Leibnitz,  and  who  endeavors  to  combine  the  mate- 
rials thence  obtained  with  the  most  valuable  results  of  the 
Scottish  philosophy,  which  owes  its  rise,  like  the  Kantian,  to 
the  skepticism  of  Hume. 

To  two  other  eminent  philosophers  a  similar  acknowledg- 
ment is  due.  The  German  side  of  M.  Cousin's  Eclecticism 
approaches,  in  aim  at  least,  if  not  in  method,  nearer  to  tlie 
philosophy  of  Schelling  and  Hegel  than  to  that  of  Kant.  It 
is  natural,  therefore,  that  his  view  of  the  limits  of  human 
thought,  and  consequently  of  the  province  of  Logic  and  of  its 
relation  to  Psychology,  should  contain  much  which  cannot  be 
directly  transferred  to  the  pages  of  a  work  wliich  advocates  a 
strictly  formal  view  of  Logic,  and  which  would  rather  contract 
than  enlarge  the  limits  assigned  by  Kant  to  the  Understanding 
and  the  Reason.  But  the  writings  of  M.  Cousin  are  indis- 
pensable to  all  who  would  gain  a  true  estimate  of  the  impor- 
tance of  Psychology  and  its  position  in  a  philosophical  course ; 
and  the  benefits  which  I  am  conscious  of  having  derived  from 
their  study  are  far  more  than  can  be  adequately  expressed 
by  a  direct  acknowledgment  of  passages  borrowed  from  them. 
From  the  author's  view  of  the  office  of  Logic  I  have  departed 
widely ;   which  makes  it  the  more  necessary  to  confess  the 


PREPACK. 


XI 


numberless  advantages  derived  from  his  writmgs,  in  relation 
to  ahnost  every  pomt  treated  of  in  the  following  pages. 

Li  many  points  in  which  I  have  departed  from  the  doc- 
trines of  the   great   Eclectic,  I  am   much   indebted  to  the 
writings  of  his  illustrious  critic,  Sir  William  HamHton.     The 
same  acknowledgment  may  indeed   be   made   in  relation   to 
nearly  the  whole  contents  of  the  present  volume,  partly  by 
way  of  direct  obligation,  and  still  more  by  way  of  hints  and 
suggestions  of  questions  to  be  solved,  and  thejnethod  of  their 
solution.     I  cannot,  indeed,  claim  the  sanction  of  this  eminent 
authority  for  any  statement  which  is  here  advanced,  except 
where  direct  reference  is  made  to  his  writings ;  yet  probably 
even  where  I  have  differed  from  him  in  opinion,  there  is 
much  that  would   never  have   been  written  at  all  but  for 
the  valuable   aid   furnished   by  him.      To   say  that  I  have 
occasionaUy  ventured  to  dissent  from  the  positions  of  each 
and  all  of  the  philosophsrs  to  whom  I  am  so  much  indebted, 
is  only  to  say  that  I  have  endeavored  to  study  their  works 
in  the  spirit  in  which  they  would  wish  to  be  studied  — with  the 
respect  and  gratitude  of  a  disciple,  but,  it  is  hoped,  without 
the  servility  of  a  copyist. 

For  the  phraseology  which  I  have  occasionally  been  com- 
peUed  to  employ  in  the  course  of  the  following  remarks, 
no  apology  will  be  required  by  those  acquainted  with  the 
history  of  mental  science.  Li  no  branch  of  study  is  it  so 
necessary  to  observe   the  Aristotelian   precept,  6voiu.r^ouiv 


XII 


PREFACE. 


<ra<f>rjv€La^  €v€k€v.  Nine-tenths  of  the  confusion  and  contro- 
versy that  have  existed  in  this  department  are  owing  to 
that  unwillingness  to  innovate  in  matters  of  language,  which 
leads  to  the  employment  of  the  same  term  in  various  shades 
of  meaning,  and  with  reference  to  various  phenomena  of 
consciousness.  In  this  respect  philosophy  is  under  deep 
obligations  to  the  purism  of  German  writers,  which  has  en- 
abled subsequent  thinkers  to  examine  the  most  important 
problems  of  Psychology  apart  from  the  old  associations  of 
language.  A  new  phraseology  may  occasion  some  little  dif- 
ficulty at  the  outset  of  a  work ;  but  to  adhere  to  an  inade- 
quate vocabulary  merely  because  its  expressions  are  estab- 
lished, is  to  involve  the  whole  of  the  subject  in  hopeless 
confusion  and  obscurity.  In  this  respect,  however,  I  trust 
I  shall  not  be  found  to  have  departed  from  authorized  lan- 
guage in  a  greater  degree  than  is  absolutely  necessary  for 
the  purpose  of  communicating  to  English  readers  some  of 
the  most  valuable  results  of  German  thought,  and  of  carrying 
into  effect  the  main  design  of  the  present  Essay,  —  that  of 
testing  the  received  processes  of  Logic,  by  reference  to  the 
facts  of  human  consciousness. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 


PAOR 


ON  THOUGHT,  AS  DISTINGUISHED  FROM  OTHER  FACTS  OF 

CONSCIOUSNESS 15 


CHAPTER    II. 


ON  THE  THREE  OPERATIONS  OF  THOUGHT, 


6» 


CHAPTER   III. 


ON  LAW,  AS  RELATED  TO  THOUGHT  AND  OTHER  OBJECTS,         76 


CHAPTER    IV. 


ON  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  CHARACTER  OF  MATHEMATICAL 
NFXESSny, 

2 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    V. 

ON  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  CHARACTER  OF  METAPHYSICAL       '^"" 

NECESSITY,      ... 

'  118 


^ 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


CHAPTER    VI. 

ON  LOGICAL  NECESSITY  AND  THE  LAWS  OF  THOUGHT, 


153 


CHAPTER    I. 


CHAPTER   VII. 

ON  THE  MATTER  AND  FORM  OF  THOUGHT, 


201 


J 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

ON  POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  THOUGHT,  ...  221 


CHAPTER    IX. 

ON  LOGIC  AS  RELATED  TO  OTHER  MENTAL  SCIENCES, 


1. 


APPENDIX, 

J 167 


ON    THOUGHT,  AS    DISTINGUISHED    FROM    OTHER    FACTS    OF 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Without  entering  into  the  countless  disputes  which 
have  taken  place  concerning  the  nature  and  definition 
of  Logic,*  it  is  sufficient  to  observe  that  it  will  be  treated 
in  the  following  pages,  in  accordance  principally  with  the 
views  of  Kant,  as  the  Science  of  the  Laws  of  Formal 
Thinking.  In  the  wide  sense,  indeed,  in  which  the  term 
is  used  by  Archbishop  Whately,  it  may  be  admitted  that 
Logic,  as  furnishing  rules  to  secure  the  mind  from  error  in 
its  deductions,  is  also  an  Art,  or,  to  speak  more  correctly, 
a  Practical  Science.*  Still,  it  may  be  questioned  whether 
the  practical  service  thus  performed  by  Logic  can  with 
propriety  be   allowed  to  influence  its  definition.      The 

1  For  a  sammary  of  various  opinions  on  this  qaestion,  see  Zabarella,  cfe 
Natura  Logicce,  lib.  i. ;  Smij^lecii  Logica,  Disp.  ii.  Qu.  v. ;  Burf^rsdicii  Inst. 
Log.  lib.  i.  cap.  1,  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Edinburgh  Beview,  No.  115,  p.  203. 

*  For  the  distinction  between  these  tenns,  see  Wolf,  Phil.  Bat.  Proleg., 
4  10.  "  Omnis  Logica  utens  est  habitus,  qui  proprio  exercitio  comparatur, 
minime  autem  discendo  acquiritur,  ndeoque  et  ipsa  doceri  nequit.  Quam- 
obrem,  cum  Logica  omnis  vel  sit  docens  vel  utens,  neque  enim  praeter 
regularum  notitiam  atque  habitum  eas  ad  praxin  transferendi  teiHum 


aV 


16 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGIC  A. 


benefits  performed  by  Logic  as  a  medicine  of  the  mind, 
however  highly  we  may  be  disposed  to  rate  them,  are 
accidental  only,  and  arise  from  causes  external  to  the 
Science  itself:  its  speculative  character,  as  an  inquiry  into 
the  laws  of  thought,  is  internal  and  essential.  To  the 
twofold  character  of  Logic  two  conditions  are  necessary. 
Firstlv,  that  there  exist  certain  mental  laws  to  which 
every  sound  thinker  is  bound  to  conform.  Secondly,  that 
it  is  possible  to  transgress  those  laws,  or  to  think  unsoundly. 
On  the  former  of  these  conditions  depends  the  possibility 
of  Logic  as  a  speculative  Science ;  on  the  latter,  its  possi- 
bility as  a  practical  Science  or  Art.  Now,  if  we  look  at 
these  two  conditions  with  reference  to  the  actual  contents 
of  pure  Logic,  it  is  manifest  that  the  abrogation  of  the  fii*8t 
would  utterly  annihilate  the  whole  Science ;  whereas  the 
abrogation  of  the  second  would  at  most  only  necessitate 
the  removal  of  a  few  excrescences,  leaving  the  main  body 
of  Logical  doctrine  substantially  as  it  is  at  present.  Sup- 
pose, for  example,  that  the  difference  between  sound  and 
unsound  reasoning  could  be  discerned  in  individual  cases 
as  a  matter  jf  fact,  but  that  we  had  no  power  of  classifying 
the  several  instances  of  each  and  referring  them  to  certain 
common  principles.  It  is  clear  that^  under  such  a  supposi- 
tion, the  present  contents  of  Logic,  speculative  and  prac- 
tical, could  have  no  existence.  The  number  of  sound  and 
unsound  thinkers  in  the  world  might  remain  much  as  it  is 
DOW,  but  the  impossibility  of  investigating  the  principles 
of  the  one  and  applying  them  to  the  correction  of  the 
other  would  make  an  Art  or  Science  of  Logic  unattainable. 


concipi  potest;  sola  Loji^ca  artificialis  docens  ea  C8t,  qnie  doceri  adeoqae 
in  numenira  disciplinarum  philosophicanim  rcferri  potest.  Atque  ideo 
qaoquc  Logicam  definivimus  per  scientiam,  minimo  autcm  per  artem  Tcl 
habitum  in  gcncrc,  quod  genus  convenit  Logicsc  utcati." 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


17 


But  let  us  imagine,  on  the  other  hand,  a  race  of  intelligent 
beings,  subject  to  the  same  laws  of  thought  as  mankind, 
but  incapable   of  transgressing  them   in  practice.      The 
elements  of  existing  Logic,  the  Concept,  the  Judgment, 
the   Syllogism,  would  remain    unaltered.      The   Science 
of  Logic  would  investigate  the  laws  of  unerring  Reason, 
as  the  Science  of  Astronomy  investigates  the  unvarying 
laws  of  the  heavenly  phenomena ;  but  an  Art  of  Logic,  to 
preserve  the  mind  from  enor,  would  be  as  absurd  as  an 
Art  of  Astronomy  proposing  to  control  and  regulate  ihQ 
planets  in  their  courses.      From  these  considerations  it 
follows  that,  even  granting  Logic  to  be,  under  existing 
circumstances,  both  Science  and  Art,  yet  the  former  is 
an  essential,  the  latter  an  accidental,  feature ;  the  one  is 
necessarily  interwoven  with  the  elements  of  the  system, 
the  other  a  contingent  result  of  the  infirmities  of  those 
who   possess  it.      In   this   respect,  pure   Logic   may  not 
unfairly  be  compared  to  Mechanics  treated  as  a  branch 
of  Mathematics.    As  Sciences,  both  proceed  deductively 
from  assumptions  more  or  less  inconsistent  with  the  actual 
state  of  things.    As  Arts,  neither  can  be  put  in  practice 
without  making  allowance  for  contingencies  neglected  in 
the  scientific  theory.     The  assumed  logical  perfection  of 
thought  bears  about  the  same  relation   to  the  ordinary 
state  of  the  human  mind  as  the  assumption  of  perfectly 
rigid  levers  and  perfectly  flexible  cords  bears  to  the  action 
of  those  instruments  in  practice.     But,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  possibility  of  making  such  allowances  implies  that  the 
difference  between  practice  and  theory  is  one  of  degree 
only,  and  not  of  kind.    The  instrument  as  used  may  not 
be  identical  with  the  instrument  as  contemplated,  but  it 
must  be  supposed  capable  of  approximation  to  it.    A  Sci- 
ence of  the  Laws  of  Thought  is  only  valuable  in  so  far  as 

2* 


18 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


19 


I 


I- 


♦ 


its  laws  are  acknowledged  to  be  those  to  which  actual 
thinking  ought,  as  far  as  possible,  to  conform,  and  which, 
if  fully  complied  with,  would  represent  only  the  better 
performance  of  existing  obligations,  not  the  imposition  of 
new  ones.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Ethical  Philosophy 
likewise.  In  describing  the  perfection  of  moral  and  intel- 
lectual virtue,  we  describe  a  standard  to  which,  in  the 
existing  state  of  human  nature,  no  man  does  or  can 
attain ;  but  the  whole  value  of  the  portrait  is  derived 
from  its  being  a  more  or  less  accurate  representation  of 
man  as  he  ought  to  be,  not  the  imaginary  sketch  of  a  being 
of  a  totally  distinct  kind.^ 

In  order  therefore  to  the  right  appreciation  of  any  given 
system  of  Logic,  it  becomes  necessary  to  ask.  What  is  the 
J  actual  nature  of  Thought  as  an  operation,  to  what  laws  is 
it  subject,  and  to  what  extent  are  they  efficient  ?  This 
inquiry  does  not,  strictly  speaking,  fall  within  the  province 
of  Zogic  itself.^  No  Science  is  competent  to  criticise  its 
own  principles.  That  there  is  such  an  operation  as  think- 
ing, and  certain  laws  to  which  it  is  bound  to  conform,  the 
Logician  does  not  question,  but  assumes.  Whether  there 
are  other  mental  operations  besides  thinking,  and  whether 
these  must  act  in  combination  with  Thought  for  the  at- 
tainment of  any  special  class  of  truths  ;  —  these  and  such 
like  questions  it  is  beyond  his  province  to  investigate.  His 
own  branch  of  inquiry  is  twofold,  partly  constructive,  and 
partly  critical.  In  the  former  capacity,  he  inquires,  what 
are  the   several  forms,  legitimate  or  illegitimate,  which 

1  "Beide,  Logik  und  Ethik,  haben  VorxhHJien  aufzusteUen,  nach  welchen 
Bich,  hier  das  Denken,  dort  das  Handeln  richten  soil,  obglelch  es  sich  eins 
wie  das  andcre,  aus  psychologischen  Griinden  par  oft  in  der  Wlrklichkeit 
nicht  darnach  richtet,  und  nicht  darnach  richten  fcoiui."— HerUart.  Psy- 
chdogie  cds  Wissenschiufi,  Th.  ii.  4  1 19. 


Thought  as  a  product  will  assume,  according  as  the  act  of 
thinking  is  or  is  not  conducted  in  conformity  to  its  given 
laws.  In  the  latter  capacity,  he  sifts  and  examines  the 
special  products  of  this  or  that  thinker,  and  pronounces 
them,  according  to  the  features  which  they  exhibit,  to  be 
legitimately  produced  or  otherwise.^ 

Beyond  the  boundaries  of  pure  Logic  there  is  thus 
another  and  important  field  of  inquiry.  Is  the  mind  capa- 
ble of  other  operations  besides  those  of  Thought ;  and  are 
there  other  kinds  of  mental  rectitude  besides  that  which 
results  from  the  conformity  of  Thought  to  its  own  laws? 
Do  the  several  mental  faculties  act  in  the  pursuit  of  truth 
conjointly  or  separately  ?  Does  each  process  guarantee 
the  complete  attainment  of  a  limited  class  of  truths,  or 
the  attainment  of  a  single  element  which  becomes  truth 
only  in  combination  ?  Do  the  Laws  of  Thought,  as  as- 
sumed by  Logic,  exhibit  those  features  which,  from  the 
general  constitution  of  the  human  mind  f^nd  the  peculiar 
character  of  the  thinking  faculty,  they  might  be  expected 
to  exhibit?  In  relation  to  these  and  similar  questions, 
Logic  is  subordinate  to  Psychology. 

To  Psychology  we  n:ust  look  for  the  explanation  and  ' 
justification  of  the  peculiar  features  of  Logic.  Logic,  says 
one  antagonist,  furnishes  no  criterion  of  material  truth 
and  falsehood.  It  may  be  that,  from  the  constitution  of 
the  human  mind,  such  a  criterion  is  impossible.  Its  prin- 
ciples, says  another,  are  mere  frivolous  tautologies.  It 
may  be  that  this  very  tautology  has  a  psychological  sig- 
nificance, that  it  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  a  mind 
gazing  upon  its  own  laws.    It  is  barren  in  the  production 


1  See  Qauberg:,  Logica,  Prolog.  ^  viii.    Drobisch,  Neue  DarsteUung  der 
Logik,  ^  9.    Frieg,  System  d^r  Juogik,  §  1 . 


•  * 


20 


PROLEGOMENA    LOGICA. 


w- 


t 


of  positive  science.  It  may  be  that  Thought  alone  was 
never  designed  by  man's  Maker  to  be  otherwise.  As  an 
instrument,  it  has  attempted  much  and  accomplished  little. 
The  fault  may  lie,  not  in  the  tool,  but  in  the  workman. 
Before  we  condemn  Logic  for  what  it  does  not  perform,  or 
despise  it  for  what  it  does,  it  may  be  as  well  to  ask,  what 
we  may  learn  elsewhere  of  the  nature  of  the  thinking 
faculty,  and  what  it  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  ac- 
complish. 

In  order,  therefore,  to  determine  accurately  the  province 
and  capabilities  of  Logic,  it  will  be  necessary  to  examine 
the  psychological  distinction  between  Thought,  properly 
so  called,  and  other  phenomena  of  mind.  This  being  as- 
certained, there  will  remain  the  inquiry,  in  what  manner 
our  consciousness  itself  and  the  several  objects  submitted 
to  it  may  be  regarded  as  subject  to  law ;  what  are  the  dif- 
ferent classes  of  laws,  whether  of  the  subject  or  of  the 
object,  the  characteristic  features  of  each,  their  mode  of 
determining  the  several  operations  subject  to  them,  and 
the  consequent  character  of  the  respective  products. 
f;v:JIvery  state  of  consciousness  necessarily  implies  two 
elements  at  least :  a  conscious  subject,  and  an  object  of 
which  he  is  conscious.  In  every  exercise,  for  example,  of 
the  senses,  we  may  distinguish  the  object  seen,  heard, 
smelt,  touched,  tasted,  from  the  subject  seeing,  hearing, 
smelling,  touching,  tasting.  In  every  emotion  of  pleasure 
or  of  pain,  there  is  a  certain  affection,  agreeable  or  dis- 
agi-eeable,  existing  within  me,  and  of  this  affection  I  am 
conscious.  In  every  act  of  volition,  there  takes  place  a 
certain  exercise  of  my  will,  and  I  am  conscious  that  it 
takes  place.  In  this  point  of  view,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
enter  on  the  often  disputed  question,  whether  such  states 
of  consciousness  furnish  immediate  evidence  of  the  ex- 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


21 


istence  of  a  world  external  to  ourselves.  That  of  which 
I  am  directly  conscious  may  be  an  object  numerically  dis- 
tinct from  myself,  or  it  may  be  a  modification  of  my  own 
mind.  All  that  need  be  insisted  upon  here  is,  that  there 
is  present  an  individual  object,  whether  thing,  act,  or  state 
of  mind,  and  that  we  are  conscious  of  such  an  object  as 
existing  within  or  without  ourselves.  A  psychological 
dualism  is  implied  in  the  very  notion  of  consciousness : 
whether  this  necessarily  involves  an  ontological  dualism, 
is  beyond  our  present  purpose  to  inquire.^ 

But  to  constitute  an  act  of  Thought^  more  is  required 
than  the  immediate  relation  of  subject  to  object  in  con- 
sciousness. Every  one  of  the  above  states  might  exist  in 
a  mind  totally  incapable  of  thought.  Let  us  suppose,  for 
example,  a  being,  in  whose  mind  every  successive  state  of 
consciousness  was  forgotten  as  soon  as  it  had  taken  place. 
Every  individual  object  might  be  presented  to  him  pre- 
cisely as  it  is  to  us.  Animals,  men,  trees,  and  stones, 
might  be  successively  placed  before  his  eyes;  pleasure, 
and  pain,  and  anger,  and  fear,  might  alternate  within  him ; 
but,  as  each  departed,  he  would  retain  no  knowledge  that 
it  had  ever  existed,  and  consequently  no  power  of  com- 
parison with  similar  or  dissimilar  objects  of  an  earlier  or 
later  consciousness.  He  would  have  no  knowledge  of 
such  objects  as  referred  to  separate  notions;  he  could  not 
say,  this  which  I  see  is  a  man,  or  a  horse ;  this  which  I 
feel  is  fear,  or  anger.  He  would  be  deficient  in  the  dis- 
tinctive feature  of  Thought,  the  concept  or  general  notion 
resulting  from  the  comparison  of  objects.     Hence  arises 

1  This  point  has  Ixien  already  arpied  fully  and  satisfactorily  by  the 
prcat  modern  advocate  of  Natural  Dualism,  Sir  William  Hamilton.  The 
reader  is  referred  to  his  edition  of  Reid's  works,  especially  to  his  notes  B 
and  C,  for  a  masterly  dissertation  on  this  important  question. 


I 


22 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


the  important  distinction  between  Intuitions^  in  which 
the  object  is  inimecliately  related  to  the  conscious  mind, 
and  Thoughts^  in  which  the  object  is  mediately  related 
through  a  concept^  gained  by  comparison.  The  former 
contains  two  elements  only,  the  subject  and  the  object 
standing  in  present  relation  to  each  other.  The  latter 
contains  three  elements,  the  thinking  subject,  the  object 
about  which  he  thinks,  and  the  concept  mediating  between 
the  two.®  Thus  even  the  exercise  of  the  senses  upon  pre- 
sent objects,  in  the  manner  in  which  it  is  ordinarily  per- 
formed by  a  man  of  mature  faculties,  does  not  consist  of 
mere  intuition,  but  is  accompanied  by  an  act  of  thought. 
In  mere  intuition,  all  that  is  simultaneously  presented  to 
the  sense  appears  as  one  whole ;  but  mere  intuition  does 
not  distinguish  its  several  parts  from  each  other  under  this 

*  Here,  and  throuj^hout  the  following  pages,  the  word  Intuition  is  used 
in  the  extent  of  the  German  Anschauung,  to  include  all  the  products  of 
the  perceptive  (external  or  internal)  and  imaginative  faculties  ;  every  act 
of  consciousness,  in  short,  of  which  the  immediate  object  is  an  individual, 
thing,  act,  or  state  of  mind,  presented  under  the  condition  of  distinct  ex- 
istence in  space  or  time. 

*  The  revival  of  this  term,  unfortunately,  till  very  recently,  suffered  to 
grow  obsolete  in  philosophy,  will  need  no  apology  with  those^who  are 
acquainted  with  the  writings  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  It  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  distinguish  in  language  between  the  act  of  thought  and  its  prod- 
uct, a  distinction  expressed  in  Greek  by  v&t)(Tis  and  viritia,  and  in  the  fol- 
lowing remarks  by  conception  and  concept.  The  latter  term  has  been  fUlly 
sanctioned  by  the  usage  of  French  philosophers,  as  well  as  of  the  emi- 
nent writer  above  mentioned. 

3  "  In  apprehending  an  individual  thing,  either  itself  through  sense  or  its 
representation  in  the  phantasy,  we  have,  in  a  certain  sort,  an  absolute  or 
irrespective  cognition,  which  is  justly  denominated  immediate,  by  contrast 
to  the  more  relative  and  mediate  knowledge  which,  subsequently,  we  com- 
pass of  the  same  object,  when,  by  a  comparative  act  of  the  understanding, 
we  refer  it  to  a  class,  that  is,  think  or  recognize  it,  by  relation  to  other 
things,  under  a  certain  notion  or  general  term."—  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Beid'a 
Works,  p.  801. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


23 


or  that  notion.  I  may  see  at  once,  in  a  single  panorama, 
a  ship  upon  the  sea,  an  island  lying  behind  it,  and  the  sky 
above  it.  To  mere  intuition  this  is  presented  only  in  con- 
fusion, as  a  single  object.  To  distinguish  its  constituent 
portions,  as  sea  and  land,  ship  and  sky,  requires  a  com- 
parison and  classification  of  them  relatively  to  so  many 
separate  concepts  existing  in  the  mind ;  and  such  classifi- 
cation is  an  act  of  Thought.^  ,^ 

In  every  act  of  Consciousness  the  ultimate  object  is  an  I 
individual.  But  in  intuition  this  object  is  presented  to 
the  mind  directly,  and  does  not  imply  the  existence,  past 
or  present,  of  anything  but  itself  and  the  mind  to  which 
it  is  presented.  In  thought,  on  the  other  hand,  the  indi- 
vidual is  represented  by  means  of  a  concept,  which  contains 
certain  attributes  applicable  to  other  individuals  of  the 
same  kind.  *  This  implies  that  there  have  been  presented 
to  the  mind  prior  objects  of  intuition,  originating  the  con- 
cept or  general  notion  to  which  subsequent  objects  are 
referred.  Hence  arises  another  important  distinction.  All 
intuition  is  direct  and  presentative  ^  all  thought  is  indirect 
and  representative.  -^    ^ 

This  distinction  necessitates  a  further  remark  on  the 
characteristic  feature  of  thought,  as  compared  with  one 
special  class    of   intuitions.      That  sensitive  perception 


1  Hoffbaucr,  Logik,  §  10. 

*  The  terms  represent,  representation,  etc.,  are,  here  and  throughout  the 
present  work,  used  in  a  wider  sense  than  that  to  which  they  are  confined 
by  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  With  that  philosopher,  the  representative  faculty 
is  synon}Tnous  with  the  imagination  proper,  and  the  above  terms  arc  used 
exclusively  with  reference  to  individual  objects.  See  Beid's  Works,  pp.  Sa.'i, 
809;  Discussions,  p.  13.  In  the  following  pages  the  term  representation  and 
its  cognates  are  extended  so  as  to  include  the  concept,  which  is  representa- 
tive of  many  individuals,  as  well  as  the  image,  which  is  representative 
of  one. 


24 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


25 


takes  place  through  the  medium  of  a  representative  idea, 
is  a  hypothesis  which  was  made  more  than  questionable 
by  the  philosophy  of  Reid,  and  may  be  regarded  as  com- 
pletely overthrown  by  the  recent  labors  of  his  illustrious 
editor,  Sir  William  Hamilton.  But  there  still  remains  the 
faculty  of  Imagination,  whose  office  is  the  production  of 
images  representative  of  the  several  phenomena  of  Per- 
ception,^ internal  as  well  as  external.    In  relation  to  this 

1  The  term  Perception  requires  a  few  words  in  explanation.    In  modem 
philosophy,  fVom  Descartes  to  Reid,  this  term  was  used  widely,  as  coex- 
tensive Miith  Apprehension  or  Consciousness  in  general,  with  some  minor 
modifications,  for  an  account  of  which  the  reader  is  referred  to  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  Reid,  p.  876.     By  Reid  and  his  followers  it  was  used  for  the 
consciousness  of  an  external  object  presented  to  the  mind  throu^rh  the 
organs  of  sense,  as  distin(;uished  from  Sensation^  the  consciousness  of  an 
affection  of  the  subject  through  the  same  organs.    In  this  sense  they  are 
clearly  distinguished  by  M.  Royer  Collanl,  Jouffroy's  Reid,  iii.  p.  3-i9. 
"  II  y  a  dans  I'operation  du  toucher  sensation  et  perception  tout  ensemble: 
changement  d'etat  ou  modification  inte'rieure,  c'est  la  sensation ;  connais- 
sance  d'un  objet  exterieur,  c'est  la  perception."    Cf.  Reid,  Intell.  Powers, 
Essay  i.  ch.  i.    Stewart,  Outlines  of  Moral  Philosophy,  §  15.    According  to 
M.  Royer  Collard,  the  senses  of  smell,  hearing,  and  taste,  give  rise  to  sen- 
sations only;  touch  is  in  every  case  a  union  of  sensation  and  perception; 
while  sight  holds  an  intermediate  and  doubtful  position,  as  informing  us 
of  the  existence  of  extension,  but  only  in  two  dimensions  of  space.    Sir 
W.  Hamilton,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  that  the  general  consciousness  of 
the  locality  of  a  sensorial  affection  ought  to  be  regarded  as  a  Perception 
proper;  and,  in  accordance  with  this  view,  he  has  announced  the  import- 
ant law,  that  Sensation  and  Perception,  though  always  coexistent,  are,  as 
regards  their  intensity,  always  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  each  other.    Some 
recent  French  philosophers,  influenced  by  the  union  of  physiological  with 
psychological  researches,  have  employed  the  term  Perception  in  another 
sense,  to  denote  Sensation  with  Consciousness,  Sensation  being  extended 
to  those  affections  of  the  nervous  organism  of  which  we  are  not  conscious. 
This  occurs  in  the  writings  of  Maine  de  Biran,  and  appears  to  have  misled 
M.  Ravaisson  into  imagining  that  that  philosopher  had  anticipated  the 
above-mentioned  law  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton.     The  passage  alluded  to  is 
apparently  one  in  the  Essai  mtr  la  decomposition  de  la  Pen&^e,  p.  116,  but 


faculty,  the   criterion   above  given   as   characteristic  of 
Thought  requires  a  few  words  of  explanation. 

Imagination,  regarded  as  a  product,  may  be  defined,  the 
consciousness  of  an  image  in  the  mind  resembling  and  rep- 
resenting an  object  of  intuition.*  It  is  thus  at  the  same 
time  presentative  and  representative.  It  is  presentative 
of  the  image  which  has  its  own  distinct  existence  in  con- 
sciousness, irrespective  of  its  relation  to  the  object  which 
it  is  supposed  to  represent.  It  is  representative  of  the  ob- 
ject which  that  image  resembles ;  and  such  resemblance  is 
only  possible  on  the  condition  that  the  image  be,  like  the 
object,  individual.    If  we  try  to  form  in  oiir  minds  the 


the  resemblance  is  merely  verbal.    A  nearer  anticipation  may  perhaps  bo 
found  in  Kant,  Anthropologie,  ^  20. 

In  the  text,  Perception  is  employed  to  denote  all  those  states  of  Con 
sdousness  which  are  presentative  only,  not  representative.  It  will  thus 
include  all  intuitions  except  those  of  Imagination,  and  may  be  divided 
into  external  or  sensitive,  and  internal;  the  former  corresponding  to  the 
Perception  of  Reid.  This  use  of  the  term,  allowance  being  made  for  a 
different  theory  of  external  Perception,  accords  with  that  of  Kant. 

1  This  is  the  ordinary  psychological  sense  of  Imagination ;  however 
variously  the  term  may  have  been  employed  in  reference  to  poetry,  and 
generally  to  the  philosophy  of  taste.  It  corresponds  with  the  definition 
given  by  Descartes  (Meditatio  Secunda),  **  irnaginari  nihUaliud  est  quam  ret 
corporea  figuram  seu  imaginem  contanplari ; "  except  that  the  latter  is  incor- 
rectly limited  to  the  reproduction  of  objects  of  sight  only.  The  beautiful 
lines  of  Shelley  furnish  an  exact  description  of  imagination  relatively  to 
two  other  senses : 

"  Moffic,  when  soft  voices  die, 

Vibrates  in  the  memory; 

Odors,  when  sweet  violets  sicken, 

Live  within  tlie  sense  they  quicken.** 

But  the  operation  of  the  imaginative  faculty  must  not  be  confined  even 
to  the  general  field  of  sensations.  The  important  question,"  How  many 
presentative  faculties  has  man?  will  be  referred  to  again.  The  province 
of  imagination  will  be  determined  by  the  answer  to  this  question,  as  every 
original  presentation  may  Ijc  represented  in  a  phantasm. 

3 


:'/ 


26 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


2T 


4 


}  ^ 


•  I 


image  of  a  triangle,  it  must  be  of  some  individual  figure, 
equilateral,  isosceles,  or  scalene.  It  is  impossible  that  it 
should  be  at  the  same  time  all  of  these,  or  none.  It  may 
bear  more  or  less  resemblance  to  the  object  which  it  repre- 
sents ;  but  it  can  attain  resemblance  at  all  only  by  being, 
like  the  object  itself,  individual.  I  may  recall  to  mind, 
with  more  or  less  vividness,  the  features  of  an  absent 
friend,  as  I  may  paint  his  portrait  with  more  or  less  ac- 
curacy ;  but  the  likeness  in  neither  case  ceases  to  be  the 
individual  representation  of  an  individual  man.  But  my 
notion  of  Man  in  general  can  attain  universality  only 
by  surrendering  resemblance.  It  becomes  the  indifferent 
representative  of  all  mankind  only  in  so  far  as  it  has  no 
special  likeness  to  any  one.  It  is  thus  not  the  adequate 
and  actual  representative  of  any  single  object,  but  an  in- 
adequate and  potential  representative  of  many;  that  is, 
it  may  in  different  acts  of  thought  be  employed  in  relation 
to  distinct,  and  in  some  respects  dissimilar,  individuals  of 
the  same  class.  From  this  neglect  of  individual  charac- 
teristics arises  the  first  distinguishing  feature  of  a  concept ; 
viz.  that  it  cannot  in  itself  be  depicted  to  sense  or  imagina" 
tion}  It  is  not  the  sensible  image  of  one  object,  but  an 
intelligible  relation  between  many. 

A  second  important  characteristic  of  all  concepts  is,  that 
they  require  to  be  fixed  in  a  representative  sign.  This 
characteristic  cannot  indeed  be  determined  a  jyriori,  from 
the  mere  notion  of  the  concept  as  universal,  but  it  may  be 
proved  to  a  moral  certainty  a  posteriori,  by  the  inability 
of  which  in  practice  every  man  is  conscious,  of  advancing, 
without  the  aid  of  symbols,  beyond  the  individual  objects 
of  sense  or  imagination.  In  the  presence  of  several  indi- 
viduals of  the  same  species,  the  eye  may  observe  points  of 

1  Cf.  Hamilton  on  Reid,  p.  360. 


similarity  between  them ;  and  in  this  no  symbol  is  needed ; 
but  every  feature  thus  observed  is  the  distinct  attribute  of 
a  distinct  individual,  and,  however  similar,  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  identical.  B^or  example:  I  see  lying  on  the 
table  before  me  a  number  of  shillings  of  the  same  coinage. 
Examined  severally,  the  image  and  superscription  of  each 
is  undistinguishable  from  that  of  its  fellow ;  but,  in  view- 
in<^  them  side  by  side,  space  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
my  perception ;  and  the  difference  of  locality  is  sufficient 
to  make  them  distinct,  though  similar,  individuals.^  The 
same  is  the  case  with  any  representative  image,  w^hether 
in  a  mirror,  in  a  painting,  or  in  the  imagination,  waking 
or  dreaming.  It  can  only  be  depicted  as  occupying  a  cer- 
tain place ;  and  thus  as  an  individual  and  the  representa- 
tive of  an  individual.  It  is  true  that  I  cannot  say  that  it 
represents  this  particular  coin  rather  than  that ;  and  con- 
sequently it  may  be  considered  as  the  representative  of 
all,  successitfelg  but  not  simultaneously.  To  find  a  repre- 
sentative which  shall  embrace  all  at  once,  I  must  divest  it 
of  the  condition  of  occupying  space ;-  and  this,  experience 
assures  us,  can  only  be  done  by  means  of  symbols,  verbal 
or  other,  by  which  the  concept  is  fixed  in  the  understand- 
ing. Such,  for  example,  is  a  verbal  description  of  the  coin 
in  question,  which  contains  a  collection  of  attributes  freed 
from  the  condition  of  locality,  and  hence  from  all  resem- 
blance to  an  object  of  sense.  If  we  substitute  Time  for 
Space,  the  same  remarks  will  be  equally  applicable  to  the 
objects  of  our  internal  consciousness.  Every  appetite  and 
desire,  every  affection  and  volition,  as  presented,  is  an  in- 

"H  '  On  this  ground  Kant  refutes  Leibnitz's  principle  of  the  identity  of  in- 

disceniablts,  a  principle  applicable  to  concepts,  but  not  to-objects  of  intu- 


ition. 


Compare  Ilcrbart,  Psychologic  oLs  Wissenschafl,  §  120.    Werke^  vl.  p.  163. 


28 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGIOA. 


29 


It 


dividual  state  of  consciousness,  distinguished  from  every 
other  by  its  relation  to  a  different  period  of  time.  States 
in  other  respects  exactly  similar  may  succeed  one  another 
at  regular  intervals ;  but  the  hunger  which  I  feel  to-day  is 
an  individual  feeling,  as  numerically  distinct  from  that 
which  I  felt  yesterday,  or  that  which  I  shall  feel  to-mor- 
row, as  a  shilling  lying  in  my  pocket  is  from  a  similar 
shilling  lying  at  the  bank.  Whereas  my  notion  of  hunger, 
or  fear,  or  volition,  is  a  general  concept,  having  no  relation 
to  one  period  of  time  rather  than  to  another,  and,  as  such, 
requires,  like  other  concepts,  a  representative  sign. 

r-  Language,  taking  the  word  in  its  widest  sense,  is  thus 
indispensable,  not  merely  to  the  communication,  but  to 
the  formation  of  Thought.  This  doctrine  is  not  unfre- 
quently  estimated  as  the  correlative  or  consequent  of  that 
which  derives  all  knowledge  from  sensation;  an  estimate 
apparently  warranted  by  the  association  of  the  two  theories 
in  the  philosophy  of  Condillac.  But  it  would  not  be 
difficult  to  show  that  the  ultra-sensational  j)hilosophy  is 
that  which  could  most  easily  dispense  with  the  necessity 
of  introducing  language  at  all.  Ideas,  says  Condillac,  are 
but  transformed  sensations ;  and  his  disciple,  Destutt  do 
Tracy,  has  earned  the  doctrine  to  its  fullest  development 
in  the  aphorism  penser  c^est  sentir.  But  who  imagines 
language  to  be  essential  to  sensation  ?  Or  who  does  not 
see  that  the  introduction  of  such  an  instrument  for  the 
purpose  of  transforming  our  sensations  implies  the  exist- 
ence of  a  mental  power  which  mere  sensation  can  never 
confer?  It  is  only  on  the  supposition  that  the  concept  is 
something  distinct  from  and  unlike  all  the  products  of  the 
senses,  that  the  representative  symbol  becomes  necessary. 
Sensation,  imagination,  and  memoiy,  so  far  as  the  latter  ia 


distinct  from  thought,*  may  dispense  with  its  assistance. 
As  for  the  crowning  extravagance  of  Home  Tooke,  who 
tells  us  that  what  are  called  operations  of  mind  are  merely 
operations  of  language,  we  have  only  to  ask,  what  makes 
language  operate  ?  It  might  as  reasonably  be  maintained 
that  a  coat  is  not  the  work  of  the  tailor,  but  merely  of  his 
needle.  But  it  is  the  perpetual  error  of  the  sensational 
school  to  confound  the  indispensable  condition  of  a  thing 
with  the  thing  itself.  Thought  is  not  sensation,  though 
the  exercise  of  the  senses  is  a  necessary  preliminary  to  that 
of  the  undei-standing.  Science  is  not  a  well-constructed 
language,  as  the  skill  of  the  painter  is  not  indeutical  with 
the  goodness  of  his  brushes  and  colors ;  yet  we  must 
acknowledge  that  the  power  of  the  artist  could  neither 
have  been  acquired  nor  exhibited,  had  these  necessary 
implements  been  withheld. 

The  above  view  of  the  relation  of  thought  to  language 
is  sometimes  met  by  the  following  dilemma.  "  Language, 
you  say,  is  essential  to  thought ;  yet  language  itself,  if  not 
of  divine  origin,  must  have  been  thought  out  by  man. 
You  must,  therefore,  be  prepared  to  defend  in  its  utmost 
rigor  the  hypothesis  of  a  supernatural  origin  of  speech;  or 
you  mast  allow  that  its  inventor,  at  least,  was  a  man 
capable   of  thinking  without  its  aid."^     To  solve    this 

'  So  far,  namely,  as  it  corresponds  to  the  mi^ahi,  not  to  the  iLyifiv7j<ris 
of  Aristotle.  The  neglect  of  this  distinction  led  Condillac  to  deny  that 
brutes  have  any  raemory,  since  they  are  destitute  of  language.  Aristotle, 
with  more  accuracy,  allows  that  memory  is  common  to  men  and  brutes, 
but  reminiscence  peculiar  to  the  former.    See  De  Memoria,  ch.  2,  ^  25. 

*  See  Rousseau,  Discours  stir  Vorigitie  de  Vin€galil€  parmi  les  hommet. 
Premiere  Partie.  "  Franchissons  pour  un  moment  Tespace  immense  qui 
dut  se  trouver  entre  le  pur  etat  de  nature  et  Ic  besoin  des  langues ;  et  cher- 
cbons,  en  les  supposant  n^c^saires,  comment  ellcs  pnrent  commencer  li 
s'e'tablir.     Nouvellc  difficultd  pire  cncoM2  que  la  pr^^dente:   car  si  les 

8* 


II 


30 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


dilemma,  we  need  not  call  in  aid  the  curious  hypothesis 

of  Condillac,  who  held  that  the  dependence  of  thought 

on  sensation   (and   by  implication   on   language)   was   a 

consequence  of  the  fall  of  Adam ;  we  need  only  observe 

what  actually  takes  place  in  the  formation  of  lanjrua^-e 

and  thought  among  ourselves.    To  the  child  learning  to 

speak,  words  are  not  the  signs  of  thoughts,  but  of  intuitions; 

the  words  man  and  horse  do  not  represent  a  collection 

of  attributes,  but  are  only  the  jiame  of  the  individual  now 

before  him.    It  is  not  until  the  name  has  bee'n  successively 

appropriated  to  various  individuals,  that  reflection  begins 

to  inquire  into  the  common  features  of  the  class.^    Lan- 

guage,  therefore,  as  taught  to  the  infant,  is  chronologically 

prior  to  thought  and  posterior  to  sensation.     In  inquiring 

how  far  the  same  process  can  account  for  the  invention 

of  language,  which  now  takes  place  in  the  learning  it,  the 

real  question  at  issue  is  simply  this :  Is  the  act  of  mvmcr 

names  to  individual  objects  of  sense  a  thing  so  completely 

beyond  the  power  of  man,  created  in  the  full  maturity 

of  his  faculties,  that  we  must  suppose  a  divine  Instructor 

performing  precisely  the  same  oflice  as  is  now  performed 

for  the  infant  by  his  mother  or  his  nurse;  teaching"  him. 

that  is,  to  associate  this  sound  with   this  sight?    This 

question  may  be  answered  afiirmatively  or  negatively,  but 

in  either  case  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  relation  of 

language  to  thought,  properly  so  called.* 

hommes  ont  eu  besoin  do  la  parole  pour  apprcndre  k  penscr,  lis  ont  eu 
bien  plus  besoin  encore  de  savoir  penser  pour  trouver  I'art  de  la  parole." 

1  See  Adam  Smith's  Considerations  concerning  the  first  Formation  of  Lan* 
guages,  appended  to  his  Theory  of  Moral  Sentitnents. 

>  On  this  subject,  the  following  remarks  of  Maine  de  Biran  are  well 
worthy  of  attention:  "Pour  que  ces  premiers  signes  donnas  devlcnnent 
quelque  chose  pour  Tindividu  qui  s'en  sert,  11  faut  qu'ilMes  institue  lui- 
mfime  une  seconde  fois  par  son  activity  propre,  oo  qu'U  y  attache  on  aens. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


31 


In  relation  to  this  question,  the  reader  must  be  careful 
not  to  confuse  Language  with  Articulations,  The  case 
of  the  deaf  and  dumb,  so  often  quoted  as  an  instance 
of  thought  without  language,  is  in  this  respect  utterly 
irrelevant.  The  education  of  these  persons  consists  in  the 
substitution  of  a  system  of  signs  addressed  to  the  eye 
or  the  hand  in  the  place  of  one  addressed  to  the  ear. 
This  system  performs  precisely  the  same  oflice  in  relation 
to  them  that  speech  pei-forms  in  the  ordinary  mental 
development  of  children :  it  constitutes,  in  fact,  their 
language.  They  are  thus  in  no  respect  an  exceptional 
case;  and  the  whole  question  has  to  be  considered  on 
general,  not  on  special  data.  I  cannot  perceive  any  other 
man's  thoughts  as  they  pass  in  his  mind :  I  can  only  infer 
their  existence  by  perceptible  signs ;  and  this  presupposes 
an  established  system  of  communication.  The  only  valid 
method  of  investigating  the  relation  between  thought  and 
speech  is  to   examine  the  only  instances  in  which  both 


Ceux  qui  pensent  que  Thommc  n'eflt  pu  jamais  inventer  le  langage,  si  Dieu 
meme  ne  le  lui  cfit  donnd  ou  r^vele,  ne  me  semblcnt  pas  bien  entendre  la 
question  do  I'institution  du  langagc:  ils  confondent  sans  cessc  le  fond  avec 
les  formes.  Supposd  que  Dico  efit  donne  a  I'hommc  une  langue  touto 
faite  ou.un  systemo  parfait  de  signes  articulcs  ou  ecrits  propres  a  expri- 
mer  toutes  ses  idecs :  il  s'agissait  toujours  pour  I'homme,  d'attribuer  2t 
chaque  signe  sa  valour  ou  son  sons  propre,  c'est-iMlire  d'institucrvcritable- 
ment  ce  signe  avec  une  intention  ct  dans  un  but  con9u  par  I'etre  intelli- 
gent, de  memo  que  I'enfant  institue  les  premiers  signes  qunnd  il  trans- 
forme  les  oris  qui  lui  sont  donnes  par  la  nature  en  vc'ritables  signes  de 
reclame. 

"  La  difflcultc  du  problbme  psychologique,  qui  conslste  a  de'terminer  les 
facultes  qui  ont  dd  concourir  a  institution  du  premier  langage,  subsiste 
done  la  memo,  solt  que  les  signes  qui  sont  la  forme  et  comme  le  mate- 
riel de  ce  langage  aient  ^te'  donnes  ou  re've'Ie's  par  la  supreme  intelligence, 
Boit  qu'ils  aient  6x^  inventes  par  Thomroe  ou  sugg^rds  par  les  idecs  ou  les 
sentimens  dont  ils  sont  rexprcssion." — NouveUes  Considerations  sur  les  rap' 
ports  du  physique  et  du  moral  de  Vhomme,  p.  93. 


82 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


* 


ji  ■' 


elements  are  presented,  the  operations  of  my  own  con- 
sciousness. Accepting  what  is  there  given  in  combination, 
I  must  endeavor  by  analysis  to  ascertain  how  much  of 
the  compound  phenomenon  is  necessary,  and  how  much 
accidental. 

The  concept,  as  thus  described,  is  the  charactenstic 
feature  of  Thought  j)roppr,  as  distinguished  from  other 
facts  of  consciousness:  and  the  thinking  process  may  be 
adequately  defined  as  the  act  of  knowinf/  or  judglnfj  of 
things  by  means  of  concejyts}  It  remains  to  inquire  what, 
according  to  this  definition,  must  be  the  limits  within 
which  Thought  is  operative,  and  what,  consequently,  will 
be  the  distinguishing  character  of  its  laws. 

Thought  is  only  operative  within  the  field  of  possible 
experience ;  i,  e.,  upon  such  objects  as  can  be  presented  in 
an  actual  intuition  or  represented  in  an  imaginary  one. 
For  the  concept  is  the  result  of  data  furnished  by  intui- 
tion ;  and  its  legitimacy,  as  an  object  of  thought,  must  be 
tested  by  reference  to  the  same  data.  It  is  true  that  the 
concept  itself,  as  such,  cannot  be  presented  intuitively ; 
but  it  must  contain  no  attribute  which  is  incompatible 
with  the  intuitive  presentation  of  its  object.  The  concept 
is  not  itself  individual,  but  it  must  comprehend'  such 
attributes  as  are  capable  of  individualization,  such  as  can 
coexist  in  an  object  of  intuition.     The  notion  of  a  triangle, 


1  "  Der  Tcrstand  iibcrhaupt  kann  als  ein  VermoRen  zu  arthcilen  vor- 
gpstellt  werden.  Denn  cr  ist  nach  dcm  Obigen  ein  Vermo|^en  zu  denkcn. 
Dcnkcn  ist  das  Erkenntniss  durch  Bej^iffc"  Kant,  Kritik  der  rein.  Vem, 
(p.  70).  An  exact  adherent  of  Kant  would  regard  the  definition  jpven  in 
the  text  as  tautological;  for  with  him  the  provinces  of  Thought  and  Judg- 
ment arc  coextensive,  and  all  judgment  requires  concepts.  Bo^  as  in  the 
following  remarks  the  province  of  judgment  is  extended  beyond  that  of 
thought,  the  limitation  becomes  necessary. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


33 


as  a  rectilinear  figure  of  three  sides,  does  not  itself  contain 
the  attributes  of  equilateral,  isosceles,  or  scalene ;  but  it  is 
capable  of  being  combined  with  any  one  of  the  three  in  a 
perceived  or  imagined  figure.  But  a  rectilinear  figure  of 
two  sides  is,  by  the  application  of  the  same  test,  shown 
to  be  no  concept  at  all.  So  long  as  we  merely  unite  the 
attnbutes  in  speech,  without  attempting  to  combine  them 
in  an  individual  object,  we  may  not  be  aware  that  we  are 
talking  nonsense ;  the  attempt  to  imagine  the  figure  shows 
at  once  the  incompatibility  of  the  attributes.  This,  then, 
is  the  criterion  of  positive  thinking.  A  form  of  words, 
uniting  attributes  not  presentable  in  an  intuition,  is  not 
the  sign  of  a  thought,  but  of  the  negation  of  all  thinking. 
Conception  must  thus  be  carefully  distinguished,  as  well 
from  mei-e  imagination,  as  from  a  mere  understanding 
of  the  meaning  of  words.*  Combinations  of  attributes 
logically  impossible  may  be  expressed  in  language  per- 
fectly intelligible.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  understanding 
the  meaning  of  the  i)hrase  bilinear  figure,  or  iron-gold. 
The  language  is  intelligible,  though  the  object  is  incon- 
ceivable. On  the  other  hand,  though  all  conception 
implies  imagination,  yet  all  imagination  does  not  imply 
conception.  To  have  a  valid  conception  of  a  horse,  I 
must  not  only  know  the  meaning  of  the  several  attributes 
constituting  tlie  definition  of  the  animal,  but  I  must  also 
be  able  to  combine  those  attributes  in  a  representative  * 

'  These  have  been  confounded  by  others  besides  Rcid.  Tims  Aldrich, 
after  defining  Simple  Apprehension  as  rkudus  rei  conceptus  inidlectivus,  pro- 
ceeds: "Si  quis  dixerit  Trianijidum  aquilaterum  esse  aqmavgidum^  possum 
Apprehensione  Siraplici  incomplexa  intelligere  quid  sibi  vclint  singula 
Orationis  hujus  vocabula."  Apprehension  iu  this  sense  is  not  a  logical 
process  at  all,  and  is  not  governed  by  any  of  the  laws  of  logical  thinking. 
~  Cf.  Hamilton  on  Reid,  p.  377. 


84 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


f 


image;  that  is,  to  individualize  them.     Tliis,  however,  is 
not   mere  imagination,  it  is  imagination   relatively  to  a 
concept.     I  not  only  see  as  it  were  the  image  with  the 
-mind's  eye,  but  I  also  think  of  it  as  a  horse,  as  possessing 
the  attributes  of  a  given  concept,  and  called  by  a  name 
expressive  of  them.      But  mere    imagination   is  possible 
without  any  such  relation.     Without  any  effort  to  recall 
an  object  by  means  of  its  distinctive  attributes,  I  may 
be  passively  conscious  of  the  continuance,  in   a  weaker 
state,  of  a  sensible  or  otherwise  intuitive  impression,  when 
the  object  which  gave  rise  to  it  is  no  longer  present.    This 
is  the  Imagination  which  is  described  by  Aristotle  as  a 
ki7ul  of  ipcaJc  seiisation,^  and   as  sensitive   imagination} 
When  coupled  with  a  consciousness  of  the  past  existence 
of  the  impression  which  it  represents,  it  forms  the  Memory, 
as  distinguished  from  the  i?emtwi5cence,  of  Aristotle;^  This 
kind  of  imagination  does  not  in  itself  involve  a  distinction 
or  comparison  of  presentations :  it  is  compatible  with  an 
ignorance  or  forgetfulness  of  the  existence  of  any  presen- 
tations, save  the  one  represented  by  the  image.     Concep- 
tion, on  the  other  hand,  in  its  lowest  degree,  implies  at 
least   a    comparison    and    distinction   of  this   from   tlmt. 
When  exhibited,  as  for  its  ultimate  verification  it  must 
be,  in  the  construction  of  an  individual  image  answering 
to  the  general  notion,  it  is  still  an  act  of  thought,  rather 
than  of  intuition ;  and  when  coupled  with  the  conscious 
effort  to    recall    a  past   impression,  it   answera    in   some 
degree  to  the  Reminiscence  of  Aristotle.* 


1  Bhct.  I.  11.  J  De  Animn,  III.  11.  8  pg  Menuma,  c.  1. 

***  The  Understandlnjr,  thonfxht  proper,  notion,  concept,  etc.,  may  coin- 
cide or  not  with  Imaj^ination,  representation  proper,  iinajro,  etc.  The  two 
faculties  do  not  coincide  in  a  general  notion;  for  we  cannot  represent  Man 
or  Horso  in  an  actual  image  without  individualizing  the  universal;  and 


M 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


35 


Conception,  where  it  does  not  coincide  with  imagination, 
implies  imagination  as  the  test  of  its  validity.  To  form 
the  notion  of  a  class  as  distinguished  from  an  individual,  I 
must  emancipate  the  attributes  of  which  I  am  conscious 
from  their  connection  with  a  definite  time  and  place,  and 
this,  as  has  been  already  observed,  requires  the  intervention 
of  language.  The  consciousness  of  a  general  notion  is  thus 
an  instance  of  sgmbolical  as  distinguished  from  intuitive 
knowledge  ;*  and  the  act  of  Conception,  viewed  apart  from 
Imagination,  could  only  consist  in  the  enumeration,  by 
means  of  verbal  or  other  symbols,  of  the  different  parts 
constituting  a  given  notion.*    But  the  symbol,  though  in- 


thas  contradiction  emerges.  But  In  the  individual,  say  Socrates  or  Bu- 
cephalus, they  do  coincide ;  for  I  see  no  valid  ground  why  we  should  not 
think f  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  or  conceive  the  individuals  which  we 
reprefmt.*'—  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  13.  The  Reminiscence  of 
Aristotle  will  include  this  kind  of  imagination  under  it,  as  the  last  step  of 
the  process. 

1  This  distinction  is  due  to  Leibnitz.  Sec  his  Meditationes  de  Cognitione, 
Veritate,  et  Ida's,  Opera,  ed.  Erdmann,  p.  79. 

*  "  In  cognitione  symholica  prima  mentis  operatio  ahsdvitur  recensione  vocah- 
ulorum,  vd  aliorum  signorum,  qitibus  ea  indigitantur  qtue  notionem  rei  distinc- 
tam  ingrediuntur.  Etcnim  in  cognitione  symbolica  tantummodo  verbis 
ennnciamus  quae  in  idcis  continentur,  vel  aliis  signis  eadcm  rcprasscuta- 
mus,  ideas  vero  ipsas  verbis  aut  signis  aliis  indigitatas  non  intucmur. 
Quare  cum  in  cognitione  intuitiva  prima  mentis  operatio  absolvatur  si 
attentionem  successive  in  idea  rei  ad  ea  dirigimus  quae  notionem  distinc- 
tam  generis  vel  speciei  ingrediuntur,  singula  autem  haec  enunciabilia  sint, 
adeoquo  vocabulis  vel  signis  aliis  indigituri  possint;  in  cognitione  symbol- 
ica prima  mentis  operatio  absolvi  debet  recensione  voca])ulorum,  vel  rep- 
raesentatione  aliorum  signorum,  quibus  ea  dcnotantur,  quae  notionem  rei 
distinctam  ingrediuntur.  Ito  prima  mentis  operatio  in  cognitione  symbol- 
ica arboris  absolvitur,  si  dicimus  vegitabile,  quod  ex  trunco,  ramis,  surcu- 
lis  ct  foliis  constat;  etcnim  sigillatim  rccensemus  verba  quibus  ea  indigi- 
tantur quae  in  arboribus  tanquam  communia  distinguimus,  conscquenter 
quae  notionem  arboris  in  genere,  quatenus  distincta  est,  ingrediuntur. 
Non  autem  jam  nobis  quocstio  est,  utrum  notio  distincta  sit  completa 


It 


86 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


87 


dispensable  as  an  instrument  of  thought,  lends  itself  with 
equal  facility  to  every  combination,  and  thus  furnishes  no 
criterion  by  which  we  can  distinguish  between  sense  and 
nonsense,  between  the  conceivable  and  the  inconceivable. 
A  round  square,  or  a  bilinear  JigurCy  is,  as  a  form  of 
speech,  quite  as  possible  as  a  straight  line^  or  an  equilateral 
triangle.  The  mere  juxtaposition  of  words  does  not  indi- 
cate the  possibility  or  impossibility  of  the  corresponding 
notion,  until  we  attempt  to  construct  in  imagination  an  in- 
dividual object  in  accordance  with  it.  Till  this  criterion  is 
applied,  the  act  of  conception  is  rather  a  substitute  for 
consciousness  than  a  mode  of  consciousness  itself.  The 
sign  is  substituted  for  the  thing  signified ;  a  step  which 
considerably  facilitates  the  performance  of  complex  opera- 
tions of  thought,  but  in  the  same  proportion  endangers  the 
logical  accuracy  of  each  successive  step ;  since  we  do  not, 
in  each,  stop  to  verify  our  signs.  Words,  as  thus  employed, 
resemble  algebraical  symbols,  which,  during  the  process  of 
a  long  calculation,  we  combine  in  various  relations  to  each 
other,  without  at  the  moment  thinking  of  the  original  sig- 
nification assigned  to  each.  But  those  who,  on  this  ac- 
count, would  reduce  the  whole  of  thouijht  to  an  algebraical 
computation,  overlook  the  most  important  feature,  the  ver- 
ification, namely,  of  the  result,  according  to  the  logical 
conditions  of  conception,  after  the  algebraical  j)rocess  is 
finished.  It  may  be  convenient,  in  the  course  of  a  compli- 
c:ited  reasoning,  to  assume  the  logical  accuracy  of  the  sub- 

atqnc  dctcrminata,  ntqnc  oratlone  ista  tallu  notio  sl^iflcctnr,  nt  hrec  defl- 
niilonis  loio  inservire  possit.  Suffloit  enim  hie  ea  gigillatini  enanclarl 
qua;  inentc  ab  idea  rei  separantur,  dura  distincte  nobw  genus  vcl  spcclem 
repriescntare  conamur.  Pundet  enim  co;^iiio  symbolica  ab  intuitlva, 
quam  supponit  et  ad  quam  rcfcrtur.  Quicquid  ij^itur  huic  dccst,  idem 
etiam  illi  deessc  debet."— Wolf,  Psycholofjia  Empiriva,  4  3Q8. 


ordinate  parts,  and  to  employ  their  respective  symbols  on 
this  assumption.  But  what  the  concept  gains  in  flexibility 
it  loses  in  distinctness;  and  the  logical  and  algebraical 
perfections  are  thus  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  each  other.  It 
therefore  becomes  necessary,  at  the  end  of  the  process,  to 
submit  the  result  to  the  logical  test,  to  which  each  step  has 
been  tacitly  supposed  to  conform ;  that  of  the  possible  co- 
existence of  the  several  attributes  in  an  individual  object.^ 

The  above  remarks  will  necessitate  some  modification 
of  the  doctrines  ordinarily  taught  in  logical  treatises  con- 
cerning general  notions,  or,  as  they  are  commonly  though 
not  very  happily  called,  abstract  ideas.  We  are  told  that 
the  mind  examines  a  number  of  individual  objects,  agree- 
ing in  some  features  and  diflfering  in  others,  that  it  sepa- 
rates the  points  in  which  they  agree  from  those  in  which 
they  diflfer,  and  makes,  of  the  former  only,  an  abstract  idea 
or  general  notion,  which  is  indiflTerently  applicable  to  all 
the  individuals  *from  which  it  was  derived,  and  by  virtue 
of  which  they  are  all  called  by  a  common  name. 

The  reality  of  this  process  of  Abstraction,*  and  of  the 

1 "  Plerumque,  praesertim  in  analjsi  lonfflore,  non  totam  simul  natnram 
rei  intuemur,  sed  rerura  loco  signis  utimur,  quorum  explicationem  in  pr«- 
senti  aliqua  cogitatione  compendii  causa  solemus  praetermittere,  scientes, 
aut  credentes  nos  earn  habere  in  potestate:  ita  cum  chiliogonum,  sen  poly- 
gonum milie  sequalium  laterum  cogito,  non  semper  naturam  lateris,  et 
aequalitatis,  et  millcnarii  (seu  cub!  a  denario)  considero,  sed  vocabulis  istis 
(quorum  sensu  obscure  saltem.  atque  imperfecte  menti  obversatur)  in 
animo  utor  loco  ideamm,  quas  de  lis  habeo,  quoniam  mcmini  me  significa- 
tlonem  istorum  vocabulorum  habere,  explicationem  autem  nunc  judico 
necessariam  non  esse;  qualem  cogitationem  caecam,  vel  etiam  symbolicara 
appellaro  soleo,  qua  et  in  Algebra,  et  in  Arithmetica  utimur,  imo  fere 
Ubique/'—  Leibnitz,  Meditationes  de  Cognitione,  Veritate  el  Idris. 

*  Drobisch  observes  that  the  term  Abstraction  is  used  sometimes  In  a 
psychological,  sometimes  in  a  logical  sense.  In  the  former,  we  are  said 
to  abstract  the  attention  fh)m  certain  distinctive  features  of  objects  pr«- 


I 

1. 


38 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


|ii 


•    'ii 


idea  to  which  it  is  supposed  to  give  rise,  has  been  matter 
of  considerable  controversy  among  modern  philosophers. 
Bishop  Berkeley,  and  subsequently  Hume,  denied  alto- 
gether the  possibility  of  such  an  operation,  on  the  following 
gi'ounds.  The  general  idea  of  a  triangle,  it  was  argued  by 
Locke,^  is  an  imperfect  idea,  wherein  parts  of  several  differ- 
ent and  inconsistent  ideas  are  put  together.  As  limited  to 
no  particular  kind  of  triangle,  but  comprehending  all,  it 
must  be  neither  oblique,  nor  rectangle,  neither  equilateral, 
equicrural,  nor  scalene,  but  all  and  none  of  these  at  once. 
The  abstract  idea,  as  thus  described,  Berkeley  easily  per- 
ceived to  be  self-contradictory,  and  the  doctrine  suicidal. 
"  I  have  a  faculty,"  he  says,  **  of  imagining  or  representing 
to  myself  the  ideas  of  those  particular  things  I  have  per- 
ceived, and  of  variously  compounding  and  dividing  them. 
I  can  imagine  a  man  with  two  heads,  or  the  upper  parts  of 
a  man  joined  to  the  body  of  a  horse.  I  can  consider  the 
hand,  the  eye,  the  nose,  each  by  itself,  abstracted  or  sepa- 
rated from  the  rest  of  the  body.  But  then,  whatever  hand 
or  eye  I  imagine,  it  must  have  some  particular  shape  and 
color.  Likewise  the  idea  of  man  that  I  frame  to  myself; 
must  be  either  of  a  white,  or  a  black,  or  a  tawny,  a  straight 
or  a  crooked,  a  tall  or  a  low,  or  a  middle-sized  man.  To 
be  plain,  I  own  myself  able  to  abstract  in  one  sense,  as 
when  I  consider  some  particular  parts  or  qualities  separa- 
ted from  others,  with  which  though  they  are  united  in 
some  object,  yet  it  is  possible  they  may  really  exist  without 


Rented  {abstrahere  a  differentih).  In  the  latter,  we  are  said  to  abstract  cer- 
tain portions  of  a  given  concept  from  the  remainder  (abstrahert*  differentias). 
The  former  sense  must  be  understood  here,  where  we  are  considering  the 
mental  process  by  which  concepts  are  formed.  To  the  latter,  as  a  con- 
scious process  of  thought,  the  following  remarks  do  not  apply. 
1  Es9ay,  book  It.  ch.  7,  §  9. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


39 


them.  But  I  deny  that  I  can  abstract  one  from  another, 
or  conceive  separately,  those  qualities  which  it  is  impossi- 
ble should  exist  so  separated ;  or  that  I  can  frame  a  gen- 
eral notion  by  abstracting  from  particulars  in  the  manner 
aforesaid."* 

**  It  is,  I  know,*'  continues  the  Bishop, "  a  point  much  in- 
sisted on,  that  all  knowledge  and  demonstration  are  about 
universal  notions,  to  which  I  fully  agree :  but  then  it  doth 
not  appear  to  me  that  those  notions  are  formed  by  abstrac- 
tion in  the  manner  premised  ;  universality,  so  fiir  as  I  can 
comprehend,  not  consisting  in  the  absolute,  positive  nature 
or  conception  of  anything,  but  in  the  relation  it  bears  to 
the  particulars  signified  or  represented  by  it :  by  virtue 
whereof  it  is  that  things,  names,  or  notions,  being  in  their 
own  nature  particular,  are  rendered  universal.  Thus  when 
I  demonstrate  any  proposition  concerning  triangles,  it  is  to 
be  supposed  that  I  have  in  view  the  universal  idea  of  a 
triangle  ;  which  ought  not  to  be  understood  as  if  I  could 
frame  an  idea  of  a  triangle  which  was  neither  equilateral, 
nor  scalene,  nor  equicrural.  But  only  that  the  i)articular 
triangle  I  consider,  whether  of  this  or  that  sort  it  matters 
not,  doth  equally  stand  for  and  represent  all  rectilinear  tri- 
angles whatever,  and  is  in  that  sense  universal,  .... 
Though  the  idea  I  have  in  view  whilst  I  make  the  demon- 
stration be,  for  instance,  that  of  an  isosceles  rectangular 
triangle,  whose  sides  are  of  a  determinate  length,  I  may 
nevertheless  be  certain  it  extends  to  all  other  rectilinear 
triangles,  of  what  sort  or  bigness  soever;  and  that,  be- 
cause neither  the  right  angle,  nor  the  equality,  nor  deter- 
minate length  of  the  sides,  are  at  all  concerned  in  the 
demonstration.  It  is  true,  the  diagram  I  have  in  view  in- 
cludes all  these  particulars ;  but  then  there  is  not  the  least 


I 


Principles  qf  Human  Knowledge,  Introduction,  §  x. 


4« 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


41 


U 


i- 


I 

I 


mention  made  of  them  in  the  proof  of  the  proposition. .  •  • 
And  here  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  a  man  may  con- 
sider a  figure  merely  as  triangular,  without  attending  to 
the  particular  qualities  of  the  angles  or  relations  of  the 
sides.  So  far  he  may  abstract :  but  this  will  never  prove 
that  he  can  frame  an  abstract  general  inconsistent  idea  of 
a  triangle."^  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  argued  by  Reid, 
that  if  a  man  may  consider  a  figure  simply  as  triangular, 
without  attending  to  the  particular  qualities  of  the  angles 
or  relations  of  the  sides,  he  must  have  some  conception  of 
this  object  of  his  consideration  ;  for  no  man  can  consider  a 
thing  which  he  does  not  conceive.  He  has  a  conception, 
therefore,  of  a  triangular  figure,  merely  as  such ;  and  this 
is  all  that  is  meant  by  an  abstract  general  conception  of  a 
triangle.' 

In  this  controversy,  the  question  has  been  needlessly 
confused  by  the  vague  and  inaccurate  use  of  terms.  Idea 
has  been  indifferently  employed,  by  modern  philosophers, 
to  denote  the  object  of  thought,  of  imagination,  and  even 
(under  the  representative  hypothesis)  of  perception.*  Con- 
ception, again,  has  not  been  sufficiently  distinguished,  on 
the  one  side,  from  imagination,  and,  on  the  other,  fi*om  a 
mere  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  words;  and  too 
little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  office  of  language, 
both  as  a  substitute  for  consciousness,  and  as  contributing 
to  the  distinctness  of  consciousness  itself.    It  is  not  strictly 

1  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Introduction,  ^  xv.  xvl. 

'  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  v.  ch.  6. 

«  As  it  is  sometimes  convenient  to  have  a  (general  term  indifferently 
applicable  to  any  object  of  internal  consciousness,  I  have  in  the  present 
worlc  occasionally  availed  myself  in  this  extent  of  the  term  Idea,  rtycct- 
Ing,  however,  the  representative  idea  of  perception.  But  the  term  has 
been  avoided  wherever  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between  two  differeni 
states  of  coDscioosness. 


I 


coiTect  to  say  that  the  individual  alone  is  perceived  first, 
and  the  general  notion  formed  from  it  by  abstraction ;  for, 
without  the   assistance  of  the  general  notion,  the  indi- 
viduals themselves  and  their  several  parts  could  not  be  i 
distinguished  from  each  other.     If  I  am  to  form  a  general 
notion  of  man  by  examining  the  individuals  Peter,  James, 
and  John,  and  separating  the  accidents  in  which  they 
differ  from  the  essential  points  in  which  they  agree,  it  is 
clear  that  I  must  previously  have  formed  general  notions 
of  the  parts  thus  separated  from  each  other.     In  order  to 
separate,  by  an  act  of  thought,  the  figure  common  to  a 
number  of  men  from  the  accidents  of  stature,  complexion, 
etc.,  peculiar  to  each,  I  must  first  be  able  to  form  distinct 
notions  of  the  human  figure  on  the  one  side,  and  •f  the 
several  statures,  complexions,  etc.,  on  the  other.     Abstrac- 
tion thus  presupposes  conception,  no  less  than  conception 
presupposes  abstraction ;  and  we  have  still  to  learn  how 
either  process  can  be  a  preliminaiy  condition  to  the  other. 
The  fact  is,  that  our  earliest   consciousness  is  neither 
of  the  individual  discerned  as  an  individual,  nor  of  the 
universal    discerned  as  an   imiversal,  but  of  a  confused 
mixture  of  the  two,  which  it  requires  a  further  develop- 
ment of  thought  to  analyze  into  the  one  or  the  other.* 
Whatever  we  perceive  occupies  a  definite  position  in  time 
and  space ;  it  is  seen  9ioto  and  here;  so  far  it  is  an  indi- 
vidual.   But  position  in  time  and  space  does  not  constitute 
a  mark  by  which  this  individual  can  be  distinguished  from 
that ;  I  cannot  by  these  relations  alone  determine  whether 
the  object  seen  now  and  here  is  or  is  not  the  same  indi- 
vidual that  was  formerly  seen  elsewhere.    To  discern  the 
individual  as  such  or  the  universal  as  such,  I  must  by  an 

1  See  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  p.  497. 

4» 


1^- 


42 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


43 


m 


I 
I 


act  of  thought  discern  certain  attributes  as  characteristic 
of  one,  and  certain  others  as  common  to  many ;  and  this 
power  of  discernment  is  gradually  imparted  to  each  of  us 
in  practice  by  the  use  of  language,  in  which  our  earliest 
abstractions  are  given  to  us  already  made.    In  this  gradual 
formation  of  distinct  thought  from  confused  intuition,  it 
may  in  one  sense  indeed  be  said  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
class  is  prior  to  that  of  the  individual.     For  resemblances 
are  noticed  earlier  than  differences ;  ^  and  the  names  dis- 
tinctive of  individuals  are   at  first  associated  only  with 
their  general  features.    "  Children,"  says  Aristotle,  **  at  first 
call  all  men  father^  and  all  women  mother,  but  afterwards 
they  distinguish  one  person  from  another."  ^    By  degrees 
the  individual  attributes  are  discerned  and  separated  from 
the  generic ;  but  in  the  first  instance  the  name  is  applied 
to  diflTerent  objects  before  we  have  learned  to  analyze  the 
growing  powers  of  speech  and  thought,  to  ask  what  we 
mean  by  each  several  use  of  this  or  that  appellation,  and 
to  correct  and  ^x  the  signification  of  words  at  first  used 
vaguely  and  obscurely.     Such  is  the  actual  service  per- 
formed by  language  in  the  education  of  mankind  under 
the  existing  conditions  of  social  intercourse.     What  was 
the  origin  of  language  itself,  and  how  far  the  same  descrip- 
tion will  apply  to  the  mental  development  of  the  first  man, 
is  matter  rather  of  ingenious  conjecture  than  of  scientific 
explanation. 

Berkeley,  therefore,  was  clearly  right  in  denying  the 
existence  of  any  such  process  of  Abstraction  as  that 
described  by  Locke.     The  error  of  the  latter  consisted 

1  A  contrary  theory  on  this  point  is  the  source  of  most  of  the  difflcalties 
which  Rousseau  professes  to  find  in  accounting  for  the  origin  of  general 
language  from  the  names  given  to  individuals. 

>  Phui.  Atuc.  1. 1. 


1 


in  regarding  Abstraction  as  a  positive  act  of  thought, 
instead  of  the  mere  negation  of  thought.  Abstraction  is 
nothing  more  than  non-attention  to  certain  parts  of  an 
object :  we  do  not  positively  think  of  a  triangle  as  neither 
equilateral,  isosceles,  nor  scalene ;  but  we  think  of  the 
figure  as  composed  of  three  sides,  without  asking  the 
question  whether  those  sides  are  equal  or  unequal.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  Berkeley,  in  maintaining  that  all 
notions  are  in  their  own  nature  particular,  has  overlooked 
the  fact  that  thought,  and  language  as  the  instrument 
of  thought,  is  necessary  to  distinguish  the  particular  as 
particular,  no  less  than  the  univereal  as  universal ;  and 
that  we  are  thus  enabled,  partially  in  intuitive  and  wholly 
in  symbolical  cognition,  to  discern  generic  attributes,  and 
to  constitute  them  an  object  of  conception,  without  being 
conscious  of  the  particulars  by  which  they  are  accom- 
panied. Berkeley  is  right  in  denying  that  we  can  imagine 
the  universal  entirely  apart  from  the  particular,  but,  owing 
to  the  vague  significance  of  the  word  idecL,  he  seems  to 
speak  of  imagination  as  if  it  were  coextensive  with  con- 
ception. In  symbolical  cognition,  the  latter  process  may 
be  earned  on  apart  from  the  former,  subject,  however,  as 
has  been  already  observed,  to  the  condition  of  being 
tested  as  valid  or  invalid  by  the  power  of  imagining  a 
corresponding  object.  This  distinction  has  been  clearly 
indicated  by  Berkeley  in  another  of  his  works  ;^  and  perhaps 
his  whole  discussion  needs  only  a  more  exact  distinction 
between  the  perception  of  individuals  in  time  and  space 
and  the  recognition  of  them  by  their  peculiar  attributes,  to 
render  it  philosophically  unexceptionable. 

In  speaking  of  Imagination  as  the  test  of  Conception, 
we  do  not  accede  to  the  ultra-sensationalism  of  Condillac, 

1  MinuU  Philosopher,  Dial.  vii.  §  8. 


44 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


45 


j! ' 


I  '  >■ 


nor  even  to  the  modified  doctrine  of  Laromignifere,  who 
denves  from  the  senses  the  whole  matter  of  our  knowl- 
edge.     Imlwidualize  your  concepts,  does  not  mean  sensa. 
twnalhe  them,  unless  the  senses  are  the  only  sources  of 
presentation.    If  I  am  immediately  conscious,  for  example, 
of  an  exercise  of  will,  as  an  individual  act  taking  place 
Mithm  me,  the  phenomena  of  volition  become  a  distinct 
class  of  presentations,  coordinate  with,  not  subordinate  to 
those  of  the  senses,  and  capable,  like  them,  of  being  repre^ 
sented  by  the  imagination  and  thought  upon  by  the  under- 
suinding.    If  I  am  conscious  of  emotions  of  joy  or  sorrow, 
of  anger  or  fear,  existing  as  present  individual  states  of 
mmd,  distinct  from    sensible   impressions,  these,  in-  like 
manner,  must  be  considered  as  data  for  thought,  furnished 
by  intuition.    If,  on  the  perception  of  certain  individual 
acts  performed  by  myself  or  by  another,  I  am  immediately 
conscious  of  an  idea  of  riff  At  or  tcronff ;  I  have  again  a 
distmct  class  of  intuitions,  simple  and   nndefinable,  the 
laws  and  common  features  of  which  may  furnish  matter 
of  further  reflection,  but  the  existence  of  which,  as  indi- 
vidual  facts,  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  all  moral 
speculation. 

The  possibility,  therefore,  of  any  branch  of  scientific  in- 
quiry depends  upon  the  psychological  question,  JIow  many 
preventative  facultie»  lias  man  ?  >    Every  such  faculty  may 

>  In  'PeaWnff  of  .he  hnm.„  mind  as  poMOMing  .  plurality  of  facaltic, 

. «  perhaps  hardly  neccssao^  to  protest  against  the  misinterpretation  of 

this  lansuago,  as  if  It  implied  that  these  faculties  were  distinct  and  inde- 

pendent  portions  of  the  mind,  like  the  separate  member,  of  the  body. 

Su-  W.  Hamilton  (Z>e<ure.  m  ilaaphp,ic,  Lect.  xx.)  has  shown  that  the 

ITrlT^f  T,'""  T  '^"  *""  "'"'  •^"*""^  P"^"'""'  ""«  ">««  vast  ma. 

nV  /  ,?'°''         '"""'  '''*""  °P*"'y  '"">«"'  »'  «"«n"y  assumed 
that  the  faculties  of  mind  are  nothing  more  than  modes  in  which  the  sim- 

pie  indivisible  principle  of  though,  mi,  »ct  and  exist.   As  thus  expUined 


furnish  distinct  materials  for  thonght.  Physical  Science 
is  possible,  if  the  senses  present  us  with  material  phenom- 
ena whose  relations  and  laws  thought  may  investigate. 
Moral  Science  is  possible,  if  we  are  presented  with  the 
fact  of  moral  approbation  and  disapprobation  of  this  or 
that  action,  in  itself,  and  for  its  own  sake ;  and  the  ques- 
tion for  thought  to  investigate  is,  Whence  do  these  feelings 
arise,  and  on  what  laws  are  they  dependent  ?  -^sthetical 
Science  is  again  possible  as  a  distinct  branch  of  inquiry, 
if  the  emotions  arising  from  the  contemplation  of  beauty 
in  the  works  of  nature  or  of  art  can  be  shown  to  be  dis- 
tinct from  any  communicated  by  their  mere  relation  to 
the  senses.  And  Metaphysics  must  submit  to  'the  same 
criterion.  Rational  Cosmology  and  Rational  Psychology 
are  possible,  only  if  Matter  and  Mind,  as  distinct  from 
their  several  phenomena,  can  be  shown  to  be  in  any  way 
presented^  as  the  object  of  an  immediate  intuition. 

This  distinction  between  the  presentations  of  intuition 
and  the  representations  of  thought,  which  is  thus  the  key 
to  all  the  most  valuable  applications  of  Psychology,  is 
intimated  with  more  or  less  accuracy  in  the  writings  of 
several  modern  philosophers.  The  often-quoted  passage 
of  Locke,  in  which  the  operations  of  thought  ai*e  com- 

the  term  is  unobjectionable.  It  may  be  that  in  mental,  as  in  physical 
mechanics,  we  know  force  only  from  its  effects ;  but  the  consciousness 
of  distinct  effects  will  then  form  the  real  basis  of  Psychology.  The  fac- 
ulties may  then  be  retained  as  a  convenient  method  of  classification,  pro- 
Tided  the  language  is  properly  explained,  and  no  more  is  attributed  to 
them  than  is  warranted  by  consciousness.  The  same  consciousness  which 
tdls  me  that  seeing  is  distinct  from  hearing,  tells  me  also  that  volition 
is  distinct  fVom  both ;  and  to  speak  of  the  faculty  of  will  does  not  neces- 
sarily imply  more  than  the  consciousness  of  a  distinct  class  of  mental 
phenomena.  No  one  but  an  advocate  of  the  grossest  materialism  could 
understand  such  an  expression  as  implying  numerically  distinct  organs 
of  mind,  as  of  body. 


46 


PKOLEGOMENA   LOQICA. 


pared  to  the  productions  of  art,  furnishes  in  this  respect, 
when  understood  in  its  proper  latitude,  an  unexceptiona- 
ble description  of  the  respective  provinces  of  the  intuitive 
and  discursive  faculties.    « It  is  not  in  the  power  of  the 
most  exalted  wit,  or  enlarged  understanding,  by  any  quick- 
ness  or  variety  of  thought,  to  invent  or  frame  one  new 
simple  idea  in  the  mind.    The  dominion  of  man,  in  this 
little  worid  of  his  own  understanding,  being  much  the 
same  as  it  is  in  the  gieat  worid  of  visible  things  ;  wherein 
his  power,  however  managed  by  art  and  skill,  reaches  no 
farther  than  to  compound  or  divide  the  materials  that  are 
made  to  his  hand;  but  can  do  nothing  towards  the  making 
the  least  particle  of  new  matter,  or  destroying  one  atom 
of  what  is  already  in  being." »     The  Ideas  of  Sensation 
and  Ideas  of  Reflection  of  the  same  philosopher,  however  ' 
unfortunate  may  be  the  original  choice  of  terms,  and  how- 
ever inconsistent  their  subsequent  employment,  point  cor- 
rectly enough  to  the  two  great  sources  of  external  and 
internal  intuition.'    A  further  step  in  accuracy  is  gained 
in  the  Impressions  and  Ideas  of  Hume,  though  the  dis- 
tinction loses  most  of  its  value  in  his  hands  by  the  absurd 
ground  of  distinction  which  he  has  laid  down  between 
them,  and  by  the  unfortunate  metaphor  which  declares 
every  idea  to  be  an  image  of  an  impression.'    Kant,  who 

1  £saay,  b.  ii.  ch.  2  ^  2. 

«  Reflection,  in  consistency  with  etymology,  ought  to  have  been  limited 
to  the  operations  of  thought;  in  which  sense  we  can  reflect  upon  sensible 
olyects  as  upon  all  other  things.  Locke  only  escapes  from  Roid's  criti- 
cism  on  this  point  by  using  reflection  improperly,  as  Stewart  has  ob- 
served,  as  synonymous  with  [internal]  consciousness.  This  use  of  the 
term,  however,  is  not  peculiar  to  Locke.  See  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Lectures 
on  Metaphysics,  pp.  162,  406. 

•  According  to  Hume,  Ideas  and  Impreialone  differ  fVom  each  other  only 
in  theur  different  degrees  of  force  and  vivacity;  and  beUef  he  defines  as 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


47 


took  up  the  discussion  where  Hume  left  it,  with  the  ad- 
vantage of  a  new  philosophical  language,  unencumbered 
with  the  associations  of  earlier  systems,  is  the  earliest  phi- 
losopher whose  writings  have  disentangled  the  confusion 
universally  following  on  the  use  of  the  term  idea,  and 
exhibited  this  most  important  distinction  with  any  de<n*ee 
of  accuracy  and  precision.^  It  is  one  of  the  most  valuable 
principles  of  the  Critical  Philosophy,  that  the  understand' 
ing  has  no  power  of  intuition;  a  principle  which  does  not, 
however,  necessitate  the  adoption  of  the  Kantian  division 
of  the  mental  fiiculties,  nor  even  the  determination  of  the 
question,  whether  the  mind  possesses  numerically  distinct 
faculties  at  all.  It  simply  means,  that  the  act  of  ThoughT] 
cannot  create  its  own  object :  that,  being  mediate  and  rep- 
resentative, it  requires  to  be  based  on  an  immediate  and  t 
presentative  fact  of  consciousness. 

It  cannot  therefore  be  maintained  that  the  senses  are 
the  sole  criteria  of  truth  and  of  reality,  unless  we  assume, 

"aUvelyidca  associated  with  a  present  impression;"  a  doctrine  which 
almost  justifies  the  sarcastic  application  of  Rcid,  "it  will  follow,  that  the 
idea  of  a  lion  is  a  lion  of  less  strength  and  vivacity.  And  hence  may 
arise  a  ver>'  important  question,  whether  the  idea  of  a  lion  may  not  tear 
in  pieces  and  devour  the  ideas  of  sheep,  oxen,  and  horses,  and  even  of 
men,  women,  and  children." 

1  In  this  respect,  nothing  can  be  more  unfair  than  Stewart's  sneers  at 
the  obscurity  and  new  technical  language  of  Kant.  The  philosophical 
terms  of  English  and  French  writers  are  derived  from  the  same  source, 
and  subject  to  the  same  varieties  of  application.  The  purism  of  German 
writers  has  given  to  all  subsequent  thinkers  the  inestimable  advantage  of 
contemplating  the  same  thoughts  under  a  new  phraseology,  and  with  new 
••TOciations  of  etymology  and  metaphor;  an  advantage  which  no  one  has 
appreciated  more  highly,  or  explained  more  happily,  than  Stewart  himself, 
on  another  occasion.  As  it  is  impossible  to  comply  exactly  with  the  pre 
cept  of  Locke,  to  judge  of  ideas  in  themselves,  their  names  being  wholly 
laid  aside,  the  next  best  course  is,  to  examine  them,  as  far  as  possible, 
through  the  medium  of  two  independent  hinguagcs. 


lii 


4d 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


49 


mk 


m  defiance  of  all  consciousness,  that  there  exist  no  im- 
mediate  mental  phenomena,  but  those  communicated  by 
^sensation.  /Any  one  presentation  is  as  true  and  as  real  as 
^i^F^^  and  unreality  can  only  be^in  wiih 

thought.     The  immediate  judgment  of  presentation,  that 
am  at  this  moment  conscious  of  a  certain  object,  is 
equally  true  as  regards  any  class  of  presentations;     Un- 
reality,  m  this  case,  can  only  consist  in  the  distinctness  of 
one  class  of  presentations  from  another,  which  latter  we 
have  arbitranly  selected  as  the  test  of  reality;  and  false- 
hood,  m  the  assertion  of  the  identity  of  distinct  classes,  or 
of  the  distinctness  of  identical  ones.    But  such  a  selec 
tion   or  assertion   involves  an   act   of  thought ;   it  is  a 
judgment  concerning  intuitions  as  classified  under  certain 
concepts.     If  I  choose  arbitrarily  to  select  the  senses  as 
the  sole  test  of  reality,  the  phantasms  of  imagination  are 
so  far  unreal ;  but  their  unreality  implies  no  more  than 
that  they  are  not  perceived  by  the  senses.     If  I  gay   « A 
centaur  exists  as  an  image  in  my  mind,  therefore  it  exists 
n  nature     the  assertion  is  false,  because,  by  an  act  of 
thought,  I  judge  that  to  be  an  object  of  possible  sense, 
which  IS  only  gjven  to  me  as  an  object  of  imagination : 

Lrs '"  ""*"" "  "■' '"'"  '^'  "»•'"■  - 

This  view  of  the  reality  of  all  presentations,  as  such, 
could  not  indeed  be  consistently  held  by  the  advocates  of 
a  representative  theory  of  perception.  If,  in  all  intuition, 
n  am  immediately  conscious  only  of  certain  ideas  or  modi- 
/  ^."?'^""7f."»y  ^^"  '"i"^^  I  am  reduced  to  the  alternative, 
either  of  disbelieving  the  existence  of  an  extenial  world 
altogether,  or  of  drawing  a  distinction  between  such  ideas 
as  are  representative  and  indicate  the  existence  of  objects 
without  my  mind,  and  such  as  are  purely  imaginary  and 


I 


have  no  objective  reality  corresponding.^  The  former  will[ 
then  be  distinguished  as  real,  the  latter  as  unreal  presenta- 
tions. But  i^  in  perception,  I  am  immediately  and  pre- 
sentatively  conscious  of  a  non-ego  (and  such  is  the  soundest 
view,  both  in  common  sense  and  in  philosophy),  the  repre- 
sentative idea  and  its  supposed  claim  to  superior  reality 
vanishes  altogether.  Every  presentation  is  real  in  itself 
some  as  immediately  informing  me  of  the  existence  of 
states  of  my  own  mind,  others  as  immediately  informing 
me  of  the  existence  of  objects  without ;  and  my  judgment 
about  each  is  equally  true  when  I  assert  it  to  be  what  it 
is,  and  equally  false  when  I  assert  it  to  be  what  it  is  not. 
In  this  respect,  the  philosophers  of  the  school  of  Common 
Sense  have  not  always  consistently  adhered  to  their  fun-  ' 
damental  principle,  in  the  distinction  which  they  have 
drawn  between  perception  and  imagination.*    . 

But  though  it  is  not  true  that  the  whole  matter  of 
knowledge  is  furnished  by  the  senses,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  it  is  entirely  furnished  by  the  presentative  faculties. 
And  this  may  throw  some  light  on  a  distinction,  concern- 
ing which  there  frequently  exists  considerable  confusion, 
the  distinction  between  what  are,  vaguely  enough,  termed 
positive  and  negative  ideas.  A  positive  intuition  is  one 
which  has  been  presented  to  us  in  actual  consciousness, 
real  or  imaginary :  a  positive  concept  is  one  whose  com- 
ponent parts  are  capable  of  being  so  presented  in  combi- 
nation. A  negative  concept,  on  the  other  hand,  which 
is  in  fact  no  concept  at  all,  is  the  attempt  to  realize  in 

1  See  Locke,  Essay,  b.  iv.  ch.  4,  §§  3—12. 

2  See  Reid,  Inquiry,  ch.  ii.  4  3,  and  the  antagonist  remarks  of  Stewart, 
Elements,  vol.  i.  ch.  3.  Both  discussions  mi<;ht  have  been  cleared  of  some 
conftislon  by  determining  accurately  what  is  meant  by  reality  in  Presen- 
tations. 


h 


60 


PKOLEGOMEIfA  LOGICA. 


thought  those  combinations  of  attributes  of  which  no 
corresponding  intuition  is  possible.  The  inability  may  be 
absolute  or  relative,  owing  to  the  general  limitations  of  all 
human  consciousness,  or  to  peculiar  deficiencies  in  the 
experience  of  this  or  that  individual.  Thus  a  blind  man 
inay  be  said  to  have  a  negative  idea  of  color,  when  he 
attempts  to  supply  the  defects  of  his  experience  by  anal- 
ogy from  other  sensations;  as  in  the  case  mentioned  by 

ir    K,     ,f '  "''°  ^'^^  '"PP"^***  '^'  "»'<>'  «f  ^c^rfet  to 
resemble  the  sound  of  a  trumpet.^    But  in  like  manner 

any  man,  though  in  the  full  possession  of  his  faculties,  can 

only  negatively  conceive  those  simple  ideas' which  have 

never  been  actually  presented  in  their  proper  intuition. 

The  nature  of  the  presentation  will  of  course  depend  upon 

the  foculty  to  which  that  class  of  intuitions  beloU     If  I 

have  never  seen  objects  of  any  other  color  than  white  and 

red,  I  have  a  positive  idea  of  these,  a  negative  idea  of 

blue  and  yellow.    If  I  had  all  my  lifetime  been  subject 

to  coercion,  and  had  never  performed  an  act  of  volition, 

I  should  have  a  negative  idea  of  free  agency.    If  I  had 

never  in  my  life  found  my  volition  opposed,  I  should  have 

a  negative  ,dea  of  coercion.    As  it  is,  I  have  a  positive 

Idea  of  both.    I  desire  to  thrust  my  arm  out  in  open  space, 

and  my  desire  is  carried  into  effect.    Here  is  the  positive 

consciousness  of  freedom.    I  try  to  thrust  it  through  a 

wall,  and  am  resisted.    Here  is  the  positive  consciousness 


>  Estay,  b.  Ui.  ch.  4,  Ul. 

Jn^!;  f"«f  ,^»  ■"«  ">'""'  'he  immediate  objeela  of  scneatlon  or  reflec 
1"  '"  ^^f  «e»«e  Of  .he  term,,  ,„eh  ^  color  and  ,ou„d,  whlh  cTn^ 
apprehended  only  by  actual  sio-hf  nr-  k^-^ 
which  can  be  knr^J^     ,    k     v"  *'^"^'  ^^^^^^^^  and  voUtlon, 

tion,  but  the  elements  must  be  given  beforehand.    Compare  Locke,  T^ 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


61 


of  coercion.^  When  Locke  declared  infinite  space  and 
infinite  duration  to  be  negative  ideas,  he  was  right,  if 
we  grant  his  hypothesis  of  their  origin.  The  former  he 
derived  from  sensation ;  and  all  the  space  which  we  can 
actually  perceive  by  the  senses  is  finite:  the  latter  he 
derived  from  reflection;  and  every  duration  which  we 
have  personally  experienced  is  finite  also.  Those  who  do 
not  accede  to  his  conclusion  ground  their  dissent  on  a 
denial  of  his  premises.*  The  language  in  which  the  con- 
cept is  expressed  is  in  this  respect  altogether  indifferent. 
We  may  speak  of  the  same  act  as  voluntary,  or  not  con- 
strained, as  compulsory,  or  not  voluntary.  The  test  of 
its  positive  or  negative  character  is  to  be  found  in  the 
question,  Has  it  ever  been  realized  in  an  intuitive  pre- 
sentation ? 

Those  ideas  whose  negative  character  depends  merely 
on  the  deficiences  of  individual  experience,  and  which 
may  therefore  be  described  as  accidentally  or  relatively 
negative,  are  beyond  the  consideration  of  pure  Logic,  or 


1  Some  philosophers  represent  the  idea  of  fVeedom  as  a  negative  one. 
Thus  Kant  (Rechtslehre,  p.  i>8,  cd.  Schubert)  and  Fithte  {Kritik  oiler  Qffen- 
barung,  §  2)  describe  it  as  mcrcly  an  absence  of  the  feeling  of  "ompulsion. 
This  description  would  be  correct,  if  we  had  never  performed  an  act  in 
our  lives  except  under  coercion.  As  it  is,  the  idea  of  freedom  is  as  posi- 
tive as  that  of  restraint,  both  being  at  different  times  presented  in  actual 
consciousness.  The  same  is  the  case  with  heat  and  cold,  good  and  evil, 
and  other  pairs  of  contraries,  each  of  which,  as  a  phenomenon  of  con- 
sciousness, is  as  positive  as  the  other.  What  may  be  their  respective  rela- 
tions to  a  transcendental  cause  beyond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  we 
have  no  means  of  determining. 

2  See  Cousin,  Histoire  de  la  Philosqphie,  le9on  xviii.  On  the  other  hand, 
Locke's  conclusion  is  supported,  though  on  different  grounds,  by  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  Discussions^  p.  605,  who  shows  that  an  absolutely  first  unit  of 
Space  or  Time,  and  an  infinite  extent  of  either,  are  both  equally  inconceiv- 
able. 


■!» 


62 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


PKOI^GOUBNA  LOGICA. 


53 


pare  Metaphysics,  which  deal  only  with  those  conditions 
of  thought  which  are  common  to  all  mankind.    Hence  the 
only  negative  ideas  with  which  the  logician  or  metaphysi- 
cian as  such  is  concerned,  are  those  which  arise  from  an 
attempt  to  transcend  the  conditions  of  all  hnman  thought 
If  the  hnman  mind  is  subject  to  laws  and   limitations 
which  It  IS  unable  to  transgress  by  any  effort  of  thou-^ht 
(and  that  this  is  the  case  will  be  shown  at  a  further  sta-ro 
of  our  inquiry),  there  will  arise  in  relation  to  these  a  cla'ss 
of  notions  which  may  be  distinguished  as  essentianu  or 
ahsolutehj  negative.    Such  negative  notions,  however,  must 
not  be  confounded  with  the  absence  of  all  mental  activity. 
They  imply  at  once  an  attempt  to  think,  and  a  failure  in 
that  attempt.'     The  language  by  which  such  notions  are 
indicated  is  not  like  a  word  in  an  unknown  tongue,  which 
excites   no  corresponding  affection  in  the  mind  of  the 
hearer:   it  indicates  a  relation,  if  only  of  difference,  to 
that  of  which  we  are  positively  conscious,  and  a  eonse- 
qnent  effort  to  pass  from  one  to  the  other.    Thus,  if  it  be 
true  that  the  infinite  is  not  a  positive  object  of  human 
thought,  it  will  not  follow  that  the  word  is  to  us  wholly 
unmeaning.    We  may  attempt  to  separate  the  condition 
of  fin.teness  from  our  conception  of  a  given  object,  though 
the  result  m.ay  ultimately  involve  a  self-contradiction     We 
may  attempt  in  like  manner  to  conceive  a  space  enclosed 
by  two  straight  lines,  and  it  is  not  till  after  the  attempt 
has  been  made  that  we  become  aware  that  the  expression 
bilinear  figure  admits  of  no  corresponding  notion.    And  it 
may  frequently  happen,  owing  to  the  use  of  language  as  a 
substitute  for  positive  thought,  that  a  process  of  reasonin.- 
may  bo  carried  on  to  a  considerable  length,  without  the 
reasoncr    being  aware    of  the   essentially  inconceivable 

'  See  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Biscitsslom,  p.  C02. 


character  of  the  terms  which  he  is  employing.  If  we 
assume  without  inquiry  the  possible  existence  of  a  circular 
square,  we  may  demonstrate  of  it  in  succession  all  the 
properties  of  the  circle  and  all  those  of  the  square,  without 
at  the  moment  perceiving  their  incompatibility  with  each 
other.  Such  a  self-deception  is  still  easier  when  the  nega- 
tive character  depends,  not  on  the  union  of  attributes 
which  cannot  be  conceived  in  conjunction,  but  on  the 
separation  of  those  which  cannot  be  conceived  apart.  We 
may  easily  analyze  in  language  that  which  it  is  impossible 
to  analyze  in  thought.  Thus  we  can  neither  perceive  nor 
imagine  color  without  extension ;  an  unextended  color  is 
therefore  a  purely  negative  notion.  Yet  many  philoso- 
phers of  eminence  liave  maintained  that  the  connection 
between  these  two  ideas  is  merely  one  of  association,  and 
have  reasoned  concerning  color  apart  from  extension  with 
as  much  confidence  as  if  their  language  represented  a 
positive  thought.  The  speculations  concerning  the  seat 
of  the  soul  may  be  cited  as  another  instance  of  the  same 
kind.  Position  in  space  and  occupation  of  space  arc  cor- 
relative notions;  neither  is  conceivable  apart  from  the 
other.  Yet  the  above  speculations  for  the  most  part 
proceed  on  the  tacit  assumption  that  it  is  possible  to 
assign  a  local  habitation  to  an  unextended  substance. 
Such  is  the  influence  of  language,  even  when  representing, 
not  thought,  but  its  negation. 

If  thought  is  operative  only  within  the  field  of  possible 
experience,  it  follows,  that  we  are  not  entitled,  in  any  act 
of  thought,  to  add  to  the  data  given  in  the  concept,  with- 
out a  fresh  appeal  to  intuition.  I  have  in  my  mind  the 
notion  of  a  centaur,  as  a  creature  with  the  upper  parts  of 
a  man  and  the  lower  parts  of  a  horse.  But  this  concept 
does  not  in  itself  contain  the  attribute  of  existence  in  space 

5» 


54 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


as  an  object  of  possible  perception.     I  am  therefore  not 
warranted  .n  thinlcing  of  the  centaur  a,  so  existing,  until 
he  attnbute  .a  supplied  fro.n  its  proper  source  of  p^senta- 
tion,  wh.ch  ,n  this  case  is  sensible  experience.     If  mv 
notion  of  man  does  not  contain  the  attribute  of  mortality. 
I  may  th.nk  of  man  as  mortal  or  as  immortal,  but  I  can- 
not  determme  which  of  these  judgments  is  true,  ,-.  e.,  is  in 
accordance  with  the  corresponding  intuition,  without  con,- 
panng  them  with  the  fact  as  presented  by  experience.     In 
the  mere  notion  of  two  straight  lines,  it  is  not  contained 
that  they  cannot  inclose  a  space ;  and  in  the  mere  notion, 
of  the  numbers  7  and  5,  it  is  not  contained  that  their  sum 
IS  12     Neither  of  these  judgments,  therefore,  can  be  deter- 
mined  to  be  tnie  without  an  appeal  to  some  fact  or  other 
of  intuition.    This  limitation  of  the  province  of  tliouH.t 
implies  some  important  consequences,  which  will  an„ear 
when  we  come  to  consider  the  character  of  the  laws  of 
pure  thinking  recognized  by  Logic. 

Before  taking  leave  of  this  part  of  our  subject,  it  may  be 
tiseful  to  point  out  one  or  two  questions  of  controversy, 
to  which  the  distinction  between  Thought  and  other  facts 
of  consciousness  may  be  applied  with  advanta-e 

It  has  been  remarked  by  Sir  William  Hamilton,'  that 
the  whole  controversy  of  Nominalism  and  Conceptualism 
IS  founded  on  the  ambiguity  of  the  terms  employed ;  on 
the  want,  that  is,  of  an  accurate  distinction,  such  as  is  fur- 
nished by  the  German  Anschauung  and  BegHff,  between 
the  individual  intuitions  of  sense  and  imagination,  and 
the  general  concepts  of  the  understanding.  We  may  ob- 
serve  further,  that  the  controversy  between  Nominalism 
and  Realism  may  be,  if  not  absolutely  decided,  at  least 
considerably  simplified,  by  attending  to  the  same  distino- 

*  Beid'i  Works,  p.  412. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


55 


tion.  Some  recent  critics,  in  examining  this  question,  have 
managed  to  introduce  additional  confusion  into  what  was 
sufficiently  confused  before.  It  is  asked,  for  example, 
whether  the  great  division  of  animal,  vegetable,  and  min- 
eral is  not  to  be  regarded  as  the  work  of  nature,  rather 
than  as  the  arbitrary  product  of  man's  classification.  Un- 
doubtedly :  but  what  has  that  to  do  with  the  question  of 
the  existence  of  Universals  out  of  the  mind  ?  We  admit, 
that  is,  that  nature  has  stamped  on  certain  locally  distinct 
individuals  a  number  of  prominent  features  of  resem- 
blance, which  cannot  fail  to  strike  the  eye  of  an  observer. 
But  has  she  thereby  produced  anything  more  than  one 
set  of  attributes  existing  in  one  individual  in  one  place, 
and  another  similar  set  existing  in  another  individual  ia 
another  place  ?  But  when,  by  an  act  of  mind,  we  have 
abstracted  from  the  existence  in  space  under  which 
all  objects  of  sense  are  presented,  and,  by  virtue  of  that 
abstraction,  have  advanced  from  individual  similarity  to 
specific  unity,  from  the  similar  attributes  of  several  objects 
to  the  mutual  relation  of  all,  the  results  of  the  process  can 
only  be  regarded  as  the  offspring  of  our  minds.  This  con- 
sideration does  not  indeed  prove  decisively  the  impossi- 
bility of  universals  a  parte  rei,  but  it  shows  that  no  argu- 
ment in  favor  of  their  existence  can  be  drawn  from  the 
observed  uniformities  of  nature.^ 

Another  subject  of  dispute  between  different  schools  of 
philosophy  is.  What  are  the  limits  of  definition  ?  The 
Scholastic  Logicians,  holding  that  definition  was  by  genus 
and  differentia,  very  consistently  laid  it  down  as  a  canon, 


*  Since  the  pablicatlon  of  the  first  edition  of  this  work,  T  have  been 
gratified  at  finding  the  same  view  maintained  in  an  able  discossion  hy 
M.  de  R^musat,  Abelard,  vol.  11.  p.  125. 


56 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


that  no  object  was  definable  which  could  not  be  regarded 
a^  a  Species.     Summa  genera   and  individuals  were  by 
this  rule  incapable  of  definition.     On  the  other  hand,  Des- 
cartes  and  Locke,  rejecting  this  restriction,  maintain  that 
s^mple  ideas  alone  cannot  be  defined.    Both  are  ri-ht,  ac 
cording  to  their  different  meanings  of  definition.^  With 
the  former,  it  signifies  the  resolution  of  a  complex  oeneral 
cmcept  into  the  simpler  concepts  which  it  comprehends. 
With  the  latter,  it  is  the  resolution  of  a  complex  individ^ 
ual  object  of  sense  into  the  simpler  objects  of  which  it  is 
composed.    The  one  is  a  mental  analysis  of  notions,  the 
other  a  sensible  analysis  of  intuitions.    No  definition,  as 
Locke  truly  observes,  will  convey  the  idsa  of  whiteness  to 
a  blind  man  ;  t.  e^  it  will  not  enable  him  to  form  a  sensible 
image  of  the  color.     But  no  definition  (in  the  scholastic 
sense)  was  ever  intended  to  accomplish  this  object.     The 
far-famed  animal  rationale  does  not  do  it  for  man ;  and 
tor  the  very  sufiicient  reason,  that  concepts,  as  such,  are 
not  capable  of  being  presented  in  sense  or  imagination. 
If  the  purpose  of  logical  definition  were  to  enable  us  to 
torm  an  .^.a, ,-.  ,.,  a  representative  image  of  an  object, 
pointing  It  out  with  the  finger  would  be  a  far  more  satis- 
lactory  definition  than  any  verbal  analysis.^    But  ideas  in 
this  sense,  have  no  connection   with  logical  definition. 
Locke  s  Ideas  of  sensation,  simple  or  complex,  are  all  ex- 
eluded  from  the  province  of  definition,  as  being  individu- 
als,  I.  e.,  as  not  being  concepts  at  all.    On  the  other  hand, 
the  concept  whiteness,  as  a  species  of  color,  is  capable  of 
definition  by  its  optical  differentia,  as  a  color  produced  by 
equal  mixture  of  the  simple  rays.     An  example  adduced 

Cf.  MiU  8  Loijic,  vol.  i.  p.  183.  -"crvAy. 


67 


by  Descartes,  as  well  as  by  Locke  and  Leibnitz,^  will  illus- 
trate the  distinction  still  more  clearly.  The  concept  of  a 
chiliogon  is  a  regular  polygon  of  1000  sides.  As  addressed 
to  the  sense,  this  definition  would  not  enable  any  man  to 
distinguish  an  individual  figure  of  the  kind  by  sight  from 
another  which  had  999  sides;  but,  as  addressed  to  the 
understanding,  it  is  sufiicient  for  the  demonstration  of  the 
mathematical  properties  of  the  figure.  Yet  even  here,  in- 
tuition, though  not  directly  applied,  is  the  virtual  test  of 
the  possibility  of  the  conception.  I  may  not  be  able  dis- 
tinctly to  represent  in  an  image  or  construct  in  a  figure  a 
thousand  sides  at  once ;  but  it  is  from  ray  intuitive  con- 
sciousness of  the  same  attributes  as  existing  on  a  more 
limited  scale,  that  I  know  that  there  is  nothing  incompati- 
ble between  the  number  of  a  thousand  sides  and  the  prop- 
erty of  enclosing  a  space.  Under  this  conviction  the  sym- 
bolical takes  the  place  of  the  intuitive  cognition  ;  and  we 
are  enabled,  by  the  aid  of  language,  to  think  of  the  figure 
in  certain  relations,  without  actually  constructing  it  with 
the  hand  or  in  the  mind. 

The  same  distinction  will  furnish  a  ground  for  criticizing 
certain  popular  systems  of  logical  notation.  If  Logic  is 
exclusively  concerned  with  Thought,  and  Thought  is  ex- 
clusively concerned  with  Concepts,  it  is  impossible  to  ap- 
prove of  a  practice,  sanctioned  by  some  eminent  Logicians, 
of  representing  the  relation  of  terms  in  a  syllogism  by  that 
of  figures  in  a  dingram.  To  illustrate,  for  example,  the 
position  of  the  terms  in  Barbara,  by  a  diagram  of  three 
circles,  one  within  another,  is  to  lose  sight  of  the  distinc- 
tive mark  of  a  concept,  that  it  cannot  be  presented  to  the 
sense,  and  tends  to  confuse  the  mental  inclusion  of  one 

1  Sec  Descartes,  Meditatio  Sexta;  Locke,  Essay,  ii.  29, 13;  Leibnitz,  Nou- 
veaux  Essais,  ii.  29, 13. 


'  flf 


58 


PROLEGOMENA   LOCrCA. 


notion  m  the  sphere  of  another,  with  the  local  inclusion  of 
a  smaller  portion  of  space  in  a  larger.'  The  diagrams  of 
Geometry  ,n  th.s  respect  furnish  no  precedent ;  for  they  do 
not  Illustrate  the/orm  of  the  thought,  but  the  matter,  not 
the  general  character  of  the  demonstration  as  a  reasoning 
process,  but  its  special  application  as  a  reasoning  abo«° 

Tv  ^h"",    f  V^"""- .  ^""  "'^^  "  ''"''  ^  practice  justified 
by  the  test  of  conce.vability  which  has  been  mentioned 
above,  the  possibility,  namely,  of  individualizing  the  attri- 
butes comprehended  in  a  concept.    For,  whereas  that  test 
IS  employed  to  determine  the  conceivability  of  the  actual 
contents  of  each  separate  concept,  the  logical  diagrams  are 
designed  to  represent  the  universal  relations  in  which  all 
concepts,  whatever  be  their  several  contents,  formally  stand 
towards  each  other.    The  contrast  between  these  two,  as 
leg.t.mate  and  illegitimate  appeals  to  intuition,  will  more 
luJJy  appear  in  the  sequel. 

1 "  Da  der  Mcnsch  die  Sprache  hat,"  says  Hecel  "ala  d««  a.,  v 

zToZ  Tr  ;r  ^-'^"-^-^-  --hen  u' d  !:^^ 

™.n         f"  ^^-^-y-«-.  eines   CalaUs,  f^ha.ten  rwoU^ 
While  dissenting  totally  from  the  Hejjelian  view  of  LoHo   t  /  "" 

quoting  the  above  passage,  as  appH^able  tTeve^^il^'r^^^^^^^ 
wh.h  n^gnizes  the  essential  distinction  bctweelTh:!:;^^^^^^^^^^ 


CHAPTER    II. 

ON  THE   THBEE   OPERATIONS    OF  THOUGHT. 

Concerning  the  threefold  division  of  the  mental  opera- 
tions usually   acknowledged  by    Logicians,  it  has  been 
questioned  whether  they  are  properly  to  be  regarded  as 
distinct  acts  of  Thought  or  not.    The  question  may  be 
considerably  simplified,  by  discriminating  between  difierent 
principles  of  identity  or  distinctness,  as  applicable  severally 
to  mental  and  material  objects.     The  only  natural  and 
necessary  principle  of  distinction  between  objects  is  the 
numerical  divereity  of  individuals.      In  this  respect,  not 
only  the  several  acts  of  Simple  Apprehension,  Judgment, 
and  Reasoning,  but  every  single  act  of  each  class,  is  dis- 
tinct from   every  other.     An  act  of  reasoning  w^hich  I 
perform  to-day  is  numerically  distinct  from  any  act  per- 
formed yesterday,  though  both  may  be  governed  by  the 
same  laws  and  applied  to  the  same  objects.    Beyond  this, 
any  principle  o£  specific  identity  or  diversity  is  to  a  certain 
extent  arbitrary  and  artificial.    The  only  ground  of  dis- 
tinction between  a  natural  and  an  unnatural  classification 
of  individuals   depends  upon  the  frequency  with  which 
we  have  occasion  to  view  them  in  this  or  that  relation ;  in 
other  words,  on  the  respective  utility  of  diflTerent  points 
of  view  for  certain   given   purposes.      On   this   giound, 
Apprehension,  Judgment,  and  Reasoning  are  rightly  and 
necessarily  regarded  as  distinct  classes  of  mental  opera- 
tions, relatively  to  Logic,  inasmuch  as  their  several  pro- 


60 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


I 


ducts,  the  Concept,  the  Judgment,  and  the  Syllogism,  ex- 
hibit distinct  logical  forms,  and  require  a  distinct  logical 
treatment. 

Psychologically,   the   question    must  be   examined   on 
somewhat  different  grounds.     It  may  be  urged,  for  exam- 
ple, on  the  one  side,  that  the  several  operations  are  the 
product  of  the  simple  faculty  of  Comparison ;  that  they 
are  not  in  act  ever  separable  from  each  other.  Apprehension 
being  always  accompanied  by  Judgment,  and  Judgment 
by  Apprehension,  and  Reasoning  by  both  ;  that  the  mind, 
one  and  indivisible,  is  wholly  employed  in  each.     On  the 
other  side,  it  may  be  answered,  that  acts  of  Comparison 
may  be  regarded  as  specifically  distinct,  as  engaged  on 
distinct  objects ;    that  the  comparison  of  attributes  with 
each   other,  of  concepts,  immediately  in   themselves,  or 
mediately  with  a  common  third  concept,  are  pro  tanto 
distinct  acts;  that  the  same  mind  is  not  always  equally 
skilful  in  all  three ;  and  other  arguments  of  the  like  kind. 
Both  these  opposite  opinions  may  be  accepted  as  true,  if 
we  attend  to  the  different  points  of  view  which  render  the 
decision  of  all  such  matters  of  controversy  in  some  degree 
arbitrary. 

The  distinction  between  the  faculties  and  parts  of  the 
mind  is  based  on  a  principle  exactly  the  reverse  of  that 
by  which  a  similar  distinction  is  made  relatively  to  the 
body.  The  membere  of  the  latter  are  given  as  logically 
and  numerically  distinct,  and  thus  furnish  a  preexisting 
basis  for  the  classification  of  their  several  operations. 
Thus,  seeing  and  hearing  are  distinguished  from  each 
other,  as  the  operations  of  the  eye  and  the  ear  respec- 
tively ;  and  the  use  of  the  pen,  the  brush,  and  the  chisel, 
may  in  this  point  of  view  be  classified  together,  as  opera- 
tions of  the  hand;  whereas,  in  the  mind^  the  distinctness 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


61 


of  the  operations  is  itself  the  ground  on  which,  for  mere 
convenience  of  discussion,  we  classify  and  distinguish 
different  parts  and  faculties,  as  belonging  to  the  mind 
itself.^  The  acts,  therefore,  must,  on  independent  grounds, 
be  determined  to  be  identical  or  distinct,  before  we  unite 
or  separate  them,  as  related  to  the  same  or  divei*se  mental 
powere. 

Hence  it  appears  that  the  classification  of  operations, 
relatively  to  distinct  mental  faculties,  is  contingent  upon 
the  adoption  of  some  independent  principle  for  classifying 
the  same  operations  in  themselves.  In  the  present  state 
of  Psychology,  much  must  be  left  to  the  discretion  of 
individual  inquirers;  no  one  division  having  been  so 
universally  adopted  by  philosophei-s,  or  having  led  to  such 
important  results,  as  to  render  imperative  its  adoption  as 
the  division  Kar  iioxrjv  of  psychologers.  But  to  suppose  a 
distinct  mental  faculty  for  each  of  the  three  logical  opera- 
tions, solely  on  the  ground  of  the  distinct  objects  compared 
in  each,  is,  to  say  the  least,  to  make  Psychology  unneces- 
sarily complicated,  and  to  offend  against  a  rule  of  great 
weight  in  all  systems  of  classification,  JEntia  non  sunt 
multiplicanda  proeter  necesdtatem.  Indeed,  the  several 
phenomena  of  conception,  judgment,  and  reasoning, 
viewed  merely  as  mental  acts,  and  without  reference  to 
the  divei*sity  of  the  data  from  which  the  act  commences 
and  with  which  it  deals,  appear  to  furnish  far  more  promi- 


1 "  Nous  ne  savons  que  Tame  humainc  possede  ccrtaincs  facultds,  quo 
parce  que  nous  voyons  en  elle  certains  phenomcnes  se  produlre.  Ainsi, 
parce  que  nous  observons  qu'elle  sent,  qu'elle  pense,  qu'clle  se  souvient, 
nous  en  concluons  qu'elle  a  la  capacitd  de  sentir,  la  capacitc  de  pcnscr,  la 
capacite'  de  se  souvenir;  et  ee  sont  ces  capaoites  que  nous  appelons  pes  fae- 
ult^s."—  Jouffroy,  Dcs  facuUen  de  Vdnie  humainef  (Melanges  PhUosophiqueSf 
p.  313, 2d  ed.) 

6 


II 


62 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


63 


i 


lii 


h 


nent  features  of  similarity  than  of  difference.    They  are 
effected  by  the  same  means ;  they  are  governed  by  the 
same  laws;    they  are  confined  within   the  same  limits; 
they  admit  of  the  same  distinctions  of  material  and  foi-raal 
validity.     The  psychological  analysis  of  any  one  may  be 
applied,  almost  in  the  same  words,  to  the  others ;  and  so 
far  as  thought  alone  is  concerned  (though  not  always  in 
the  possession  and  management  of  the  materials   upon 
which   thought  is  exercised),  the  same   mental  qualities 
are  manifested  in  the  right  performance  of  each.     In  a 
psychological  point  of  view,  to  enumerate  separate  mental 
faculties,  as  giving  rise  to  the  various  products  of  thought, 
IS,  to  say  the  least,  to  encumber  the  science  with  unneces' 
sary  and  perplexing  distinctions.     It  will  be  sufficient  to 
refer  them  to  the  single  faculty  of  T/iouffht,  the  operation 
of  which  is  in  all  cases  Comparison,^ 

But  the  faculty  of  Thouf;ht,  though  uniform  in  its  own 
nature  and  in  the  manner  of  its  operation,  may  yet  give 
use  to  different  products,  according  to  the  diversity  of  the 
materials  upon  which  it  operates ;  and  this  difference,  as 
has  already  been  observed,  forms  the  basis  of  the  classifi- 
cation  usually  adopted  in  Logic.  Hence,  from  the  different 
points  of  view  in  which  thought  is  contemplated  by  the 
two  sciences,  there  arises  some  diversity  of  detail,  which  it 
is  desirable  to  point  out  more  particulariy. 

Extending  the  terms  Apprehension  and  Judgment  be- 
yond the  region  of  Thought  proper,^  it  may  be  faid  down, 

I  See  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  Lect.  xxxfv. 
The  division  into  Simple  Apprehension,  Jndgment,  and  Reasoning,  Is 
usually  given  as  one  of  the  discursive  faculties.  Yet  even  Logicians  have 
extended  it  to  the  powers  of  perception  and  imagination.  Indeed,  these 
severa  faculties  have  shared  in  the  confusion  arising  fVom  the  vague  use. 
m  modem  philosophy,  of  the  term  idea.    A  striking  instance  is  affonied 


as  a  general  canon  of  Psychology,  that  the  unit  of  con- 
sciousness is  :i  judgment;  in  other  words,  that  every  act  of 
consciousness,  intuitive  or  discursive,  is  comprised  in  a 
conviction  of  the  presence  of  its  object,  either  internally 
in  the  mind  or  externally  in  space.  The  result  of  every 
such  act  must  thus  be  generally  stated  in  the  proposition, 
**  This  is  here."  Consequently,  at  least  with  reference  to 
the  primary  and  spontaneous,  as  distinguished  from  the 
secondary  and  reflex  acts  of  consciousness,  it  is  more  cor- 
rect to  describe  Apprehension  as  the  analysis  of  Judgments, 
than  Judgment  as  the  synthesis  of  Apprehensions.^ 

In  a  psychological  point  of  view,  therefore,  it  is  incor- 
rect to  describe  Simple  Apprehension  as  the  first  operation 
of  the  mind.  In  one  sense,  indeed,  the  relation  of  prior 
and  posterior  is  altogether  out  of  place :  Chronologically, 
inasmuch  as  every  Apprehension  is  simultaneous  with  a 
Judgment,  and  every  Judgment  with  an  Apprehension ; 
and  logically,  inasmuch  as  Judgment  cannot  exist  without 
Apprehension,  nor  Apprehension  without  Judgment.  In 
another  sense,  however,  we  may  properly  say  that  Judg- 
ment is  prior  to  Apprehension  ;  meaning  that  the  subject 
and  the  object  are  first  given  in  their  mutual  relation  to 
each  other,  before  either  of  them  can  itself  become  a  sep- 
arate object  of  attention.  But  when  a  corresponding 
division  is  adoj^ted  of  the  operations  of  Thought,  properly 
so  called,  the  same  order  of  priority  cannot  be  observed. 
Every  operation  of  thought  is  a  judgment,  in  the  psycho- 
logical sense  of  the  term  ;  but  the  psychological  judgment 
must  not  be  confounded  with  the  logical.     The  former  is 

by  "Wolf,  in  his  account  of  Apprehension  and  Judgment.  PhU.  Bat., 
SS  33-39. 

1  See  Reid,  InteJlectual  Powers,  Essay  iv.  ch.  3,  with  Sir  W.  HamUton's 
Commentary. 


64 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGIC  A. 


the  judgment  of  a  relation  between  the  conscious  subject 
and  the  immediate  object  of  consciousness ;  the  latter  is 
the  judgment  of  a  relation  wiiich  two  objects  of  thought 
bear  to  each  other.     The  former  cannot  be  distinguished 
as  true  or  false,  inasmuch  as  the  object  is  thereby  only 
judged  to  be  present  at  the  moment  when  we  are  con- 
scious of  it  as  affecting  us  in  a  certain  manner ;  and  this 
consciousness  is  necessarily  true.     The  latter  is  true  or 
false   according  as  the  relations  thou<?ht  as  existing  be- 
tween  certain  concepts  are  actually  found  in  the  objects 
represented  by  those  concepts  or  not.     The  logical  judg- 
ment necessarily  contains  two  concepts,  and  hence  must  be 
regarded  as  logically  and  chronologically  posterior  to  the 
conception,  which  requires  one  only.    The  psychological 
judgment  is  coeval  with  the  iii-st  act  of  consciousness,  and 
is  implied  in  every  mental  process,  whether  of  intuition  or 
of  thought.     It  cannot,  therefore,  be  called  prior  or  poste- 
rior to  any  other  mental  operation,  for  there  is  no  mental 
operation  in  which  it  does  not  take  place ;  but  the  judg- 
ments of  intuition  are  logically  and  chronologically  prior 
to  the  judgments  of  thought.*    Conception  is  a  psychologi- 


^  Of  the  important  distinction  between  chronological  and  logical  priority 
(the  tempore  and  natura  of  the  scholastic  post-predicaments),  it  will  be 
sufficient  to  quote  one  ancient  and  one  modem  exposition.  Aristotle  (for 
name  and  thing),  Categ.  ch.  12:  Up6Tfpov  irtpov  (rtpov  Xtyrrou  rtrpaxm^ 
Tp&Tov  ii\v  KoL  Kvpidn-ara  Karh  xp^yov,  ko^'  h  irpf<r$vrfpoy  htpov  htpov  koI 
va\ai6rfpoif  Ktytrai.  .  .  .  AfvTtpoy  8i  rh  fx^i  aimarptipoy  Karh,  rijy  rov  tJyeu 
ijco\ov^<riVf  oToy  rh  ty  rwv  Ivo  irp6r(pov'  hvo7y  fi^y  yhp  6yTcoy  iucoKov^u 
tv^vs  rh  ty  tlyaiy  iyhs  8c  uyrot  ovK  iyayxcuoy  9vo  thai,  Metaph.  viii.  8.  2. 
ndtrns  ^  rrjs  roiainris  -^portpa  i<rr\y  ri  iyipytia  koI  \6ytp  koI  rp  ov<rl<^' 
Xpi^V  8'  ?<"*  /iiv  fis,  tm  8'  its  oH,  Cousin,  Pwgramme  d'un  cours  de 
Philosophie:  "Une  connaissance  est  ant^rieure  k  une  autre  dans  I'ordre 
logique,  en  tant  qu'elle  I'autorlse;  elle  est  alors  son  antdced(?nt  logique. 
Une  connaissance  est  ante'rieure  k  une  autre  dans  I'ordre  psychologique, 
en  tant  qu'elle  se  produit  avant  elle  dans  I'csprit  humaln;  ello  est  alors  soa 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


65 


M 


cal  judgment,  but  not  a  logical  one,  and  is  properly  ranked 
as  the  first  operation  of  Thought,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the 
simplest.  '    7 

As  the  design  of  the  present  essay  is  not  to  consider 
Psychology  in  itself,  but  Psychology  in  its  relation  to 
Logic,  I  shall  content  myself  with  accepting  the  three 
operations  of  Thought  as  they  are  commonly  distinguished 
by  Logicians,  examining  them  with  a  view  of  ascertaining 
what  light  Psychology  can  throw  on  the  province  and  laws 
of  each.  Other  points  of  view,  and  other  principles  of 
classification,  need  not  be  further  discussed  in  this  place. 
In  relation  to  their  several  logical  products,  the  three  I 
operations  may  be  distinguished  as  follows. 

Conceiving  has  been  already  explained  as  the  individu- 
alizing of  certain  attributes  comprehended  in  a  general 
notion  and  expressed  in  a  general  term;  the  representation, 
namely,  of  such  attributes  as  coexisting  in  a  possible  ob- 
ject of  intuition.     Language,  as  before  observed,  is,  in  its 

earliest  operations,  a  sign,  not  of  concepts,  but  of  intu-; 

itions.  Its  earliest  terms  are  employed  as  the  proper  / 
names  of  individual  objects.  Conception  does  not  take 
place  till  afler  we  have  learned  to  give  the  same  name  to 
various  individuals  presented  to  us  with  certain  differences 
of  attributes,  and  hence  to  associate  it  with  a  portion 
only,  not  with  the  whole,  of  what  is  presented  in  each. 
This  may  be  distinguished  as  Abstraction^  a  spontaneous, 
though  not  always  a  voluntary  act,  the  concentration  of 
the  mind  on  certain  portions  only  of  a  given  object  in 
relation  to  its  name.  This  must  not  be  treated,  as  is 
frequently  done  by  Logicians,  as  a  conscious  process  of 

ant^ced^nt  psychologique."  For  some  admirable  applications  of  the  above 
distinction,  see  the  same  author's  criticism  of  Locke,  Cours  de  Philosophies 
iccon  17. 

6* 


66 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


67 


If 


I 


thought,  being  only  a  preliminary  condition  to  thinking, 
taking  place  in  the  majority  of  cases  unconsciously,  dur- 
ing the  gi-adual  acquisition  of  speech.*  Our  names  thus 
gradually  acquire  a  signification,  being  transformed  from 
proper  names  to  appellatives.  Finally,  the  act  of  concep- 
tion  consists  in  contemplating  the  attributes  thus  com- 
bined in  the  signification  of  a  name  as  coexisting,  alono* 
With  individual  features,  in  a  possible  object  of  intuition, 
and  hence,  apart  from  the  individual  features,  as  indif- 
ferently representing  all  such  objects.  This  representative 
collection  of  attributes,  combined  by  means  of  a  si^^n,  is  a 
Concept. 

In  the  above  remarks,  the  office  of  language  is  con- 
sidered as  it  now  exists  and  is  taught,  not  as  it  might  pos- 
sibly have  been  originally  created.     We  do  not  form  our 
own  language,  but  receive  it  ready  fonned ;  and  its  teach- 
ing, whether  true  or  deceitful,  whether  promoting  or  dis- 
torting   the   right    development    of  the    mind,  does,  as 
matter  of  fact,  impress  us  from  our  infancy  upwards  with 
certain  associations,  and  casts  our  earliest  thoughts  in  a 
certain  mould,  from  which  no  future  effort  can  wholly 
emancipate  us.     I  am  not  now  considering  what  might 
have  been  the  course  of  our  mental  growth  had  we  been 
the  original  inventors  of  our  mother  tongue,  or  if  we  had 
been  born  among  a  people  with  whom  (as  in  a  liypothesis 

1  Abstraction,  as  described  by  Stewart,  Elements,  vol.  I.  ch.  4,  answers  in 
essential  points  to  what  I  have  here  described.  It  should  bo  observed, 
however,  that  bv  language  as  it  now  operates,  whatever  may  have  been 
the  case  in  its  first  formation,  the  question  as  to  what  attributes  shall  be 
abstracted  and  what  retained,  is  in  a  great  measure  determined  for  us. 
The  process  must  thus  be  distinguished  from  the  voluntarv  abstraction  im- 
plied in  all  operations  of  thought.  On  Abstraction,  as  distinguished  from 
Attention,  see  Tissot,  AnOiropologie,  voL  i.  p.  142. 


of  Reid's  ^)  every  sound  represented  a  complete  sentence. 
Lun^-uaire  is  not  here  considered  as  it  might  have  been  in- 
vented  by  a  conclave  of  imaginary  philosophers,  or  as  it 
may  have  influenced  the  thoughts  of  Adam  in  Paradise ; 
but  as  it  does  influence  the  thoughts  of  children  born  into 
the  world,  the  offspring  of  articulately-speaking  parents. 

As  in  Conception  a  single  general  notion  is  considered 
in  its  relation  to  a  possible  object  of  intuition,  so  in  Judg- 
ment two  such  notions  are  considered  as  related  to  a  com- 
mon object.  When  I  assert  that  A  is  B,  I  do  not  mean  ( 
that  the  attributes  constituting  the  concept  A  are  identical 
with  those  constituting  the  concept  B, — for  this  is  only 
true  in  identical  judgments, — but  that  the  object  in  which 
the  one  set  of  attributes  is  found  is  the  same  as  that  in 
which  the  other  set  is  found.  To  assert  that  all  philoso- 
phers are  liable  to  error,  is  not  to  assert  that  the  significa- 
tion of  the  term  philosopher  is  identical  with  that  ofliabl^ 
to  error;  but  that  the  attributes  comprehended  in  these 
two  distinct  terms  are  in  some  manner  united  in  the  same 
subject.  To  ask  what  constitutes  unity  or  identity  in  a 
subject  of  attributes,  is  to  enter  on  a  deep  metaphysical 
question,  the  discussion  of  which  must  be  postponed  to  a 
later  stage  of  our  inquiry ;  it  is  sufficient  for  the  present 
to  observe,  that  the  common  language  and  common 
thought  of  mankind  universally  acknowledge  something 
of  the  kind,  assuming,  whether  they  can  explain  it  or  not, 
that  a  certain  smell  and  color  and  form,  w^hich  are  distinct 
attributes,  are  in  some  way  related,  as  parts  or  qualities, 
to  some  one  thing  which  we  call  a  rose  ;  and  that,  when  I 
assert  that  the  rose  is  fragrant,  I  imply  that  the  thing 


1  Correspondence,  Letter  xi.  to  Dr.  James  Gregory.    See  p.  71  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  edition. 


68 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PBOLEOOHENA  LOQICA. 


69 


i 


which  affects  in  a  certain  way  my  power  of  sight  is  in 
some  manner  identical  with  that  which  affects  in  a  cer- 
tain  way  my  power  of  smell.  The  metaphysical  problem 
thus  lies  at  the  bottom  both  of  Conception  and  of  Judg- 
ment,  and,  whether  it  admits  of  satisfactory  explanatio^L 
or  not,  nmst  be  included  as  a  fact  in  any  description  of  the 
several  operations  of  Thought. 

Reasoning  is  the  most  complex  of  the  three  operations, 
as  in  it  two  concepts  are  determined  to  be  in  a  certain 
manner  related  to  each  other,  through  the  medium  of  their 
mutual  relations  to  a  third  concept.    This  operation  is 
therefore  treated  last  in  order.^     The   several  relations 
asserted  in  the  premises  and  deduced  in  the  conclusion, 
are  of  the  same  nature  as  those  implied  in  Judgment,  and 
lead  to  the  same  metaphysical  difficulties.    These,  together 
with  the  logical  and  psychological  character  of  the  Laws 
of  Thought,  will  be  considered  in  a  future  chapter.    For 
the  present  it  will  be  sufficient  to  attempt,  in  accord- 
ance  with   the   above    observations,  a  definition  of  the 
products  of  the  several   acts  of  Thought,   the  Concept, 
the  Judgment,  and  the  Syllogism,  the  legitimate  objecte 
of  Formal  Logic. 

A  Concept  is  a  collection  of  attributes,  united  by  a  sign, 
and  representing  a  possible  object  of  intuition. 

A  Judgment  is  a  combination  of  two  concepts,  related 
to  one  or  more  common  objects  of  possible  intuition. 

1  "Judicium  notiones  conjungit  vel  separat.  adeoqne  eas  supponit. 
Ratiocinando  ex  notionibus  et  judiciis  praeviis  elicitur  judicium  ulteriua, 
adeoquc  ratiocinatio  notiones  et  judicia  supponit.  Etro  notio  est  operatio 
prima,  judicium  secunda,  discureus  tertia."  — Wolf,  PhU.  Rat.  ^  53.  But 
Wolf,  as  before  observed,  has  not  accurately  distlnj-uished  between  the 
perceptive  and  discursive  faculties.  His  remark  is  true,  though  only  in  a 
much  narrower  sense  than  that  in  which  he  designed  it. 


A  Syllogism  is  a  combination  of  two  judgments,  neces- 
sitating a  third  judgment  as  the  consequence  of  their 
mutual  relation. 

The  definition  above  given  of  a  Judgment  renders  ne- 
cessary a  few  remarks  on  a  class  of  propositions,  whose 
true  logical  character  has  been  considerably  misappre- 
hended by  eminent  authorities.  According  to  the  above 
definition,  every  judgment  in  Logic  must  be  regarded  as  a 
combination  of  concepts;  every  term  of  such  judgment, 
as  the  sign  of  a  concept.  This  is  no  less  true  of  singular 
than  of  common  judgments,  and  the  neglect  of  it  has 
given  rise  to  some  errors  in  the  logical  treatment  of  prop- 
ositions. "Proper  names,"  says  Mr.  Mill,  "denote  the 
individuals  who  are  called  by  them ;  but  they  do  not  indi- 
cate or  imply  any  attributes  as  belonging  to  those  indi- 
viduals. When  we  name  a  child  by  the  name  Mary,  or 
a  dog  by  the  name  Cajsar,  these  names  are  simply  marks 
used  to  enable  those  individuals  to  be  made  subjects  of 
discourse.  It  may  be  said,  indeed,  that  we  must  have  had 
some  reason  for  giving  them  those  names  rather  than  any 
others ;  and  this  is  true :  but  the  name,  once  given,  be- 
comes independent  of  the  reason.  A  man  may  have  been 
named  John,  because  that  was  the  name  of  his  father ;  a 
town  may  have  been  named  Dartmouth,  because  it  is  situ- 
ated at  the  mouth  of  the  Dart.  But  it  is  no  part  of  the 
signification  of  the  word  John,  that  the  father  of  the  per- 
son so  called  bore  the  same  name ;  nor  even  of  the  word 
Dartmouth,  to  be  situated  at  the  mouth  of  the  Dart."  ^ 

These  remarks  are  true  so  far  as  the  name  alone  is  con- 
cerned, or  as  regards  the  reason  of  its  being  imposed,  at  a 
certain  time,  on  a  certain  man.  But,  then,  the  man,  as  an 
individual  existing  at  some  past  time,  cannot  become  ini- 

4 

1  MiU's  Logic,  vol.  i.  p.  40. 


70 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


i! 


mediately  an  object  of  thought,  and  hence  is  not,  properly 

speaking,  the  subject  of  any  logical  proposition.    If  I  say, 

« Cffisar  was  the  conqueror  of  Pompey,"  the  immediate' 

object  of  my  thought  is  not  Caesar  as  an  individual  exist- 

ing  nearly  two  thousand  years  ago,  but  a  concept  now 

present  in  ray  mind,  comprising  certain  attributes,  which  I 

believe  to  have  coexisted  in  a  certain  man.    I  may  histori- 

calhj  know  that  these  attributes  existed  in  one  individual 

only;  and  hence  my  concept,  viitually  universal,  is  actually 

singular,  from  the  accident  of  its  being  predicable  of  that 

individual  only.     But  there  is  no  logical  objection  to  the 

theory  that  the  whole  history  of  mankind  may  be  repeated 

at  recuiTing  intervals,  and  that  the  name  and  actions  of 

Caesar  may  be  successively  found  in  various  individuals  at 

coiTesponding  periods  of  every  cycle. 

"Alter  erit  turn  Tiphys,  et  altera  qiu-e  vehnt  Argo 
Delectos  heroas:  erunt  etiam  altera  bella; 
Atque  iterum  ad  Trojam  magnus  mittetur  Achilles." 

These  remarks  will  suggest  a  correction  of  the  ordinary 
logical  account  of  the  quantity  of  propositions,  which 
should  have  been  made  long  ago.  The  subjects  of  all 
logical  judgments  are  concepts :  the  true  singular  proposi- 
tion in  Logic  is  not  one  in  which  the  concept  is  materially 
limited  to  an  individual  by  extralogical  considerations,  but 
one  in  which  it  is  formally  so  limited  by  a  sign  of  indi- 
viduality.  In  scholastic  language,  only  individua  demon^ 
strativa,  and  not,  as  is  vulgariy  taught,  indimdua  signata, 
are  properiy  the  subjects  of  singular  propositions.^  In- 
definite,  or,  as  they  should  rather  be  called,  indesignate* 

1  Cf.  Fries,  System  der  Logik,  §  22.    His  principle  is  sound,  though  some 
of  his  instances  are  inaccurate. 

2  Properly  speaking,  particular  propositions  are  indeanite,  singuhirs  and 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


71 


propositions,  are  an  anomaly  in  Logic,  no  less  when  the 
subject  is  a  singular  than  when  it  is  a  common  term.  In 
both,  the  quantity  can  only  be  known  by  the  matter,  and, 
in  both,  an  appeal  to  the  matter  is  extralogical. 

The  same  considerations  will  also  show  the  propriety 
of  Aristotle's  limitation  of  the  logical  verb  to  the  present 
tense  only.  All  thought  is  a  consciousness  of  present 
mental  acts,  and  its  object  is  not  the  past  event,  but  the 
present  concept  of  it.  Hence  the  office  of  the  verb  in 
Logic  is  not  to  declare  the  past  or  future  connection  of  an 
attribute  with  its  subject  in  the  represented  fact,  but  to 
declare  the  present  coexistence  of  two  concepts  in  the 
representative  act  of  thought.* 

Before  quitting  this  portion  of  the  subject  it  will  be 
desirable  to  compare  the  conclusions  arrived  at  with  those 
of  two  eminent  philosophers,  from  both  of  whom  they 
appear,  verbally  at  least,  to  differ  in  a  slight  degree. 

Locke's  well-known  definition  of  knowledge,  *'The  per- 
ception of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas,*' 
has  been  somewhat  severely  commented  on  by  his  illus- 
trious critic,  M.  Cousin.*  The  French  philosopher  shows 
clearly  that,  in  many  of  our  judgments,  we  cannot  be  said 


a 


universals  definite.  For  when  I  say  Some  A  is  B,  I  leave  it  altogether 
undetermined  how  many,  and  whether  any  given  A  is  included  or  not. 
For  this  reason  it  is  better  to  adopt  the  term  indesignate,  suggested  by  Sir 
W.  Hamilton. 

^  "  Copula  non  est  nisi  verbum  substantivum  praesentis  temporis.  De- 
notat  enim  nexum  inter  subjectum  et  praedicatum  intercedentem,  qnalis 
nempe  repraesentatur  in  ideis  nostris.  Cum  igitur  in  orani  judicio  nexus 
ille  semper  sit  aliquid  praisens,  copula  non  esse  potest  nisi  verbum  sub- 
stantivum praesentis  temporis."  — Wolf,  Phil.  Rat.  ^  202. 

*  Cours  de  Philosophie,  le9on  23.  Compare  Jouffroy's  Reid,  Preface,  pp. 
130,  133,  sqq.  For  other  criticisms,  see  Reid,  InteUectual  Powers,  Essay  I. 
ch.  7;  Essay  VI.  eh.  3;  Leibnitz,  Nouveaux  Essais,  TV.  1. 


72 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


1/ 


I 


:1 


i 


to  have  distinct  notions  of  terms  united,  prior  to  pro- 
nouncing on  the  fact  of  their  agreement.     The  distinc- 
tions drawn  in  the  preceding  remarks  will,  I  think,  furnish 
a  ground  for  a  more  exact  decision  of  the  point  at  issue 
than  lias  been  given  either  by  the  English  philosopher  or 
his  French  censor.     Locke*s  definition  abounds  in  verbal 
inaccuracy,  for  which,  however,  the  author  is  not  entirely 
responsible,  as  it  is  partly  owing  to  the  unsettled  significa- 
tion, in  his  day,  of  philosophical  terms,  which  have  since 
been  more  accurately  determined.     Taking  Perception  in 
the  strict  sense  to  which  it  has  been  determined  by  Reid 
and  his  successors,  it  is  not  correct  to  say,  in  general 
terms,  that  the  agreement  of  ideas  is  in  all  cases  jt>ercciy<?</. 
Extending  Knowledge,  as  Locke  himself  does,  Xo  include 
the  evidence  of  the  senses,*  it  is  incorrect  to  say  that,  in 
all  knowledge,  we  have  a  distinct  consciousness  of  two 
ideas  and  their  agreement.      And  the  term  Idea  itself, 
used  loosely  by  Locke,  as  by  Descartes,  for  any  object 
of  consciousness,  admits  of  a  variety  of  subordinate  senses, 
in  some  of  which  the  definition  is  assuredly  inaccurate. 
But,  as  limited  to  the  logical  judgment  proper,  as  it  has 
been  above  distinguished  from  the  psychological,  the  defi- 
nition is  substantially  correct,  though  susceptible  of  some 
verbal  improvement.     In  every  logical  judgment  there  is 
a  union  of  concepts ;  and  every  concept  is  represented  by 
a  sign.    The  concepts  themselves  must  be  regarded  as  ex- 
isting in  the  mind  before  their  union ;  and,  the  signs  being" 
practically  furnished  by  the  existing  terms  of  a  language, 
the  logical  judgment  may  be  properly  described  as  formed 
by  the  combination  of  concepts ;  as  its  representative,  the 
proposition,  is  formed  by  the  combination  of  terms.     But 
to  the  judgments  distinguished  as  psychological  the  defi- 

1  JS:*«ii/,  B.  IV.  ch.?.  k  14.     . 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


73 


nition  of  Locke  is  inapplicable;  and  here  the  objections  of 
M.  Cousin  may  be  urged  with  full  effect.  Such  are  all  the 
spontaneous  judgments  of  the  perceptive  and  imaginative 
faculties.  Such,  too,  is  the  Cartesian  cogito,  ergo  sum,  a 
primitive  judgment,  not  of  the  senses,  but  of  the  internal 
consciousness,  which  the  opponents  of  Descartes,  from 
Gassendi  to  Kant,  have  misrepresented  as  a  logical  reason- 
ing from  concepts.*  The  definition  of  Locke  is  therefore 
correct,  as  far  as  regards  judgments  of  thought,  properly 
so  called  ;  judgments  formed  by  means  of  concepts,  and, 
consequently,  of  language,  and  whose  constituent  parts 
are  given  piecemeal  in  words,  and  put  together  by  the 
mind  in  the  act  of  judging.  It  is  incorrect,  as  regards  all 
judgments,  whether  concerning  the  ego  or  the  non-ego, 
which  the  mind  forms  for  itself,  by  an  immediate  act  of 
consciousness,  without  the  aid  of  verbal  or  other  signs  of 
voluntary  intuition. 

From  the  definition  of  Locke  we  proceed  to  consider 
that  of  Kant.  In  the  Critical  Philosophy,  Thought  and 
Judgment  are  synonymous,  and  the  act  of  the  understand- 
ing. The  understanding  may  be  defined  indifferently,  the 
faculty  of  .iiinking,  or  the  faculty  of  judging ;  for  all 
thought  is  cognition  by  means  of  concepts ;  and  all  con- 
cepts are  the  predicates  of  possible  judgments,  and  are,  by 
such  judgments,  referred  to  objects  of  sensible  intuition, 
either  immediately,  or  through  the  interposition  of  lower 


'  See  an  article  In  Cousin's  Fragments  Fhilosoph'qftes,  "  Sur  le  vrai  sens 
du  cogito,  ergo  sum."  To  this  I  am  indebted  for  the  following  quotation 
from  Descartes  himself:  "  Cum  itaque  quis  advertit  se  cogitare,  atque  inde 
seqni  se  existere,  quamvis  forte  nunquam  antea  quaesiverit  quid  sit  cogi- 
tatio  nee  quid  existentia,  non  potest  tamen  non  utramque  satis  nosse,  ut 
sibi  in  hac  parte  satisfaciat."  —  Responsio  ad  sextos  objectiones.  See  also 
Clauberg,  Logica,  Qa.  clx. 


74 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGIC  A. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


75 


I: 


concepts.^  The  intuitions  of  sense  being/  according  to 
Kant's  theory  of  perception,  immediate  representations  of 
objects,  the  judgment  is  thus  the  mediate  cognition  of  an 
object,  or  the  representation  of  a  representation.* 

In  a  psychological  point  of  view,  the  Kantian  definition 
of  Judgment  is  too  narrow ;  as  it  virtually  denies  that  any 
act  of  Judgment  whatever  is  peiformed  in  the  exercise  of 
the  intuitive  fuculties ;  a  denial  which  the  author  repeats 
still  more  explicitly  in  other  passages.^  In  a  logical  point 
of  view,  it  is  too  wide ;  the  province  of  Judgment  being 
made  coextensive  with  the  whole  of  Thouj'ht,  including, 
therefore,  under  it.  Conception  or  Simple  Apprehension. 
Every  concept,  according  to  Kant,  is  the  predicate  of  a 
possible  judgment,  in  which  it  may  be  affirmed  of  any  of 
the  objects  of  intuition  included  within  its  sphere.  lie 
might  have  gone  further,  and  said  that,  in  all  positive 
thinking,  the  possible  judgment  becomes  an  actual  one. 
But  it  is  a  psychological,  not   a  logical  judgment.     It 

1  "  Wir  kcinnen  alle  Ilandlungcn  des  Verstnndes  auf  Urthcilo  znriick- 
fuhrcn,  so  dass  der  Verstand  iibcrhaupt  als  ein  Vcrmo-ren  zu  urthcilcn 
vorgestellt  wcrdcn  kann.  Dcnn  er  ist  nach  dem  Obiti:en  ein  Vcrm6<;ea 
zu  denken.  Denken  ist  das  Erkenntniss  durth  Bej^riffe.  Be<n-iffe  alxjr 
beziehen  sich,  als  Pradicate  ino;;Ucher  Urtheile,  auf  Irgend  eiiie  Vorstel- 
lung  von  einem  noch  unbestimmien  Gcgenstande."— JSTn/tA'  der  r.  F.  p.  70, 
ed.  Rosen kranz. 

*  "  Da  keine  Vorstellung  unmlttelbar  auf  den  Gegcnstand  peht,  als  bios 
die  Anschauung,  so  wird  ein  Begriff  niemals  auf  einen  Gegenstand  ua- 
mittelbar,  sondern  auf  irgcnd  eine  andre  Vorstcllung  von  dcmselbcn  (sie 
sey  Anschauung  oder  selbsf  schon  BegriflT)  bczogen.  Das  Urtlicil  ist  also 
die  mittelbare  Erkenntniss  eines  Gegenstandes,  mithin  die  Vorstellung 
einer  Vorstellung  desselben."  — ITrrtiA:  der  r.  V.  p.  69. 

3  "  Wahrheit  oder  Schein  sind  nicht  im  Gegenstande,  so  feme  er  angcs- 
chaut  wird,  sondeni  im,  Urtheile  iibcr  denselben,  so  feme  er  gedacht  wird. 
Man  kann  also  zwar  richtig  sagen :  dass  die  Sinno  nicht  irrcn,  aber  nicht 
darum,  weil  sie  jederzeit  richtig  urtheilen,  sondcra  weU  sie  gar  nicht 
urtheilen."— JBTrifiA;  der  r.  V.  p.  238. 


affirms  only  the  mental  existence  of  the  object,  as  now 
present  in  thought;  and  the  affirmation  is  necessarily  true, 
whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  object.  To  make  the  doc- 
trine of  Kant  consistent,  the  province  assigned  to  Judg- 
ment must  be  either  extended  or  contracted.  It  must 
either  be  extended,  to  denote  every  consciousness  of  a 
relation  between  subject  and  object,  i.  e.,  to  every  opera- 
tion of  mind,  or  it  must  be  contracted,  to  denote  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  relation  between  two  objects  of  thought ; 
in  which  case  it  does  not  extend  beyond  the  logical  judg- 
ment by  means  of,  at  least,  two  concepts. 

Having  thus  pointed  out  the  distinction  of  Thought 
from  other  mental  acts,  and  its  various  subdivisions  rela- 
tively to  Logic,  I  shall  proceed  to  offer  a  few  observations 
on  the  nature  of  Law,  in  so  far  as  that  term  is  aj^plicable 
to  a  conscious  subject. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


77 


^ 


CHAPTER   III. 

ON  LAW,  AS  RELATED  TO  THOUGHT  AND  OTHER  OBJECTS. 

The  following  passage  from  Archbishop  Whately's 
Logic  may  serve  as  an  appropriate  introduction  to  this  part 
of  our  subject.  "  What  may  be  called  a  mathematical  im- 
possibility, is  that  which  involves  an  absurdity  and  self- 
contradiction  ;  e.  g.,  that  two  straight  lines  should  inclose  a 
space,  is  not  only  impossible,  but  inconceivable,  as  it  would 
be  at  variance  with  the  definition  of  a  straight  line.  And 
it  should  be  observed,  that  inability  to  accomplish  any- 
thing which  is,  in  this  sense,  impossible,  implies  no  limita- 
tion of  power,  and  is  compatible  even  with  omnipotence, 
in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word.  If  it  be  proposed,  e,  g^  to 
construct  a  triangle  having  one  of  its  sides  equal  to  the 
other  two,  or  to  find  two  numbers  having  the  same  ratio 
to  each  other  as  the  side  of  a  square  and  its  diameter,  it  is 
not  from  a  defect  of  power  that  we  are  precluded  from 
solving  such  a  problem  as  these  ;  since,  in  fact,  the  problem 
is  in  itself  unmeaning  and  absurd:  it  is,  in  reality,  nothing 
that  is  required  to  be  done."  ^ 

Substantially,  perhaps,  this  is  not  far  from  the  truth.  But 
it  may  be  stated  in  a  more  satisfactory  form  by  divesting 
it  of  a  hypothesis  which,  even  if  true  (and  this  we  have  no 

1  Whately's  Logic,  p.  353.    (Sixth  edition.) 


means  of  ascertaining),  may  for  the  present  purpose  be 
dispensed  with.^ 

When  anything  is  said  to  be  inconceivable,  it  is  thereby 
acknowledged  that  the  human  mind  is  not  altogether  un- 
restricted in  its  operations.  It  is  bounded  not  only  as  re- 
gards the  sphere  of  objects  of  w^hich  it  is  permitted  to  take 
cognizance,  but  also  as  regards  the  manner  in  which  it  is 
capable  of  thinking  about  objects  within  that  sphere.  In 
other  words,  there  are  laws  under  which  the  mind  is  com- 
pelled to  think,  and  which  it  cannot  transgress,  otherwise 
than  negatively,  by  ceasing  to  think  at  all. 

The  existence,  then,  of  laws  of  thought  is  a  fact  of 
wliich  our  every-day  consciousness  assures  us.  Necessity, 
of  whatsoever  kind,  implies  a  necessary  agent ;  that  is,  an 
agent  acting  under  a  law.  If,  then,  any  question  can  be 
jiroposed  to  the  mind  of  man  which  he  feels  himself  com- 
pelled to  decide  in  one  way  only,  that  compulsion  is  at 
once  an  evidence  of  the  -existence  of  laws  which,  as  a 
thinker,  he  is  compelled  to  obey. 

And  this  admission  is  all  that  is  required  for  the  solution 
of  such  difticulties  as  that  suggested  above.  If  our  whole 
thinking  is  subject  to  certain  laws,  it  follows  that  we  can- 
not think  of  any  object,  not  even  of  omnipotence  itself 
except  as  those  laws  compel  us.  The  limitation  does  not 
lie  in  the  object  of  which  we  think,  but  in  the  thinking 
subject.  "Whatsoever  we  imagine,"  says  Hobbes,  "is 
finite.  Therefore  there  is  no  idea  or  conception  of  any- 
thing we  call  infinite.     No  man  can  have  in  his  mind  an 

1  In  venturing  to  criticize  this  note,  one  of  the  most  valuable  portions 
of  the  Archbishop's  work,  I  iKjg  to  state,  that  it  is  to  the  wordin<r  only  of 
the  first  part  that  my  remarks  are  intended  to  apply.  With  the  just  and 
philosophical  distinction  laid  down  in  the  same  place  between  the  three 
senses  of  the  word  impossihUity,  I  have  only  to  express  full  concurrence. 

7* 


78 


PKOLEQOMEKA  LOQICA. 


PBOLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


79 


!l 


image  of  infinite  magnitude ;  nor  conceive  infinite  swift- 
ness, infinite  time,  or  infinite  force,  or  infinite  power. 
When  we  say  anything  is  infinite,  we  signify  only  that  wo 
are  not  able  to  conceive  the  ends  and  bounds  of  the  things 
named  ;  having  no  conception  of  the  thing,  but  of  our  own 
inability."  ^ 

It  may  be,  indeed,  that  the  conditions  of  possible 
thought  correspond  to  conditions  of  possible  being,  that 
what  is  to  us  inconceivable  is  in  itself  non-existent.^  But 
of  this,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  it  is  impossible  to  have 
any  evidence.  If  man,  as  a  thinker,  is  subject  to  necessary 
laws,  he  cannot  examine  the  absolute  validity  of  the  laws 
themselves,  except  by  assuming  the  whole  question  at 
issue.  For  such  examination  must  itself  be  conducted  in 
subordination  to  the  same  conditions.  Whatever  weak- 
ness, therefore,  there  may  be  in  the  object  of  criticism,  the 
same  must  necessarily  affect  the  critical  process  itself. 

We  may  indeed  believe,  and  ought  to  believe,  that  the 
powers  which  our  Creator  has  bestowed  upon  us  are  not 
given  as  the  instruments  of  deception.  We  may  believe, 
and  ought  to  believe,  that,  intellectually  no  less  than  mor- 
ally, the  present  life  is  a  state  of  discipline  and  preparation 


1  Leviathan,  i.  3.  (p.  17,  cd.  Molesworth.)  This  opinion  of  Ilobbes  has 
been  severely  censured  by  Cud  worth,  Intellectual  System,  B.  I.  eh.  v.  ^  1, 
who,  however,  mistakes  the  meaning  of  the  assertion,  both  in  what  it  ex- 
presses and  in  what  it  implies.  The  error  of  Cudworth  in  this  respect  has 
been  corrected  by  his  learned  translator,  Mosheim,  who,  though  no  ft-iend 
to  Ilohhcs's  views  in  general,  admits  that  in  this  particular  his  doctrine  is 
not  liable  to  the  objections  urged  against  it  Sec  Harrison's  edition  of 
Cudworth,  vol.  ii.  p.  HQ2. 

*  In  itself,  distinguished  from,  as  an  ohjrct  ofthmight.  As  the  latter,  it  is 
of  course  impossible.  The  distinction  between  things  per  se  and  things 
as  objects  of  thought,  will  be  familiar  to  every  reader  of  Kant  It  is,  in 
fact,  the  cardinal  point  of  the  whole  Critical  Philosophy. 


for  another;  and  that  the  portion  of  knowledge  which  our 
limited  faculties  are  permitted  to  attain  to  here  may  in- 
deed, in  the  eyes  of  a  higher  Intelligence,  be  but  partial 
truth,  but  cannot  be  absolute  falsehood.  But,  in  believing 
thus,  we  desert  the  evidence  of  Reason  to  rest  on  that 
of  Faith,  and  of  the  principles  on  which  Reason  itself 
depends  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  have  any  other 
guarantee. 

But  such  a  faith,  however  well  founded,  has  but  a  regu- 
lative and  practical,  not  a  speculative  application.  It  bids 
us  rest  content  within  the  limits  which  have  been  assigned 
to  us :  it  cannot  enable  us  to  overleap  them,  or  to  exalt  to 
a  more  absolute  character  the  conclusions  obtained  by 
finite  thinkers  concerning  finite  objects  of  thought.^  For 
the  same  condition  which  disqualifies  us  from  criticizing 
the  laws  of  thought,  must  also  deprive  us  of  the  power  of 
ascertaining  how  much  of  the  results  of  those  laws  is  true 
in  itself,  and  how  much  is  relative  and  dependent  upon  the 
particular  bodily  or  ment<il  constitution  of  man  during  the 
present  life.  To  determine  this  question,  it  would  be  ne- 
cessary to  examine  the  same  conclusions  with  a  new  set  of 
faculties,*  and  under  new  conditions  of  thought,  so  as  to 
separate  what  is  merely  relative  to  the  existing  state  of 


1  When  Kant  {Kritik  der  r.  V.  p.  49)  declares  that  the  objects  of  our  in- 
tuition are  not  in  themselves  as  they  appear  to  us,  he  falls  into  the  opposite 
extreme  to  that  which  he  is  combating:  the  Critic  becomes  a  Dogmatist 
in  negation.  To  warrant  this  conclusion,  we  must  previously  have  com- 
pared things  as  they  are  with  things  as  they  seem ;  a  comparison  which 
is,  ex  hi/pothesi,  imi)ossibIe.  We  can  only  say  that  we  have  no  means  of 
determining  whether  they  agree  or  not.  And,  in  the  absence  of  proof 
on  either  side,  the  presumption  is  in  favor  of  what  is  at  least  subjectively 
true.  The  onus  pmbandi  lies  with  the  assailant,  not  with  the  defender,  of 
our  faculties.    Cf.  Royer-Collard,  Jouffroy's  Reid,  vol.  iv.  p.  412. 

«  See  Reid,  IntcU.  Powers,  Essay  vi.  ch.  5.    (p.  447,  ed.  Hamilton.) 


80 


PROLEaOMENA  LOQICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


81 


I 


[f^ 


human  conscionsness,  from  what  is  absolute  and  common 
to  other  intelligences.* 

In  accordance  with  these  views,  we  are  naturally  led  to 
regard  all  the  hitherto  unsolved  problems  of  Metaphysics 
as  requiring  to  be  treated  from  a  i)sychological,  instead  of 
an  ontological  point  of  view.    Instead  of  asking  what  are 
the  circumstances,  in  the  constitution  of  things,  by  virtue 
of  which  they  present  such  and  such  difficulties  and  con- 
tradictions  to  human  understanding,  we  must  ask  what  are 
the  circumstances  of  the  human  understanding  itself,  by 
virtue  of  which  a  distinction  exists  between  the  conceiva- 
ble and  the  inconceivable.     Such,  in  fact,  was  the  revolu- 
tion introduced  by  Kant  into  metaphysical  speculation  ;  a 
revolution  which  he  aptly  compares  to  that  effected  in 
Astronomy  by  Copernicus,  when  he  thouglit  of  investigat- 
ing the  apparent  motion  of  the  heavens  from  .the  side  of 
the  spectator,  instead  of  from  that  of  the  objects.     The 
advantages  of  such  a  treatment  are  obvious.     From  the 
objective  view,  we  obtain  only  the  fact  that  certain  ques- 
tions   have   up   to  the   present  time  remained  unsolved. 
From  the  subjective  view,  we  learn  why  they  are  insoluble; 
and  the  answer  to  this  question  determines  the  laws  and 
limits  of  thought.     The  abuse  of  the  method  appears  in 

J  Tmth  relative  to  no  intelligence  Is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  as  it  Implies 
a  relation  existing  afYer  one  of  the  correlatives  has  been  annlhilafed. 
Our  only  possible  notion  of  absolute  truth  is  a  truth  relative  to  all  intclli- 
pcnces.  If  all  truth  is  subjective  which  implies  a  cognitive  power,  Omnis- 
cience  itself  has  but  subjective  truth.  "  Aux  termes  de  la  phllosophle 
de  Kant,''  says  M.  Cousin,  "  la  ralson  divine  seralt  done  aussi  frappee  de 
subjecnvite,  par  cela  meme  quo  cette  ralson  reside  dans  un  sujet  de'ter- 
mme  (jul  est  Dieu."  (Le^ns  sur  Kant,  p.  350.)  Within  the  limits  of  hu- 
man knowled-e  the  same  principle  Is  allowed  bv  Kant  himself:  "  so  l)cdeu- 
tet  die  objective  Gultlgkelt  dcs  Erfahrunj^surthcils  nichts  anders,  als  die 
nothwendigo  Allgemeingiiltigkeit  desselben."-  Proiegoimna,  §  18. 


the  attempts  of  the  successors  of  Kant,  especially  of  Schel- 
ling  and  Hegel,  to  construct  a  philosophy  of  the  absolute 
from  the  subjective  side,  by  denying  in  certain  relations 
the  validity  of  those  laws  of  thought  which  they  acknowl- 
edge in  others,  and  endeavoring  thereby  to  do  away  with 
relation  in  consciousness  altogether.  Such  a  system,  with 
whatever  ability  it  may  be  constructed,  carries  in  its  funda- 
mental conception  the  germ  of  its  own  refutation.  It 
commences  by  giving  the  lie  to  consciousness  ;  it  proceeds 
by  dividing  the  human  mind  against  itself,  the  understand- 
ing against  the  reason,  and  the  reason  against  the  under- 
standing ;  it  ends  by  leaving  no  test  by  which  its  own  truth 
can  be  determined.  But  the  philosophy  of  Kant  is  like  the 
spear  of  Achilles,  and  possesses  virtue  to  heal  the  wounds 
which  it  has  itself  inflicted.  While  it  is  impossible  to  deny 
the  lineal  descent  of  the  philosophy  of  Schelling  and  of 
Hegel  from  a  one-sided  view  of  Kantian  principles,  it  is 
equally  clear  that  the  only  satisfactory  refutation  of  the 
extravagances  of  that  philosophy  must  be  based  on  a  sober 
acknowledjrment  of  those  laws  and  limits  of  the  mental 
faculties  which   Kant  has  been  mainly  instrumental  in 

pointing  out. 

We  must  admit,  then,  that  our  present  faculties  are 
trustworthy  guides  to  that  portion  of  knowledge  which 
God  designs  us  to  attain  to  in  our  present  state  ;  that  the 
laws  to  which  these  faculties  are  subjected,  though  perhaps 
not  absolutely  binding  on  things  in  themselves,  are  binding 
upon  our  mode  of  contemplating  them;  that,  while  we 
obey  these  laws,  we  seek  after  truth,  according  to  our  kind 
and  in  conformity  with  the  end  of  our  intellectual  being ; 
and  that,  when  we  neglect  them,  we  abandon  ourselves  to 
every  form  of  error ;  or,  rather,  we  lose  all  power  of  dis- 
cerning between  error  and  truth ;  we  commence  by  an  act 


82 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


f 


of  intellectual  suicide,  and  construct  a  system  which,  by 
virtue  of  its  fundamental  principle,  must  disclaim  all  supe- 
riority over,  and  decline  to  combat  with,  any  rival  theory ; 
its  sole  claim  to  attention  being,  that  it  may,  for  aught  we 
know,  be  true  or  false,  or  both,  or  neither. 

To  apply  these  principles  to  the  question  with  which  we 
commenced:  Among  the  limitations  to  which  even  om- 
nipotence is  regarded  as  subject,  none  is  of  older  birth,  or 
has  been  more  frequently  alleged,  than  the  impossibility  of 
undoing  an  act  already  done, 

fi6yov  yhp  auTov  Kcd  eths  arrfpterKtreUt 
irfivT^a  TroifTy  &a<r'  hv  J  Tfirpayfitya, 

Now,  it  maybe  that  Time  and  Space  are,  as  Kant  main- 
tains, merely  subjective  conditions  of  human  sensibility. 
As  such,  they  limit  the  whole  exercise  of  human  thouHit. 
But  the  limits  of  the  thinking  faculty  are  limits  of  things 
as  objects  of  thought  only ;  and  beyond  that  sphere  we 
know  nothing.  It  may  be  that  the  whole  distinction  of 
past,  present,  and  future,  has  no  place  relatively  to  other 
intelligences  than  ours.  Still,  that  distinction  continues  to 
influence  all  human  thought ;  and  every  act,  as  an  object 
of  thought,  must  be  regarded  as  taking  i)lace  according  to 
the  conditions  of  temporal  succession.  If  we  cease  to  re- 
gard it  in  this  light,  we  do  not  extend  our  knowledge,  but 
abandon  the  problem  as  (humanly  speaking)  unthinlable. 
The  limitation,  then,  is  not  of  omnipotence  in  itself,  but 
of  all  power  as  the  object  of  human  thought.*     The  ulti- 

1  This  distinction  Is  drawn  by  Locko,  in  his  Second  Reply  to  the  Bishop 
of  Worcester.  "  But  it  is  further  urj,red,  that  wo  cannot  conceive  how 
matter  can  think.  I  {,TTint  it :  bat  to  arirue  from  thence  that  Go<l,  therefore, 
cannot  give  to  matter  a  faculty  of  thinking,  is  to  say  God's  omnipotency 
is  limited  to  a  narrow  compasp,  because  man's  understanding  is  so;  and 
brings  down  God's  infinite  power  to  the  size  of  our  capacities." 


J 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


83 


mate  consequence  of  this  admission  will  be,  that  the  un- 
limited is  not  an  object  of  human  thought  at  all.*  It  may 
be  an  object  of  human  beliefs  but  the  two  provinces  are 
not  coextensive. 

So  again  with  reference  to  the  impossibility  of  reversing 
a  necessary  truth,  such  as  those  of  Geometry.  To  whom 
is  the  problem  to  construct  a  triangle,  one  of  whose  sides 
shall  be  greater  than  the  other  two,  "  unmeaning  ? " 
Clearly  to  the  geometer,  whose  science  has  already  shown 
him  the  necessary  truth  of  a  contradictory  proposition. 
I>y  a  law  of  thought,  he  is  compelled  to  deny  that  two 
contradictory  assertions  can  be  true  at  the  same  time. 
Why  they  may  not  both  be  true  at  different  times,  —  why 
a  mathematical  proposition  once  demonstrated  is  held  al- 
ways and  everywhere  true,  and  its  contradictory  always 
and  everywhere  false  ;  while  other  truths,  however  certain 
at  present,  are  allowed  only  to  a  limited  extent  under 
temporal  or  local  restrictions,  —  requires  some  further  con- 
sideration. 

Necessity  is  the  result  of  law,  and  law  implies  an  agent 
whose  working  is  regulated  thereby.^  But  it  is  a  law  only 
to  that  which  works  under  it :  to  an  observer,  who  sees 
the  results  of  the  law  without  being  subject  to  its  influ- 
ence, it  is  no  more  than  a  fact  evidenced  by  or  inferred 
from  sensible  observation,  and  can  never  obtain  higher 
value  than  that  of  a  generalization  from  a  more  or  less  ex- 
tended experience.    Hence  arise  two  very  different  kinds 


4! 


« 

T 


J  See  the  admirable  Article  on  M.  Cousin's  Philosophy  by  Sir  Wm.  Ham- 
ilton, Discussions^  p.  1. 

*  *'  All  things  that  are  have  some  operation  not  violent  or  casual 

That  which  doth  assign  unto  each  thing  the  kind,  that  which  doth  moder- 
ate the  force  and  power,  that  which  doth  appoint  the  form  and  measure 
of  lyorking,  the  same  we  term  a  Law."  —  Hooker,  J2.  P.  i.  2. 


84 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


Of  necessity,  the  results  respectively  of  laws  of  the  ego  and 
of  the  non-ego;^  of  laws  under  which  I  feel  myself  com- 
pelled to  think,  and  of  laws  under  which  I   see  other 
agents  invariably  working.    These  two  it  is  essential  to  all 
sound  thinking  to  distinguish  from  each  otlK^r;  and  the 
more  so,  inasmuch  as  they  have  been  perpetually  con- 
founded  together.      The  distinctive  features  of  each  have 
been   overlooked   by  the    disciples   of  opposite   schools. 
By  one  party,  laws  of  thought  have  been  degraded  to 
generalizations   from   experience;    by  another,   empirical 
laws  have  been  invested  with  the  character  and  authority 
of  original  principles  of  mlnd.^    And  yet,  apart  from  the 
psychological  tenets  of  any  particular  school,   it  would 
seem  as  if  a  distinctive  criterion  might  h  priori  be  deter- 
mined, from  a  mere  analysis  of  the  notion  of  law  and  its 
operation. 

Setting  aside,  for  an  instant,  the  question  how  the  mind 
of  man  is  actually  constituted,  let  us  suppose  an  intelligent 
being,  subject  to  laws  under  which  he  is  compelled  to 
think,  and  placed  in  the  midst  of  a  worid  of  material 

1  It  is  much  to  be  wished  that  these  expressions,  or  some  equivalent. 

were  more  naturalized  in  English  philosophy.    In  Germany  and  Franc^ 

they  are  fully  established  as  technical  terms,  and  the  foundation  of  the 

most  important  distinctions  in  mental  science.   In  adopting  he,^  the  Latin 

expressions  instead  of  English  equivalents,  I  have  been  guided  by  the  an- 

thorny  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Beie:.  Warks^  p.  lOO.  supported  by  that  of  Mr. 

Hallam,i./^a/Mreo/£„rt)pe,vol.ii.p.436.    (Second  edition.)    The  latter 

observes,  of  the  term  Ego,  "  It  seems  reasonable  not  to  scruple  the  use  of 

a  word  so  convenient,  if  not  necessary,  to  express  the  unity  of  the  con- 

scious  principle.    If  it  had  been  employed  earlier,  I  am  apt  to  think  that 

some  great  metaphysical  extravagances  would  have  been  avoided,  and 

some  fundamental  truths  more  clearly  apprehended." 

8  The  opposite  theories  of  Dr.  Whewell  and  of  Mr.  Mill,  on  the  nature 
of  axiomatic  principles,  exhibit  the  extreme  views  in  a  remarkable  do- 
gree.    See  Appendix^  note  A. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


85 


agents,  subject  to  laws  under  which  they  must  act.  What 
would  be  the  distinctive  character  presented  to  his  mind 
by  these  respective  laws  of  himself  and  of  the  world  with- 
out? The  laws  of  the  planetary  motions  are  absolutely 
binding  on  the  moving  bodies  themselves,  independently 
of  the  existence  of  astronomical  science.  But  it  is  optional 
with  an  intelligent  being  to  study  astronomy  or  not ;  and, 
when  he  does  so,  he  observes,  as  matter  of  fact,  how  such 
laws  influence  their  own  subordinate  agents  ;  but  he  does 
not  himself  become  an  agent  under  their  influence.  As  ficts 
of  his  experience,^  they  are  known  solely  in  and  through  his 
observation  ;  as  laws  within  their  own  sphere,  they  are  in- 
dependent of  his  knowing  aught  about  them.  But  the 
laws  of  his  mind  come  into  operation  as  laws  when  the  act 
of  thinking  commences,  and  are  binding,  not  on  this  or 
that  class  of  physical  phenomena,  but  upon  the  thinker 
himself,  in  the  contemplation  of  all  of  them.  Hence  it  is 
not  optional  with  him  whether  he  will  think  according  to 
these  or  other  conditions.  Choose  what  object  of  study  he 
will,  he  cannot  think  at  all,  he  cannot  conceive  his  liberty 
of  choosing,  without  being  ipso  facto  under  their  influ- 
ence. Hence  arises  an  obvious  criterion.  A  law  which  is 
not  binding  on  me  as  a  thinker,  may  at  any  time  be  re- 
versed, without  affecting  my  mode  of  observing  the  same 
accents  under  their  new  conditions.  And  I  have  no  diffi- 
culty  in  conceiving  such  a  revei*sal  as  at  any  moment  pos- 
sible, because,  antecedent  to  experience,  I  had  no  internal 
bias  which  required  the  recognition  of  the  existing  law 
rather  than  of  any  other.     I  have  only  to  discard  an  ad- 


1  "  Les  vdritds  primitives  pont  dc  deux  sortcs,  comme  Ics  dc'rivatives. 
Elles  sont  du  nombre  des  veritcs  dc  raison,  ou  des  verites  dc  fait.  Les 
v<?ritc5s  de  raison  sont  ndccssaircs,  ct  celles  de  fait  sont  contingcntes.** 
—  Leibnitz,  Nouv.  Essais^  iv.  2. 

d 


86 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


87 


ventitions  knowledge.   But  the  reversal  of  a  necessary  law 
of  thought,  supposing  that  there  are  such,  is,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  inconceivable ;  for  conception  is  itself 
the  serv^ant  of  the  law,  and,  ex  hypothec,  cannot  rebel 
against  it.    I  cannot  by  an  act  of  thought  annihilate  the 
conditions  by  which  all  thought  is  governed.   I  can,  indeed, 
admit  the  possibility  that  there  may  be  other  beings  think- 
ing under  other  laws ;  but  I  can  form  no  positive  con- 
ception of  their  nature.    Such  a  supposition  is  not  thought, 
but  its  negation.   A  mind  cannot  think  by  other  laws  than 
its  own. 

Now,  how  far  is  this  hypothesis  supported  by  facts?    Is 
it  a  matter  of  fact,  that  men  are  acquainted  with  certain 
truths  which  they  acknowledge  to  be  necessary  only  while 
the  present  laws  of  nature  remain  in  force,  and  which  they 
can   conceive  as  reversible  at  any  moment,  and   others 
which  they  are  compelled  to  regard  as  necessary  under  all 
circumstances  of  which  they  are  capable  of  thinking?    Is 
it  a  matter  of  fact,  that  men  do  not  attribute  the  same 
necessity  and  universality  to  physical  as  to  mathematical 
truths  ?    Do  they  not  acknowledge  that,  while  the  laws  of 
the  physical  world  continue  as  they  are,  seed-time  and 
harvest,  and  cold  and  heat,  and  summer  and  winter,  and 
day  and  night,  shall  never  cease ;  and  yet,  have  they  any 
difficulty  in  conceiving  the  earth's  motion  stopped  by  some 
superior  power,  and  one-half  of  the  globe  left  from  that 
time  forth  in  perpetual  daylight ?i   Or  do  they  see  the  least 

1  "Tons  los  cxemples  qui  confirment  une  vdrit^  gdn(?nile,  de  qnelnae 
norabre  qu  ils  soient,  ne  sufflscnt  pas  pour  etablir  la  ne.-essite  universelle 
de  cette  raeme  verite:  car  il  ne  suit  pas,  que  ce  qui  est  arrive  arrivera  tou- 
jours  de  meme.  Par  exemple.  les  Grecs  ct  les  Romains  et  tous  les  autre, 
peuples  ont  toujours  remarque,  qu'avant  le  dccours  de  viugt  quatro  hemes 
lejour  se  change  en  nuit.  et  la  nuit  en  jour.    Mais  on  se  seroJt  trompd  si 


improbability,  not  to  say  impossibility,  in  the  supposition, 
that  in  some  remote  part  of  space  there  may  exist  worlds 
in  which  the  alternations  of  the  seasons  have  no  place? 
On  the  other  hand,  can  they  conceive  the  same  power 
forming  a  triangle  with  more  or  less  than  two  right  angles? 
Can  they  conceive  an  occurrence  taking  place  in  any  por- 
tion of  space  without  a  cause  ?  or  an  object  possessing 
neither  of  two  contradictory  attributes  ?  If  such  a  dis- 
tinction exists,  and  our  daily  consciousness  assures  us  that 
it  does,  the  fact  at  once  affords  at  least  a  strong  presump- 
tion that  the  necessity  in  the  one  case  is  a  necessity  of 
observation  only,  depending  on  the  laws  of  the  world 
without,  in  the  other  a  necessity  of  thought,  depending  on 
the  laws  of  our  mental  constitution. 

But,  granting  that  thought  has  its  laws,  how  are  these  to 
be  discovered?  Only  by  reflection  upon  the  phenomena 
of  actual  thinking,  and  the  restriction  to  which,  in  all 
cases,  we  experience  it  to  be  subject.  To  learn  how  we 
think,  we  must  in  the  first  place  actually  think;  and  a 
multitude  of  successive  acts  of  thought  will  be  necessary, 
before  we  become  aware  that  certain  conditions  are  contin- 
gent, and  limited  to  some  of  those  acts  only,  while  others 
are  necessary,  and  cannot  but  be  present  in  all.^  If,  there- 
fore, ^Jxperience  be  taken  in  a  wide  sense,  as  coextensive 
with  the  whole  of  consciousness,  to  include  all  of  which 
the  mind  is  conscious  as  agent  or  patient,  all  that  it  does 

Ton  avoit  crti,  que  la  meme  rfegle  s'observe  partout,  puisqu*on  a  vu  le  con- 
trairo  dans  le  sejour  de  Nova  Zembla.  Et  celui-la  se  tromperoit  encore, 
qui  crolroit,  que  c'est  au  moins  dans  nos  climuts  une  v<?rite'  necessaire  ct 
<ftemelle,  puisqu'on  doit  juger,  que  la  Terre  et  le  Soleil  meme  n'existent 
pas  ncccssairemcnt,  et  qu'il  y  aura  peut-etrc  un  temps,  oil  ce  bcl  astre  ne 
Bcra  plus  avec  tout  son  Systeme,  au  moins  en  sa  presente  forme.*'— Leib- 
nitz, NoitveatLX  Essais,  Avant-Propos. 
1  See  Hamilton  on  Reid,  p.  772,  and  Cousin,  Cours  de  Philosqphie,l^(^.22, 


t 


88 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


from  Within,  as  well  as  all  that  it  suffers  from  without,  — in 
this  sense,  the  laws  of  thought  as  well  as  the  phenomena 
of  matter,  in  fact  all  knowledge  whatever,  may  be  said  to 
be  derived  from  e7^perience>   But  further,  experience  in  its 
narrower  and  more  common  meaning,  as  limited  to  the  re- 
sults of  sensation  and  perception  only,^  is,  though  not  the 
source,  the  indispensable  condition  of  discovering  the  laws 
of  mind  as  well  as  of  matter.     For,  to  think  acUially,  we 
must  think  about  something;  this  something,  the  object- 
matter  of  thought,  whatever  it  may  be,  must  in  the  fii-st 
instance  be  sui>plied  through  the  medium  of  the  senses ; 
for  thought  itself  does  not  become  an  object  of  thought 
till  after  it  has  been  called  into  exercise  by  objects  jfre- 
sented  from  without.^    But  while  the  material  or  external 
element  varies  with  every  successive  act  of  thought,  the 
formal  or  internal  remains  the  same  in  all ;  and  thus  the 
necessary  law,  binding  on  the  thinker  in  every  instance,  is 
distinguished  from  the  contingent  objects,  about  which  he 
thinks  on  this  or  that  occasion. 

The  last  consideration  necessitates  a^  further  division  of 
those  truths  which  have  already  been  distinguished  as 
necessary,  and  therefore  not  derived  from  experience. 
While  we  maintain  that  all  necessary  truths  must  have 

1  In  this  extended  sense.  Wolf  derives  the  principle  of  contradiction 
from  experience:  "£xp.nW  dicimur,  quicquid  ad  pcrceptiones  nostras  at- 
tenti  co-noscimus.  Solem  lucere  co-noscimus  ad  ea  attenti,  qu«  visu  per- 
cipimus.  Similiter  ad  nosmet  ipsos  attenti  co-noscimus,  nos  non  posse 
assensum  pra^bere  contradictoriis,  v.  ^r.  non  posse  sumere  tanqnam  verum 
qnod  simul  pluat  vel  non  pluat."-PA.  Bat.  §  Gdl.  Here  it  should  be  ob^ 
served  that  perception  is  nsed  in  a  wider  sense  than  that  to  which  Reid  and 
the  Scottish  Philosophers  aHer  him  restrict  it. 

2  'Ek  ^iy  oZy  alaH<r^u>,  ^.Woi  /.v^^,;,  U  8i  /xHj^„,  ito\XiKiS  rod  airrov 
yivofiivTii  ^fixtipia.  —  Arist.  Anal  Post.  ii.  19. 

'  Cf.  Arist.  De  Anima,  iii.  4,  7. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


89 


their  origin  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind  itself,  and  are 
virtually  prior  to  all  experience,  they  cannot  aU  of  them 
be  referred  to  Laws  of  Thought,  property  so  called.    For 
thought,  as  thought,  cannot  be  limited  to  any  special  class 
of  objects ;  its  laws  must  operate  in  all  cases  alike,  what- 
ever be  the  matter  on  which  it  is  engaged.     That  every 
triangle  has  its  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles,  is  indeed 
a  necessary  truth ;  but  it  is  true  of  triangles  only,  and  can- 
not  be  applied  to  any  other  object.    But  that  the  same 
subject  cannot  possess  contradictory  attributes,  is  a  princi- 
ple equally  applicable  to  the  objects  of  geometrical  dem- 
onstration and  to  the  most  contingent  facts  of  sensible 
experience.     It  is  equally  certain,  that  no   man   can  at 
once  be  standing  and  not  standing,  as  that  the  angles  of  a 
triangle  cannot  be  both  equal  and  unequal  to  two  right 
angles.    Hence  the  criterion  of  absolute  necessity,  though 
vaUd  as  far  as  it  goes,  is  not  adequate  to  determine  the 
whole   question.     It   serves   to   distinguish  judgments  a 
2yrioH  from  judgments  of  experience :  it  does  not  distin- 
guish  between  different  classes  of  the  former,  nor  explain 
tlieir  several  relations  to  the  mind,  which  is  the  common 
source  of  all.     Of  the  various  judgments  which  have  been 
enumerated  by  philosophers  as  necessary  truths,  it  wiU  be 
sufficient  for  our  present  pui^ose  to  select  three  classes, 
which  may  be  severally  distinguished  as  Mathematical, 
Metaphysical,  and  Logical  Necessity.    All  these,  being  in 
different  ways  regarded  as  absolutely  and  universally  ne- 
cessary, must  be  considered  as  in  different  ways  dependent 
on  laws  of  our  mental  constitution.     From  all  must  be 
distinguished  what  is  commonly  called  Physical  Necessity, 
or  belief  in  the  permanence  of  Laws  of  Nature.    The 
several  distinctions  may  be  represented  by  the  foUowing 

questions : 

o 


90 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


91 


I.  Why  do  I  judge  that  a  triangle  can,  under  no  cir. 
cumstances  wliatever,  liave  its  angles  greater  or  less  than 
two  right  angles? 

II.  Why  do  I  judge  that  every  sensible  quality  must 
belong  to  some  subject,  and  that  every  change  is  and  must 
be  brought  about  by  some  cause? 

III.  Why  do  I  judge  that  two  contradictory  attributes 
can,  under  no  circumstances  whatever,  coexist  in  the  same 
subject  ? 

IV.  Why  do  I  judge  that  the  alternations  of  day  and 
night  will  not,  under  the  existing  circumstances  of  our 
globe,  cease  to  take  place  ? 

The  last  of  these  obviously  stands  on  a  different  ground 
from  the  other  three.     I  am  immediately  cognizant  of  law 
only  as  I   am   conscious  of  its  obligation   upon  mxjself. 
The  law  itself  may  be  physical,  intellectual,  or  moral ;  but 
to  know  it  as  a  law,  I  must  know  it  as  a  condition  which 
I  cannot  or  ought  not  to  transgress.     Law,  in  this  sense, 
as  a  discerned  obligation,  can  obviously  exist  only  in  rela- 
tion to  a  conscious  agent ;  and  even  with  regard  to  con- 
scious agents,  other  than  myself,  I  only  infer  the  existence 
of  the  law  from  a  supposed  similarity  between  their  con- 
stitutions  and   my  own.      But,   as  regards   unconscious 
agents.  Law  means  no  more  than  a  constantly  observed 
fact  in  its  highest  generalization.     When  I  8i)eak  of  the 
alternations  of  day  and  night  as  consequent  on  a  law  of 
nature,  I  mean  no  more  than  that  the  alternation  has  in- 
variably been  observed  to  take  place;  and,  when  I  resolve 
such  alternations  into  the  law  of  the  earth's  rotation,  I 
mean  only  that  the  earth  does  constantly  revolve  on  her 
axis  once  in  twenty-four  hours.     Or,  if  I  could  resolve  all 
the  phenomena  of  the  material  world  into  a  univei-sal  law 
of  gravitation,  I  should  obtain  no  more  than  the  universal 


fact,  that  all  particles  of  matter  in  the  universe  do  gravi- 
tate towards  each  other,  and  that  certain  subordinate  com- 
binations of  those  particles  present  certain  phenomena  in 
so  doing.  But  I  have  not,  by  this  resolution,  got  any 
nearer  to  necessity ;  for  the  gravitation  of  bodies  in  the 
inverse  ratio  of  the  square  of  the  distance  is,  like  the  ebb 
and  flow  of  the  tides,  or  the  elliptical  orbits  of  the  planets, 
an  observed  fact  in  the  order  of  nature,  and  it  is  no  more.^ 
My  belief  in  the  continuance  of  this  observed  order  may 
perhaps  be  explained  by  some  law  of  my  mental  con- 
stitution ;  but,  as  thus  explained,  it  is  a  law  of  mind,  and 
not  of  matter.  Under  what  circumstances  certain  facts 
of  nature  may  be  resolved  into  others,  and  what  kinds  of 
experiment  and  observation  will  contribute  to  this  end, 
are  questions  which,  with  all  their  importance,  are  totally 
distinct  from  those  which  form  the  object  of  the  present 
inquiry. 

I  shall  only  observe  here,  that  to  call  such  questions  a 
portion  of  Logic  —  that  is,  to  regard  the  New  Organon  as 
a  supplement  to  the  Old,  and  both  as  forming  parts  of 
the  same  Science  —  is  to  confound  two  essentially  distinct 
branches  of  knowledge,  distinct  in  their  end,  in  their 
means,  and  in  their  evidence.^  "  We  do  not  enlarge  the 
sciences,"  says  Kant,  "  but  disfigure  them,  when  we  suffer 
their  boundaries  to  run  into  one  another."  The  con- 
fusion produced  in  the  present  instance  is  perhaps  the 
most  injurious  of  all  to  sound  thinking  —  a  confusion  be- 
tween the  mental  self  and  its  sensible  objects,  the  ego  and 
the  non-ego^  the  positive  and  negative  poles  of  speculative 
philosophy, 

1  See  Stewart,  Ekments,  vol.  ii.  ch.  2,  §  4. 

^  On  tlii)^  distinction  some  excellent  remarks  will  be  foand  in  M.  Jouf- 
twy'a  Preface  to  his  translation  of  Reid,  p.  43. 


I 


CHAPTER   IV. 


;i 


ON    THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL    CHARACTER    OF   MATHEMATICAL 

NECESSITY. 

It  has  been  already  observed,  that  whatever  truths  we 
are  compelled  to  admit  as  everywhere  and  at  all  times 
necessary,  must  have  their  origin,  not  without,  in  the  laws 
of  the  sensible  world,  but  within,  in  the  constitution  of  the 
mind  itself.*  Sundry  attemi)ts  have,  indeed,  been  made  to 
derive  them  from  sensible  experience  and  constant  associa- 
tion of  ideas;*  but  this  explanation  is  refuted  by  a  cri- 
terion  decisive  of  the  f ite  of  all  hypotheses :  it  does  not 
account  for  the  phenomena.  It  does  not  account  for  the 
fact,  that  other  associations,  as  frequent  and  as  uniform, 
are  incapable  of  producing  a  higher  conviction  than  that 
of  a  relative  and  physical  necessity  only.  And,  indeed, 
this  might  have  been  expected  beforehand  ;  for  the  utmost 
rigor  in  a  law  of  the  sensible  world  may  furnish  a  sufficient 
reason  why  phenomena  must  take  place  in  a  certain  man- 
ner, but  furnishes  no  reason  at  all  why  I  must  think  so. 

But  it  is  one  thing  to  recognize  the  operation  of  a  men- 

1  "  La  prcnve  ori;;inairo  des  vtfritcfs  iKfccssafres  vfcnt  du  scul  entcnde- 
ment,  et  les  autrcs  veritc's  vienncnt  dcs  experiences  ou  des  observations 
des  sens.  Notre  esprit  est  capable  de  connoitre  les  unes  et  les  autres,  mais 
il  est  la  source  dcs  premiijres,  et  qaelque  nombre  d'exp^riences  partlcu- 
lieres  qu'on  puisse  avoir  d'une  verite  universelle,  on  ne  sauroit  s'cn  assu- 
rer pour  toiyours  par  I'induction,  sans  en  connoitre  la  necessity  par  1a 
raison/'—  Leibnitz,  Nouv.  Essais,  1. 1,  ch.  L 

*  See,  for  example,  Mill's  Logic,  vol.  i.  p.  305. 


PROLEGOMEXA  LOGIC^V. 


93 


tal  law,  and  another  to  discover  the  law  itself.  The  dis- 
tinction above  noticed  between  Mathematical,  Metaphysi- 
cal, and  Logical  Necessity,  implies,  that,  although  the 
ori^nn  of  all  is  to  be  souMit  for  in  the  mind  itself,  they 
are  in  some  way  differently  related  to  one  or  other  of  the 
si)ecial  faculties  of  their  common  source.  AVe  must  further 
inquire,  wliat  is  the  peculiar  relation  of  the  mind  to  mathe- 
matical ideas,^  by  virtue  of  which  not  merely  the  general 
laws  of  all  thinking,  but  the  special  applications  of  those 
laws  in  Arithmetic  and  Geometry,  possess  a  necessity 
which  is  not  found  when  they  are  applied  to  concepts 
generalized  from  experience.  How  is  it  that  in  some  rea- 
sonings both  matter  and  form  can  be  furnished  by  the 
mind  itself,  while  in  others  the  form  alone  is  from  the 
mind,  the  matter  being  derived  from  experience  ? 

Before  entering  upon  this  question,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  give  some  account  of  Kant's  celebrated  distinction 
between  Analytical  and  Synthetical  Judgments.  An  An- 
alytical or  Explicative  Judgment  contains  nothing  in  the 
predicate  but  what  has  been  already  implied  in  the  concep- 
tion of  the  subject.  For  example :  since  the  conception 
of  body  implies  extension,  the  proposition,  "All  bodies  are 
extended,"  is  an  Analytical  Judgment.  Of  this  character 
are  all  pro[)Ositions  in  which,  in  scholastic  language,  the 
predicate  is  said  to  be  of  the  essence  of  the  subject; 
whether  a  part  of  the  essence,  as  in  the  predication  of 
genus  or  differentia,  or  the  sum  of  the  parts,  as  in  a  defini- 
tion.*   In  a  Synthetical  or  Ampliative  Judgment,  on  the 


1  The  word  idea  is  here  used  intentionally,  as,  in  modern  philosophy, 
the  most  va«;ue  and  indeterminate  that  could  be  selected.  It  would  be  an 
anticipation  of  what  has  yet  to  be  determined  to  give  any  more  definite 
expression. 

«  The  substitution  of  definition  for  species  is  intentional. 


94 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


I 

i 


t 

t  ■ 

■I 


other  hand,  the  predicate  adds  an  attribute  to  the  subject 
which  has  not  been  already  thought  therein.  Thus  the 
proposition,  "All  bodies  are  heavy,"  is  a  Synthetical  Judg- 
ment ;  the  attribute  /i^avj/  not  being  thought  in  the  me^e 
conception  of  body.  Of  this  kind  are  all  propositions  in 
which  the  predicate  is  said  to  be  joined  to  the  essence  of 
the  subject  as  a  property  or  accident.^ 

All  Analytical  Judgments  are  formed  by  the  mind  a 
priori,  whether  the  notion  analyzed  be  empirical  or  not. 
For  the  mind,  having  once  gained  this  notion  as  a  subject, 
has  no  occasion  for  any  additional  experience  to  determine 
the  predicate  which  is  already  given  therein.^  Any  Science 
whatever  may  therefore  have  abundance  of  necessary  truths 
of  this  kind ;  but  such  do  not  contribute  in  any  way  to  the 
extension  of  our  knowledge,  but  only  to  a  more  distinct 
consciousness  of  what  we  already  possess.    A  Synthetical 
Judgment,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  positive  extension  of 
our  knowledge,  but  requires  for  its  formation  something 
more  than  the  concept  which  stands  as  its  subject.    All 
empirical  judgments  are  synthetical ;»  but  mathematical 
necessity  requires  that  the  mind  should  be  able  to  form 

for  itself  synthetical  judgments  not  dependent  on  experi- 
ence. 

The  axioms  of  Geometry  contain  specimens  of  both 
kinds  of  judgment.  Those  which  relate  exclusively  to  geo- 
metncal  objects,  -  such  as,  «  A  straight  line  is  the  shortest 
distance  between  two  points,"*  "Two  straight  lines  cannot 
enclose  a  space,"  "Two  straight  lines  which,  being  met  by 
a  third,  make  the  interior  angles  less  than  two  right 

1  See  Kant,  KriUlc  der  r.  V.  p.  21 ;  Prolegomena,  p.  IG,  ed.  Roscnkranz. 

2  Kant,  Proley.,  p.  n. 

s  Kant,  Kritik  der  r.  V.  p.  700;  Proleg.,  p.  18. 

*  This  is  sometimes  given  as  a  definition,  but  it  is  properly  synthetical. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


95 


angles,  will  meet  if  produced" — have  been  shown  by  Kant 
to  be  synthetical;^  and  it  is  with  reference  to  these  that 
he  discusses  the  well-known  question.  How  are  synthetical 
judgments  a  priori  possible  ?  But  those  axioms  which  are 
not  peculiar  to  Geometry,  the  common  principles  of  Aris- 
totle,' —  such  as,  "  The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part," 
"Things  that  are  equal  to  the  same  are  equal  to  each  other," 
"  If  equals  be  added  to  equals,  the  sums  are  equal," — are  ana- 
lytical.^ The  two  last,  indeed,  may  be  easily  shown  to  be 
merely  various  statements  of  the  Principle  of  Identity, 
«  Every  thing  is  equal  to  itself,"  or,  "  A  =  A."  Thus,  if 
the  common  magnitude  of  thie  first  pair  of  equals  be  rep- 
resented by  A,  and  that  of  the  second  by  B,  the  axiom, 
"If  equals  be  added  to  equals,  the  sums  are  equal,"  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  identical  judgment,  "  A  -}-  B  =  A  -f-  B."* 
The  former  class  of   axioms    determine  the  peculiar 


m 


*  "  Dies  sind  die  Axiome,  welche  eigcntlich  nur  Grossen  als  solche  bet- 
reffen."—  Kant,  Kritik  der  r.  V.  p.  143;  cf.  p.  703,  etc. ;  Proleg.  p.  20.  Hence 
the  error  of  Leibnitz,  in  maintaining  that  all  axioms  (excepting,  of  coarse, 
identical  judgments  themselves)  may  be  demonstrated  fVom  definitions 
and  the  judgments  of  identity.  (Opera,  Erdm.  p.  81.)  He  selects  as  a 
specimen  the  analytical  judgment,  "The  whole  is  greater  than  its  part," 
and  of  such  his  theory  is  correct;  but  no  s)Tithetical  judgment  can  be 
proved  solely  from  analytical  premises;  and  without  synthetical  axioms 
Geometry  is  impossible. 

*  Synthetical  axioms  are  not  included,  as  they  should  have  been,  under 
the  peculiar  principles  (tJtoi  ipxal)of  Aristotle,  which  are  divided  into  defi- 
nitions and  hypotheses.  With  the  exception  of  this  omission,  Aristotle's 
account  of  geometrical  demonstration  is  far  more  accurate  than  any  that 
can  be  found  in  modem  philosophy  before  Kant. 

»  Cf.  Kant,  Kritik  der  r.  V.  p.  143. 

*  Dr.  Whewell  {Phil.  Ind.  Sc.  vol.  i.  p.  134)  speaks  of  this  axiom  as  a 
condition  of  the  intuition  of  magnitudes.  This  is  a  confusion  of  the  com- 
mon axioms  of  Logic  with  the  peculiar  axioms  of  Geometry.  Stewart 
{Elements,  vol.  ii.  ch.  1)  falls  into  the  opposite  error,  regarding  all  the 
truths  of  Geometry  as  deduced  from  d^mtions. 


I 


96 


PROLEGOMEXA   LOGICA. 


3 


character  of  nil  the  conclusions  of  Geometry;  the  latter 
have  no  peculiar  relation  to  Mathematics,  but  depend  on 
the  general  conditions  of  all  thinking  whatever,  and  have 
therefore  a  logical,  not  a  mathematical  necessity.  Tho 
whole  question  of  the  superior  necessity  of  Geometry  to 
Physical  Science  depends  upon  the  manner  in  which  wo 
account  for  the  origin  of  the  synthetical  axioms  relating 
to  magnitudes  as  such.  As  an  instance,  we  may  take  the 
proposition,  "Two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space." 

An  eminent  writer  of  the  present  day  has  labored  hard 
to  prove  that  this  principle  is  nothing  but  a  generalizatioa 
from   experience,   and,   consequently,  that   our  belief  in 
the  superior  necessity  of  mathematical  as  compared  with 
physical  truths  is  a  mere  self  deception.     He  lays  much 
stress  on  one  of  the  characteristic  properties  of  geometrical 
forms,  their  capacity  of  being  painted  in  the  imagination 
with  a  distinctness  equal  to  reality;  in  other  words,  the 
exact  resemblance  of  our  ideas  of  form  to  the  sensations 
wliich  suggest  them.^     But  while  it  is  impossible  to  deny 
the  ability  with  which  Mr.  Mill  combats  the  notion  of  an 
a/)riort  necessity  in  Mathematics,  it  is  impossible  to  assent 
to  an  argument  which  contradicts  the  direct  evidence  of 
consciousness.     Nor  docs  this  reasoning  against  Doctor 
Whewell,  however  powerful  as  an  argumentum  ad  homi- 
nem,  meet  the  real  question  at  issue.     Wiiat  is  required 
is  to  account,  not  for  the  necessity  of  geometrical  axioms 
as  tniths    relating  to  objects  without  the  mind,  but  as 
thovf/hts  relating  to  objects  within.     Mathematical  judg- 
ments are  true  of  real   objects  only  hypothetically.     If 
there   exist    anywhere   in   the   M'orld    a   pair   of   perfect 
straight  lines,  those  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space.     But 
if  such  lines  exist  nowhere  but  in  my  imagination,  it  is 

*  Mill's  Logic,  vol.  I.  p.  30D. 


IROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


97 


equally  the  case  that  I  cannot  think  of  them  as  invested 
with  the  contrary  attribute.  That  which  is  to  be  accounted 
for  is,  not  the  physical  fact  that  certain  visible  objects 
possess  certain  properties,  but  the  psychological  fact  that, 
in  the  case  of  geometrical  magnitudes,  I  am  compelled  to 
invest  imagined  objects  with  attributes  not  gained  by 
mere  analysis  of  the  notion  under  which  they  are  thought; 
—  a  compulsion  of  which  I  am  not  conscious  with  regard 
to  the  most  uniform  associations  of  phenomena  within  the 
field  of  sensible  experience.  A  sensible  object  may  have 
been  familiar  to  me  from  childhood  ;  but,  suppose  the 
external  reality  destroyed,  I  can  assert  nothing  with 
certainty  of  its  imaginary  representative,  except  what  is 
contained  in  the  concept  itself  So  long  as  I  have  to 
conform  my  judgments,  not  to  the  actual  laws  of  the 
existing  course  of  nature,  but  to  the  possible  conditions 
of  an  imaginary  state  of  things,  I  have  no  difficulty  in 
attributing  contradictory  attributes  successively  to  the 
same  object.  I  may  imagine  the  sun  rising  and  setting 
as  now  for  a  hundred  years,  and  afterwards  remaining 
continually  fixed  in  the  meridian.  Yet  my  experience 
of  the  alternations  of  day  and  night  has  been  at  least 
as  invariable  as  of  the  geometrical  properties  of  bodies. 
I  can  imagine  the  same  stone  sinking  ninety-nine  times 
in  the  water,  and  floating  the  one-hundredth;  but  my 
experience  invariably  repeats  the  former  phenomenon 
only.  Whereas,  in  the  case  of  two  straight  lines,  which, 
so  far  as  they  are  objects  of  experience,  stand  only  on  a 
level  with  the  above  and  similar  instances,  the  mind  finds 
itself  compelled  to  assert  as  necessary  one  attribute,  not 
contained  in  the  concept,  and  to  reject  its  contradictory 
as  impossible. 

The  possibility  of  forming  synthetical  judgments  a  priori 

9 


m 


ri 


98 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


in  Geometry  admits  of  only  one  adequate  explanation, 
viz^  that  the  presentative  intuition,  as  well  as  the  repre- 
sentative notion, is  derived  from  within,  not  from  without; 
in  other  words,  that  both  the  matter  and  form  of  the 
judgment  are  determined  subjectively.  If  it  can  be  shown 
that  the  object  of  which  pure  Geometry  treats  is  not 
dependent  on  sensibility,  but  sensibility  on  it;  that  it  is 
a  condition  under  which  alone  sensible  experience  is  pos- 
sible, it  is  obvious  that  its  characteristics  must  accompany 
all  our  thoughts  concerning  any  possible  object  of  such 
experience ;  that  its  laws  must  be  equally  binding  upon 
the  imaginary  representation  as  upon  the  sensible  percept : 
for,  abstract  as  we  may  from  this  or  that  particular  phe- 
nomenon of  experience,  we  are  clearly  incompetent  to  de- 
prive it  of  those  conditions  under  which  alone  Experience 
itself  is  possible. 

Such  a  condition  is  furnished  to  us  by  the  intuition  of 
Space.     That  this  is  a  subjective  condition  of  all  sensible 
perception,  and  not  a  mere  empirical  generalization  from  a 
special  class  of  phenomena,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that 
it  is  impossible,  by  any  effort  of  thought,  to  contemplate 
sensible   objects,   save   under  this   condition.      We  may 
shift  our  attention  at  will  from  this  object  to  that ;  but 
we  can  think  of  none  save   as  existing  in  space.    We 
may  conceive  the  whole  world   of  sensible   phenomena 
to  be  annihilated  by  the  fiat  of  Omnipotence ;   but  the 
annihilation  of  space  itself  is  beyond  the  power  of  thought 
to  contemplate.     That  things  in  themselves  must  exist  in 
space,  and,  as  such,  must  be  so  presented  to  every  possible 
intelligence,  is  more  than  we  may  venture  to  affirm ;  but 
this  much  is  certain,  that  man,  by  a  law  of  his  nature, 
is  compelled  to  perceive  and  to  think  of  them  as  so  ex- 
isting. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


99 


Upon  this  law  of  the  mind  depends  the  certainty  of 
geometrical  axioms  as  thoughts,  though  not  as  truths. 
The  peculiar  figures  of  space  must,  indeed,  be  originally 
suggested  empirically,  from  observation  of  the  actual  fig- 
ures of  body ;  but  this  experience  is  still  subject  to  the 
same  condition.  Bodies  cannot  be  perceived  or  imagined, 
but  in  space :  bodies  of  this  or  that  figure  cannot  be 
perceived  or  imagined,  but  as  occupying  a  similarly  figured 
space.  The  modifications  originally  suggested  by  the  for- 
mer become  an  object  of  thought  as  existing  in  the  latter ; 
and  the  features  exhibited  now  and  here  in  the  one,  we 
are  compelled  to  think  as  existing  always  and  everywhere 
in  the  other. 

The  sensationalist  is  therefore,  in  a  certain  sense,  right 
in  deriving  geometrical  axioms  from  experience.  It  must 
be  conceded  to  him  that,  had  we  never  seen  two  straight 
lines,  had  we  never  observed  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  they 
did  not  in  that  particular  instance  enclose  a  space,  we 
should  never  have  arrived  at  the  conviction  that  they 
cannot  do  so  in  any  instance.  But  this  is  equally  true 
of  any  product  of  the  imagination.  If  I  had  never  seen 
separately  the  upper  parts  of  a  man  and  the  lower  parts 
of  a  horse,  I  could  not  unite  them  together  in  the  fantastic 
image  of  a  centaur.  If  I  had  never  seen  a  black  object,  I 
could  not  combine  that  color  with  a  known  form,  so  as  to 
produce  the  imagination  of  a  black  swan.  But  why  is  it 
that  in  the  one  case  I  find  no  difficulty  whatever  in  going 
beyond  or  against  the  whole  testimony  of  my  past  experi- 
ence, while  in  the  other  such  transgression  is  altogether 
out  of  my  power?  Experience  has  uniformly  presented 
to  me  a  horse's  body  in  conjunction  with  a  horse's  head, 
and  a  man's  bead  with  a  man's  body ;  just  as  experience 
has  uniformly  presented  to  me  space  enclosed  within  a 


I 


100 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


U 


pair  of  curved  lines,  and  not  within  a  pair  of  straight  ones. 
Why  do  I,  in  the  former  case,  consider  the  results  of  my 
experience  as  contingent  only  and  transgressible,  confined 
to  the  actual  phenomena  of  a  limited  field,  and  possessing 
no  value  beyond  it ;  while,  in  the  latter,  I  am  compelled 
to  regard  them  as  necessary  and  universal  ?  Why  can  I 
give  in  imagination  to  a  quadruped  body  what  experience 
assures  me  is  possessed  by  bipeds  only?  And  why  can  I 
not,  in  like  manner,  invest  straight  lines  with  an  attribute 
which  experience  has  uniformly  presented  in  curves? 

Can  it  be  said  that  the  ideas  in  the  latter  case  are  con- 
tradictory, and  that  their  union  is  therefore  forbidden  by 
the  laws  of  formal  thinking  ?  By  no  means.  Straight  and 
curved^  viewed  merely  as  objects  of  sense,  are  opposed  only 
as  black  and  white,  or  as  biped  and  quadruped /  they  can- 
not, that  is,  be  thought  as  existing  at  the  same  time  in  the 
same  subject :  but  that  property  which  experience  testifies 
to  have  universally  accompanied  curved  lines  is  not,  merely 
by  virtue  of  that  experience,  more  incompatible  with 
straight  ones  than  the  head  which  has  uniformly  accom- 
panied a  biped  body  is  incompatible  with  a  quadruped 
one  ;  or  than  the  form  which  experience  has  uniformly  con- 
nected with  a  white  surface  is  incompatible  with  a  black 
one.  Nor  does  the  impossibility  arise  from  any  defect  in 
the  simple  ideas,  such  as  exists  in  the  case  of  a  man  who 
can  form  no  idea  of  a  color  which  he  has  never  seen.  We 
have  all  the  simple  ideas,  or  combinations  of  simple  ideas, 
which  experience  can  give ;  man's  head  and  horse's  body, 
in  the  one  case ;  straight  lines  and  space  enclosed,  in  the 
other.  Why  is  not  the  latter  conjunction  as  easy  to  the 
imagination  as  the  former  ? 

That  it  is  not  so,  is  a  matter  not  of  this  or  that  theory, 
but  of  psychological  fact ;  and,  as  such,  requires  explana- 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


101 


tion,  under  any  theory  whatever.  In  fact  we  may  demand, 
as  a  sine  qua  now,  of  every  hypothesis  concerning  the 
character  of  human  knowledge,  that  it  shall  accept  and 
account  for  this  fact,  instead  of  neglecting  or  denying  it. 
Only  two  theories  can  be  mentioned  as  having  fairly  at- 
tempted to  fulfil  this  condition.  The  one  is  that  of  Leib- 
nitz, who  treats  mathematical  principles  as  mere  analytical 
judgments,  dependent  on  the  laws  of  formal  thought.  On 
this  supposition,  the  distinction  between  Logical  and 
Mathematical  necessity  vanishes  altogether.*  But  the 
solution,  though  applicable  to  the  general  axioms  which 
Geometry,  in  common  with  all  other  Sciences,  tacitly  or 
openly  presupposes  in  so  far  as  it  contains  reasoning  at  all, 
fails  when  applied  to  those  on  which  all  that  is  especially 
geometrical  depends.  By  no  mere  analytical  process,  as 
Kant  has  shown,*  can  the  conception  of  not  enclosing  a 
space  be  elicited  from  that  of  two  straight  lines.  In  this, 
and  all  similar  principles,  the  predicate  of  the  proposition 
is  not  developed  out  of,  but  added  to,  the  subject. 

The  other,  and  far  more  satisfactory,  solution,  is  that  of 
Kant  himself  Whatever  we  are  compelled  to  regard  as 
necessary,  must  be  so  in  consequence  of  laws,  not  of  the 
object,  but  of  the  subject.  But  there  are  subjective  laws 
of  the  presentations  of  sense,  as  well  as  of  the  representa- 
tions of  thought.  We  can  perceive  only  as  permitted  by 
the  laws  of  our  perceptive  faculties,  as  we  can  think  only 
in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the  understanding.  If,  then, 
by  a  law  of  my  sensibility,  I  am  compelled  to  regard  all 
external  objects  as  existing  in  space,  any  attributes  which 
are  once  presented  to  me  as  properties  of  a  given  portion 
of  space,  the  same  must  necessarily  be  thought  as  existing 


:\i 


;l 


<lil 


1  Opera,  ed.  Erdmann,  p.  81. 


2  Prolegomena,  §  2. 


9* 


102 


PROLEliOMKNA    LOGIC  A. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


103 


1 

1 

H 

B 

1 

in  all  space,  and  at  all  times.  For  to  imagine  a  space  in 
which  such  properties  are  not  found,  would  not  be  to  im- 
agine merely  a  different  combination  of  sensible  phenom- 
ena, such  as  continually  takes  place  without  any  change  in 
the  laws  of  sensibility  ;  it  would  be  to  imagine  myself  as 
perceiving  under  conditions  other  than  those  to  which,  by 
a  law  of  my  being,  I  am  subjected.  The  attempt  to  realize 
such  imagination  is  not  a  new  train  of  thinking ;  it  is  the 
refusal  to  think  at  all.  It  does  not  inquire  what  new 
objects  may  possibly  be  presented  to  my  present  faculties; 
it  requires  me  to  determine  how  objects  may  appear  to  a 
being  whose  faculties  are  differently  constituted  from  mine. 
Thought,  as  has  already  been  observed,  is  representative, 
and  can  only  be  exercised  on  objects  presented  to  it.  It 
is  therefore  restricted  by  the  conditions  under  which  alone 
such  presentation  is  possible.  If  I  am  to  exercise  my 
thought  on  sensible  objects  at  all,  I  must  think  of  such 
objects  under  such  determinations  as  the  conditions  of  my 
sensibility  require. 

Geometrical  principles  cannot,  therefore,  properly  be 
called  laws  of  thought,  inasmuch  as  they  do  not  govern 
every  operation  of  the  thinking  faculty,  but  only  regulate 
the  application  of  thought  to  a  special  class  of  objects.  But 
they  are  laws  relative  to  the  subjective  condition  of  one 
portion  of  our  intuitions  —  those,  namely,  which  are  pre- 
sented to  the  senses  —  the  condition  of  their  presentation 
being  Space.  But  a  condition  is  discernible  only  in  con- 
junction with  that  of  which  it  is  the  condition.  Space, 
therefore,  and  its  laws  can  be  made  known  to  conscious- 
ness only  on  the  occasion  of  an  actual  experience  of  sense. 
Hence  the  twofold  character  of  geometrical  principles: 
empirical,  as  suggested  in  and  through  an  act  of  experi- 


ence ;  necessary,  as  relating  to  the  conditions  under  which 
alone  such  experience  is  possible  to  human  faculties.* 

The  same  considerations  will  explain  another  important 
feature  of  geometrical  judgments,  in  which  they  represent 
a  striking  contrast  to  truths  properly  called  empirical. 
Imagination  plays  its  part  in  both ;  but  in  the  former  case 
it  determines,  in  the  latter  it  is  determined  by,  the  phe- 
nomena given  in  experience.  The  mental  image  which  I 
can  form  of  this  or  that  individual  possesses  more  or  less 
of  truth  and  reality,  as  it  represents  with  more  or  less 
accuracy  the  features  of  the  sensible  object ;  just  as  the 
value  of  a  portrait  depends  on  the  accuracy  with  which  it 
represents  the  features  of  the  original.  The  imagination, 
again,  may  of  itself  form  new  combinations  of  attributes ; 
but  these  also  are  hypothetically  regarded  as  real  or  fic- 
titious, according  as-We  may  or  may  not  hereafter  discover 
such  combinations  to  exist  in  sensible  objects.  But  in 
Geometry  the  case  is  reversed.  Its  propositions  are 
primarily  and  necessarily  true  of  objects  existing  in  the 
imagination ;  they  are  only  secondary  and  hypothetically 
true  of  sensible  objects,  in  so  far  as  they  conform  to  the 
imaginary  model.  If  there  is  such  a  thing  in  the  visible 
world  as  a  perfect  triangle,  its  angles  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles.  But  if  there  is  not,  the  proposition  is  still 
true  of  the  triangle  as  it  exists  in  my  imagination.     And 

1  This  character  of  the  special  axioms  of  Geometry  is  remarkably  ex- 
pressed in  the  lan^anre  of  Aristotle.  For  example:  aXtr^ais,  oifx  v  rwv 
i8/«r,  AxV  o7qi  al<r^ay6fif^a  Urirh  4v  rois  fia^fiariKOts  lla-xoi'roy  rplyw 
vo¥.  —  Eth.  Nic.  vi.  9.  And  again :  Tavra  8*  iarlv  olov  Spay  rp  yo^<rti. 
^Anal.  Post.  i.  12.  With  which  may  be  compared  the  language  of  Kant, 
Logik,  ^35:  "  Die  crstcn  konnen  in  der  Anschauung  dargestellt  werden." 
Had  Aristotle  been  aware  of  the  distinction  Ixjtween  the  analytical  and  the 
synthetical  axioms,  he  might  almost  have  anticipated  Kant's  view  of  the 
whole  question. 


104 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


PROLEOOUENA  LOGICA. 


105 


l*- 


li 


the  whole  of  Geometry,  as  a  speculative  science,  would  be 
unaffected  by  the  annihilation  of  every  material  square 
or  triangle  in  existence,  whatever  might  become  of  its 
merely  approximate  applications  to  purposes  of  practical 
utility.  Whereas,  the  truths  of  Zoology,  or  Botany,  or 
Mineralogy,  are  dependent  entirely  on  the  existence  of 
animals,  or  plants,  or  minerals,  not  as  images  within  the 
mind,  but  as  entities  without.  The  cause  of  this  distinc- 
tion is  manifest  from  what  has  been  said  above.  The 
truths  of  Geometry,  though  subsequent  to,  are  not  con- 
sequent on,  experience:  they  relate  not  to  the  empiri- 
cal figures  of  body,  but  to  the  figures  of  that  space  upon 
which  sensible  experience  is  dependent.  They  are  there- 
fore unaffected  by  the  destruction  of  the  visible  bodies, 
and  could  only  become  fictitious  by  the  annihilation  of 
space  itself  But  the  truths  of  Physical  Science  depend 
upon  experience  alone :  they  are  true  of  the  objects  only 
as  actually  presented  to  the  senses ;  and  their  reality  de- 
pends entirely  on  the  real  existence  of  the  sensible  type. 

As  Geometry  is  a  science  of  necessary  truths  relating  to 
continuous  quantities  or  magnitudes,  so  Arithmetic  is  a 
science  of  necessary  truths  relating  to  discrete  quantities 
or  numbei-s.  The  two  sciences,  however,  present  some 
important  features  of  distinction.  Almost  all  the  truths 
of  Geometry  are  deductive.  It  contains  very  few  axioms, 
properly  so  called,  i.  €.,  synthetical  judgments,  derived  im- 
mediately from  the  intuition  of  space ;  and  its  processes 
consist  in  the  demonstration  of  a  multitude  of  dependent 
propositions,  from  the  combination  of  these  axioms  with 
analytical  principles.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fundamental 
operations  of  Arithmetic,  Addition,  and  Subtraction,^  pre- 

1  "Though  in  some  things,  as  in  numbers,  besides  adding  and  subtract- 


sent  to  us  a  vast  number  of  synthetical  judgments;  each 
of  which,  however,  is  derived  immediately  from  intuition, 
and  cannot,  by  any  reasoning  process,  be  deduced  from  any 
of  the  preceding  ones.^  Pure  Geometry  cannot  advance  a 
step  without  demonstration ;  and  its  processes  are  there- 
fore all  reducible  to  the  syllogistic  form.  Pure  Arithmetic 
contains  no  demonstration;  and  it  is  only  when  its  calculus 
is  applied  to  the  solution  of  particular  problems  that  rea- 
soning takes  place,  and  the  laws  of  syllogism  become  ap- 
plicable. It  is  not  reasoning  which  tells  us  that  two  and 
two  make  four;^  nor,  when  we  have  gained  this  prof)osi- 
tion,  can  we  in  any  way  deduce  from  it  that  two  and  four 
make  six.  We  must  have  recoui*se,  in  each  separate  case, 
to  the  senses  or  the  imagination,  and,  by  presenting  to 
the  one  or  the  other  a  number  of  individual  objects  corre- 

inp^,  men  name  other  operations,  as  multiplying  and  dividing,  yet  they  are 
the  same:  for  multiplicution  is  but  adding  together  of  things  equal;  and 
division,  but  subtracting  of  one  thing,  as  often  as  we  can." — Ilobbes,  Levi- 
cUhan,  part  i.  ch.  5. 

1  Subtraction  may  be  demonstrated  from  Addition,  if  all  the  truths  of 
the  latter  be  supposed  given,  or  vice  versa ;  though  it  is  simpler  to  regard 
Subtraction  as  an  independent  process  of  denumeration,  as  is  done  by  Con- 
dillac,  Langtte  des  Calculs,  ch.  i.  But  no  result  of  either  can  be  derived 
from  a  preceding  result  of  the  same  operation. 

*  Nothing,  at  first  sight,  can  appear  more  satisfactory  than  Leibnitz's 
proof  of  this  proposition.  Nouv.  Essais,  1.  iv.  ch.  7.  But  that  demon- 
stration assumes  the  definitions  of  the  higher  numbers  (2  is  1  +  1 ;  3  is  1 
-J- 1  +  1,  etc.),  and  this,  as  will  hereafter  appear,  is  in  fact  begging  the 
whole  question.  The  real  point  at  issue  is  not  whether  4  and  2  +  2  are  at 
bottom  identical,  so  that,  both  being  given,  an  analysis  of  each  will  ulti- 
mately show  their  correspondence ;  but  whether  the  former  —  notion,  defini- 
tion and  all  — is  contained  in  the  latter.  In  other  words,  whether  a  man 
who  has  never  learned  to  count  beyond  two,  could  obtain  three,  four,  five, 
and  all  higher  numbers,  by  mere  dissection  of  the  notions  which  he  pos- 
sesses already.  This  remark  applies  also  to  Stewart  {Elements,  vol.  ii.  ch. 
1),  and  to  Hegel's  attempted  critique  of  Kant  ( Werke,  vol.  v.  p.  275). 


106 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


; 


spending  to  each  term  separately,  envisage  the  resulting 
sura.^  The  intuition  thus  serves  nearly  the  same  purpose 
as  the  figure  in  a  geometrical  demonstration ;  with  the  ex- 
ception, that  in  the  latter  case  the  construction  is  adopted 
to  furnish  premises  to  a  proposed  conclusion,  while  in  the 
former  it  gives  us  a  judgment  which  we  have  no  imme- 
diate purpose  of  applying  to  any  further  use. 

An  apparent  objection,  which  meets  us  at  the  outset, 
must  not  be  left  unnoticed.  If  the  results  of  Arithmetic 
are  altogether  intuitive,  how  is  it  that  they  extend  to  cases 
of  which  sense  has  never  furnished  us  with  the  occasion 
of  judging  ?  I  may  have  never  seen  a  thousand  objects 
of  any  kind  together,  yet  I  am  as  fully  convinced  that  976 
-f  24  =  1000,  as  I  am  that  2  +  2=4,  of  which  I  see 
instances  every  day  of  my  life.  And,  even  if  I  have  seen 
examples  of  the  former  as  well  as  of  the  latter,  how  far 
does  the  observed  fact  help  in  the  formation  of  the  judg- 
ment ?  Is  my  sight  so  acute  that  I  can  distinguish  at  a 
glance  a  group  of  1000  objects  from  one  of  999  ?  Can  I 
then,  in  any  case,  be  said  to  have  seen  the  fact  verified  ? 
And  if  not,  how  is  it  that  I  do  not  merely  know  that  what 
I  have  seen  in  a  single  case  must  be  true  universally,  but 
even  can  be  assured  of  the  necessity  of  truths  which  I 
have  never  accurately  observed  in  any  actual  instance  ? 

This  objection  is  based  on  a  confusion  of  intuition  in 
general  with  the  special  presentations  of  sight*   When  the 


I 


1  See  Kant,  Kritik  der  r.  V.  p.  703.  I  have  availed  myself  of  the  term 
envisage^  as  the  best  Enj^lish  equivalent  that  has  yet  been  proposed  to  the 
German  anschauen,  a  word  which  is  applied  ij^enerally  to  any  presentation 
of  individual  objects  in  sense  or  imafrfnation.  Etymologically,  both  the 
German  and  the  Enjjlish  word  are  drawn  from  the  sense  of  sipht  only. 
If  uniformity  alone  were  to  be  consulted,  the  substantive  Anachauung,  usu- 
ally translated  intuition^  should  be  rendered  by  envisaging. 

2  A  confusion  to  which  Kant  himself  has  perhaps,  in  some  degree,  cobo 


PKOLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


107 


propositions  of  Arithmetic  are  said  to  be  intuitive,  it  does 
not  follow  that  their  truth  must  have  been  observed  in 
visible  instances ;  that  we  must  have  seen,  for  example, 
that  two  and  three  make  five,  in  lines,  or  pebbles,  or  the 
fingers  of  the  hand.  It  implies  only  that  we  must  have 
perceived  the  truth  of  the  proposition  in  some  individual 
series,  it  may  be  of  visible  objects,  it  may  be  of  audible 
sounds,  it  may  be  of  states  of  our  own  minds  present  to 
internal  observation.  In  none  of  these  cases  do  we  deal 
with  representative  concepts,  but  with  individual  objects 
presented  to  the  external  or  internal  sense. 

Now,  how,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  arithmetical  judg- 
ments usually  formed  ?  We  see  inexperienced  calculators 
arrive  at  their  results  by  running  through,  orally  or  men- 
tally, the  several  units  of  the  numbers  to  be  added  together. 
If  we  do  not  remember  that  18  and  7  make  25,  as  readily 
as  that  2  and  2  make  4,  we  supply  the  defect  by  summing 
up  severally  19,  20,  21,  etc.  The  artificial  aids  to  which 
we  have  recourse  in  larger  sums,  by  adding  up,  for  instance, 
the  corresponding  digits  in  separate  columns,  are  but  ab- 
breviated steps  of  the  same  process. 

Setting  aside,  as  belonging  to  art  rather  than  science,  all 
those  methods  whose  aim  is  merely  to  extend  or  facilitate 
already  existing  processes,  the  psychological  foundation 
of  Arithmetic  is  to  be  found  in  the  consciousness  of  suc- 
cessive mental  states ;  and  its  eariiest  actual  process  con- 
sists in  giving  names  to  the  several  members  of  the  series. 
Such  a  process,  which  may  be  denominated  natural,  as 
distinguished  from  artificial  numeration,  would  proceed 
steadily  forward,  from  one  member  arbitrarily  selected  as 

tributed,  by  representing  {Proleg.  S  2)  fi^jp  visible  points  as  the  intuition 
of  the  number;  thus  by  implication  connecting  Arithmetic  with  space 
rather  than  with  time. 


h 


^ 


108 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


109 


i 


>     »Wi 


the  starting-point,  acknowledging  no  relation  between  the 
several  steps  beyond  that  of  succession  to  its  predecessor, 
until  the  computation  ceases  from  the  inability  of  the 
memory  to  carry  on  the  series.  Such  a  system,  however 
limited  in  its  practical  results,  would  rest  on  precisely  the 
same  foundation  as  the  more  peifect  methods  which  art 
has  supplied  us,  and  will,  consequently,  contain  all  the  data 
required  for  determining  the  nature  of  the  necessary  truths 
of  Arithmetical  Science. 

As  Arithmetic,  as  well  as  Geometry,  contains  such  truths, 
it  must  be  equally  regarded  as  founded  on  an  internal  law 
or  condition  of  our  mental  constitution.     This  condition 
is  that  of  Time,  a  condition  which  governs  not  merely  our 
external  perceptions,  but  our  universal  consciousness  of  all 
that  takes  place  within  or  without  oui-selves.    Every  suc- 
cessive modification  of  the  conscious  mind  can  be  made 
known  to  us  only  as  a  change  of  state ;  a  change  which  is 
only  possible  under  the  condition  of  succession  in  time, — 
a  transition  from  an  earlier  to  a  later  phase  of  conscious- 
ness.    Of  Time,  as  an  absolute  existence,  we  cannot  form 
any  idea  whatever :  it  is  made  known  to  us  only  as  the 
condition  or  form  of  successive  states  of  consciousness. 
To  ask,  therefore,  whether  Time  has  any  existence  out  of 
our  own  minds,  is,  in  the  only  intelligible  mode  of  putting 
the  question,  to  ask  whether  other  orders  of  intelligent 
beings  are  subject  to  the  same  conditions  of  intelligence 
as  oui-sclves ;  whether  they,  like  us,  are  conscious  of  vari- 
ous mental  states,  one  succeeding  another.     Put  in  this 
form,  the  question  is  sufficiently  intelligible,  but  obviously 
one  which  we  have  no  data  for  determining ;  put  in  any 
other  form,  it  is  absolutely  void  of  meaning ;  it  contains  not 
the  material  for  thought*  but  only  a  negation  of  all  think- 
ing whatever. 


It  might  indeed  be  argued,  with  some  show  of  proba- 
bility, that  the  condition  of  successive  consciousness  is 
essentially  the  condition  of  a  finite  and  imperfect  intelli- 
gence, consequent  only  upon  its  very  limited  power  of 
simultaneous  consciousness.*  The  scholastic  doctrine  of 
an  eternal  Now,  or  nunc  stans,  so  contemptuously  treated 
by  Ilobbes,  in  this  respect  contains  assuredly  no  prima 
facie  absurdity.^  The  error  of  such  speculations  is  of  an- 
other kind.  It  consists  in  mistaking  the  negation  of  all 
thought  for  an  act  of  positive  thinking.  As  our  whole 
personal  consciousness  is  subject  to  the  condition  of  suc- 
cessiveness, we  can  form  no  positive  notion  of  a  diflferent 
state  :  we  only  know  that  it  is  something  which  we  have 
never  experienced.  The  nature  and  attributes  of  an  Infi- 
nite Intelligence  must  be  revealed  to  us  in  a  manner  ac- 
commodated to  finite  capacities.  How  far  the  accommo- 
dation extends,  we  have  no  means  of  determining,  as  we 
cannot  examine  the  same  data  with  a  different  set  of  facul- 
ties.   The  importance  of  this  distinction  between  positive 

1  Vide  Boeth.  De  Consoi.  PhU.,  lib.  v.  pros.  vi. 

*  It  is  surprising  to  sec  how  near  some  of  the  earlier  views  on  this  point 
approached  to,  without  actually  arriving  at,  the  doctrine  of  Kant.  Had 
the  question  been  considered  sul»jectively  as  well  as  objectively,  on  the 
fisychoIo«dcal  as  well  as  on  the  metaphysical  side,  the  most  important 
conclusion  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  would  have  been  anticipated.  When 
Hobbes,  in  his  controversy  with  Bramhall,  said,  "I  never  could  conceive 
an  ever-abiding  now,"  he  was  right;  but  he  was  wrong  in  supposing  that 
this  was  decisive  of  the  point  at  issue.  We  can  only  conceive  in  thought 
what  we  have  experienced  in  presentation;  and  all  our  past  presentations 
have  been  given  under  the  law  of  succession.  But  this  does  not  enable  us 
to  decide  what  may  be  the  condition  of  other  than  human  intelligences. 
In  this  respect,  the  remark  of  Bramhall  is  exactly  to  the  purpose: 
"  Though  we  are  not  able  to  comprehend  perfectly  what  God  is,  yet  wo 
are  able  to  comprehend  what  God  is  not;  that  is,  he  is  not  imperfect, 
and  therefore  he  is  not  finite."  Reid  (Intell  Powers,  Essay  iii.  ch.  3)  treats 
the  nunc  stans  as  a  contradiction,  which  it  is  not. 

10     . 


i 


no 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


Ill 


and  negative  thinking  will  be  more  closely  examined  here- 
after. 

But,  to  return  to  the  question  of  mathematical  necessity : 
To  construct  the  whole  science  of  Arithmetic,  it  is  only 
requisite  that  we  should  be  conscious  of  a  succession  in 
time,  and  should  be  able  to  give  names  to  the  several 
members  of  the  series.  And  since  in  every  act  of  con- 
sciousness we  are  subject  to  the  law  of  succession,  it  is 
impossible  in  any  form  of  consciousness  to  represent  to 
ourselves  the  facts  of  Arithmetic  as  other  than  they  are. 
To  the  art,  not  to  the  science,  of  Arithmetic  belong  all  the 
methods  for  facilitating  calculation  which  imply  anything 
more  than  the  mere  idea  of  succession.  Such  a  method, 
and  a  powerful  one,  is  afforded  by  the  invention  of  Scales 
of  Notation,  in  which,  to  the  idea  of  succession,  is  added 
that  of  recurrence  ;  the  series  being  regarded  as  commenc- 
ing again  from  a  second  unit,  after  proceeding  continuously 
through  a  certain  number  of  members,  ten  for  example,  as 
in  the  common  system.  Hence  we  are  enabled  to  repeat 
over  again,  in  the  second  and  subsequent  decades,  the 
operations  originally  performed  in  the  fii-st,  and  thus  indef- 
initely to  extend  our  calculus  in  the  form  of  a  continually 
recurring  series ;  but  the  calculus,  though  thus  rendered 
infinitely  more  efficacious  as  an  instrument,  remains  in  iti 
psychological  basis  unaltered. 

From  these  considerations  it  follows  that  the  several 
members  of  an  arithmetical  series  are  incapable  of  defi- 
nition. Succession  in  time,  and  the  consciousness  of  one, 
ttco,  three,  etc.,  are  not  complex  notions  abstracted  from 
and  after  a  multitude  of  intuitions,  but  simple  immediate 
intuitions,  differing,  as  far  as  numeration  is  concerned,  only 
in  the  order  of  their  presentation.  They  are  not  by  any 
act  of  thought  compounded,  the  latter  from  the  earlier : 


^ 


they  cannot  be  resolved  into  any  simpler  elements  of  con- 
sciousness, preseutative  or  representative,  being  themselves 
the  a  priori  conditions  of  consciousness  in  general.  Hence 
the  fiilure  of  all  attempts  to  analyze  numerical  calculation 
as  a  deductive  process.  Leibnitz,  and  subsequently  Hegel, 
have  endeavored  to  represent  the  arithmetical  processes  as 
operations  of  pure  analysis.  Assuming,  for  example,  12 
and  7  and  5,  as  give^i  concepts,  they  show  that  the  first 
may  be  ultimately  analyzed  into  the  same  constituent  units 
as  the  two  last ;  and  this  is  regarded  as  an  explanation  of 
the  whole  process  of  Addition.  They  overlook  the  fact 
that,  in  thfit  process,  12  is  not  given,  but  has  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  addition  of  the  two  other  numbers.  Arith- 
metic is  not,  like  Geometry,  a  science  whose  definitions 
are  genetic  and  preliminary  to  its  processes.  The  analysis 
of  any  number  into  its  constituent  units  presupposes  the 
whole  operation  which  it  professes  to  give  rise  to.  We 
may  call,  if  we  please,  such  an  analysis  definition  ;  but  we 
must  not  suppose  that  it  in  any  degree  corresponds  to  the 
definitions  of  Geometry,  or  answers  the  same  purpose  in 
the  operations  of  the  science.* 

The  above  considerations  are  sufficient  for  our  present 
purpose,  which  is  to  determine  the  psychological  basis  of 
mathematical  judgments,  and  their  consequent  special  char- 
acter as  necessary  truths,  in  a  distinct  sense  from  that  in 

1  Writers  of  a  very  different  school  fVom  that  of  Leibnitz  or  Hegel  have 
fallen  into  a  similar  error  with  re;^rd  to  the  nature  of  arithmetical  pro- 
cesses. Mr.  Mill,  for  example,  regards  the  whole  science  of  numbers  as 
derived  from  the  common  axioms  concerning  equality,  and  the  definitions 
of  the  several  numbers.  Stewart  appears  to  have  been  of  the  same 
opinion.  On  the  contrary,  the  whole  essentials  of  the  science  must  be  in 
existence  before  the  so-called  definitions  can  be  formed.  The  applications 
of  the  calculus  as  an  instrument  must  not  be  confounded  with  its  essential 
constituents  as  a  science. 


^\ 


112 


raOLBGOMENA   LOOICA. 


Which  the  term  is  applied  to  logical  or  physical  principles. 
JUathematical  judgments  are  synthetical,  based  on  the 
universal  conditions  of  our  intuitive  faculties,  and  are  ne- 
cessary, not,  properly  speaking,  as  laws  of  thought,  but 
because  thought  can  only  operate  in  conjunction  with  mat- 
ter given  by  intuition,  and  intuition  cannot  be  emancipated 
from  Its  own  subjective  conditions.    Hence  we  are  com- 
pelled to  think  of  our  intuitions  under  the  same  laws 
according  to  which  they  are  invariably  realized  in  con- 
sciousness.   Judgments  of  logical  necessity,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  analytical,  and  rest  on  the  laws  of  thought  prop- 
erly so  called.    Their  analytical  character  is  a  necessary 
consequence  of  the  constitution  of  the  thinking  faculty 
and  ,3  so  far  from  being  a  proof  of  the  unsoundness  or 
Inyohty  of  logical  speculations,  that  it  is  the  strongest 
evidence  of  their  truth  and  scientific  value,  and  leads  to 

most  important  consequences,  both  in  Logic  and  in  Psy- 

chology.  ^ 

The  nature  of  these  judgments,  as  well  as  of  those  dis- 
tmguished  as  metaphysically  necessary,  wiU  be  examined 
m  the  following  chapters. 


r 


CHAPTER    V. 

ON  THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   CHARACTER   OP  METAPHYSICAL 

NECESSITY. 

A  DISTINCTION  between  necessary  and  contingent  matter 
is  found,  somewhat  out  of  place  it  is  true,  but  still  it  is 
found,  in  most  of  the  older,  and,  among  English  writers,  in 
most  also  of  the  recent  treatises  on  Losric.^  The  bounda- 
ries  of  each,  however,  are  not  in  the  majority  of  instances 
determined  with  any  approach  to  accuracy.  Among  the 
schoolmen,  the  favorite  example  of  a  pioposition  of  the 
highest  degree  of  necessity  was  omne  animal  rationale  est 
risibile;  an  example  consistent  enough  with  the  mediaeval 
state  of  physical  science,  but  which  in  the  present  day  will 
scarcely  be  allowed  a  higher  degree  of  certainty  than 
belongs  to  any  other  observed  fact  in  the  constitution  of 
things.  An  eminent  modern  Logician  gives  as  an  exam- 
ple of  a  proposition  in  necessary  matter,  "  All  islands  are 
surrounded  by  water ; "  an  example  which  is  only  valid  in 

>  Matter  in  this  sense  must  not  be  confounded  with  the  modality  reco^- 
nizcil  by  Aristotle,  and  by  most  of  the  modem  German  Lonricians.  The 
former  Is  an  understood  relation  between  the  terms  of  a  proposition,  —  tlio 
form  of  the  proposition  being  in  all  cases  "A  is  B,"—  and  is  supposed  to 
be  of  use  in  determining  the  quantity  of  indefinites.  The  latter  is  an  ex- 
pressed relation,  the  form  of  the  necessary  proposition  l^eing  "A  must  l^c 
B;"  and  this  is  applicable  to  universal  and  particular  propositions  indiffer- 
ently. The  admission  of  the  latter  is  still  a  point  of  dispute  among  emi- 
nent authorities;  the  admission  of  the  former  will  be  tolerated  by  no 
Logician  who  understands  the  nature  of  his  own  science. 

10* 


n 


114 


PKOLKQOMEJfA  LOGICA. 


«o  far  as  the  predicate  forms  part  of  the  notion  of  the 
subject,  and  which,  therefore,  has  no  other  necessity  than 
belon«.stoaU  analytical  judgments, -a  necessity  derived 

fZf  r  r .""'  *■■■*""  '^'  '"""*=^-'  The  distinction 
Itself,  though  altogether  out  of  place  when  Thought  is 

consu lered  merely  in  its  relation  to  Logic,  is,  in  a  psycho- 
Iog.cal  pomt  of  view,  of  considerable  importance  The 
following  remarks  will,  it  is  hoped,  throw  some  light  on  its 
true  character.  ^ 

~r',!!*'''V"*'^'"'"''  '"■'  "^"^^^^^  »»'»  they  cannot 
p  opery  be  said  to  be  in  necessary  „,aUer.     They  are  all 

ultimately  dependent  on  the  Principles  of  Ideniity  and 
Contradiction,  "Every  A  is  A,"  and  "No  A  is  not  A- 
pnncplea^  the  necessity  of  which  arises  solely  from  their 
form,  without  any  relation  to  this  or  that  matter.  That 
every  triangle  has  three  sides,  arises  from  a  mere  analysis 
of  the  notion  of  a  triangle;  as  that  every  island  is  sur- 
rounded by  water,  arises  from  a  mere  analysis  of  the  notion 
of  an  island.  This  necessity  is  derived  solely  from  the 
laws  of  formal  thinking.  ^ 

ftct  IS  m  contingent  matter;  at  least  if  the  oppos  te  term 
be  used  in  its  highest  sense.  However  rijidly  certain 
phenomena  may  be  deduced  from  the  assumptioHf  ; 

in  Which  .he  pX,:  : j^t    '"or  r*"'"'"  '"■"'"  ""*"'"^  """'" 
'  i^&nt,  Anttk  der  r   Vn  ii-j.   vt^j       ,  «  "*"u„iu. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


115 


general  law  of  nature,  the  law  itself  remains  nothing  more 
than  an  observed  fact,  of  which  we  can  give  no  other 
explanation  than  that  it  was  the  will  of  the  Creator  to 
constitute  things  in  a  certain  manner.  For  example :  that 
a  body  in  motion,  under  certain  conditions  of  projection, 
and  attracted  by  a  force  varying  inversely  as  the  square  of 
the  distance,  will  describe  an  ellipse  having  the  centre  of 
attraction  in  one  of  the  foci,  —  this  is  matter  of  demon- 
stration ;  but  that  the  earth  is  such  a  body,  acted  upon  by 
forces  of  this  description,  is  matter  of  fact,  of  which  we 
can  only  say  that  it  is  so,  and  that  it  might  have  been 
otherwise.  The  original  premise  being  thus  contingent,  all 
deductions  from  it  are  materially  contingent  likewise. 

The  same  is  the  case  with  all  psychological  judgments, 
BO  far  as  they  merely  state  the  fact  that  our  minds  are 
constituted  in  this  or  that  manner.  But  there  is  one  re- 
markable difference  between  this  contingency  and  that 
which  is  presented  by  physical  phenomena.  The  laws  of 
the  latter  impose  no  restraint  on  my  powers  of  thought : 
relatively  to  me,  they  are  simply  universally  observed  facts. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  impediment  to  my  uniting  in  a 
judgment  any  two  notions  once  formed;  though  the  corre- 
sponding objects  cannot,  consistently  with  existing  laws 
of  nature,  be  united  in  fact.  I  may  thus  conceive  a  moun- 
tain moving,  or  a  stone  floating  on  the  water ;  though  my 
experience  has  always  presented  to  me  the  mountain  as 
standing,  and  the  stone  as  sinking.  But  as  regards  Psy- 
chology, the  powera  of  my  mind  cannot  be  presented  to 
consciousness,  but  under  one  determinate  manifestation. 
The  only  variety  is  found  in  the  objects  on  which  they 
operate.  I  am  thus  limited  in  my  power  of  forming  notions 
at  all,  in  all  cases  where  I  am,  by  mental  restrictions,  pre- 
vented from  experiencing  the  corresponding  intuition.    I 


116 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


have  thus  a  negative  idea  only  of  the  nature  of  an  intelli- 
gent  being  constituted  in  a  different  manner  from  myself; 
though  I  have  no  difficulty  in  supposing  that  many  such 
exist.     I  can  suppose,  for  instance,  that  there  may  exist 
beings  whose  knowledge  of  mateiial  objects  is  not  gained 
through  the  medium  of  bodily  senses,  or  whose   under- 
standing has  a  direct  power  of  intuition  ;  but  to  conceive 
such   a  being  is  beyond   my  power;    conception   being 
limited   to   the  field  of  positive   intuitions.     In   anotheT 
point  of  view,  both  physical  and  psychological  judgmenU 
may  be  called  necessary ;  as  the  consequence  of  certain 
established  laws,  which  laws,  however,  might  have  been 
otherwise.    In  this  sense,  both  might  be  classified  as  %>o- 
thetically  necessary;''    in  opposition  to  another  class  of 
judgments,  those  relating  to  human  actions,  which,  as  will 
hereafter  appear,  are,  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  term,  con- 
tingenU    For  logical  purposes,  however,  the  former  classi- 
fication is  preferable. 

On  the  other  hand,  mathematical  judgments  have  been 
almost  univei-sally  regarded  as  belonging  to  the  province 
of  necessary  matter.'  We  can  suppose  the  possibility  of 
beings  existing  whose  consciousness  has  no  relation  to 
space  or  lime  at  all.  We  can  suppose  it  possible  that  some 
change  in  our  mental  constitution  might  present  us  with 
the  intuition  of  space  in  more  than  three  dimensions.  This 
is  no  more  than  to  admit  the  possible  existence  of  iutelli- 

I  For  this  expression  see  Leibnitz,  Th€odic€e,  S  37;  Daval^ouve,  Ij^q^ 
p.  /8. 

-'  Universally  amonp:  those  who  have  accurately  distinguished  intenimble 
from  sensible  magnitude.    The  objections  of  Sextus  Empiricus  in  ancient 
and  of  Hume  in  modem  times,  among  skeptics,  so  far  as  thev  have  any 
special  i-elation  to  Geometry,  as  well  as  those  of  M.  Comte  and  Mr.  MiU 
among  sensationalists,  arc  mainly  based  on  a  confusion  of  these  two.       ' 


PBOLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


117 


gent  creatures  otherwise  constituted  than  ourselves,  and, 
consequently,  incomprehensible  by  us.  But  to  suppose  the 
existence  of  geometrical  figures,  or  arithmetical  numbers, 
such  as  those  with  which  we  are  now  acquainted,  is  to 
suppose  the  existence  of  space  and  time  as  we  are  now 
conscious  of  them ;  and,  therefore,  relatively  to  beings 
whose  mental  constitution  is  so  far  similar  to  our  own. 
Such  a  supposition,  therefore,  necessarily  carries  with  it 
all  the  mathematical  relations  in  which  time  and  space,  as 
given  to  us,  are  necessarily  thought.  For  mathematical 
judgments  strictly  relate  only  to  objects  of  thought,  as 
existing  in  my  mind ;  not  to  distinct  entities,  as  existing 
in  a  certain  relation  to  my  mind.  They  therefore  imply 
no  other  existence  but  that  of  a  thinking  subject,  modified 
in  a  certain  manner.  Destroy  this  subject,  or  change  its 
modification,  and  we  cannot  say,  as  in  other  cases,  that  the 
object  may  possibly  exist  still  without  the  subject,  or  may 
exist  in  a  new  relation  to  a  new  subject ;  for  the  object 
exists  only  in  and  through  that  particular  modification  of 
the  subject,  and  on  any  other  supposition  is  annihilated 
altogether.  It  is  thus  impossible  to  suppose  that  a  triangle 
can,  in  relation  to  any  intelligence  whatever,  have  its  angles 
greater  or  less  than  two  right  angles,  or  that  two  and  two 
should  not  be  equal  to  four ;  though  it  is  possible  to  sup- 
pose the  existence  of  beings  destitute  of  the  idea  of  a 
triangle  or  of  the  number  two.  This  is  necessary  matter, 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term ;  a  relation  which  our  minds 
are  incapable  of  reversing,  not  merely  positively,  in  our 
own  acts  of  thought,  but  also  negatively,  by  supposing 
others  who  can  do  so. 

There  is  one  other  science  which  has  frequently  been 
supposed  to  share  this  necessity  with  Mathematics.  Met- 
aphysics, though,  so  far  as  it  deals  in  merely  analytical 


f'i 


118 


PROLEGOMEKA   LOOICA. 


judgments,  it  has  been  sufficiently  shown  by  Kant  to  be 
incapable  of  leading  to  any  scientific  results,  is  frequently 
regarded  as  possessing  a  certain  number  of  syntlietical 
axioms,  which,  under  the  various  names  of  Principles  of 
Necessary  Truth,  Fundamental   Laws  of  Human  Belief, 
and  sometimes  even  (however  incorrectly)  of  Laws  of 
Thought,'  have  held  a  prominent  place  in  various  systems 
of  philosophy  down  to  the  present  time.    Two  of  these 
principles  may  be  especially  selected  for  examination,  partly 
on  account  of  the  importance  attached  to  them  by  eminent 
wnters,  and  partly  on  account  of  their  relation  to  the  Forms 
of  Thought  recognized  by  Logic. 

1.  The  Principle  of  Substance.  All  objects  of  percep- 
tion are  Qualities  which  exist  in  some  Subject  to  which 
they  belong. 

2.  The  Principle  of  Caus.ility.»  Whatever  begins  to 
exist  must  take  place  in  consequence  of  some  Cause 

«I  perceive,"  says  Reid,  «in  a  biUiard-baU,  figure,  color. 

'  This  nomenclMnre  is  sanctioned  by  the  aathori.y  of  M.  Boyer-Collart. 
irois  lois  dc  la  pcnsee  concourent  dans  la  perception 

Jl  ^'fT'^"^  "'  1'in.pcnetrabiUte  ont  un  .^  auquel  eUcs  sont  toher- 
entes,  et  dans  Icqud  elles  coexistent. 

2o.  routes  les  choses  sont  placecs  dans  une  d«r€e  aLsolue,  k  laquelte 
elles  particpent  eomrae  si  elles  Aaient  une  seule  et  meme  chose 

Inl'^T^T^  commence  i  exister  a  ^ttJ  prodm,  par  une  catue."- 
JoufTroy's  Beid,  vol.  iv.  p.  447. 

«  Called  also  the  Principle  of  SuJ/icien,  Reason,  or  of  Determining  Season  ■ 
though  these  expressions,  as  Sir  William  Hamilton  has  observed,  an,  use<i 

duced  and,  3  ,  The  logical  or  ideal  principle.  Why  a  thing  Is  it,«,„„  or 
«.»c„«rf.  _  Hamilton  on  Reid.  p.  m.   Cf.  Leibnitz's  Fifth  Letter  to  oLZ 

do  besom  d  une  raison  sufflsante,  pour  qu'une  chose  existe,  qu'un  ^vej 
ment  amve,  qu'une  veritc  ait  lieu."  For  a  criticism  on  the  principle 
U.US  given,  see  Herbart,  LeHrluC  .-ur  EinUitun,  in  di,  FkOaso^'l 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


119 


and  motion ;  but  the  ball  is  not  figure,  nor  is  it  color,  nor 
motion,  nor  all  these  taken  together;  it  is  something  that 
h.-»s  figure,  and  color,  and  motion.  This  is  a  dictate  of 
nature,  and  the  belief  of  all  mankind.'" 

On  the  other  hand.  Bishop  Berkeley  had  labored  hard 
to  prove  that  it  was  much  more  consonant  to  nature,  and 
to  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  to  deny  altogether  the 
existence  of  this  imperceptible  substance,  the  supposed 
support  of  perceptible  attributes.     « I  do  not  argue,"  he 
says,  « against   the  existence  of  any  one  thing  th.it  we 
can  apprehend,  either  by  sense  or  reflection.    That  the 
things  I  see  with  mine  eyes  and  touch  with  my  h.inds  do 
exist,  really  exist,  I  make  not  the  least  question.    The  only 
thing  whose  existence  we  deny,  is  that  which  philosophers 
call  matter,  or  corporeal  substance.    And  in  doing  of  this 
there  is  nl^  damage  done  to  the  rest  of  mankind,  who  I 
dare  say,  will  never  miss  it.    The  atheist,  indeed,  will  want 
the  color  of  an  empty  name  to  support  his  impiety ;  and 
the  philosophers  m.-xy  possibly  find  they  have  lost  a  great 
handle  for  trifling  and  disputation." 

"It  will  be  urged,"  he  continues,  "th.nt  thus  much  at 
least  IS  true,  to  wit,  that  we  take  away  all  corporeal  sub- 
stances. To  this  my  answer  is,  that  if  the  word  substance 
be  taken  in  the  vulgar  sense,  for  a  combination  of  sensible 
qualities,  such  as  extension,  solidity,  weight,  and  the  like  — 
this  we  cannot  be  accused  of  taking  away.  But  if  it  be 
taken  in  a  philosophic  sense,  for  the  support  of  accidents 
or  qualities  without  the  mind—  then  indeed  I  acknowledge 
that  we  take  it  away,  if  one  may  be  said  to  take  away  that 

'  Tntaiennal  Pou^s.  Essay  ii.  ch.  19.  Compa.^  Descartes,  Meditatio 
Secunda,  who  adduces  the  changes  in  a  piece  of  wax  as  an  argument  to 
show  that  the  thing  Iteelf  is  conceived  as  something  distinct  from  its  sen- 
sible qoalities. 


')ll 


i 


120 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


I 


which  never  had  any  existence,  not  even  in  the  imagina- 
tion." 1 

But  after  Berkeley  came  Hume,  who  applied  to  the 
phenomena  of  internal  perception  the  same  process  of 
reasoning  which  Berkeley  had  applied  to  the  external. 
Within  myself,  he  argued,  I  am  conscious  only  of  impres- 
sions and  ideas.  The  substance  called  Mind  is  a  mere 
fiction,  imagined  for  the  support  of  these,  as  the  substance 
called  Matter  is  imagined  for  the  support  of  sensible  qual- 
ities.*  In  opposition  to  these  skeptical  conclusions,  Reid 
and  his  disciples  appealed  to  the  authority  of  ceilain  uni- 
versally acknowledged  axioms,  distinguished  as  Principles 
of  Common  Sense,  or  Fundamental  Laws  of  Human  Belief, 
of  which  we  can  give  no  other  account  than  that  such  is 
our  constitution,  and  we  must  think  accordingly.  One  of 
these  is  the  Principle  of  Substance,  mentioned^bove. 

It  is  necessary  to  speak  with  diffidence  on  a  point  dis- 
puted by  philosophers  of  such  eminence ;  but  if  there  be 
any  truth  in  the  psychological  distinction  between  Thought 
and  Intuition,  noticed  in  my  first  chapter,  it  will  appear 
that  the  Scottish  philosophers,  in  endeavoring  to  overthrow 
Hume  and  Berkeley  at  once,  abandoned  the  only  position 
from  which  an  attack  might  have  been  successfully  made 
on  either  of  them  separately.  Hume's  philosophy  is  not 
a  legitimate  development  of  Berkeley's,  unless  we  allow 
that  our  consciousness  of  mind,  as  well  as  of  matter,  is 
representative  only.  If  it  be  true  that  neither  mental  nor 
material  substance,  as  distinguished  from  the  various  states 
and  attributes  of  either,  is  in  any  manner  presented  intui- 
tivdy,  the  two  theories  must  stand  or  fall  together.     And 

1  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  xxxr.,  xxxrll. 
'  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  part  iv.  ^  5,  6. 


i' 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


121 


this  point  is  over  and  over  again  conceded  by  Reid  and 
Stewart.^ 

Under  this  concession,  the  appeal  to  a  fundamental  law 
of  belief  is  insufficient.    Such  a  law  can  only  state  the  fact, 
that  we  are  by  our  constitution  compelled  to  believe  in  a 
certain  relation  between  two  given  notions :  it  does  not 
explain  how  either  of  such  notions  could  have  entei-ed 
into  the  mind  in  the  first  instance.    But  the  appeal  becomes 
self-contradictory  in  the  hands  of  any  one  who  admits  the 
views  of  Locke,  or  of  Kant,  concerning  the  limits  of  the 
understanding.'     Either  a  presentative  origin   must  be 
found  for  the  notions  of  substance  and  cause,  or  we  must 
admit  that,  in  these  instances,  the  act  of  thought  has 
created  its  own  objects. 

We  are  therefore  compelled  to  ask.  Is  this  asserted 
analogy  between  our  modes  of  consciousness  in  relation 

»  For  example:  "The  attributes  of  individuals  is  all  that  we  distinctly 
conceive  about  them.    It  is  true,  we  conceive  a  subject  to  which  the  attri- 
butes  belong;  but  of  this  subject,  when  its  attributes  are  set  aside  we 
have  but  an  obscure  and  relative  conception,  whether  it  be  body  or  mind  " 
--  Reid.  Int.  Powers,  Essay  v.  chap.  2.    "  It  is  not  matter,  or  bodv,  which 
I  perceive  by  my  senses;  but  only  extension,  fi^^re,  color,  and  certain 
other  qualities,  which  the  constitution  of  my  nature  leads  me  to  refer  to 
something  which  is  extended,  floored,  and  colored.    The  case  is  precisely 
Hmilar  with  respect  to  mind.    We  are  not  immediately  conscious  of  its 
existence  but  we  are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought,  and  volition;  oper- 
anons^  which  imply  the  existence  of  something  which  feels,  thinks,  and 
wills.   —  Stewart,  Elements,  Introd.  part  I. 

«  Yet  Kant,  no  less  than  Reid,  allows  that  we  are  not  immediately 
conscious  of  mind,  but  only  of  its  phenomena.  In  his  hands,  however 
the  concession  is  peri^ectly  suicidal,  and  forms  the  weak  part  of  the  Criti- 
cal Philosophy.  The  reader  who  bears  this  inconsistency  in  mind,  may 
perhaps  find  an  easier  solution  to  some  of  Kant's  Paralogisms  and  Antl- 
nom.es  of  Pure  Reason  than  could  have  t>een  given  by  the  author  himself. 
On  tins  subject,  the  admirable  remarks  of  M.  Cousin,  in  his  Sixth  Lecture 
on  Kant,  should  be  consulted. 

11 


122 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


i| 


to  matter  and  mind  really  tenable?  Does  it  not  rather 
appear  a  flat  self-contradiction  to  maintain  that  I  am  not 
immediately  conscious  of  myself,  but  only  of  my  sensations 
or  volitions ?  Who,  then,  is  this  I  that  is  conscious;  and 
how  can  I  be  conscious  of  such  states  as  mine?  In  this  case 
it  would  surely  be  llir  more  accurate  to  say,  not  that  I  am 
conscious  of  my  sensations,  but  that  the  sensation  is  con- 
scious of  itself;  but,  thus  worded,  the  glaring  absurdity 
of  the  theory  would  carry  with  it  its  own  refutation.^ 

The  one  presented  substance,  the  source  from  which  our 
data  for  thinking  on  the  subject  are  originally  drawn,  is 
myseip    Whatever  may  be  the  variety  of  the  phenomena 

1  Since  the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of  this  work,  the  author  has 
met  with  the  followin-  passaj^e  in  Jouffroy's  Nouveaux  M€lauyes  Fhiloso- 
phiques,  p.  275,  in  which  the  above  arjniment  has  been  anticipated  in  sub- 
stance,  and  almost  in  language:  "Thfese  singulifere  k  soutenir  que  jc  ne 
saisis  pas  la  cause  qui  est  wo^  que  je  sens  ma  pcnse'e,  ma  volonte,  ma  sen- 
sation,  mais  que  je  ne  me  sens  pas  pcnsant,  voulant,  sentanti  Mais  d'ou 
saurais-jo  alors  que  la  pensec,  la  volonte,  la  sensation  que  je  sens,  sont 
miennes,  qu'elles  cmanent  de  moi,  et  non  pas  d'uue  autre  cause  ?  Si  ma 
conscience  ne  saisissait  que  la  pensee,  je  pourrais  bien  concevoir  que  la 
pensce  a  une  cause;  mais  ricn  ne  ra'apprcndrait  quelle  est  cette  cause,  ni 
si  elle  est  moi  ou  toute  autre.  La  pcnsde  ne  ra'apparaitrait  done  pas  com'me 
mienne.  Ce  qui  fait  qu'clle  m'apparait  coramc  mienne,  c'est  que  je  la  sens 
emaner  de  moi ;  et  ce  qui  fait  que  jo  la  sens  emaner  de  moi,  c'est  que  je 
sens  la  cause  qui  la  produit  et  que  jc  me  reconnais  dans  cette  cause." 

2  Thus  Descartes  observes  iMeditatio  Tertia):  "  Ex  lis  vero  qua;  in  ideis 
pcnim  corporallum  clara  et  distincta  sunt,  quiedum  ab  idea  raei  ipsius 
videor  mutuari  potnisse,  nempe  substantiam,  durationem,  numerum,  et  si 
quae  alia  sunt  ejusmodi."  This  passa-e  perhaps  su-gested  the  obserra- 
tion  of  an  illustrious  French  disciple  of  the  Scottish  philosophy,  who  has 
thus  supplied  a  marked  deficiency  in  the  system  of  his  masters:  "  Lo 
moi,"  says  M.  Royer-CoUard,  "est  la  seule  unit^  qui  nous  solt  donne'e 
imme'diateracnt  par  la  nature;  nous  ne  la  rcncontrons  dans  aucune  des 
choses  que  nos  facultes  obscrvent.  Mais  rentendement  qui  la  trouve  en 
lui,  la  met  hors  de  lui  par  induction,  et  d'un  certain  norabre  de  choses 
coexistantes  U  crce  des  unites  artificiclles."  — Jouffi-oy's  JBeid,  vol.  iv.  p. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


123 


i 


V 


of  consciousness,  sensations  by  this  or  that  organ,  volitions, 
thoughts,  imaginations,  of  all  we  are  immediately  conscious 
as  afl^ections  of  one  and  the  same  self     It  is  not  by  any 
after-effort  of  reflection  that  I  combine  together  sight  and 
hearing,  thought  and  volition,  into  a  factitious  unity  or 
compounded  whole :  in  each  case  1  am  immediately  con- 
scious of  myself  seeing  and  hearing,  willing  and  thinking. 
This  self-personality,  like  all  other  simple  and  immediate 
presentations,  is  indefinable;  but  it  is  so  because  it  is  supe- 
rior  to  definition.     It  can  be  analyzed  into   no  simpler 
elements,  for  it  is  itself  the  simplest  of  all ;  it  can  be  made 
no  clearer  by  description  or  comparison,  for  it  is  revealed 
to  us  in  all  the  clearaess  of  an  original  intuition,  of  which 
description  and  comparison   can  furnish   only  faint  and 
partial  resemblances. 

The  extravagant  speculations  in  which  Metaphysicians 
attempted  to  explain  the  nature  and  properties  of  the 
soul  as  it  is  not  given  in  consciousness,  furnish  no  valid 
ground  for  renouncing  all  inquiry  into  its  character  as  it  is 
given,  as  a  power,  conscious  of  itself}  That  there  are 
many  metaphysical,  or,  rather,  psychological  difl5culties, 
still  unsolved,  connected  with  this  view  of  the  subject, 
must  be  allowed  ;2  but,  so  long  as  we  remain  within  the 
legitimate  field  of  consciousness,  we  are  not  justified  in 
abandoning  them  as  insoluble.  To  this  class  belongs  the 
question  of  Personal  Identity,  or  the  reference  of  eariier 
and  later  states  of  consciousness  to  the  same  subject ;  an 
immediate  consciousness  being  of  present   objects  only. 

3r)0.  But  the  French  ^vritcr  to  whom  this  portion  of  philosophy  is  most 
indebted  is  Maine  de  Biran. 

1  See  Cousin,  Le^ns  sur  Kant,  p.  197;  Damiron,  PsycMogie,  1.  i.  ch.  iv. 

*  See  Herbart,  Lehrbuch  zur  EirOeUung  in  die  Fhilosophie,  §  124;  Haupt- 
puncte  der  Melaphj/sik,  H  H,  12. 


124 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


125 


v 


The  following  question  may  perhaps  furnish  a  hint  of  the 
data  from  which  the  solution  of  this   problem   may  be 
attempte<l.     Time  and  Space  are  given  as  forms  or  condi- 
tions  of  the  several  phenomena  of  internal  or  external 
consciousness;  but  are  the  same  conditions  strictly  appli- 
cable to  the  conscious  subject  itself?    I  may  speak,  accu- 
rately enough,  of  my  earlier  or  later  thoughts  or  feelings; 
but,  apart  from   metaphor,  can  I,  with  any  philosophical 
accuracy,  speak  of  an  earlier  or  later  self,  even  as  a  mere 
logical  distinction  for  the  purpose  of  afterwards  identifying 
the  two?    To  identify  is  to  connect  together  in  thoughl 
objects  given  under  different  relations  of  space  or  time,  as 
when  I  pronounce  the  sovereign  now  lying  on  my  table  to 
be  numerically  one  with  that  which  I  received  yesterday 
at  the  bank.     But  is  the  conscious  self  ever  given  under 
these  different  relations  at  all  ?     Is  it  not  rather  that  from 
which  our  original  notion  of  numerical  identity  was  drawn, 
and  which  cannot  be  subjected  to  later  and  analogical 
applications  of  the  same  idea? 

This  one  presented  substance,  myself,  is  the  basis  of  the 
other  notions  of  substance  which  are  thought  representa- 
tively in  relation  to  other  phenomena.  When  I  look  at 
another  man,  I  do  not  perceive  his  consciousness.  I  see 
only  a  compound  body,  of  a  certain  form  and  color,  moving 
in  this  or  that  manner.  I  do  not  immediately  know  tha^t 
he  perceives,  feels,  and  thinks,  as  I  do  myself.  He  may 
be  an  exquisitely  formed  puppet,  requiring  perhaps  more 
mechanical  skill  in  the  construction  than  has  ever  been 
attained  by  man,  but  still  a  mere  machine,  a  possible  piece 
of  clockwork.  When  I  attribute  to  him  personality  and 
consciousness,  I  mediately  and  reflectively  transfer  to 
another  that  of  which  I  am  directly  cognizant  only  in 
myself.    In  this  case,  the  phenomena  are  given  in  a  sen- 


i 


Bible  intuition ;  the  substance  is  added  to  them  by  a  repre- 
sentative act  of  thought. 

Beyond  the  range  of  conscious  beings,  we  can  have  only 
a  negative   idea  of  substance.     The  name  is  applied  in 
relation  to  certain  collections  of  sensible  phenomena,  natu- 
ral  or   artificial,  connected   with   each   other  in  various 
ways :  by  locomotion,  by  vegetation,  by  contributing  to  a 
common  end,  by  certain  positions  in  space.     But  here  we 
have  no  positive  notion  of  substance  distinct  from  phe- 
nomena.    I  do  not  attribute  to  the  billiard-ball  a  con- 
sciousness of  its  own  figure,  color,  and  motion ;  but,  in 
denying  consciousness,  I  deny  the  only  form  in  which 
unity  and  substance  have  been  presented  to  me.    I  have 
therefore  no  data  for  thinking  one  way  or  the  other  on 
the  question.     Some  kind  of  unity  between  the  several 
phenomena  may  exist,  or  it  may  not ;  but  if  it  does  exist, 
it  exists  in  a  manner  of  which  I  can  form  no  conception ; 
and  if  it  does  not  exist,  my  faculties  do  not  enable  me  to 
detect  its  absence. 

Such  an  acknowledgment  of  the  negative  character  of 
certain  supposed  thoughts,  L  e,,  of  their  not  being  really 
thoughts  at  all,  is  very  different  from  skepticism.     It  does 
not  teach  a  distrust  of  our  faculties  within  their  proper 
limits,  but  only  tells  us  that  they  have  limits,  and  that 
they  cannot  transgress  them.    In  this  there  is  no  more  of 
paradox  than  in  asserting  that  we  cannot  see  a  man  or  a 
tower  at  a  thousand  miles'  distance.     The  fault  of  Berke- 
ley did  not  consist  in  doubting  the  existence  of  matter, 
but  in  asserting  its  non-existence.    If  I  cannot  see  a  spot 
a  thousand  miles  off;  I  am,  as  far  as  sight  is  concerned, 
equally  incompetent  to  assert  that  there  is  or  is  not  a 
tower  standing  upon  it    In  like  manner,  it  is  character, 
istic  of  all  mere  negative  notions,  that  we  have  no  direct 

11* 


il 


126 


PROLEGOMENA   LOOICA. 


Ir 


\ 


evidence  whether  their  supposed  objects  exist  or  not.    To 
manuain  that  matter  is  a  fiction,  invented  for  the  support 
of  attributes,  is  to  dogmatize  in  negation,  and,  after  all,  to 
give  a  partial  solution  only  of  the  question ;  for  fictions  as 
well  as  facts  have  their  psychological  conditions,  under 
which  alone  their  invention  is  possible.'    Had  Berkeley's 
theory  been  accompanied  by  an  inquiry  into  the  ori-in  of 
negative  notions  and  their  influence  on  thought  and  lan- 
guage. It  could   scarcely   have  given  rise  either  to  the 
extreme   skepticism  of  his  successor,  or  to  the  stran-e 
misunderstandings  of  some  of  his  .id  verearies. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  above  remarks  is 
sufficiently  obvious.    The  general  assertion,  that  all  sensi- 
ble qualities  belong  to  a  subject,  cannot  with  any  propriety 
be  called  a  principle  of  necessary  truth ;  inasmuch  as  it  is 
a  principle  which  may  be  either  true  or  false,  and  we  have 
110  means  of  determining  which.    Nor  is  it  correct  to  call 
It  a  fundamental  law  of  human  belief;  if  by  th.-xt  expres- 
sion 13  meant  anything  more   than   ^n   assertion  of  the 
universal  tendency  of  men  to  liken  other  things  to  them- 
selves, and  to  speak  of  them  under  forms  of  expression 
adapted  to  such  likeness,  far  beyond  the  point  where  the 
parallel  fails.    The  true  law  or  principle  which  connect, 
attributes  with  a  substance  extends  no  further  than  to  the 
phenomena  of  the  personal  consciousness,  which  are  neces- 

I  "It  seems  to  bo  a  judgment  of  nature."  says  Rcid  (J.  P.  il.  jO)  « ,hat 
the  things  Immediately  perceired  are  qualities  which  must  bclon"  to  » 
.abject;  and  all  the  information  that  our  senses  give  us  about  this  sabiect 
Is,  that  It  is  that  to  which  such  qualities  belong."  In  point  of  fact,  oar 
senses  tell  us  nothing  of  the  kind;  and,  we™  these  our  only  intuitive  fac 
nines,  we  should  never  have  supposed  such  a  subject  to  exist.  To  refer 
any  belief  to  a  principle  of  our  nature.  Is  insuBicient.  unless  we  can  at 
the  same  Ume  psychologically  account  for  the  origin  of  the  notions  which 
taat  oelief  implies. 

f 


r 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


127 


i 


sarily  apprehended  as  attributes  of  myself;  and  this  prin- 
ciple docs  not  warrant  us  in  asserting  that  the  whiteness 
and  roundness  and  hardness  of  the  billiard-ball  are  attri- 
butes of  the  ball,  in  the  same  manner  as  my  thoughts  and 
feelings  and  sensations  are  attributes  of  me.     Nevertheless 
there  is  a  real,  though  an  incomplete  analogy  between  the 
two  cases ;  which  may  serve  in  some  degree  to  account  for 
the  association  which  has  led  to  the  apparent  recognition, 
in  the  universal  language  of  mankind,  of  a  relation  which 
has  no  warrant  in  our  immediate  consciousness.     Though 
bodily  attrilites  are  not  perceived  as  related  to  a  sub- 
stance, they  are  in  all  cases  perceived  as  related  to  each 
other.     The  perception   by  sense  of  any  phenomenon  of 
matter  is  necessarily  accompanied  by  an  intellectual  appre- 
hension  of  its  relations  to  space,  as  occupying  it,  and  con- 
tained in  it.    Color  cannot  be  perceived  without  extension, 
nor  extension  without  solidity ;  and  solidity  is  not  a  single 
attribute,  but  includes  in  its  comprehension   the  th^ee 
dimensions  of  length,  breadth,  and  thickness.    But  we  can 
analyze  in  language  what  we  cannot  analyze  in  conscious- 
ness;  and  by  the  appropriation  of  distinct  names  to  the 
related  attributes  we  are  enabled  to  speak  of  them  apart, 
though  we  cannot  perceive  them  except  in  conjimction. 
This  is  the  real  distinction  indicated  by  the  use  of  concrete 
or  abstract   terms :  the   round,  hard,  wliite  body  denotes 
the  attribute  as  perceived  in  space;  the  roundness  and 
hardness  and  whiteness  severally  denote  the  same  attrir^ 
butes  as  separated  in  language.     This  real  distinction  is 
coupled  with  an  association  transferred  from  the  personal 
consciousness  ;  and  men  speak  of  the  roundness  and  hard- 
ness and  whiteness  of  the  ball,  as  they  speak  of  rwy  thoughts 
and  my  feelings  and  my  desires,  without  being  aware  that 
the  relation  which  in  the  latter  case  is  a  fact  of  conscious- 


/ 


128 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


1 1 


ness,  is  in  the  other  an  imaginary  parallel,  wliich  cannot 
be   positively  verified  by  consciousness,   though   for   the 
same  reason  it  cannot  be  positively  denied. 
I      But,  though  there   is   thus   no   speculative   reason   for 
accepting  or  rejecting  Berkeley's  theory  as  true  or  false,  or 
f  for  attempting  to  adapt  to  it  common  forms  of  speech, 
there  may,  in  certain  philosophical  inquiries,  be  a  practical 
reason  for  accepting  or  rejecting  it  as  convenient  or  incon- 
venient.    If  the  method  of  metaphysical  research  can  in 
any  degree  be  simplified  by  divesting  it  of  the  liypothesis 
of  a  substratum  of  sensible  attributes,  this  ^\•l  be  a  suffi- 
cient reason  for  accepting  the  theory  as  pro  tanto  valid. 
Such  simplification  will  not,  however,  be  effected  by  taking 
the  Berkeleian  theory  in  ift  whole  extent.     The  admission 
of  ideas  as  the  immediate  objects  of  perception,  whether 
in  Berkeley's  form,  as  entities  distinct  from  the  mind,  or  in 
Fichte's,  as  modifications  of  the  mind  itself,  and  the  neces- 
sary consequence  that  nothing  exists  except  when  it  is 
perceived,  is  too  repugnant  to  the  common  sense  of  man- 
kind to  have  any  ultimate  value  in  philosophy.     There  is 
still  room,  however,  for  an  attempt  to  construct  a  similar 
theory,  viewed  from  the  objective  side,  which,  banishing 
the  hypothesis  of  a  substratum,  shall  regard  the  sensible 
attributes  as  the  things  themselves.     Whether  such  a  the- 
ory would  offer  any  ground  for  constructing  Metaphysical 
Science  on  a  surer  basis,  or  whether  it  would  share  the 
fate  of  preceding  systems,  remains  to  be  seen.* 
Much  of  the  above  reasoning  is  applicable  to  the  Prin- 

1  Somethino;  of  this  «!ort  may  perhaps  Ik;  attempted  In  connectfor.  with 
Sir  William  HamUton's  doctrine  of  Natural  Realism.  But  that  doctrine, 
admirable  as  it  is  in  many  of  the  fragments  that  have  been  published,  is 
unfortunately  least  complete  in  its  ontological  relaUons.  On  the  reaJly 
weak  side  of  Berkeley's  Philosophy,  see  Appendix,  note  B. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


129 


ciple  of  Causality  likewise.     I  hold  a  piece  of  wax  to  the 
fire,  and  it  begins  to  melt.^     Here  my  senses  inform  me 
only  of  two  successive  phenomena:  the  proximity  of  the 
fire,  and  the  melting  of  the  wax.     That  the  one  is  the 
productive  cause  of  the  other,  is  an  addition  to  the  sen- 
sible data,  which,  so  far  as  this  particular  instance  is  con- 
cerned,  is  not  given,  but  inferred.    Here,  again,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  inquire  whether  we  shall  abandon  the  belief  in 
Causes  altogether;  whether  we  shall  concede  that  Thoucrht 
alone  is  competent  to  create  the  notion ;  or  whether  we 
can  discover  any  intuition  in  which  Causality,  as  distinct 
from  mere  Succession,  is  immediately  presented. 

Hume,  and  subsequently  Brown,  denied  altogether  the 
existence  of  Cause  in  this  sense  of  the  term.     Witli  these 
philosophers,  a  cause  is  nothing  more  than  something  prior 
to  the  change,  and  constantly  conjoined  with  it.''«We 
give  the  name  oUause;^  says  Brown,  «to  the  object  which 
we  believe  to  be  the  invariable  antecedent  of  a  particular 
change;  we  give  the  name  of  effect  reciprocally  to  that 
invariable  consequent;  and  the  relation  itself,  when  con- 
sidered abstractly,  we  denominate  i.ot..r  in  the  object  that 
18  the  invariable  ^r^iece,\enU  -  susceptibility  in  the  object 
that  exhibits,  in  its  change,  the  invariable  consequent.    We 
sny  of  fire,  that  it  has  the  power  of  melting  metals,  and  of 
metals,  that  they  are  susceptible  effusion  by  fire  —that 
fire  ,8  the  cause  of  the  fusion,  and  the  fusion  the  Iffect  of 
the  application  of  fire;   but  in  all  this  variety  of  words 
we  mean  nothing  more  than  our  belief,  that  when  a  solid 
metal  is  subjected  for  a  certain  time  to  the  application  of 

Of  change  as  perceptible  by  the  senses.    The  other  and  verv  different 
of  the  theory  of  Maine  de  Biran. 


ISO 


PROLEGOMENA   l.OGICA. 


Hi! 


a  strong  beat,  it  will  begin  afterwards  to  exist' in  tbat  dif- 
ferent state  wbich  is  termed  liquidity,  —  tbat  in  all  past 
time,  in  tbe  same  circumstances,  it  would  bave  exbibited 
tbe  same  cbange,  —  and  tbat  it  will  continue  to  do  so  in 
tbe  same  circumstances  in  all  future  time."* 

Tbus  far  Hume  and  Brown  are  at  one.  Into  tbe  subor- 
dinate question  at  issue  between  tbem,  as  to  tbe  origin  of 
our  belief  in  tbe  uniformity  of  nature,  it  is  foreign  to  my 
present  purpose  to  enter.  I  bave  at  present  to  do  only 
witb  tbat  portion  of  tbe  tbeory  in  wbicb  botb  pbilosopbers 
are  agreed,  — tbe  resolution  of  cause  into  invariable  ante- 
cedent;  concerning  wbicb  Reid  remarks,  tbat  we  may  learn 
from  it  tbat  nigbt  is  tbe  cause  of  day,  and  day  tbe  cause 
of  nigbt ;  for  no  two  tbings  bave  more  constantly  followed 
eacb  otber  since  tbe  beginning  of  tbe  world. 

In  tbe  tbeory  of  causation,  as  above  stated,  two  very 
distinct  principles  are  fused  into  one;  and  tbe  fusion  is 
indicated  by  tbe  two  words  invariable  antecedent.  Admit- 
ting for  tbe  moment  tbat  causation  means  no  more  tban 
immediate  antecedence  in  time,  it  is  obviously  one  tbing 
to  say  tbat  every  event  must  bave  807ne  antecedent  or  other, 
and  anotber  to  say  tbat  tbis  particular  event  must  always 
have  this  particular  antecedent,  Tbe  latter  assertion,  wbich 
implies  tbe  assumption  of  tbe  uniformity  of  nature  in  her 
operations,  is,  even  granting  its  universal  trutb,  obviously 
a  law  of  tbings,  and  not  of  tbougbt,  tbe  contradictory  of 
wbicb  is  at  any  time  perfectly  conceivable.  Tbere  is  no 
absurdity  in  tbe  supposition,  wbetber  it  be  true  or  not  as 
a  fact,  tbat  tbe  pbenomenon  C  may  at  one  time  be  pre- 
ceded by  A,  and  at  anotber  by  B ;  tbe  otber  circumstances 
being  in  botb  cases  exactly  alike.  Wbetber  sucb  a  vari- 
ation actually  takes  place  under  tbe  existing  constitution 

1  Inquiry  into  the  BelcUion  of  Cause  and  ^fect,  p.  12. 


I 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA.  131 

Of  the  world  which  we  inhabit,  is  another  question  ;  but 
there  ,s  certa.nly  „o  difficulty  in  conceiving  that  i^  an 
.mag.„ary  world  it  may  take  place.    This  portion  of  the 
pnncp  e  being  thus  excluded  from  the  class  of  necessary 
truths,  the  remaining  portion  will  not  be  difficult  to  explain 
.     The  assertion  that  every  event  must  have  some  antecedent 
or  o  her,  imphes  no  more  than  that  we  cannot  conceive  it 
as  standing  at  the  absolute  beginning  of  all  time,  apart 
fim   any  relation  to  a  preceding  series  of  phenomena. 
This  IS  an  obvious  result  of  the  subjection  of  our  conscious- 
n^  to  the  law  of  time.     For  our  consciousness  of  time  is 
not  of  time  m  the  abstract,  but  of  phenomena  as  takin<. 
place  in  time ;  and  the  law  which  compels  us  to  conceive 
every  event  as  occurring  in  time,  obviously  compels  us 

But       rV  "'  ■■"''"'  ''  ""^'  *'^'"P-'"  »ntecedent.> 
But,  as  thus  limited,  the  principle,  however  necessary,  is 

obviously  inadequate  as  a  theory  of  causation.    We  can- 
not he  p  feeling  that  there  is  a  deficiency  even  in  the 

original  theory  as  stated  by  Hume-  we  feel  tL 
imnU«o  o^      *i  •  ^Auiiic,  we  leel  that  cause 

Z  Rei  r      '"^  "r  "''"  '"""•''^"^  -*--'-».  and 

to  a  philosophical  refutation  of  the  theory,  is  at  least  a 

practical  proof  of  its  insufficiencv     The  U     , 
cf."]]     *  .  ''""i^iuucy.     ine  teelinc:  becomes 

s  .11  stronger  when  the  element  of  invariability  it  elf 
shown  to  bean  adventitious  accretion,  and  the  i-Hn 
pnnciple  is  reduced  to  the   mere  ackiiowledg  1     '     a 

antecedence   that   of  productive  power,  and   regard  this 

*  In  thus  acknowledffino-  one  plomont  r.f  *^. 

acpend  on  the  mc„,al  Taw^f  "xi     r  „    i '  e  rT    "'  "'  '^""'■-"''' '" 
the  tbcoiy  of  Sir  W  H»mn,„       '  ™'^"  '"  *""<'•  '  f-"™  P»«iall.v  adopted 

or  .h«  .Lr..r !;,'St:  J-  --^  <">--«-  -  t^e  .^al^der 


132 


r*  ', 


llr 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


addition  as  essential  to  the  conception  of  a  Cause.  A 
belief  so  universal,  even  if  it  be  delusive  in  a  portion  of 
its  extent,  can  only  be  explained,  even  as  a  delusion,  by 
the  supposition  that  it  has  an  origin  in  truth  ;  that  there 
is  such  a  notion  as  power  given  in  the  actual  facts  of 
consciousness,  however  it  may  be  extended  in  imagination 
beyond  the  data  which  suggested  it. 

The  philosophers  of  the  school  of  Reid  could  not  fairly 
meet  Hume's  theory  of  causation,  for  the  same  reason  that 
they  could  not  fairly  meet  his  theory  of  substance  ;  because 
they  denied  the  existence  of  an  immediate  consciousness 
of  mind,  as  distinguished  from  its  several  states.     It  was 
easy  for  Hume  to  show  that  volition  is  but  one  phenom- 
enon, and  motion  is  but  another;  and  that  the  former  is  so 
far  from  being  the  necessary  cause  of  the   other,  that  a 
stroke  of  paralysis  may  put  an  end  even  to  the  uniformity 
of  the  sequence.     It  was  also  easy  for  him  to  show  that, 
as  the  motion  of  the  arm  is  not  the  immediate  consequent 
of  the  volition,  but  is  separated  from  it  by  an  intervening 
nervous  and  muscular  action,  of  which  we  are  unconscious, 
the  one  cannot  be  directly  given  as  produced  by  the  other. 
The  intuition  of  Power  is  not  immediately  given  in  the 
action  of  matter  upon  matter ;  nor  yet  can  it  be  given  in 
the  action  of  matter  upon  mind,  nor  in  that  of  mind  upon 
matter;  for  to  this  day  we  are  utterly  ignorant  how  mat- 
ter and  mind  operate  upon  each  other.     We  know  not  how 
the  material  refractions  of  the  eye  are  connected  with  the 
mental  sensation  of  seeing,  nor  how  the  determination  of 
the   will   operates  in   bringing  about   the  motion   of  the 
muscles.     We  can  investigate  severally  the  phenomena  of 
mntter  and  of  mind,  as  we  can  examine  severally  the  consti- 
tution of  the  earth  and  the  architecture  of  the  heavens : 
we  seek  the  boundary-line  of  their  junction,  as  the  child 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


133 


chases  the  horizon,  only  to  discover  that  it  flies  as  we 
pui-sue  it. 

There  is  thus  no  alteiTiative,  but  either  to  abandon  the 
inquiry  after  an  immediate  intuition  of  power,  or  to  seek 
for  it  in  mind  as  determining/  its  own  modifications;^  a 
coui-se  open  to  those  who  admit  an  immediate  conscious- 
ness of  self,  and  to  them  only.     My  first  and  only  presen- 
tation of  power  or  causality  is  thus  to  be  found  in  my 
consciousness  of  myself  as  willing.     In  every  act  of  voli- 
tion I  am  fully  conscious  that  it  is  in  my  power  to  form 
the  resolution  or  to  abstain ;  and  this  constitutes  the  pre- 
seutative  consciousness  of  free  will  and  of  power.     Like 
any  other  simple  idea,  it  cannot  be  defined ;  and  hence 
the  difficulty  of  verbally  distinguishing  causation   from 
mere  succession.     But  every  man  who  has  been  conscious 
of  an  act  of  will,  has  been  conscious  of  power  therein  ;  and 

>  This  is  clearly  and  accurately  stated  by  M.  Cousin:  " Chorche-t-on  la 
notion  de  cause  dans  Taction  dc  la  bille  sur  la  bille,  comme  on  le  Aiisait 
avant  Hume,  ou  dc  la  main  sur  la  bille,  et  des  premiers  muscles  locomo- 
teurs  sur  leurs  extremit^s,  ou  meme  dans  Taction  de  la  volonte  sur  le  mus- 
clc,  comme  I'a  fait  M.  de  Biran,  on  ne  la  trouvera  dans  aucun  de  ces  cas, 
pas  meme  dans  le  dernier,  car  il  est  possible  qu'il  y  ait  une  paralysie  des 
muscles  qui  rende  la  volonte  impuissante  sur  cux,  improductive,  incapable 
d'etre  cause  et  par  consequent  d'en  su-prerer  la  notion.    Mais  ce  qu'au- 
rune  paralysie  ne  pent  empecher,   c'est  Taction  de  la  volonte  sur  elle- 
meme,  la  production  d'une  resolution,  c'est-k-dire  une  causation  touto 
Bpirituelle,  type  primitif  de  la  causalite.  dont  toutcs  Ics  actions  exterieurcs, 
a  commencer  par  Teffort  musculaire,  et  k  finir  par  le  mouvement  dc  la 
billc  sur  la  bille,  ne  sont  que  des  symboles  plus  ou  moins  infidclcs." 
-Fragments  Philosophiqnes,  Preface  de  la  premiere  Edition.     James  Mill 
Umdysis  of  the  Human  Mind,  vol.  ii.  p.  2.%)  speaks  of  the  idea  of  power 
in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  as  "an  item  alto-ether  ima-inary." 
Such  a  thorou-h-oin-  imajrination  is  a  psycholoj,ncal  impossibility:  the 
item  must  be  piven  in  one  relation  before  it  can  be  imaffined  in  another. 
Ao  effort  of  imagiuution  can  create  its  object  out  of  nothing. 

12 


134 


PROLEGOMEXA   LOGICA. 


i 


to  one  who  has  not  been  so  conscious,  no  verbal  descrip- 
tion can  supply  the  tifficiency. 

Here  again,  as  in  the  case  of  substance,  as  soon  as  we 
advance  beyond  the  region  of  consciousness  we  find  our- 
selves in  the  midst  of  negative  notions,  which  we  can 
neither  conceive,  nor  afiirm,  nor  deny.  Our  clearest  notion 
of  efficiency  is  that  of  a  relation  between  two  objects, 
similar  to  that  which  exists  between  ourselves  and  our 
volitions.^  But  what  relation  can  exist  between  the  heat 
of  fire  and  the  melting  of  wax,  similar  to  that  between  a 
conscious  mind  and  its  self-determinations?  Or,  if  there 
is  nothing  precisely  similar,  can  there  be  anything  in  any 
degree  analogous  ?  We  cannot  say  that  there  is,  or,  if 
there  is,  how  far  the  analogy  extends,  and  how  and  where 
it  fails.  We  can  form  no  positive  conception  of  a  power 
of  this  kind :  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  something  dif- 
ferent from  the  only  power  of  which  we  are  intuitively 
conscious.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  not  wan-anted 
in  denying  the  existence  of  anything  of  the  kind  ;  for 
denial  is  as  much  an  act  of  positive  thought  as  affirmation, 
and  a  negative  idea  furnishes  no  data  for  one  or  the  other. 

The  principle  of  Causality  is  thus  precisely  analogous  to 
that  of  Substance,  in  its  origin  and  legitimate  application, 
as  well  as  in  its  perversion.  The  idea  of  power  cannot 
legitimately  be  extended  beyond  the  phenomena  of  per- 
sonal consciousness  in  which  it  is  directly  manifested. 
But  the  phenomena  of  matter  are  thus  far  similar  to  those 
of  mind,  that  both  alike  are  subject  to  the  law  of  time ; 
the  phenomena  of  nature  being  in  all  cases  preceded  by 
other  phenomena,  as  the  phenomena  of  volition  are  pre- 
ceded by  a  productive  energy  of  the  person  willing.  The 
relation  which  is  given  in  the  latter  alone  is  transferred  by 

•  *  See  Reid,  Active  Powers,  Essay  i.  ch.  v. 


I 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


135 


association  to  the  former;  and  men  speak  of  the  power  of 
fire  to  melt  wax,  as  they  speak  of  their  own  power  of  self- 
determination,  without  being  aware  that,  in  departing 
from  the  field  of  consciousness,  they  have  departed  from 
the  only  province  in  which  the  term  poioer  has  any  posi- 
tive significance.^  What  is  meant  by  power  in  a  fire  to 
melt  wax?  How  and  when  is  it  exerted,  and  in  what 
manner  does  it  come  under  our  cognizance?  Supposing 
such^ower  to  be  suspended  by  an  act  of  omnipotence, 
the^ipreme  Being  at  the  same  time  producing  the  suc- 
cession of  phenomena  by  the  immediate  interposition  of 
his  own  will, — could  we  in  any  way  detect  the  change? 
Or  suppose  the  course  of  nature  to  be  governed  by  a 
preestablished  harmony,  which  ordained  that  at  a  certain 
moment  fire  and  wax  should  be  in  the  neicrhborhood  of 
each  other;  that,  at  the  same  moment,  fire  by  itself  should 
burn,  and  wax  by  its  own  laws  should  melt,  neither  aflfect- 
ing  the  other,  —  would  not  all  the  perceptible  phenomena 
be  precisely  the  same  as  at  present  ?  These  suppositions 
may  be  extravagant,  though  they  are  supported  by  some 
of  the  most  eminent  names  in  philosophy ;  but  the  mere 
possibility  of  making  them  shows  that  the  rival  hypothesis 
is  not  a  necessary  truth;  the  various  principles  being 
opposed,  only  like  the  vortices  of  Descartes  and  the  gravi- 


t> 


*  Thus  M.  Engel  observes :  "  Dans  ce  que  nous  nppclons  force  d'attrac- 
tlon,  d'afllnitd,  ou  meme  d 'impulsion,  la  seule  chose  connue  (c'est  a-dire 
representee  k  rima<;ination  et  aux  sens),  c'est  I'effor  ope're,  savoir,  le  rap- 
prochement des  deux  corps  attires  et  attirant.  Aucune  lanjnie  n'a  de  mot 
pour  cxprimer  ce  jc  ne  mis  qnoi  {p/Tort,  tendance,  nisus),  qui  reste  absolument 
cachd,  mais  que  tous  les  esprits  con<,"oivent  nccessairemcnt  commc  ajoutc?  a 
la  representation  phe'nome'ntile."  (Sec  Do  Biran,  Nonvellcs  Considerations^ 
p.  23.)  Tlie  ce  je  ne  sais  quoi  expresses  exactly  the  negative  character  of 
the  notion  in  question. 


136 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


li 


tation  of  Newton,  as  more  or  less  plausible  methods  of 
accounting  for  the  same  physical  phenomena. 

Before  we  can  positively  assert,  as  a  principle  of  neces- 
sary truth,  that  all  physical  phenomena  must  have  a  cause, 
we  must  ascertain  clearly  what  meaning  we  attach  to  the 
word  cause.    If  we  eliminate  the  notion  of  power,  which 
has  no  positive  significance  in  this  relation,  and  confine 
ourselves   to   that  of  chronological   succession,  we   may 
assign  three  diflferent  meanings  to  the  term  cause,  and 
three  different  degrees  of  certainty  to  the  corresponding 
principle.     If  we  mean  no  more  than  that  every  even^ 
must  have  some  chronological  antecedent,  the  principle  is 
a  necessary  truth,  dependent  upon  an  original  law  of  the 
human  consciousness,  by  which  we  are  compelled  to  con- 
template all  phenomena  as  taking  place  in  time.    If  we 
advance  a  step  beyond  this,  and  add   to  the  notion  of 
succession  that  of  invariahilitij,  or   repetition  of  similar 
phenomena    under   similar   circumstances,   the    principle 
may  be  stated  in  two  different  ways.      We  may  inter- 
pret Cause  to  mean  simply  invariable  antecedent,  in  which 
case  the  principle  may  be  expressed  as  follows:   Every 
phenomenon  which  takes  place  in  nature  is  preceded  by 
some    other  phenomenon,  or   aggregate   of   phenomena,* 
with  which  it  is  invariably  conjoined.    Or,  secondly,  re- 
garding the  invariability  as  one  of  consequence  and  not 
of  antecedence,  we  may  enunciate  the  principle  in  a  some- 


This  last  limitation  is  necessary :  the  cause,  to  speak  accurately,  is  the 
sum  total  of  the  conditions,  whose  united  presence  is  followed  invariably 
by  the  effect.  It  is  not  any  single  phenomenon,  unless  we  can,  by  succes- 
sive  experiments,  eliminate  all  the  concomitants  save  one,  and  thus  show 
that,  as  far  as  the  given  effect  is  concerned,  they  are  indifferent.  This 
however,  in  practice,  is  seldom  the  case.  On  this  subject  some  valuable 
remarks  wiU  be  found  in  Mill's  Logic,  book  iii.  ch.  5 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


137 


what  more  complex  form:  Every  phenomenon  which 
takes  place  has,  among  its  immediate  antecedents,  some 
one  phenomenon  or  aggregate  of  phenomena,  which  being 
repeated,  the  same  consequent  phenomenon  will  invariably 
recur. 

As  stated  in  the  first  of  the  above  forms,  the  Principle 
of  Causality  is  no  more  than  an  induction  from  experience, 
and  can  never  at  highest  amount  to  more  than  the  asser- 
tion of  a  general  fact  in  nature.  We  are  not  warranted  in 
stating,  prior  to  observation,  that  the  two  phenomena  A 
and  B  are  so  invariably  connected  together  that  nature 
never  presents,  and  man  can  never  produce,  a  single 
instance  of  the  latter  without  the  precedence  of  the  for- 
mer. Such  a  conclusion  may  be  established,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  by  a  long  course  of  observation  :  it  may  be  regarded 
as  extremely  probable  beforehand,  from  what  observation 
teaches  us  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  in  other  instances : 
but  in  these  cases  it  is  not  a  principle  of  necessary  truth ; 
it  is  an  inductive  law  or  general  fact  in  the  constitution  of 
nature  as  now  established  by  the  will  of  God.  It  is  thus, 
and  it  might  be  otherwise. 

In  point  of  fact,  the  principle,  as  thus  explained,  is  so  far 
from  being  necessary,  that  it  has  not  yet  been  ascertained 
to  be  true.  As  far  as  observation  has  hitherto  gone,  the 
same  phenomenon  occura  at  different  times  with  totally 
different  antecedents.  Thus,  as  Mr.  Mill  has  observed, 
one  set  of  observations  or  experiments  shows  that  the  sun 
is  a  cause  of  heat ;  another,  that  friction  is  a  cause  of  it ; 
others,  that  percussion,  electricity,  and  chemical  action,  are 
also  causes.  It  is  very  possible,  indeed  highly  probable, 
that  further  observation  may  hereafter  discover  some  one 
uniform  feature  running  through  these  several  sources; 
but  this  is  only  a  probability  supported  by  the  analogy  of 

12* 


138 


PROLEGOMENA   LOQICA. 


li 


!i 


nature  in  other  instances ;  it  is  not  a  necessary  law  of  our 
own  minds  compelling  us,  prior  to  experience,  to  pronounce 
tliat  a  plurality  of  physical  causes  is  impossible. 

The  second  form  of  the  principle  is  less  open  to  excep- 
tion.   For,  though  it  may  be  a  matter  of  question  whether 
the  same  phenomenon  may  not  proceed  from  a  variety  of 
physical  causes,  it  appears  to  be  beyond  all  doubt  that  any 
one  of  those  causes,  whenever  it  takes  i)lace,  will  be  ade- 
quate to  the  production  of  the  effect.     Thus  expressed, 
the  law  m  question  is  identical  with  that  belief  in  the 
universal  connection  of  similar  events,  which  Ilumo  re- 
duces to  the  result  of  association,  which  his  antagonists  of 
the  Scottish  school  refer  to  an  original  principle  of  our 
nature ;  while  Mr.  Mill  holds  it  to  be  itself  an  instance  of 
induction,  and  induction  by  no  means  of  the  most  obvious 
kind. 

Kone  of  these  solutions  is  entirely  satisfactory.     That 
of  Hume  has  been  sufficiently  refuted  even  by  the  disciple 
of  his  general  theory,  Brown;  and  the  refirtation  holds 
good,  whether  we  suppose,  with  Brown,  that  the  theory  in 
question  is  a  dogmatic  position  maintained  by  Hume  him- 
self,  or  whether,  with    Sir  W.   Hamilton,  we   regard  it 
merely  as  the  reductio  ad  ahsurdum  of  the  dogmatism 
then  in  vogue.    That  of  an  original  principle  of  our  nature, 
though  true  as  far  as  it  goes,  is  too  vague,  and  confounds 
under  one  general  term  things  which  it  should  be  the 
principal  object  of  any  mental  classification  to  distinguish 
There  are  some  original  principles  of  our  nature  of  immuta- 
ble  obligation  ;  and  there  are  others  which  are  perpetually 
leading  us  astray.    There  are  some  which  lead  us  to  truths 
which  we  cannot  reverse  even  in  thought;  and  there  are 
others  which  point  out  only  contingent  and  variable  phe- 
nomena.    Sight  and  hearing,  appetite  and  desire,  the  law 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


139 


of  conscience,  and  the  intuitions  of  space  and  time,  are  all 
equally  original  principles  of  our  nature ;  that  is,  we  can 
ultimately  give  no  account  of  them,  but  that  it  has  i)leased 
our  Maker  so  to  constitute  us.  Mr.  Mill's  explanation  over- 
looks the  fact,  that  when  the  principle  in  question  is  found 
in  apparent  conflict  with  experience,  it  is  invariably  as- 
sumed to  be  in  the  right,  and  experience  in  the  wrong; 
which  is  not  the  case  with  merely  inductive  laws :  to  say 
nothing  of  the  paralogism  of  making  the  ground  and  prin- 
ciple of  all  induction  itself  dependent  upon  induction,  and 
upon  induction  only.  Our  earliest  and  uni)hilosophical 
inductions  appear  as  often  to  indicate  variety  in  the  opera- 
tions of  nature  as  uniformity.  The  sun  rises  and  sets,  the 
tide  ebbs  and  flows,  with  regularity ;  but  storm  and  calm, 
rain  and  sunshine,  appear  to  observe  no  fixed  order  of 
succession.  But,  in  any  instance  whatever  of  physical 
causation,  let  an  apparent  repetition  of  the  cause  not  be 
followed  by  that  of  the  effect,  and  all  men  alike,  philo- 
sophical or  unphilosophical,  will  at  once  assert  that  there 
was  some  latent  variety  in  the  circumstances,  and  not  a 
change  in  the  uniformity  of  their  succession. 

The  Principle  of  Causality,  as  thus  exhibited,  seems  to 
combine  in  one  formula  two  separate  elements,  the  one 
necessary,  the  other  empirical.  That  matter  in  every  rela- 
tion is  subject  to  some  law,  by  virtue  of  which  a  given 
antecedent  admits  at  any  one  time  of  only  one  possible 
consequent,  seems  to  be  a  necessary  and  unavoidable  con- 
viction. That  this  law  will  be  manifested  by  the  production 
of  similar  phenomena  on  similar  occasions,  is  the  result  of 
a  combination  of  this  necessary  conviction  with  the  expe- 
rience of  the  actual  evidence  of  law  in  our  own  world,  in 
those  cases  which  are  most  open  to  observation.  I  can 
suppose  it  possible  that  in  another  world  the  law  may  be 


140 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


I 


manifested  iu  another  way,  according  to  which  the  phe- 
nomena  of  matter  may  have  no  settled  relations  to  each 
other,  but  phenomena  at  one  time  and  in  one  place  con- 
nected, as  cause  and  effect,  may  at  another  time  or  in 
another  place  have  no  connection  at  all.     But  even  in  this 
case,  I  can  only  conceive  the  material  agents  as  passively 
obeying  tlie  law  of  their  organization,  not  as  enabled,  by 
their  own  caprice,  to  obey  or  disobey  on  different  occasions. 
Whether  the  perceptible  results  be  more  or  less  regular,  I 
am  still  compelled  to  believe  that,  in  any  single  instance, 
the  antecedent  circumstances  being  given,  the  consequent 
cannot  but  be  determined  by  them  in  one-way  and  in  one 
way  only ;  whether  a  similar  antecedent  will  on  a  future 
occasion  be  followed  by  a  similar  consequent  or  not. 

At  the  same  time  I  am  not  entitled  to  pronounce,  a 
priori,  that  matter  cannot  possibly  disobey  its  own  law ; 
though  assuredly  I  am  unable  to  conceive  how  it  can  do' 
so.    And  we  have  thus  a  remarkable  parallel  between  the 
general  law  of  causation,  as  applicable  to  physical  phenom- 
ena,  and  the  psychological  facts  of  our  own  constitution, 
the  reverse  of  which,  as  was  observed  at  the  beginning  of 
the  present  chapter,  may  be  mpposed,  but  cannot  be  \on^ 
ceivecl    And  this  parallel,  I  am  inclined  to  think,  furnishes 
a  key  to  the  true  character  of  the  law.    If  we  were  told 
of  an  instance  on  our  own  globe  in  which  the  repetition 
of  exactly  similar  phenomena  had  apparently  not  been 
followed  by  the  same  effect,  we  should  without  hesitation 
account  for  it  on  one  of  two  grounds :  either  the  phenom- 
ena  were  not  really  exactly  similar,  or  the  interposition 
of  some  intelligent  being  had  prevented  the  natural  result 
And  if  we  were  asked  why  these  two  alternatives  alone 
are  admissible,  we  should  probably  reply,  -Because  matter 
cannot  change    of  itselil"     And  probably,  if  we  were 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


141 


informed  that  in  some  other  world,  where  the  laws  of 
matter  are  manifested  otherwise  than  by  regular  succes- 
sion, the  natural  relation  had  in  any  given  instance  not 
taken  place,  we  should  ascribe  it  in  like  manner  to  some 
external  intervention,  not  to  any  power  of  obedience  or 
disobedience  residing  in  the  matter  itself.    Whatever  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect  is  conceived  as  existing  between 
two  material  phenomena,  whether  limited  to  a  single 
occasion   or  repeated  in   orderly  recuiTence,  we  find  it 
impossible  to  attribute  to  the  phenomena  at  that  particular 
time  anything  like  self-action,  or  a  choice  of  alternatives 
to  determine  or  be  determined  in  this  way  or  that.     Now, 
why  cannot  we  think  of  matter  as  acting  by  itself?     Be- 
cause power  and  self-determination  have  never  been  given 
to  us,  save  in  one  form,  that  of  the  actions  of  the  conscious 
self.    What  I  am  to  conceive  as  taking  place,  I  must  con- 
ceive as  taking  place  in  the  only  manner  of  taking  place 
in  which  it  has  ever  been  presented  to  me.    This  reduces 
the  law  of  Causality,  in  one  sense  indeed,  to  an  empirical 
principle,  but  to  an  empirical  principle  of  a  very  peculiar 
character;    one,  namely,  in   which   it  is   psychologically 
impossible  that  experience  should  testify  in  more  than  one 
way.     Such  principles,  however  empirical  in  their  origin, 
are  coextensive  in  their  application  with  the  whole  domain 
of  thought.    They  cannot,  properly  speaking,  be  called 
inductive  truths;    for  they  require  no   accumulation  of 
physical  experience.     The  course  of  Nature  is  thought  as 
uniform,  because,  so  long  as  Nature  alone  is  spoken  of,  that 
element  is  absent  which  alone  we  can  think  of  as  origin- 
ating  a  change  -—  Intelligence.    And  for  the  same  reason,  so 
long  as  the  several  phenomena  of  Nature  are  believed  to 
be  each  under  the  control  of  a  separate  intelligence,  the 
axiom  of  her  uniformity  will  admit  of  perpetual  modifica- 


% 


1 

? 


142 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


143 


f 

II 


i 


I 


tion.  The  winds  may  blow  north  or  south,  as  suits  the 
caprices  of  ^olus;  Xanthus  may  neglect  the  laws  of  his 
periodical  rise  and  fall,  to  arrest  the  progress  of  Achilles; 
and  even  the  steady-going  coachman,  Phcebus,  may  alter 
upon  occasion  the  pace  of  his  chariot,  to  gratify  the  wishes 
of  his  roving  parent. 

To  call  the  Principle  of  Causality,  as  thus  explained,  a 
Law  of  Thought,  would  be  incorrect.     We  cannot  think 
the  contrary,  not  because  the  laws  of  thought  forbid  us, 
but  because  the  material  for  thought  is  wanting.    Thought 
is  subject  to  two  different  modes  of  restriction :  firstly, 
from  its  own  laws,  by  which  it  is  restricted  as  to  its  foi-ra ; 
and,  secondly,  from  the  laws  of  intuition,  by  which  it  is 
restricted  as  to  its  matter.     The  restriction,  in  the  present 
instance,  is  of  the  latter  kind.     We  cannot  conceive  a 
course  of  nature  without  causation,  as  we  cannot  conceive 
a  being  who  sees  without  eyes  or  hears  without  ears ;  be- 
cause we  cannot,  under  existing  circumstances,  experience 
the  necessary  intuition.     But  such  things  may,  notwith- 
standing, exist ;  and,  under  other  circumstances,  they  might 
become  objects  of  possible  conce[)tion,  the  laws  of  the 
process  of  conception  remaining  unaltered.     This  will  be 
more  clearly  seen  hereafter,  when  we  come  to  treat  of 
Logical  Necessity  and  the  Laws  of  Thought. 

The  Principle  of  Causality  may  thus,  as  far  as  its  ne- 
cessity is  concerned,  be  referred  to  an  intermediate  place 
between  the  axioms  of  mathematics  and  the  generaliza- 
tions of  physical  science,  being  contingent  in  some  degree 
as  compared  with  the  former,  and  necessary  in  some  degree 
as  compared  with  the  latter.  It  is  contingent,  inasmuch 
as  it  relates  to  circumstances  to  which  our  experience  is 
subjected  in  the  present  state  of  things,  and  those  circum- 
stances  might  possibly  have  been  different.    It  is  necessary, 


inasmuch  as,  while  those  circumstances  remain  as  they  are, 
the  conviction  produced  by  them  is  unavoidable,  in  thought 
no  less  than  in  fact.     The  necessity  has  thus  a  negative, 
not  a  positive  origin ;  and  this  origin  suggests  a  practical 
caution  as  regards  the  employment  of  the  principle.     Our 
immediate  intuition  of  power,  as  has  been  before  observed, 
is  to  be  found  in  the  consciousness  of  mind  as  modifying 
itself,  the  ego  determining  its  own  volitions.     That  mind 
operates  upon  matter,  we  are  not  immediately  conscious. 
It  is  not  given  in  any  intuition  that  the  determination  of 
the  will  acta  upon  the  muscles  of  the  arm ;  though  the 
motion  of  the  latter  follows  the  generation  of  the  former. 
Hence,  though  we  are  compelled  to  ascribe  all  change  to 
the  only  power  of  which  we  are  conscious,  we  are  unable 
to  ascribe  it  in  the  only  manner  of  operation  of  which  we 
are  conscious.    For  purposes  of  scientific  investigation,  the 
principle  is  thus  purely  negative,  though  it  serves  to  regu- 
late our  belief.     We  know  not  to  this  day,  and  we  never 
can  know  in  this  life,  how  mind  operates  upon  matter; 
though  we  must  believe  that,  in  some  way  or  other,  it  does 
so  operate.     It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  construct   de- 
ductively  any   system   of  Natural  Philosophy   from   the 
Principle  of  Causality,  or  from  any  other  axiom  exi)ressing 
the  agency  of  mind  upon  matter.    The  value  of  such  prin- 
ciples is  purely  psychological. 

From  the  view  above  given  of  the  Principle  of  Causality, 
some  important  consequences  might  be  drawn  relatively  to 
other  sciences ;  which,  however,  my  present  limits  do  not 
permit  me  to  attempt.  One  such  remark,  however,  will,  I 
trust,  be  tolerated,  both  from  the  intrinsic  importance  of 
the  question  to  which  it  relates,  and  from  its  connection 
with  the  doctrines  of  an  eminent  author,*  to  whom  I  have 

*  For  the  argument  of  Mr.  MUl,  here  alluded  to,  see  Appendix,  note  D. 


14i 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


'i 
ii 


I 


i 


been  considerably  indebted  in  the  preceding  pages.     If 
the  view  above  taken  be  sound,  we  are  enabled  to  detect 
a  fundamental  fallacy  in  the  argument  in  favor  of  necessity 
from  the  determination  of  the  will  by  motives.     If  every 
thing  in  nature,  it  is  argued,  must  have  a  cause  or  sufficient 
reason,  the  determinations  of  the  will  cannot  be  exempted 
from  this  general  law.     If  I  am  determined  by  motives  in 
the  formation  of  every  act  of  volition,  then  there  is  some- 
thing previous  to  such  act  which  made  it  to  be  necessarily 
produced.     If  I  am  not  so  determined,  there  is  an  effect  in 
nature  without  a  cause.    In  this  argument,  there  is  a  latent 
ambiguity  of  language.     As  applied  to  Physics,  the  cause 
of  a  phenomenon  is  a  certain  antecedent  fact,  which  bein<T 
repeated,  the  phenomenon  will  recur.    This  notion  of  cause 
is  gathered  from  material  phenomena,  and  can  only  by  an 
imperfect  analogy  be  applied  to  mental.     In  this  sense, 
motives  addressed  to  the  will  are  not  causes ;  for,  in  every 
act  of  volition,  I  am  fully  conscious  that  I  can  at  this  mo- 
ment act  in  either  of  two  ways,  and  that,  all  the  antecedent 
phenomena  being  precisely  the  same,  I  may  determine  one 
wjfy  to-day,  and  another  way  to-morrow.    To  speak  of  the 
determinations  of  the  will  as  caused  by  phenomena,  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  the  fusion  of  metal  is  caused  by  fire,  is 
to  give  the  lie  to  consciousness  for  the  sake  of  theory.    On 
the  other  hand,  if  cause  be  interpreted  to  mean  an  agent 
with  power,  my  only  positive  notion  of  cause  in  this  sense 
is  derived  from  the  consciousness  of  myself  as  determining, 
not  as  determined.    Of  the  power  of  motives  upon  my  will, 
consciousness  tells  me  nothing;  but  only  that  the  one  is 
presented  and  the  other  follows ;  not,  however,  as  in  Phys- 
ics, uniformly.     My  notion  of  causes  with  power,  other 
than  myself,  is  derived  from  the  primary  intuition  of  my- 
self as  a  cause,  and  cannot  be  made  to  react  upon  that 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


145 


intuition,  without  the  fallacy  of  deducing  the  known  from 
the  unknown.  Of  myself,  as  necessitated  by  motives,  my 
immediate  consciousness  tells  me  nothing.  It  is  a  mere 
inference  from  a  supposed  general  law  of  causality,  which 
law  is  itself  derived  from  the  consciousness  of  the  very 
reverse.  You  are  conscious,  says  the  necessitarian,  of 
yourself  as  a  determining  cause ;  therefore  you  must  be  a 
determined  effect.  By  what  logic  does  this  follow  ?  If 
these  considerations  suggest  a  limit  to  the  univei-sality  of 
the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  so  be  it.  Ko  principle 
can  consistently  be  allowed  so  much  universality  as  to 
overthrow  the  intuition  from  which  it  had  its  rise.^ 

Another  observation  will  not  be  deemed  unimportant 
by  those  who  are  aware  how  many  philosophical  theories 
have  been  constructed  on  the  sole  basis  of  philosophical 
phraseology.*  Locke  has  laid  some  stress  on  the  fact,  that 
the  names  which  stand  for  insensible  actions  and  notions 
are  derived  from  those  of  sensible  objects.  «  To  imagine, 
apprehend,  comprehend,  adhere,  conceive,  instil,  disgust,' 
disturbance,  tranquillity,  etc.,  are  all  words  taken  from  the 
operations  of  sensible  things,  and  applied  to  certain  modes 
of  thinking.  By  which  we  may  give  some  kind  of  guess 
what  kind  of  notions  they  were,  and  whence  derived,  which 
filled  their  minds  who  were  the  first  beginners  of  Ian- 


I 


J  The  above  cursory  remarks  are  of  course  not  desifrned  as  a  full  exam- 
ination of  the  problem  of  necessity,  but  only  as  a  hint  for  examining  one 
of  the  arguments  advanced  in  its  support.  More  would  be  out  of  place 
here.    A  few  additional  observations  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix,  note  E. 

« It  will  scarcely  be  credited  that  a  philosopher  of  Hegel's  eminence 
should  have  connected  a  logical  theory  of  judgment  with  the  fact  that 
the  German  word  Urtheil  etymologically  means  original  part.  Such  a 
method  of  philosophizing  could  hardly  have  been  surpassed  by  Conradus 
Crambe,  or  his  facctioua  relaUve  Mr.  Swan,  Gamester  and  Punster  of  the 
City  of  London. 

13 


146 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


i 


guages;  and  how  nature,  even  in  the  naming  of  things, 
unawares  suggested  to  men  the  originals  and  principles 
of  all  their  knowledge."  *     The  fallacy  of  the  theory  at- 
tached to  this  foct  by  Locke  himself,  and  by  Horne  Tooke, 
has  been  fully  exposed  by  Dugald  Stewart ;  but  it  should 
also  have  been  observed  that,  in  point  of  fact,  the  obliga- 
tion  is  not  entirely  on  one  side.     While,  as  regards  attri- 
butes and  phenomena,  the  language  of  mental  science  has 
mostly  been  borrowed  from  that  of  sensation ;  in  all  that 
relates  to  the  notions  of  cause  or  force,  as  has  been  well 
remarked  by  Maine  de  Biran,  the  language  property  be- 
longing to  the  mental  fact  has  been  transferred  by  analogy 
to  the  physical.    As  the  basis  of  a  theory,  the  fact  is  of  no 
great  value ;  but  its  weight,  such  as  it  is,  should  at  least 
be  acknowledged  to  bear  on  both  sides  of  the  question. 

Before  closing  the  present  remarks  it  is  necessary  to 
say  a  few  words  in  reference  to  an  objection  which  will 
probably  have  frequently  suggested  itself  to  those  conver- 
sant  with  the  literature  of  the  subject.  The  origin  here 
assigned  to  the  principle  of  causality  (and  the  same  may 
in  some  degree  be  said  of  that  of  substance  also)  may 
perhaps  appear  to  be  of  too  empirical  a  character  to  con- 
sist with  the  amount  of  universality  assigned  to  the  prin- 
ciple itself;  besides  being  in  some  respects  at  variance 
with  the  opinions  of  those  philosophers  to  whom  the  pre- 
ceding pages  are  mostly  indebted.^  Sir  William  Hamilton 
has  remarked,  that,  if  the  conception  of  active  power  is 
derived,  as  Reid  asserts,  from  our  voluntary  exertions,  our 
notion  of  causality  would  be  of  an  empirical  derivation, 

1  Essaj/,  b.  iii.  ch.  i.  4  5. 

«  A  point  at  issue  between  two  eminent  French  philosophers,  to  whose 
writings  I  am  under  considerable  obligations,  wiU  be  considered  in  the 
Appendix,  note  F. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOaiCA. 


147 


and  without  the  quality  of  universality  and  necessity.^ 
Reid  himself,  in  another  passage,  admits  the  same  thing. 
"  The  proposition  to  be  proved,"  he  says,  « is  not  a  contin- 
gent, but  a  necessary  proposition.  It  is  not  that  things 
which  begin  to  exist  commonly  have  a  cause,  or  even  that 
they  always  in  fact  have  a  cause;  but  that  they  must  have 
a  cause,  and  cannot  begin  to  exist  without  a  cause.  Prop- 
ositions of  this  kind,  from  their  nature,  are  incapable  of 
proof  by  induction.  Experience  informs  us  only  of  what 
is  or  has  been,  not  of  what  must  be ;  and  the  conclusion 
must  be  of  the  same  nature  with  the  premises."* 

That  experience  is  the  chronological  antecedent  of  all 
our  knowledge,  even  of  the  most  necessary  truths,  is  now 
generally  admitted.     But  a  distinction  is  frequently  drawn, 
and  has  been  more  than  once  adverted  to  in  the  precedino- 
pages,  between  truths  or  notions  of  which  experience  is 
the  source,  and  those  of  which  it  is  only  the  occasion.     The 
mind,  instead  of  being  compared  to  a  tabula  rasa,  on  which 
experience  impresses  the  whole  writing,  is  likened  to  a 
seed,  which  must  indeed  be  planted  before  it  will  grow; 
but  contact  with  the  soil  is  only  the  occasion  which  calls 
forth  the  hidden  germ  of  the  plant.     Both  analogies  are 
impeifect ;  and  both,  as  regards  the  present  question,  tend 
rather  to  darken  than  to  illustrate.     The  point  may  be 
better  explained  by  laying  aside,  as  far  as  is  possible,  phys- 
ical imagery  altogether,  and  by  examining  separately  the 
relation  to  experience  of  notions  or  concepts,  and  of  judg- 
ments;    instead   of  confounding  both   under  the   vague 
expression,  origin  of  ideas. 

Every  general  concept  is  in  one  sense  empirical;  for 
every  concept  must  be  formed  from  an  intuition,  and  every 

J  Rfid's  Works,  p.  604. 

»  LiteU.  Powers,  F^say  vi.  ch.  6  (p.  455  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  edition). 


i 


148 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


III 


intuition  is  experienced.     But  there  are  some  intuitions 
which,  from  our  constitution  and  position  in  tlie  world,  we 
cannot  help  experiencing;    and  there  are  others  which, 
according  to  circumstances,  we   may  experience  or  not. 
The  former  will  give  rise  to  concepts  which,  without  any 
great  impropriety  of  language,  may  be  called  native,  or  a 
priori;  being  such  as,  though  not  coeval  with  the  mind 
itself,  will  certainly  be  formed  in  every  man  as  he  grows 
up,  and  such  as  it  was  preordained  that  every  man  should 
have.     The  latter  will  give  rise  to  concepts  which,  for  a 
like  reason,  may  be  called  adventitious,  or  a  posteriori ; 
being  such  as  may  or  may  not  be  formed,  according  to  the 
special  experience  of  this  or  that  individual.     To  the  for- 
mer class  belong  the  notions  of  time  and  space,  as  implied 
in  all  our  intuitions,  internal  or  external:  to  this  class 
belong  also  the  notions  of  seeing,  hearing,  and  such  other 
mental  operations  as,  in  some  manner  or  other,  are  per- 
formed by  every  man  not  physically  deficient  in  the  requi- 
site  organs.     Of  the  same  kind  are  the  notions  of  right  and 
wrong,  which  must  necessarily  arise  in  the  mind  of  every 
man  who  has  ever  performed  an  action  of  which  his  con- 
science approves  or  disapproves,  —  and  all  men  must  at 
times  do  both.    The  numerous  controversies  concernin<» 
the  existence  of  a  moral  sense  may  be  considerably  simpli- 
fied  by  this  consideration.*     On  the  other  hand,  to  the 
class  of  adventitious  notions  belong  those  of  this  or  that 
color,  sound,  etc. ;  in  short,  of  all  simple  or  complex  objects 
of  perception  which  it  is  possible  may  have  been  presented 
to  the  experience  of  one  man  and  not  to  that  of  another. 

But  a  necessity  of  which  I  am  conscious,  can,  like  truth 
and  falsehood,  exist  only  in  judgments.  It  may  be  or- 
dained by  the  laws  of  my  constitution  that  I  must  neces- 

^  See  Appendix^  note  G. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


149 


garily  form  certain  notions;  but  those  notions  are  not 
therefore  thought  by  me  as  necessary.  The  simplest  form 
in  which  necessity  can  be  presented  to  my  consciousness  is 
that  of  a  judgment,  A  must  be  B.  This  character  belongs 
to  all  such  judgments  as.  by  the  laws  of  his  constitution  a 
man  must  form,  supposing^  him  to  be  possessed  of  the  con- 
stituent  concepts. 

There  are  certain  concepts  which,  whether  native  or 
adventitious  in  their  own  origin,  must,  when  once  gained, 
necessarily  be  thought  in  conjunction ;  there  are  others 
which  we  are  at  liberty  to  connect  or  not,  according  to 
circumstances.  This  necessity  or  contingency  of  judg- 
ments is  generally  confounded  with  necessity  or  contin- 
gency in  the  corresponding  concepts ;  but  the  fact  is,  that 
they  are  not  even  coextensive  in  their  provinces.  There 
may  be  thousands  of  men  who  never  heard  of  a  circle  or 
its  radius :  there  is  not  one  who,  those  notions  being  once 
acquired,  can  fail  to  see  that  all  the  radii  of  a  circle  must 
be  equal  to  each  other. 

Necessity  in  judgments  is  dependent  sometimes  on  the 
laws  of  thought,  sometimes  on  the  laws  of  other  parts  of 
our  constitution  ;  and  the  terra  may,  in  another  sense,  be 
applied  to  that  character  in  certain  judgments  which  arises 
from  the  limitation  of  our  faculties,  and  from  the  circum- 
stances in  which  all  men  alike  are  placed.  Thus,  by  the 
laws  of  thought,  every  part  of  any  given  concept,  be  its 
origin  what  it  may,  must  be  thought  as  identical  with 
itself;  and  hence  arises  the  logical  necessity  of  all  analyti- 
cal judgments.  By  the  laws  of  our  intuitive  faculties,  all 
objects  of  external  perception  have  a  certain  relation  to 
Space,  and  all  objects  of  internal  perception  to  Time;  and 
hence  arises  the  mathematical  necessity  of  geometrical  and 
arithmetical  judgments.    Again,  the  limitations  imposed 

13» 


150 


n 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


i 


r       «      < 


'!!  ^ 


on  our  intuitive  faculties  restrict  us,  in  the  case  of  certain 
intuitions,  to  one  relation  only  between  them ;  and  hence 
arises  the  psychological  necessity  of  certain  judgments,  of 
which  we  can  suppose,  but  cannot  conceive,  the  contrary. 
The  restriction  in  this  case  is  not  properly  a  law  regulatin- 
acts  which  we  can  perform,  but  a  bar  separating  us  fron" 
acts  which  we  cannot  perform.     None  of  these  classes  of 
judgments  can  properly  be  termed  empirical ;    being  de- 
pendent, not  on  experience  alone,  but  on  experience  in 
conjunction  with  certain  laws  and  limitations  of  our  mental 
constitution.     They  are  thus,  to  adopt  Shaftesbury's  cor- 
rection  of  Locke,  if  not  innate,  at  least  connatural;  the 
constitution  of  man  being  such  that,  being  adult  or  grown 
up,  at  such  or  such  a  time,  sooner  or   later  (no  matter 
when),  they  will  infallibly,  inevitably,  necessarily  spring 
up  m  hmi.     These  laws  and  limitations  of  our  constitution 
render  necessary  the  adoption  of  Leibnitz's  addition  to  the 
sensationalist  axion^  "Nihil  est  in  intellectu,  quod  non 
fuerit  m  sensu,  nisi  ipse  intellectusr    And  even  with  this 
addition,  sense  must  be  understood  with  extreme  latitude, 
foT  every  possible  kind  of  external  or  internal  presentation. 
There  is  another  class  of  judgments  in  regard  to  which 
our  experience  is  restricted  by  the  circumstances  in  which 

^Nouvenux  Essais,  1.  ii.  ch.  1.  This  axiom  has  been  attributed  to  Aris- 
totle, who,  in  De  Anima,  iii.  4,  compares  the  intellect  before  its  actual  exei^ 
dse  to  a  tablet  with  nothing  actually  written  upon  it  iypa^ruo.  <?  ;.,3i. 
^<^X«  iKr*A*x«ra  -yry^M^Vo.).  But  Aristotle  does  not  regard  the  blank 
as  filled  up  by  the  senses,  but  by  the  activity  of  the  intellect  itself  A 
nearer  approach  to  the  sensational  tabula  rasa  may  be  found  in  the  doo 
trine  attributed  to  the  Stoics  by  (Pseudo)  Plutarch.  De  Plac  PM  iv  U- 

^ux7,5,  &^,p  xdprns  4y,py&^  «',  i^oypa<t>^y'  •»»  rovro  fda^  i^d^rmy  rAr 
i^ou..  iua.ayp<i^,r<u-  .punas  »4  6  rris  i^aypa^s  rp<hras  6  8^  rA.  a.V3V*- 
•w.    Compare  Zeller,  PhUosophie  der  Griechen,  Ui.  p.  31. 


151 


we  are  universally  placed.  This  is  the  case  with  the  results 
of  existing  physical  laws  of  the  universe,  which  we  can 
perfectly  conceive  revei-sed,  though  within  our  actual 
experience  they  never  are  so.  I  am  fully  convinced,  for 
example,  that,  under  the  existing  state  of  things,  a  stone 
thrown  into  the  water  will  sink  to  the  bottom ;  but  it  is 
perfectly  conceivable  that  it  might  float.  Lastly,  there  is 
a  class  of  judgments  which  are,  in  the  strictest  sense,  con- 
tingent ;  such  as  relate  to  the  conduct  of  a  voluntary  agent, 
who  is  subject  to  no  necessary  restraint,  whatever  may  be 
his  moral  obligations. 

The  above  remarks  are  not  designed  as  an  exact  state- 
ment of  the  theory  of  any  previous  philosopher,^  nor  as  an 
explanation  of  language  which  has  been  hitherto  employed 
in  describing  a  supposed  origin  of  our  ideas.     They  are 
offered  only  as  expressing  what  I  believe  to  be  a  more 
exact  and  accurate  account  than  is  conveyed  by  the  physi- 
cal analogies  already  mentioned,  by  the  vague  phraseology 
of  source  and  occasion,  or  by  the  obscure  notions  of  poten- 
tial and  actual  consciousness.     They  likewise  help  to  dis- 
tinguish, what  it  is  important  to  keep  separate  from  each 
other,  necessity  in  the  acquisition  of  concepts,  and  neces- 
sity in  their  combination  in  judgments.     It  is  hardly  cor- 
rect, for  example,  to  call  mathematical  notions  native,  or 
a  priori;  since  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  or  universal 
among  mankind  to  form  the  concept  of  a  circle  or  a  tri- 
angle, still  less  of  an  ellipse  or  a  parabola.     But  the  judg- 
ments aflirming  the  properties  of  these  figures  are  necessary 
in  the  highest  possible  degree.     On  the  other  hand,  the 

1  They  approach  closely  to  the  view  ^iven  by  Maine  de  Biran  in  his 
6th  and  7th  Answer  to  the  objections  of  Stapfer;  but  that  philosopher 
has  hardly  marked  with  sufficient  distinctness  the  positive  and  negative 
elements. 


152 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


153 


li 


III 


! 


I 


conception  of  a  cause  is  necessary  in  its  origin ;  all  men 
being,  in  some  degree,  conscious  of  the  exertion  of  power 
in  their  voluntary  acts.  But  the  necessity  of  the  principle 
of  causality,  as  a  proposition,  is  of  an  inferior  degree  to 
that  of  mathematical  judgments. 

rThe  general  results  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 
1.  Judgments  necessary  in  the  first  degree,  or  logical 
and  mathematical  necessity.     These  are  dependent  on  the 
laws  of  our  mental  operations ;    and  their  contradictious 
are  neither  conceivable  nor  supposable. 

2.  Judgments  necessary  in  the  second  degree,  or  psy- 
chological necessity.  These  are  dependent  on  the  restric- 
tions of  our  mental  constitution  ;  and  their  contradictories 
are  supposable,  but  not  conceivable.  To  this  class  belon^* 
the  principles  of  causality  and  of  substance. 

3.  Judgments  necessary  in  the  third  degree,  or  physical 
necessity.  These  are  dependent  on  the  laws  of  the  mate- 
rial world ;  and  their  contradictories  are  both  supposable 
and  conceivable,  but  never  actuallv  true. 

4.  Judgments  purely  contingent,  where   either  contra- 

Ldictory  may  be  the  true  or  the  false  alternative.     Such  are 
all  judgments  reducible  to  no  law  of  causation. 

To  this  class  belong  at  the  present  moment  many  jud^^- 
ments  on  physical  phenomena ;  but  here  the  contingency 
solely  arises  from  our  ignorance  of  the  law,  and  may  here- 
after be  removed.  Thus  I  am  certain  that  the  sun  will 
rise  to-morrow ;  but  I  am  uncertain  whether  the  wind  will 
blow  from  the  north  or  south.  But  this  only  means  that 
we  are  acquainted  with  the  laws  of  the  one  phenomenon, 
and  ignorant  of  those  of  the  other.  The  progress  of 
science  may  raise  all  these  judgments  to  cases  of  physical 
necessity.  But  my  whole  consciousness  assures  me  that  my 
own  voluntary  acts  are  subject  to  no  invariable  law,  and 


that  to  dream  of  any  amount  of  future  science  enablino- 
a  man  to  predict  these,  as  he  can  now  predict  an  eclipse, 
and  may  hereafter  predict  a  change  of  weather,  is  perfectly 
chimerical.  These  last  judgments  are,  therefore,  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  the  term,  contingent;  while  those  of  the 
second  and  third  class,  as  before  observed,  may  be  called 
contingent  or  necessary,  according  to  the  different  points 
of  view  in  which  they  are  regarded. 

It  only  remains  to  point  out  the  relation  of  the  present 
chapter  to  Logical  Science.     Accidentally,  it  may  be  ap- 
plied to  the  correction  of  a  few  perversions  of  the  Scholas- 
tic Logic,  such  as  the  theory  of  demonstrative  syllogisms ; 
but  its  essential  connection  with  the  Science  will  be  found 
in   the    different  forms   of  conceptions   and  judgments. 
Though  the  notions  of  substance  and  of  cause  are  obscure 
and  negative  only,  the  processes  of  conception  and  judg- 
ment, in   their  primitive   form,  proceed   upon   the   tacit 
acknowledgment  of  the   existence   of  something  of  the 
kind.     In   the   act   of  conception,  for  example,  different 
attributes  are  regarded  as  forming  one  whole  by  relation 
to  a  common  substance.     My  conception  of  gold,  for  ex- 
ample, is  that  of  a  yellow,  hard,  heavy  body;  but  the  color 
is   perceived   by  the  eye,  the   hardness  is   discerned   by 
touch,  the  weight  is  made  known  by  its  pressure  as  it  lies 
in  my  hand.     When  I  conceive  these  various  attributes  as 
forming  one  thing,  the  gold  is  neither  the  color,  nor  the 
hardness,  nor  the  weight,  but  the  something  to  which  all 
these  qualities  belong.    Again,  having  conceived  gold  as 
yellow,  and  hard,  and  heavy,  I  afterwards  discover  it  to  be 
soluble.     Here,  in  forming  the  judgment,  gold  is  soluble,  I 
regard  the  attributes  forming  the  subject  and  the  predicate 
as  coexisting  in  a  common  substance ;  and  this  identity  of 
substance  is  expressed  by  the  copula.    Our  ordinary  mod-  i 


li!!!' 


154 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


II 


ifications  of  thought  and  speech  thus  contain  certain  neg- 
ative  elements,  the  notions  attached  to  which  no  amount 
of  reflection  or  analysis  can  render  perfectly  clear  and 
distinct ;  though  they  have  been  instinctively  adopted  by 
all  mankind,  and  underlie  forms  of  speech  and  thought 
which  are  found  among  all  nations.  No  language  can  in 
these  respects  be  constructed  upon  principles  of  philosoph- 
ical analysis ;  for  analysis  cannot  take  place  till  language 
has  arrived  at  a  certain  stage  of  maturity ;  and,  till  that 
period,  it  must  be  suffered  to  grow  up  with  all  the  imper- 
fections consequent  on  a  hasty  generalization  from  the 
data  of  personal  intuition.  The  logical  character  of  these 
negative  notions  will  be  more  fully  explained  when  we 
come  to  examine  the  distinction  between  the  matter  and 
the  form  of  thought. 

A  preliminary  examination  of  the  piinciples  of  substance 
and  causality  is  also  necessary,  before  we  can  inquire  into 
the  character  of  the  logical  laws  of  thought.  If  it  were 
strictly  accurate  to  regard  the  principle  of  causality,  with 
M.  Cousin,^  as  a  Principle  of  the  Reason ;  —  if  it  were 
true  that  one  terra  of  the  judgment,  that  of  change,  being 
given,  the  mind  is  competent  by  its  own  act  to  add  the 
other,  and  assert  "change  supposes  a  cause  ;"  and  that  this 
term  thus  added  contains  a  positive  element  of  thought, 
and  not  a  mere  negation  of  the  existence  of  data  for  think- 
ing ;  —  if  this  were  the  case,  the  whole  Science  of  Logic 
would  have  to  be  remodelled  accordingly.  The  Reason, 
as  distinguished  in  Kant's  sense  from  the  Understanding^, 
would  become  a  source  of  speculative  truth  ;  its  principles 
would  assume  the  character  of  Laws  of  Thoudit :  and 
Logic  would  become,  according  to  M.  Cousin's  conception, 
the  passage  from  Psychology  to  Ontology :  the  process  of 

^  Gmn  de  Fhihsophie,  Le9on  19. 


PROLEGOMEXA   LOGICA. 


155 


pure  Thinking  would  conduct  us  to  the  science  of  pure 
Being.  A  Logic  of  the  Reason  would  thus  become  a 
necessary  complement  of  the  Logic  of  the  Understanding; 
and  a  considerable  portion,  if  not  the  whole,  of  the  Hegelian' 
Dialectic  must  be  incorporated  with  the  Formal  Science  of 
Kant.  To  show  that  such  a  treatment,  instead  of  being  a 
completion,  would  be  a  corruption  of  the  Science,  — instead 
of  making  Logic  fruitful  of  truths,  would  make  it  prolific 
of  chimeras,  —  instead  of  attaining  knowledge,  would  aim 
at  impossibilities, -has  been  one  of  the  main  objects  of 
the  preceding  inquiry. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


151 


CHAPTER    VI. 

ON   LOGICAL   NECESSITY   AND   THE   LAWS   OP  THOUGHT. 

The  result  of  the  two  preceding  chapters  has  been  to 
mark  off  two  classes  of  Necessary  Truths,  which,  though 
dependent,  as  all  such  truths  must  be,  upon  mental  laws 
and  limitations,  do  not,  properly  speaking,  exhibit  the 
operation  of  Laws  of  Thought,  nor  come  within  the  prov- 
ince of  Logic.  We  have  now  to  examine  the  psychological 
character  of  ^e  laws  of  pure  thinking,  and  the  kind  of 
necessity  exhibited  in  consequence  by  strictly  logical  pro- 
cessesTJ  The  following  passage  from  Mr.  Mill's  Logic  may 
serve  to  introduce  the  subject: 

"  This  maxim  (the  dictum  de  omni  et  nulla),  when  con- 
sidered as  a  principle  of  reasoning,  appeai-s  united  to  a 
system  of  metaphysics  once  indeed  generally  received,  but 
which  for  the  last  two  centuries  has  been  considered  as 
finally  abandoned,  though  there  have  not  been  wantin^r,  in 
our  own  day,  attempts  at  its  revival.  So  lon^r  as  what 
were  termed  Universals  were  regarded  as  a  peculiar  kind 
of  substances,  having  an  objective  existence  distinct  from 
the  individual  objects  classed  under  them,  the  dictum 
de  omni  conveyed  an  important  meaning;  because  it 
exi)rcssed  the  intercommunity  of  nature,  which  it  was 
necessary  upon  that  theory  that  we  should  suppose  to  exist 
between  those  general  substances  and  the  particular  sub- 
stances which  were  subordinated  to  them.  That  everything 
predicable  of  the  universal  was  predicable  of  the  various 


m 
jl  I 


individuals  contained  under  it,  was  then  no  identical 
proposition,  but  a  statement  of  what  was  conceived  as  a 
fundamental  law  of  the  universe.  The  assertion  that  the 
entire  nature  and  properties  of  the  substantia  secunda 
formed  part  of  the  properties  of  each  of  the  individual 
substances  called  by  the  same  name,  —  that  the  proper- 
ties of  Man,  for  example,  were  properties  of  all  men, — 
was  a  proposition  of  real  significance  when  man  did  not 
mean  all  men,  but  something  inherent  in  men,  and  vastly 
superior  to  them  in  dignity.  Now,  however,  when  it 
is  known  that  a  class,  a  universal,  a  genus  or  species,  is 
not  an  entity  per  se,  hut  neither  more  nor  less  than  the 
individual  substances  themselves  which  are  placed  in  the 
class,  and  that  there  is  nothing  real  in  the  matter  except 
those  objects,  a  common  name  given  to  them,  and  common 
attributes  indicated  by  the  name ;  what,  I  should  be  glad 
to  know,  do  we  learn  by  being  told  that  whatever  can  be 
aflSrmed  of  a  class  may  be  affirmed  of  every  object  con- 
tained in  the  class?  The  class  is  nothing  but  the  objects 
contained  in  it ;  and  the  dictum  de  omni  merely  amounts 
to  the  identical  proposition,  that  whatever  is  true  of  cer- 
tain objects,  is  true  of  each  of  those  objects.  If  all  ratioci- 
nation were  no  more  than  the  application  of  this  maxim 
to  particular  cases,  the  syllogism  would  indeed  be,  what 
it  has  so  often  been  declared  to  be,  solemn  trifling.  The 
dictum  de  omrii  is  on  a  par  with  another  truth,  which  in 
its  time  was  also  reckoned  of  great  importance, '  Whatever 
is,  is;*  and  not  to  be  compared  in  point  of  significance 
to  the  cognate  aphorism,  'It  is  impossible  for  the  same 
thing  to  be  and  not  to  be;'  since  this  is,  at  the  lowest, 
equivalent  to  the  logical  axiom  that  contradictory  proposi- 
tions cannot  both  be  true.  To  give  any  real  meaning  to 
the  dictum  de  omniy  we  must  consider  it  not  as  an  axiom, 

14 


158 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


159 


but  as  a  definition ;  we  must  look  upon  it  aa  intended 
to  explain,  in  a  circuitous  and  paraphrastic  manner,  the 
meaning  of  the  word  class,^^  ^ 

I  quote  the  above  passage  from  a  work  of  high  and  in 
many  respects  of  deserved  reputation,  as  a  remarkable 
instance  of  the  total   misconception  of  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  Logic,  arising  from   that  erroneous  view  to 
which  I  have  before  alluded,  which  regards  the  Aristo- 
telian  and  the  Baconian  Organon  as  forming  portions  of 
the  same  system,  and  as  subservient  to  the  same  end,  that 
of  physical  investigation  or  the  discovery  of  "  fundamental 
laws  of  the  universe."     That  the  deductive  method  may 
be  advantageously  applied  to  purposes  of  physical  inquiry 
is  unquestionable;  and  in  this  respect  Mr.  Mill  has  cer- 
tainly  not  underrated  its  value.     Any  single  proposition 
of  any  syllogism  or  chain  of  syllogisms  may  thus  materially 
contain  a  fact  or  a  law  of  nature ;  but  that  the  funda- 
mental principle  on  which  all  reasoning  is  supposed  to 
depend  can  by  any  possibility  exhibit  a  law  of  external 
nature  and  not  a  law  of  mind,  is  a  supposition  which,  if 
tenable,  would  make  a  science  of  Logic  impossible.    If 
the  dictum  de  omni  were,  as  Mr.  Mill  supposes,  formed  on 
the  hypothesis  that  universals  had  a  distinct  existence  in 
nature  apart  from  the  mind  that  contemplates  them,  Logic 
might  be  entitled  to  rank  with    Optics   or  Astronomy, 
as  a  science  of  the  laws  of  this  or  that  order  of  natural 
phenomena ;  or  it  might,  perhaps,  aspire  to  the  character 
of  a  general  Cosmology,  including  these  and  other  physical 
sciences  as  subordinate  branches ;  but  it  could  not  pretend 
to  the  slightest  knowledge  of  the  laws  which  the  mind 
obeys  in  thinking;  and  its  principles,  as  mere  generaliza- 
tions from  experience,  could  never  attain  to  more  than  a 

*  MUl's  Logic,  vol.  i.  p.  234. 


physical  necessity,  as  the  statement  of  cei^tain  facts  in  the 
existing  constitution  of  the  world. 

A  science  is  never  ultimately  benefited  by  dissembling 
any  conclusion  to  which  its  principles  appear  fairly  to 
lead ;  still  less  can  it  gain  by  adulterating  those  principles 
themselves  with  foreign  matter,  borrowed  from  .other  de- 
partments, in  the  hope  of  obviating  the  apprehended 
results.  In  the  case  of  Logic  especially,  it  may  be  confi- 
dently asserted  that  nine-tenths  of  the  confusion  and  mis- 
understanding which  still  prevail  concerning  its  nature 
and  capabilities,  have  arisen  from  ill-judged  attempts  to 
invest  it  with  an  appearance  of  utility  in  matters  alien  to 
its  province.*  Let  us  therefore  look  the  supposed  charge 
fairly  in  the  face,  and  ask  what  will  be  the  consequences 
if  we  admit  that  the  fundamental  principles  of  pure  think- 
ing are,  as  they  seem  to  be,  analytical  or  identical  judg- 
ments. Is  Logic  thereby  determined  to  be  false  or  futile  ? 
By  no  means.  A  system  is  futile  only  when  it  aims  at  the 
solution  of  questions  beyond  the  reach  of  human  faculties : 
and  even  then,  the  prosecution  of  such  inquiries  is  attended 
with  an  indirect  benefit ;  inasmuch  as  it  is  only  after  re- 
peated failures  that  men  learn  to  know  the  true  limits  of 
their  mental  powers,  and  can  profit  by  the  precept  ulti- 
mately enjoined  by  a  critical  psychology : 

"  Tecum  habita,  et  noris,  quam  sit  tibi  curta  supellex." 

It  may  indeed  be  humiliating  to  learn,  what  such  an 
admission  necessarily  implies,  that  the  understanding  of 
man  is  not  furnished  with  a  power  of  intuition  as  well  as 

1  Rosenkranz,  in  his  preface  to  Kant's  Lo*?ic,  speaks  severely  but  truly 
on  this  point :  "  So  ist  denn  auch  die  Lopk  hundertfach  von  philosophis- 
chen  Stumpcm  utUiter  gemisshandelt  worden." 


1i 


if 


160 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


PKOLEGOUENA  LOOICA. 


161 


!i 


* .( 


of  thought;  but  only  in  the  same  way  as  it  is  humiliating 
to  know  that  he  cannot  fly  like  a  bird,  nor  swim  like  a  fish. 
The  restriction  is  one  which  the  Maker  of  mankind  has 
thought  fit  to  impose  upon  his  creatures ;  and,  regret  it  as 
they  may,  they  cannot  escape  from  it.     If  Logic,  indeed, 
supplied  us  with  nothing  but  identical  principles,  it  would 
by  no  means  follow  that  the  study  of  it  is  altogether  use- 
less ;  but,  in  point  of  fact,  it  does  very  much  more.  Viewed 
in  connection  with  Psychology,  it  points  to  the  important 
fact,  that  these  principles  are  laws  of  mind ;  and  this  fact 
alone,  applied  to  the  past  history  and  future  prospects  of 
Philosophy,  will  give  rise  to  a  series  of  practical  rules  of 
inestimable  value  in  the  direction  of  the  mental  powers. 

To  prove,  then,  that  Logic  is  either  futile  or  false,  it  must 
be  shown  either  that  it  is  impossible  for  a  thinking  bein<r 
to  attain  to  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  by  which  he  thinks, 
and  to  test   thereby  the   legitimacy  of  the   products   of 
thought,  or  that  the  laws  by  which  the  human  mind  is 
actually  governed  are  different  from  those  universally  as- 
sumed  and  insisted  upon  by  Logicians.     But  if,  on  these 
two  points.  Logic  and  Psychology  are  found  to  be  at  one, 
each  becomes  the  strongest  possible  guarantee  of  the  truth 
and  scientific  value  of  the  other.     The  laws  which  the 
logician  has  all  along  assumed  as  the  basis  of  his  system 
are  now  shown  to  be  the  very  ones  by  which,  from  the 
actual  constitution  of  the  human  mind,  the  operations  of 
thought  are  regulated;   the   conclusions  arrived  at  by  a 
critical  examination  of  the  mental  powers  are  shown  to 
be  the  same  laws  of  thinking  which  had  before  been  ac- 
cepted as  principles  from  a  critical  examination  of  the 
mental  products.    Thus,  by  the  united  forces  of  Logic  and 
Psychology,  we  advance  a  step  in  the  most  important  of 
all  speculative  knowledge,  the  knowledge  of  ourselves  and 


I 


of  our  capacities ;  and  so  far  is  either  science  from  being 
thereby  proved  futile,  that  they  become  the  strongest  pos- 
sible safeguard  against  all  futile  speculations,  by  pointing 
out  clearly  the  nature  of  the  laws  of  the  pure  understand- 
ing, and  the  exact  limits  within  which  they  are  operative. 
Enough  has,  I  trust,  been  said  to  vindicate  Logic  from 
the  charge  of  frivolity,  whatever  may  be  the  conclusion 
concerning  its  principles  to  which  our  inquiries  finally  lead 
us.  But,  in  the  eyes  of  a  philosopher,  such  a  vindication  is 
wholly  unnecessary.  The  only  question  worthy  of  a  liberal  / 
mind,  as  regards  the  result  of  any  investigation,  is  not,  Is 
it  useful  ?  but,  Is  it  true  ?  .However  fully  persuaded  we 
may  be  that  every  speculative  truth  has  its  practical  ad- 
vantages, to  require  a  foresight  of  such  advantages  before 
entering  on  the  inquiry,  is  to  interpose  the  most  effectual 
bar  that  can  be  devised  to  the  progress  of  any  knowledge, 
and  the  attainment  of  any  benefit.^    The  only  tenable  po- 

1  This  Is  indeed  admitted,  and  ably  maintained,  by  some  of  that  class  of 
■writers  whose  researches  are  most  to  the  taste  of  the  Utilitarian.  I  am 
happy  to  be  able  to  quote  the  following  admirable  vindication  of  the  pur- 
suit of  truth  for  its  own  sake,  from  a  philosopher  with  whose  general  prin- 
ciples I  am  by  no  means  inclined  to  sympathize: 

"  Si  la  puissance  preponderantc  dc  notre  organisation  ne  corrigeait, 
mt*me  involontairement,  dans  I'esprit  dcs  savans,  ce  qu'il  y  a  sous  ce  rap- 
port d'ineomplet  et  d'e'troit  dans  la  tendance  penerale  de  notre  epoque,  I'in- 
telligence  humaine,  reduite  a  nc  s'occupcr  que  de  recherches  susceptibles 
d'une  utilite  pratique  immediate,  se  trouverait  par  cela  seul,  comme  I'a 
tresjustement  remarque'  Condorcet,  toutafait  arretee  dans  ses  progr^s, 
xnvme  k  regard  de  ces  applications  auxquelles  on  aurait  imprudemment 
sacritie  Ics  travaux  purement  spe'culatifs ;  car,  les  applications  les  plus  ini- 
portantes  de'rivent  constamment  dc  theories  formees  dans  une  simple  inten- 
tion scientifique,  et  qui  8«)uvent  ont  it6  cultiv<5e6  pendant  plusieurs  sic'cles 
Bans  produire  ancun  rdsultat  pratique.  On  en  pent  citer  un  exemple 
bien  remarquabic  dans  les  belles  speculations  des  geometres  grecs  sur  les 
sections  coniques,  qui,  apres  une  longue  suite  de  ge'nerations,  ont  scrvi,  en 
determinant  la  renovation  de  Ta^stronomie,  It  conduire  finalement  I'art  de 


162 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


163 


if 


li 


f 


li  ti 


! 


Bition  that  can  be  occupied  by  the  assailants  of  Logic  mnst 
be  acquired  by  showing  that  men  do  not,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  reason  consciously  or  unconsciously  according  to  its 
rules;  that  the  thinking  process  is  not  governed  by  laws  at 
all ;  or  that  its  laws  are  totally  different  from  those  which 
the  logician  lays  down. 

But  it  is  time  to  examine  the  question  itself  which  has 
given  rise  to  these  observations.  Are  the  Laws  of  Thought 
in  reality  identical  judgments  or  not?  It  may,  perhaps, 
appear  that  the  so-called  frivolity  of  such  judgments  is 
the  result  of  unsuspected  causes,  having  their  root  in  the 
nature  of  the  mind  itself;  that  the  very  feature  which  is 
selected  as  the  especial  object  of  contempt  and  ridicule  is 
the  strongest  evidence  of  the  truth  and  value  of  the  prin- 
ciples which  it  characterizes.  Supposing,  then,  that  the 
act  of  thinking  is  goveraed  by  certain  laws,  what  might 
we  naturally  expect  to  find  as  the  prominent  feature  by 
which  such  laws  will  be  distinguished  ?  A  new  truth  is  in 
its  very  nature  partial :  it  is  new  only  because  it  is  partial ; 
—  the  discovery  of  the  particular  attributes  of  some  par- 
ticular thing  or  class  of  things.  In  a  psychological  point 
of  view,  the  determination  of  the  laws  of  thought  (be  their 

la  navi«ration  an  dcgr^  de  perfectionnement  qu'il  a  atteintdans  ces  demiers 
temps,  et  auquel  il  ne  serait  jamais  parvenu  sans  les  travaux  si  pureraent 
theoriques  d'Archimfede  et  d'Apollonius;  tellement  que  Condorcet  a  pu 
dire  avec  raison  k  cet  ejjard :  *  le  matelot,  qu'une  exacte  observation  de  la 
lonfritude  prc'serve  du  naufrajre,  doit  la  vie  a  une  the'orie  con9ue,  deux 
mille  ans  auparavant,  pardes  hommes  de  ge'nie  qni  avaient  en  vue  de  sim- 
ples spc'culations  g<5om(<triqnc8.* "— Comte,  Cours  de  FMosophie  Positive, 
vol.  i.  p.  64. 

An  English  philosopher,  who  has  treated  of  the  same  subjects  in  a  very 
different  spirit,  has  expressed  the  same  sentiment  briefly  and  well :  "  It 
may  be  universally  true,  that  Knowled-e  is  Power;  but  we  have  to  do 
with  it  not  as  Power,  but  as  Knowled^jc." 


character  as  judgments  what  it  may)  is  as  much  a  new 
truth  as  any  other ;  being  the  discovery  of  a  particular 
fact  in  the  constitution  of  the  human  mind.    But  when  we 
consider  the  same  laws  logically,  in  their  application  to  the 
products  of  thought,  how  is  it  possible  for  any  new  truth 
to  be  determined  by  them?    As  general  laws,  they  can 
have  no  special  relation  to  this  object  of  thought  rather 
than  that ;  and  it  is  upon  such  special  relations  that  the 
discovery  of  every  new  property  must  depend.     Material 
knowledge  arises  from  the  observation  of  differences :  the 
essential  feature  of  laws  of  thought  must  be  the  abstrac- 
tion from  all  differences.'    A  necessary  law  of  all  thinking, 
which  shall  at  the  same  time  ascertain  the  definite  prop- 
erties of  a  definite  class  of  things,  is  a  contradiction  in 
terms ;  for  it  is  optional,  and  therefore  contingent,  whether 
we  shall  apply  our  thoughts  to  that  particular  class  of 
things  or  not.     But  if  all  men  have  been  thinking,  some 
on  this  thing,  some  on  that,  but  all  under  one  code  of  laws, 
what  marvel  if,  when  their  attention  is  called  to  those 
laws,  they  should  recognize  them  as  what  they  have  all 
along  virtually  acknowledged  ?     Herein  at  once  lies  the 
explanation  and  the  justification  of  the  so-called  frivolity 
of  principles  of  this  kind.    They  can  determine  only  the 
general  attributes  common  to  all  objects  of  thought  as 
such  ;  and  these  attributes  must  constitute  the  very  analyt- 
ical judgments  which  Logic  is  so  much  decried  for  offering. 
Surely,  in  the  name  of  common  sense  and  common  honesty, 
never  was  outcry  more  absurd  than  that  which  finds  fault 
with  a  science  for  accomplishing  the  very  purpose  which  it 
professes  to  attempt,  and  for  exhibiting  the  very  features 
which,  if  its  pretensions  are  well  founded,  and  its  method 
sound,  it  necessarily  must  exhibit. 

1  Kant,  Logik,  Einlcitung  vii.  p.  219.    Ed.  Rozenkrani. 


!   i 


164 


M^i 


i 


'}    ! 


1 1     'I 

1 


PROLEGOMENA   LOQICA, 


It  is  a  remarkable  fact  in  the  modern  history  of  philos- 
ophy,  as  regards  identical  judgments,  that,  while  English 
philosophers,  taking  their  departure  from  the  principles  of 
Locke,  have  been  unsparing  in  their  expressions  of  scorn 
and  censure  of  them  as  mere  verbal  trifling,  German  philos- 
ophei-s,  taking  their  departure  from  the  principles  of  Kant, 
Lave  placed  them  at  the  head  of  all  philosophy,  as  the 
only  absolute  principles  of  truth  and  certainty.     Yet  Kant, 
as  well  as  Locke,  and  with  far  more  accuracy  of  discrim- 
ination, perceived   and   pointed   out  the  impossibility  of 
constructing  a  system  of  philosophy  upon  these  judgments 
only.     That   both   extremes  are  equally  in  enor,  —  that 
both  arise  from  a  crude  and  one-sided  view  of  a  philosophy 
not  perhaps  in  all  respects  consistent  with  itself,  —  and 
that  the  truth  lies  between  the  two,  is  a  natural  and  obvi- 
ous conclusion.    To  enter  into  the  extravagances  of  FLchte 
and  Schelling  would  be  foreign  to  the  purposes  of  the 
present  work ;   but  as  regards  the  disciple  of  Locke,  it 
may  be  observed,  that  he  has  no  choice  but  of  two  alter- 
natives: either  to  repudiate  the  attack  of  his  master  on 
frivolous  propositions,  or  to  retract  his  refutation  of  the 
doctrine  of  innate  ideas.     If  the  principles  of  thought  are 
competent  to  supply  any  positive  addition  to  what  is  given 
m  intuition,  it  follows  that  the  act  of  thought  can  in  so  flir 
create  its  own  materials.    This  brings  us  back,  of  necessity, 
to  the  theory  of  innate  ideas.     If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
understanding  can  only  modify  what  is  given  out  of  the 
act  of  thought,  it  follows  that  analytical  judgments  are 
not  mere  verbal  frivolities,  but  fundamental  laws  of  the 
thinking  faculty. 

The  Laws  of  Thought,  properiy  so  called,  may  thus  be 
psychologically  distinguished  from  the  other  elements  of 
the  process  by  the  answers  to  the  following  questiona: 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


165 


1.  What  is  the  material  which  must  be  gfven  prior  to  any 
act  of  pure  thinking?  2.  How  is  that  material  modified 
by  the  act  of  thought  itself?  3.  What  are  the  conditions 
by  which  the  understanding  is  bound  in  such  modification  ? 
The  third  question  will  determine  the  fundamental  laws 
of  the  several  operations  of  Conception,  Judgment,  and 
Reasoning. 

The   act   of  conception   consists  in   regarding  certain 
attributes  as  coexisting  in  a  possible  object  of  intuition. 
It  has  before  been  remarked,  that  when  the  object  of  intu- 
ition is  actual,  i.  c,  now  and  here  present,  an  act  of  thought 
is  necessary  to  distinguish  it  as  such  from  other  objects 
simultaneously  presented.     This,  however,  is  not  pure  con-/ 
ception,  but  conception  in  conjunction  with  intuition.     In 
pure  conception,  the  attributes  are  not  presented  in  thera-{ 
selves,  but  represented  by  their  signs.    Hence  the  necessity, ; 
in  some  form  or  other,  of  language ;  and  hence  the  object ' 
of  intuition,  in  an  act  of  pure  conception,  is  not  presented 
as  actual,  but  represented  as  possible.^ 

Two  preliminary  conditions  are  thus  requisite,  prior  to 
any  act  of  pure  conception.  Fii*stly,  attributes  must  be 
given  which,  in  some  combination  or  other,  have  been  pre- 
sented in  a  former  intuition.  For,  as  thought  cannot  create 
intuition,  attributes  which  have  never  been  experienced 
are  not  conceivable.  They  need  not  indeed  have  been 
experienced  in  their  present  relation,  but  in  some  relation 
or  other.  Thus,  though  I  have  never  seen  that  combina- 
tion of  a  man's  head  with  a  horse's  body,  which  is  sup- 
posed to  constitute  a  centaur,  yet  the  notion  of  such  a 
conjunction  is  perfectly  conceivable,  because  both  the 
horse's  body  and  the  man's  head  have  been  presented  in 
other  combinations.    Secondly,  as  the  attributes  are  nowf 

1  Cf.  Krug,  Logik,  ^  15. 


I! 


Ill 


i 


1 


166 


PROLEGOMENA  LOQICA. 


'  given  in  and  through  their  signs,  the  import  of  those  signs 
is  presupposed  to  be  known.  A  word  which  I  cannot  con- 
nect  with  some  known  attribute  is,  for  all  purposes  of 
thought,  like  the  terms  of  an  unknown  tongue.  Pure 
thought  can  neither  supply  defects  in  the  experience  of 
things,  nor  ignorance  of  the  meaning  of  words.  Informa- 
tion on  both  these  points  is  therefore  presupposed. 

These  materials  being  given,  how  are  they  dealt  with 
by  the  act  of  thought,  and  what  are  the  laws  and  limits 
which  govern  or  confine  the  operation  ?    By  the  act  of 
conception,  the  given  attributes  are  combined  in  a  unity 
of  representation.     Are  there,  then,  any  cases  in  which, 
certain  attributes  being  given,  I  am  compelled  to  think 
them  as  representing  an  object?  are  there  any  cases  in 
which  I  am  forbidden   to   do  so?  and  are  there  any  in 
which,  as  far  as  thought  is  concerned,  I  am  left  at  liberty 
to  do  as  I  please  ?    Pure  conception  being  concerned  with 
possible  objects  of  intuition  only,  the  first  and  third  cases 
merge  into  one.     The  actual  existence  of  any  object  can 
be  determined  only  by  its  actual  presence  in  this  or  that 
intuition ;  and  even  then  the  evidence  extends  only  to  its 
present  existence  now  and  here,  not  to  its  necessary  exist- 
ence at  any  future  time  when  it  may  become  an  object  of 
thought.     As  an  object  of  a  past  intuition,  it  has  then  a 
possible  and  representative  existence  ouly.^     The  first  law 
of  pure  thinking  applicable  to  conception  is  thus  indicated 

»  "As  not  now  present  in  time,  an  immediate  Itnowledge  of  the  pa*/  is  im- 
possible. The  past  is  only  mediately  cognizable  in  and  through  a  present 
modification  relative  to  and  representative  of  it,  as  having  been.  To 
speak  of  an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past  involves  a  contradiction  in 
adjecto.  For,  to  know  the  past  immediately,  it  must  be  known  in  itself - 
and  to  be  known  in  itself,  it  must  be  known  as  now  existing.  But  the  past 
is  just  a  negation  of  the  now  existent;  its  very  notion,  therefore,  excludes 
the  possibility  of  its  being  immediately  known."  -  Sir  W.  HamUton  Beid's 
Works,  p.  810.  ' 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


167 


by  the  negative  criterion,  that  there  are  certain  attributes 
which  we  cannot  think  as  coexisting  in  any  possible  object 
of  intuition.  This  leads  us  to  the  well-known  Principle 
of  Contradiction,*  the  most  general  form  of  which  is, 
"Nothing  can  be  A  and  not-A ; "  or,  " No  object  can  be 
thought  under  contradictory  attributes."  But,  though 
everything  which  is  contradictory  is  thus  inconceivable,  it 
cannot  be  maintained,  on  the  other  hand,  that  everything 
which  is  not  contradictory  is  conceivable.* 

But  the  Principle  of  Contradiction,  as  above  enunciated, 
can  only  be  applied  in  thought  coordinately  with  another 
and  a  positive  principle.  If  an  object  cannot  be  thought 
under  contradictory  attributes,  the  impossibility  arises 
from  its  having  a  definite  character  of  its  own,  including 
one  of  the  contradictories  and  excludins:  the  other.  The 
universe  of  conceivable  objects  embraces  both  A  and  not- 
A:  it  is  only  when  definitely  conceived  as  the  one  that  an 
object  cannot  be  conceived  as  the  other.  Every  object  of 
thought,  as  such,  is  thus  conceived  by  limitation  and  diflTer- 
ence;  as  having  definite  characteristics  by  which  it  is 
marked  off  and  distinguished  from  all  others;  as  being, 
in  short,  itself,  and  nothing  else.  The  indefinite  ideas, 
therefore,  corresponding  to  the  general  terms  Thing,  Ob- 
ject, Being  in  general,  are  not  concepts,  as  containing  no 
distinctive  attributes ;  and  the  general  object  denoted  by 
such  terms  is  inconceivable.  This  second  Law  of  Thought 
is  expressed  by  the  Principle  of  Identity,  "  Every  A  is  A ; " 
or,  "Every  object  of  thought  is  conceived  as  itself."* 

*  This  law,  as  Krug  has  remarked  {Logik,  §  18),  ought  rather  to  be  called 
the  Principle  of  Non-Contradiction. 

2  On  conceivability  as  a  test  of  logical  possibility,  see  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
Beid's  Works,  p.  377. 

•  Cf.  Krug,  Logik,  §  17,  who  contemplates  the  principle  from  the  oppo- 


168 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


I      i.| 


But  these  two  Laws  of  Thought  necessarily  involve  a 
third.     The  object  which  I  conceive  is,  by  the  Law  of 
Identity,  discerned  as  being  that  which  it  is,  and  by  the 
Law  of  Contradiction  is  distinguished  from  that  which  it 
is  not    But  these  two  correlatives  must  also  be  regarded 
as  constituting  between  them  the  universe  of  all  that  is 
conceivable ;  for  the  distinction  above  made  is  not  between 
two  definite  objects  of  thought,  but  between  the  object  of 
which  I  think  and  all  those  of  which  I  do  not  think.     Not- 
A  implies  the  exclusion  of  A  only,  and  of  nothing  else, 
and  thus  denotes  the  universe  of  all  conceivable  objects 
with  that  one  exception.     This  relation,  in  its  more  gen- 
eral  expression,  constitutes  a  third  Law  of  Thought,  the 
Principle  of  Excluded  Middle,^  "Every  possible  olyect  is 
either  A  or  not-A.**    These  three  Principles,  of  Contradic- 
tion, Identity,  and  Excluded  Middle,  constitute  the  Laws 
of  Pure  Thinking,  or  of  Thought  as  Thought. 

Another  limitation  must  be  noticed,  which,  though  per- 
haps  not  properly  an  a  pHoH  law  arising  out  of  the  nature 
of  thought  itself,  is  at  least  a  univei-sally  valid  a  posteriori 
restriction  arising  from  the  practical  limits  of  our  intuitive 
powers.  Thought  can  only  deal  with  such  attributes  as 
have  been  in  some  manner  presented  in  intuition.  Hence, 
in  all  cases  where  intuition  is  impossible,  thought  is  im- 

Bite  side.  He  is  wron-  however,  in  deducing  from  it  the  principle  of 
Contradiction,  which  is  an  independent  axiom.  The  two  have  been  Un- 
founded or  identified  by  many  eminent  philosophers;  as  Leibnitz  (Bejlex 
surl^),  Wolf  (Ph.  Bat,  ^  07,,,  Kant  (I^k,  Einl.  vii.),  Herbart  (Eini. 
in  dte  Philosophie,  f  39).  IIotTbaucr  (Loyi*-.  ^  23)  shows  that  the  two  prin- 
ciples  are  independent,  and  that  neither  can  be  deduced  from  the  other 
without  a  petitio  prinrtpii. 

1  Primupium  exclusi  medii  inter  dm  contradictaria.  For  the  history  of  this 
expression,  and  of  the  Law  denoted  by  it,  see  Sir  W.Uamiiton'a  Leoturu 
<m  Logic,  p.  65. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


169 


possible  likewise.  Hence  arises  a  class  of  practical  lim- 
itations of  thought  based  on  the  limitations  of  possible 
experience.  Some  of  these  are  partial  and  accidental  only ; 
as  in  the  case  of  a  blind  man,  who  can  have  no  intuitive 
experience  of  colons.  But  one  at  least  is  common  to  all 
men,  and,  so  far,  psychologically,  if  not  logically,  necessary. 
Though,  as  far  as  the  laws  of  thought  are  concerned,  it  is 
permitted  to  unite  in  an  act  of  conception  all  attributes 
which  are  not  contradictory  of  each  other,  it  is  impossible 
in  practice  to  go  beyond  a  very  limited  number.  The 
number  of  attributes  in  the  universe  not  logically  repug- 
nant to  each  other  is  infinite;  and  the  mind  can  therefore 
find  no  absolute  limits  to  its  downward  progress  in  the 
formation  of  subordinate  notions.  To  arrive  at  a  notion 
which  shall  comprehend  within  itself  all  conceivable  com- 
patible attributes,  and  which  shall  therefore  admit  of  no 
further  possible  limitation  but  that  of  the  individual  con- 
ditions of  presence  in  space  and  time,  is  an  act  which,  if 
not  a  priori  self-destructive,  will  at  least  in  practice  require 
an  infinite  grasp  of  mind  and  an  infinite  length  of  time  for 
its  accomplishment.^ 

Hence  it  follows  at  once  that  a  logical  Highest  Genus, 
and  a  logical  Lowest  Species  —  t.  e.,  a  notion  so  simple  as 
to  admit  of  no  further  subtraction,  and  a  notion  so  complex 
as  to  admit  of  no  further  addition  —  are  both  inconceivable. 
The  meaning  of  these  two  terms  in  Logic  must  not  be ' 

'  This  and  the  preceding  condition  are  sometimes  given  as  the  Laws  of 
Hom^gendfy  and  Specification.  See  Kant,  Kritik  der  r.  V.  p.  510,  ed.  Rosen- 
krans;  Krug,  Loyik,  M5,  b;  Fries,  Sytt.  der  Logik,  ^  2L  I  prefer  to  regard 
them  as  deductions  from  a  higher  law.  It  may  be  observed,  that  those 
logicians  who  insist  on  the  Law  of  Homogeneity  are  not  consistent  in  call- 
ing thing  or  ob)ect  a  concept  ( Begriff).  The  third  law  joined  with  these  two, 
that  of  Logical  Affinity,  or  Continuity,  is  questionable,  both  as  regards  truth 
And  raltte. 

15 


1j 


170 


PROLEGOMENA  L06ICA. 


PROLEQOMENA  LOGICA. 


171 


1 


confounded  with  that  which  is  applicable  to  this  or  that 
branch  of  material  science.     The  Highest  Genus  in  any 
special  science  is  the  general  class,  comprehending  all  the 
objects  whose  properties  that  science  investigates ;  the  dif- 
ferent Lowest  Species  are  the  classes  at  which  that  special 
investigation  terminates.    In  Geometry,  for  example,  under 
the  stimmitm  r/enus  of  magnitudes  in  space,  Ave  find  three 
coordinate  inflrn(B  species  of  tnangles,  the  equilateral,  the 
isosceles,  and  the  scalene.      The  geometrical  properties  of 
the   figures  are  not  affected  by  any  further  subdivision. 
These  three  classes  are  therefore  lowest  species  in  Geom- 
etry, but  not  in  Logic.     For  of  geometrical  limitations,  the 
logician,  as  such,  knows  nothing.     In  a  mere  relation  of 
concepts,  the  notion  of  an  equilateral  triangle  whose  sides 
are  three  feet  long,  is  a  further  subdivision  of  the  notion 
of  an  equilateral  triangle ;  and  out  of  this  again  we  may 
form   the   subordinate    notion,   "an    equilateral    triangle 
whose  sides  are  three  feet  long  and  divided  into  inches.'' 
This  process  may,  as  far  as  Logic  is  concerned,  be  contin- 
ued ad  hifinitum. 

The  extreme  limits  of  generalization  and  specification 
being  thus  inconceivable,  we  obtain  from  these  conditions 
two  characteristics  of  all  logical  concepts,  namely,  that 
they  must  have  both  comprehension  and  extension.  Every 
notion,  that  is  to  say,  as  a  condition  of  its  conceivability, 
must  contain  a  plurality  of  attributes,  in  consequence  of 
which  it  is  capable  of  subordination  to  a  higher  notion ; 
and  it  must  contain  a  limited  number  only  of  attributes, 
in  consequence  of  which  lower  notions  may  be  subordi- 
nated to  it.  This  canon  of  conceivability,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  not  invalidated  by  the  supposed  highest  and  lowest 
classes  of  the  logicians,  which  are  limits  never  amved  at 
in  any  process  of  actual  thought.    Neither  is  it  invalidated 


by  the  so-called  simple  ideas,  which,  according  to  the 
doctrine  of  Descartes  and  Locke,  are  the  limits  beyond 
which  analysis  is  impossible.  For  a  simple  idea,  like  a 
summum  genus^  is  by  itself  inconceivable.  In  every  intu- 
ition it  is  presented  as  part  of  a  complex  object ;  and  it 
can  in  no  act  of  positive  thought  be  contemplated  out  of 
that  connection.  Whiteness  and  redness,  for  example,  are 
given  to  us  in  combination  with  extension  ;  motion,  with 
a  moving  body ;  pleasure  and  pain,  with  a  conscious  sub- 
ject. We  cannot  represent  to  ourselves,  as  a  possible 
object  of  intuition,  a  color  unextended,^  a  motion  without 
a  moving  body,  a  feeling  without  a  mind.  Simple  ideas 
are  thus  never  conceived  as'  such,  but  only  forming  parts 
of  a  complex  object.  That  they  are  indefinable  (in  Locke's 
view  of  definition),  has  been  remarked  in  a  former  chap- 
ter; but  this  arises,  not  from  their  forming  absolutely 
simple  concepts,  but  from  their  being  simple  portions  of  a 
complex  intuition. 

From  these  two  characteristics  of  all  concepts  follows 
their  capability  of  Definition  and  Division  —  the  former 
being  an  enumeration  of  the  higher  notions  contained  in 
the  comprehension  of  a  given  concept;  the  latter,  an 
enumeration  of  the  lower  notions  contained  in  its  exten- 
sion. The  manner,  however,  in  which  these  two  operations 
are  commonly  treated  in  logical  writings  manifests  an  utter 
confusion  between  the  general  laws  of  thinking  as  appli- 
cable to  any  matter,  such  as  they  are  laid  down  in  pure 
Logic,  and  the  performance  of  a  special  act  of  thought 
about  this  or  that  matter,  which  forms  a  portion  of  this  or 
that  branch  of  applied  Logic.    The  so-called  Logical  Laws 

'  The  error  of  those  philosophers  who  suppose  that  color  can  be  con- 
ceived apart  from  extension,  has  been  noticed  by  Sir  W.  Uamilton,  Reid's 
Works,  p.  800. 


m\ 


M 


•  1 


i 
I 


172 


PROLEGOMENA   L0OJCA« 


of  Definition  and  Division  are  merely  derived  from  an 

analysis  of  the  notions  of  the  operations  themselves ; 

notions  such  as  might  be  borrowed  concerning  any  object 
from  the  art  or  science  to  which  it  materially  belongs.  In 
the  ffiven  notion  of  Definition,  as  the  enumeration  of  the 
parts  comprehended  in  a  concept,  it  is  of  course  implied 
that  it  must  be  adequate,  otherwise  the  parts  are  not 
enumerated ;  and  that  it  is  clear,  otherwise  they  are  not 
parts.  And  so  of  Division,  substituting  parts  of  exten- 
sion for  those  of  comprehension.  Such  an  analysis  fur- 
nishes no  test  even  of  the  formal  validity  of  any  single 
act  of  division  or  definition ;  it  only  takes  to  pieces  the 
general  notion  of  the  process:  But  it  is  obvious  that  any 
given  notion,  borrowed  from  any  source  whatever,  may  be 
analyzed  in  like  manner  by  an  application  of  thought. 
From  the  notion  of  weighing  a  pound  of  cheese,  it  follows 
of  course,  firstly,  that  the  whole  quantity  weighed  must 
be  exactly  a  pound  ;  secondly,  that  any  part  of  the  same 
must  be  less  than  a  pound  ;  thirdly,  that  the  same  ounce 
must  not  be  weighed  twice  over.  If  this  criterion  be 
adopted,  a  chapter  on  cheese-weighing  has  as  good  a  right 
to  be  placed  in  Logic,  as  a  chapter  on  Division  or  Defini- 
tion. 

The  question  necessary  to  determine  the  true  logical 
character  of  these  processes  is  not,  *' Given  the.  general 
notions  of  the  two  operations,  to  determine  by  analysis 
I  \ what  those  notions  imply;"  but,  "Given  any  particular 
\  Iconcept,  how  much  can  be  ascertained  by  pure  thinking 
^Iconcerning  its  relation  to  higher  or  lower  concepts?" 
Viewed  in  this  light.  Definition,  as  a  logical  operation,  is  a 
portion  of  the  act  of  Conception,  governed  by  the  same 
laws,  and  subject  to  the  same  limitations.    We  can  deter- 
mine thereby  nothing  concerning  the  actual  possession  of 


PROLEQOMENA  LOGIC  A. 


173 


certain  attributes  by  certain  objects:  we  cannot  even 
ascertain  that  objects  of  any  kind  really  exist  in  nature. 
Conception  being  limited  to  possible  objects  of  intuition 
only.  Definition  is  confined  to  the  analysis  and  separate 
exposition  of  the  attributes  contained  in  a  given  concept, 
and  determines  not  their  reality  but  their  conceivability. 
Its  only  logical  laws  are  the  Principles  of  Identity  and 
Contradiction :  the  one  compelling  us  to  regard  any  given 
concept  as  identical  with  the  sum  of  its  constituent  parts, 
and  the  other  pronouncing  that  a  definition  which  enu- 
merates attributes  directly  or  by  implication  incompatible 
with  each  other  is  logically  self-destructive.  If  the  attri- 
butes are  compatible,  the  definition  is  allowed  as  valid,  as 
far  as  Logic  is  qualified  to  pronounce  judgment :  for  further 
examination  it  must  be  referred  to  the  tribunal  of  ex- 
perience. The  purpose  of  logical  definition  is  thus  not 
material  accuracy,  but  formal  distinctness  as  regards  the 
intension  or  comprehension  ^  of  the  concept. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  rules  of  definition  commonly  given 
in  logical  treatises  have  no  value  or  significance  except  in 
extralogical  applications.  To  say  that  a  definition  must 
be  adequate  to  the  7iotion  which  I  entertain,  is  only  to  say 
that  what  I  assign  as  the  contents  of  a  notion  must  be 
what  I  think  to  be  the  contents  ;  which  is,  of  course,  im- 
plied in  the  fact  of  my  assigning  them.  The  rule  acquires 
a  material  significance  when  interpreted  to  mean  that  the 
attributes  assigned  in  the  definition  must  exactly  corre- 
spond to  the  characteristic  features  of  the  object  as  it  exists 
in  nature.  But,  then,  to  detei-mine  whether  this  rule  is 
complied  with  or  not  is  clearly  beyond  the  province  of  the 

*  See  Drobisch,  Neue  DarsteUung  der  Logik,  §  102.  That  analytical  dis- 
tinctness alone  falls  within  the  province  of  Logic  is  shown  by  Kant,  Logik, 
Einl.  viii. 

]5* 


iM 


174 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


175 


i 

j 
1      '' 

i 
1 

,i 

1 

•I 


logician.  I  may  assign  «  rational  animal,"  as  an  analysis  of 
my  notion  of  man  ;  but  to  ascertain,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
that  all  men  possess  reason,  and  that  all  other  animals  are 
without  it,  is  manifestly  a  question  not  of  thought,  but  of 
experience.  There  is  no  alternative  between  exemptin<r 
the  logician  as  such  from  all  material  knowledge  whatever, 
and  requiring  from  him  a  minute  acquaintance  with  every 
possible  branch  of  human  knowledge.  If  he  is  bound  to 
know,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  men  are  rational  and  horses 
hinnible,  he  is  by  the  same  rule  bound  to  be  conversant 
with  the  constitution  and  properties  of  every  object  which 
nature  can  present  or  art  produce. 

It  is  obvious  also  that  Logic  can  admit  one  kind  of  de- 
finition, and  one  only.  The  so-called  nominal  definition 
by  synonym  or  etymology  would  require  of  the  logician  a 
material  knowledge  of  the  vocabulary  and  construction  of 
any  given  language,  thus  making  Logic  a  compendium 
of  all  dictionaries  and  all  grammai-s.»  The  so-called  acci- 
dental  definitimi  is  a  logical  absurdity.  If  the  notion 
homo,  for  example,  is  composed  of  the  notions  animal 
rationale,  it  cannot  at  the  same  time  contain  the  distinct 
attributes  of  hipes  implume.  To  use  the  same  word  for 
both  combinations  is  simply  to  employ  language  equivo- 

1  "In  thi8  place,"  says  Archbishop  Whately,  "we  are  concerned  with 
nominal  definitions  only,  because  all  that  is  requisite  for  the  purposes  of 
rmsoning  (which  is  the  proper  province  of  Logic)  is,  that  a  term  shall  not 
be  used  m  different  senses :  a  r^  definition  of  anything  belongs  to  the  scL 
ence  or  system  which  is  employed  about  that  thing."  In  the  sense  in 
which  nominal  and  real  definition  were  distinguished  by  the  scholastic  lo- 
gicians.  the  exact  reverse  is  the  truth.  Logic  is  concerned  with  real  i  e 
with  notional  definitions  only:  to  explain  the  meaning  of  particular  words 
belongs  to  the  dictionaries  or  grammars  of  particular  languages.  But  this 
is  onfy  one  out  of  thousands  of  errors  committed  by  various  writers 
through  confounding  the  thing  or  notion  in  the  mind  with  the  things  or  in' 
dividuals  out  of  it.  Even  Kant  {Logik,  S  106^  has  not  quite  avoided  this 
ambiguity. 


cally.  It  may  so  happen  that  all  the  individuals  possessed 
of  reason  are  also  provided  with  two  legs  and  destitute  of 
feathers ;  but  this  is  not  implied  in  the  notion  of  ration- 
ality, and  cannot  be  elicited  by  any  act  of  pure  thinking. 
For  this  reason  those  logicians  are  clearly  right  who  con- 
sider the  enumeration  of  properties  or  accidents,  not  as  a 
definition  of  notions,  but  as  a  description  of  individuals. 
But  such  a  description  has  clearly  no  connection  with 
Logic,  but  solely  with  the  natural  history  of  the  object 
described. 

Division,  on  the  other  hand,  corresponds  in  one  sense  to 
the  remaining  portion  of  the  act  of  Conception,  the  union 
of  the  attributes  in  a  possible  object  of  intuition,  and  is 
thus  regulated  by  the  same  laws  as  Definition.  But  Divi- 
sion,  in  this  sense  of  the  term,  is  not  Specification,  but 
Individualization;  and  moreover  pays  no  attention  to 
any  coordinate  members  of  the  same  class,  but  is  solely 
occupied  with  the  one  object  conceived.  It  thus  belon^'s, 
not'  to  symbolical,  but  to  intuitive  coornition ;  beinff  not 
the  mere  enumeration  of  the  constituent  elements  of  a 
concept,  but  the  verification  of  their  conceivability  by  the 
aid  of  the  imagination.  Such  an  imagination  is  in  one 
sense  a  Division ;  for  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  imagine  an 
individual  triangle  which  shall  be  neither  equilateral,  isos- 
celes, nor  scalene :  one  of  these  attributes  therefore  enters 
into  every  actual  intuition  of  a  triangle,  and  thus  far  limits 
and  divides  the  general  notion.  But,  then,  the  attributes 
added  are  not  in  this  case  contemplated  as  the  constituents 
of  a  lower  class,  but  of  a  possible  individual.  In  like  man- 
ner, I  cannot  imagine  a  man  of  no  color  and  no  stature; 
but  in  adding  these  particulars  to  my  conception,  I  do  not 
think  of  them  as  related  to  any  coordinate  class,  as  consti- 
tuting a  division  of  men  into  tall  and  short,  or  white  and 


,)' 


176 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


not  white.  I  tliink  of  them  only  as  necessary  to  test  the 
conceivability  of  the  generic  attributes  with  which  they 
are  combined.  The  office  of  Division  in  this  respect  is  to 
make  our  conceptions  clear,  as  that  of  Defiuitiou  is  to  make 
them  distinct} 

Beyond  this,  the  process  of  Division,  as  contributing  to 
distinctness  in  the  extension  of  a  Concept,  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  an  act  of  pure  thinking,*  or  as  solely  determined 
by  logical  laws.  Even  in  the  case  of  dichotomy  by  contra- 
diction, the  princij)le  of  division  must  be  given,  as  an 
addition  to  the  attributes  comprehended  in  the  concept, 
before  the  logician  can  take  a  single  step.  For  Division 
is  not,  like  Definition,  a  mental  analysis  of  given  materials: 
the  specific  difference  must  be  added  to  the  given  attri- 
butes of  the  genus ;  and  to  gain  this  additional  material, 
it  is  necessary  to  go  out  of  the  act  of  thought,  to  seek  for 
new  empirical  data.  ''Divide  animal"  is  a  command 
which  no  logician,  as  such,  can  obey ;  for  the  mere  notion 
animal  does  not  of  itself  suggest  rational  or  irrational, 
any  more  than  mortal  or  immortal,  virtuous  or  vicious,  or 
any  other  attributes  not  logically  incompatible  with  the 
genus.^  The  principle  of  division  must  be  given  in  addi- 
tion to  the  concept  to  be  divided ;  and  when  it  is  given, 
the  process,  thus  raised  from  a  material  to  a  formal  one, 


r*. 


I 


1  A  conception  Is  ctfar  wlien  its  object,  as  a  whole,  can  bo  distinguished 
from  any  other;  it  is  d/«/»nrt  when  its  several  constituent  parts  vmx  be  dis- 
tinj^uished  from  each  other.  The  merit  of  first  pointing  out  these  charac- 
teristics of  tlie  logical  perfection  of  thought  belongs  to  Leibnitz.    See  his 

editattones  de  Cognitione  Veritate  et  Ideis. 
By  pure  thinking  is  not  meant  thinking  which  has  no  relation  to  any  past 
experience;  for  without  some  experience,  all  thought  is  impossible.  It 
means  only  that  we  can  proceed  to  the  act  of  thought  without  additional 
data  iKjing  required  prior  to  and  out  of  the  act  Itself.  The  relation  of  ex- 
perience to  thought  is  too  often  lost  sight  of  in  the  Kautian  philosophy. 

*  See  Fries,  System  der  Logik,  §  92. 


PKOLEGOMBNA   LOGICA. 


177 


has,  like  definition,  a  potential  only,  not  an  actual  value  in 
relation  to  experience.     If  the  differentia  rational  is  given, 
I  can  divide  animal  into  rational  and  not-rational ;  but  if 
the  differentia  mortal  is  given,  I  can  also,  as  far  as  Logic 
is  concerned,  divide  into  mortal  and  immortal.    I  must 
appeal  to  experience,  and  not  to  thought,  to  determine 
whether  one  or  the  other  of  these  divisions  is  actually  tnie ; 
whether  the  Struldbrugs  of  Luggnagg  or  the  Undying 
Fish  of  Bowscale  Tarn  are  really  existing  animals  or  not. 
Every  concept  is  potentially  divisible  by  any  two  given 
differentiae,  contradictory  of  each  other,  and  both  compati- 
ble with  the  genus.    And  the  laws  by  which  the  process 
is  governed  are,  firstly,  the  Principle  of  Contradiction ; 
and,  secondly,  that  of  Excluded  Middle.     By  the  first,  wo 
are  forbidden  to  think  that  two  contradictory  attributes 
can  both  be  present  in  the  same  object ;  by  the  second,  we 
are  forbidden  to  think  that  both  can  be  absent.     The  first 
tells  us  that  both  differentiae  must  be  compatible  with  the 
genus:  I  cannot,  for  example,  divide  animal  into  animate 
and  inanimate.     The  second  tells  us  that  one  or  the  other 
must  be  found  in  every  member  of  the  genus;  but  in  what 
manner  this  is  actually  carried  out,  whether  by  every  ex- 
isting  member  possessing  one  of  the  differentife  and  none 
the  other,  or  by  some  possessing  one  and  some  the  other, 
experience  alone  can  determine.^ 

It  thus  appears  that  even  dichotomy  by  contradiction  is 
not,  strictly  speaking,  a  formal  process,  as  Kant  considers 
It;*  but  that  it  is  partly  material,  and  so  far  extralogical ; 
and  that  the  material  element  predominates  still  more, 
according  as  any  other  principle  of  division  is  adopted. 
Where  the  specific  differences  are  not  contradictory,  so 

'  Trendelenburg,  Zogisthe  ITntersuchungen,  I.  4. 

*  Logik,  S  113.    See,  on  the  other  side,  Hoffbauer,  LogOc,  \S  134, 138. 


;i 


It 


I 


178 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


that  each  naturally  suggests  the  other,  every  one  of  them 
must  be  given,  prior  to  any  possible  act  of  formal  thinking. 
The  only  division  of  a  concept  which  can  be  regarded  as 
a  purely  logical  process  is  that  sometimes  distinguished  as 
Determinatioti,  which  consists  in  the  reunion  of  attributes 
previously  separated  by  definition.^  In  a  formal  point  of 
view,  therefore,  the  arrangement  of  those  logicians  who 
treat  of  Definition  before  Division  is  preferable  to  the 
inverse  order  adopted  by  Aldrich,  Dioisionem  excipit 
Dejinitio, 

Throughout  the  preceding  remarks,  the  presence  of  all 
the  antecedent  conditions  requisite  to  the  logical  perfec- 
tion of  cognitions  is  presupposed.  It  is  taken  for  granted 
that  we  are,  prior  to  any  act  of  conception,  in  i)ossession 
of  the  materials  necessary  to  complete  clearness  and  dis- 
tinctness, and  that  the  act  of  thought  consists  merely  in 
eliciting  the  concept  with  these  qualities  out  of  the  suffi- 
cient data.  And  this  supposition  is  the  only  one  which 
can  be  admitted  into  a  system  of  pure  Logic,  or  into 
Psychology  in  its  purely  logical  relation.  The  failure  of 
materials  for  conception  is  precisely  analogous  to  the  fail- 
ure of  materials  for  reasoning.  In  the  latter  case,  if  a 
single  premise  only  is  given,  or  two  premises  so  related 
that  no  necessary  conclusion  follows  from  them,  the  logician 
is  not  called  upon  to  remedy  the  deficiency;  he  simply 
decides  that  the  data  are  insufficient  for  reasoninjr  at  alL 
In  like  manner,  if  the  empirical  data  for  clear  or  distinct 
conception  are  wanting,  the  logician,  as  such,  can  only  say 
that  the  materials  for  the  thought  are  insufficient.  The 
distinction  between  clear  and  obscure,  distinct  and  indis- 
tinct conceptions,  is  as  much  out  of  the  province  of  pure 
Logic,  as  a  distinction  between  syllogisms  whose  prembes 

1  Sec  Drobisch,  H  17,  29,  30. 


179 


necessitate  their  conclusion,  and  reasonings  in  which  the 
consequence  may  with  more  or  less  probability  be  conjec- 
tured.    In  conception   and   in  judgment,  as  well   as  in 
reasoning,  there  are  processes  necessitated  by  the  laws  of 
thought  from  certain  data;  there  are  othera  which  are  not 
necessitated,  but  which  may  be  hazarded  with  more  or  less 
risk  of  error ;  the  presumption  in  their  favor  amounting  in 
some  cases  to  a  moral  certainty,  and  binding  upon  ''our 
practice,  but  never  reaching  the  height  of  logical  necessity 
or  speculative  perfection.^     The  first  class  alone  are  recog- 
nized by  Pure  Logic,  and  that  in  relation  not  merely  to 
reasoning,  but  to  all  three  operations  of  thought.    Applied 
Logic,  in  the  Kantian  sense  of  the  term,  may  treat  of  the 
several  practical  imperfections  of  human  thought,  which 
lower  in  this  or  that  special  instance  tlie  logical  standard 
.  of  perfection.     Here  we  may  treat  of  notions  more  or  less 
obscure  or  confused,  of  judgments  more  or  less  uncertain, 
of  reasonings  more  or  less  inconsequent.     The  object  of 
the  present  observations  is  rather  to  ascertain  what  light 
may  be  thrown  by  psychological   considerations  on  the 
purely  logical  processes,  and  to  call  attention  to  the  fact, 
that  th^istinction  between  material  and  formal  thinking] 
may  and  ought  to  be  consistently  carried  out  in  reference 
to  all  the  operations  of  the  understanding. 

Judgment  is  distinguished  from  Conception  by  the  dif- 
ference of  its  data.  In  Conception,  attributes  are  given, 
to  be  united  by  thought  in  a  possible  object  of  intuition ;' 
mfJudgment,  concepts  are  given,  to  be  united  by  thought 
m  a  common  object]  Like  Conception,  also,  Judgment  ntny 
be  considered  either  as  pure,  or  as  combined  with  a  present 
intuition.  Pure  judgments  are  those  in  which  the  given 
concepts  are  of  such  a  character  that  their  mutual  relation 

>  Cf.  Knig,Xosfifc,  S  35,  Anm.  1. 


I 


'^1 


I 


!■ 


180 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PBOLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


181 


of  agreement  or  difference  can  be  determined  by  an  act  of 
thought  alone,  without  any  appeal  to  experience.  (This  is 
the  case  when  the  attributes  comprehended  in  the  one  con- 
cept form  either  the  whole  or  apaiJ;  of  those  comprehended 
in  the  other ;  or  where  some  attribute  comprehended  in  the 
one  is  contradictory  of  one  of  those  comprehended  in  the 
other.  In  the  former  case  we  are  enabled  at  once,  by  the 
law  of  Identity,  to  imite  the  two  concepts  in  an  affirmative 
judgment,  and  in  the  latter,  by  the  law  of  Contradiction, 
to  separate  them  by  a  negative  judgment.  But  this  class 
of  judgments  (being  those  commonly  known  as  analytical 
or  explicative)  may,  with  more  propriety,  be  included  un- 
der the  head  of  Conception.  The  affirmative  analytical 
judgment  is  in  fact  nothing  more  than  the  Definition,  com- 
plete or  partial,  of  the  subject-notion ;  while  the  negative 
judgment  expresses  only  the  necessary  condition  of  all 
conception,  which,  by  discerning  any  notion  as  being  that 
which  it  is,  necessarily  excludes  it  from  all  that  it  is  not. 

In  synthetical  or  ampliative  judgments,  the  act  of 
thought  is  not  sufficient  to  determine  the  relation  of  the 
concepts  to  each  other,  without  the  accompaniment  of  an 
intuition,  pure  or  empirical.  For  example:  in  order  to 
form  the  judgment,  "Two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a 
space,"  I  must  not  only  be  able  to  conceive  separately  the 
two  notions  of  a  straight  line  and  of  an  inclosing  of  space, 
but  I  must  also,  by  the  aid  of  imagination,  construct  a 
representation  in  my  mind  of  two  actual  straight  lines  and 
their  actual  positions  in  space.  I  must  perceive  that  these 
two  straight  lines  are  incapable  of  inclosing  a  space,  before 
I  pronounce  the  universal  judgment  concerning  all  pairs 
of  straight  lines.  Here  the  relation  between  the  two  con- 
cepts is  presented  in  a  pure  or  a  priori  intuition^  t.  e.,  in 
an  intuition  containing  no  adventitious  element  external 


to  the  mind  itself  Again,  in  order  to  form  the  judgment, 
"  Gold  is  heavy,"  supposing  that  my  conception  of  gold 
does  not  in  itself  include  the  attribute  of  weight,  I  cannot, 
by  merely  thinking  of  gold  as  a  hard,  yellow,  shining  body', 
determine  what  effect  it  will  produce  when  laid ''on  the' 
hand.  I  must  actually  place  an  individual  piece  of  gold 
on  my  hand,  and  ascertain  by  experience  the  fact  of  its 
pressure.  Here  the  relation  between  the  two  concepts  is 
presented  in  a  mixed  or  empirical  intuition,  i.  e.,  in  an 
intuition  caused  by  the  presence  of  a  body  external  to  the 
mind  itself. 

Yet  in  this  class  of  judgments,  as  well  as  in  the  former,"^ 
when  the  necessary  intuition  has  once  been  given^  the  act 
of  thought  itself  is  governed  by  the  same  laws  of  Identity 
and  Contradiction.     In   pronouncing  that    two   distinct 
notions  are  united  in  one  and  the  same  object,  that  it  is 
the  ff old  which  is  heavy,  I  unite  the  concepts  "gold"  and  "^ 
«  heavy "  in  a  comjilex  notion  comprehending  both,  and 
denoting  the  union  of  both  in  a  common  object.     That 
which  was  before  conceived  as  "gold,"  is  now  conceived 
as  "  heavy  gold  "  (whether  the  new  attribute  becomes  part 
of  the  meaning  of  the  term  gold  or  not  is  of  no  conse- 
quence), and  this  complex  notion  is  now  exhibited  in  the 
act  of  judgment,  as  analyzed  into  its  constituent  parts,  and 
identified  with  them.»     Synthetical  judgments  may  thus, 
as  far  as  the  mere  act  of  thought  is  concerned,  be  brought 
under  the  same  law  as  analytical  ones,  namely,  the  PHn- 
ciple  of  Identity  when  the  judgment  is  affirmative,  and 
that  of  Contradiction  when  it  is  negative.  "^ 

Another  law  of  thought  is  sometimes  given  as  the 
foundation  of  Judgment,  under  the  name  of  the  Lo-ical 
Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason.     This  law,  which  mu^t  be 

1  See  Drobisch,  Neue  Darstdlung  dcr  Logik  4  3G 

16  ^    >»     • 


\s 


182 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


carefully  distinguished  from  the  Metaphysical  Principle 
of  Causality,  is  enunciated,  **  Every  judgment  must  have 
a  sufficient  ground  for  its  assertion."  *  But,  in  truth,  the 
relation  of  this  principle  to  the  act  of  judgment  is  merely 
negative :  it  forbids  us  in  certain  cases  to  judge  at  all,  and 
it  does  no  more.  If  the  judgment  is  analytical,  the  law  of 
Identity  or  of  Contradiction  is  the  sufficient  reason  for 
making  it.  If  the  judgment  is  synthetical,  we  have,  pre- 
viously to  the  given  intuition,  no  reason  at  all;  and,  accord- 
ingly,  we  suspend  our  thought  till  we  have  referred  the 
decision  to  the  tribunal  of  experience.  The  only  logical 
reason  for  a  thought  of  any  kind  is  its  relation  to  some 
other  thought ;  and  this  relation  will  in  each  case  be  de- 
termined by  its  own  proper  law.  The  Principle  of  Suffi- 
cient Keason  is  therefore  no  law  of  thought,  but  only  the 
statement  that  every  act  of  thought  must  be  governed  by 
some  law  or  other.* 


1  See  Kant,  Logik,  Einlcitang  vii.;  Fries,  Syst.  der  Logih,  S  41;  Krug, 
Logik,  §  20;  Thomson,  Laws  of  Thought,  p.  20C. 

2  In  excluding  the  Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason  from  tbo  laws  of 
thought  I  am  happy  to  find  myself  supported  by  the  authority  of  Sir 
William  Hamilton  in  the  philosophical  Appendix  to  his  Viscusshm,  pub- 
lished subsequently  to  the  first  edition  of  the  present  work.  "The  Princi- 
ple of  Sufficient  Beason,"  he  says,  "  should  l)c  excluded  from  Loj^ic.  For, 
inasmuch  as  this  principle  is  not  material  (material  =  non-formal)  it  is 
only  a  derivation  of  the  three  formal  laws ;  and  inasmuch  as  it  is  ma- 
terial, it  coincides  with  the  principle  of  Causality,  and  is  cxtralogical." 
Kant  {Logik,  Einleitung  vii.)  takes  a  different  view.  He  rej^rds  the  Princi- 
ple of  Contradiction  as  the  criterion  of  the  lojrical  possibility  of  a  judg- 
ment, that  of  Sufficient  Reason  as  the  criterion  of  its  logical  reality.^  Bat 
of  judgments,  as  distinguished  fVom  the  conclusions  of  syllogisms,  the 
only  logical  reality  is  possibility.  Directly  I  have  ascertained  two  notions 
not  to  be  contradictory  to  each  other,  I  have  made  an  actual  judgment  of 
the  logical  possibility  of  their  coexistence;  and  to  take  any  step  beyond 
this,  experience  is  required,  and  not  logic.  The  difference  between  prob- 
lemaUcal  and  assertorial  judgments  is  extralogical,  and  depends  on  the 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


183 


H^-pothetical  and  Disjunctive  Judgments  must  be  re- 
served  for  a  separate  examination.    At  present,  we  must 
proceed  to  investigate  the  laws  of  Reasoning.     This  pro- 
cess  differs   from   Judgment,   as   Judgment   differs   from 
Conception,  in  the  nature  of  its  preliminary  data.     In 
Judgment,  concepts  are  given,  thought  being  required  to 
determine  their  possible  coexistence  in  an  object.    In  Rea- 
soning, one  or  more  judgments  are  given,  thought  being 
required  to  determine  what  further  judgments  may  be 
elicited  from  them.    Under  this  head  will  thus  be  included 
not  merely  the  ordinary  Syllogism,  but  likewise  (so  far  as 
they  contain  processes  of  thought  at  all)  the  immediate 
inferences  of  Opposition  and  Conversion.     In   all  these, 
the  material  given  prior  to  the  act  of  thought  is  a  judg' 
ment;  and  the  process  of  judging  from  concepts  is  thus 
not    included,  but    presupposed;   the    conclusion    being 
always  a  different  judgment,  either  in  form,  as  regards 
Quantity,  Quality,  or  Relation,  which  is  the  case  in  imme- 
diate consequences;  or  partially  in  matter,  which  is  the 
case  in  mediate  reasoning  by  syllogism.^     The   common 
arrangement,  therefore,  which  places  immediate  inference 
ill  the  second  part  of  Logic,  is  objectionable.^ 

question  whether  a  logical  judgment  is  or  is  not  determined  by  experience 
to  be  materially  true. 

1  Sec  Kant,  Logik,  ^  44.  His  theory  of  contraposition  affecting  the 
modality  o{  the  judgment  is  untenable,  and  seems  to  result  merely  from 
that  excessive  love  of  system  which  must  bring  in  four  forms  somehow. 
The  supposed  demonstrative  character  of  the  conclusion  in  contraposition 
is  merely  a  necessity  of  consequence  from  the  position  of  the  premise;  a 
character  which  is  found  in  all  logical  reasoning  whatever. 

2  This  order,  however,  has  by  no  means  Iwen  uniformly  adopted  by  Lo- 
l?icians.  Aristotle  treats  of  Opposition  in  the  De  Interpntatione,  and  of 
Conversion  in  the  Prior  Analytics.  Wolf  separates  Opposition  and  Con- 
version, considered  as  relations  between  two  given  propositions,  from  the 
processes  of  inference  derivable  from  each.    The  former  is  treated  in  con- 


i- 


'  ^4 


> 


184 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


Opposition  may  be  treated  in  two  points  of  view. 
Firstly,  as  a  relation  between  two  given  propositions; 
secondly,  as  a  process  of  inference,  in  which,  one  proposi- 
tion being  given,  another  may  be  determined.  In  the  for- 
mer character,  it  is  merely  an  explanation  of  the  meanin<y 
of  certain  logical  terms ;  in  the  latter,  it  is  a  process  of 
reasoning,  a  deduction  of  one  proposition  as  conclusion 
from  another  as  premise,  and  governed,  as  we  shall  see,  by 
the  same  laws  as  the  mediate  inference.*  The  primary 
processes,  on  which  the  rest  may  be  made  to  depend,  are 
those  of  Subaltern  and  Contradictory  Opposition;  the 
former  being  grounded  on  the  Principle  of  Identity,  and 
the  latter  on  those  of  Contradiction  and  Excluded  Middle. 
Thus  in  the  proposition,  "All  A  is  some  B,"  an  identity  is 
stated  between  the  whole  of  the  objects  thought  under 
the  concept  A,  and  a  portion  of  those  thought  under  B.* 


nectlon  with  Judf?ment;  the  latter,  under  the  name  of  Immediate  Conse- 
quence, in  connection  with  reasoning.  Kant  and  his  followers  treat  im- 
mediate consequences  as  reasonings,  under  the  name  of  Syllogisms  of  the 
Understanding ;  an  arrangement  which  is  logically  correct,  whatever  may 
be  the  psychological  objections  to  the  nomenclature. 

J  On  account  of  this  identity  of  law,  various  attempts  have  been  made 
by  ingenious  writers  to  reduce  immediate  consequence  to  the  mediate  form. 
Thus  Wolf  exhibits  subaltern  opposition  as  a  syllogism  with  the  minor 
premise,  "Some  A  is  A;"  thus  per\ersely  representing  the  law  of  thought, 
which  governs  the  reasoning  process  in  general,  as  a  part  of  the  special 
matter  given  preliminary  to  a  particular  act.  Still  more  absurd  is  the 
elaborate  system  which  Krug,  after  a  hint  from  Wolf,  has  constructed,  in 
which  all  immediate  inferences  appear  as  hypothetical  syllogisms;  a  ma- 
jor premise  being  supplied  in  the  form,  "  If  all  A  is  B,  some  A  is  B." 
The  author  appears  to  have  forgotten  that  either  this  premise  is  an  addi- 
tional empirical  truth,  in  which  case  the  immediate  reasoning  is  not  a  logi- 
cal process  at  all,  or  it  is  a  formal  inference,  presupposing  the  very  reason- 
ing to  which  it  is  prefixed,  and  thus  begging  the  whole  question. 

*  Throughout  the  following  pages,  in  order  to  exhibit  the  law  of 
thought  more  clearly  in  each  case,  I  have,  in  conformity  with  the  views  of 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA.  185 

%  h 

The  conclusion,  "  Therefore  some  A  is  some  B,"  proceeds 

on  the  principle  that  every  part  of  A  must  be  identical 
with  a  part  of  that  which  has  been  given  as  identical  with 
all  A.  This  process  resembles  the  inference  in  an  affirma- 
tive syllogism,  except  that  in  the  latter  there  is  given  a 
double  identity ;  firstly,  of  the  middle  term  with  a  part  of 
the  major;  and  secondly,  of  the  minor  with  a  part  of  the 
middle.  The  inferences  of  Contradictory  Opposition  are 
based  on  the  Principles  of  Contradiction  and  Excluded 
Middle.  By  the  former,  when  one  of  two  contradictory 
judgments  is  given  as  true,  we  infer  that  the  other  is  false; 
and  by  the  latter,  when  one  is  given  as  false,  we  infer  that 
the  other  is  true.  The  remaining  inferences  of  Opposition 
may  be  reduced  to  combinations  of  the  above. 

The  several  processes  of  Conversion,  if  the  predicate  is 
quantified  as  well  as  the  subject,  may  be  reduced  to  Sim- 
ple Conversion  only;  and  even  under  the  old  system, 
Conversion  per  accidens  may  be  regarded  as  a  combination 
of  Simple  Conversion  with  one  of  the  inferences  of  Oppo- 
sition.* Simple  Conversion  is  thus  the  only  one  which  it 
is  necessary  to  examine.    This  cannot  properly  be  regarded 


':^| 


Sir  William  Hamilton,  stated  the  quantity  of  the  predicate  as  well  as  of 
the  sulycct  in  each  proposition.  Of  the  value  of  this  addition  to  the  ordi- 
nary logical  forms,  I  have  elsewhere  expressed  my  opinion  (North  British 
Beview,  No.  29).  I  have  not,  therefore,  thought  it  necessar}'  to  enter  into 
an  elaljorate  examination  of  it  here;  especially  as  it  is  sufficient  for  my 
purpose  to  bring  forward  only  those  forms  of  reasoning  universally  ad- 
mitted by  logicians.  In  quantifying  the  predicate  in  these  instances,  we 
only  express  what  every  treatise  on  Logic  tells  us  to  understand,  viz., 
that  the  predicate  of  an  affirmative  proposition  is  not  distributed;  t.  c,  is 
thought  as  particular. 

1  Thus  Aldrich  analyzes  conversion  per  acddens.  "  Sit  vera  E :  Ergo  ct 
ejus  simpliciter  conversa:  Ergo  et  conversae  subaltemata:  qua;  esrex- 
posit«  conversa  per  accidens.  Sit  vera  A:  Ergo  et  ejus  subaltemata: 
Ergo  et  subalteniataj  siiupUciter  conversa :  qua  est  exposita  per  accidens." 

16* 


186 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


as  a  process  of  judgment;  for  either  the  converted  prop- 
osition is  a  new  judgment  distinct  from  the  original  one, 
or  it  is  merely  the  same  judgment  expressed  in  different 
language.     In  the  former  case,  it  is  an  inference  from  a 
premise,  and  consequently  a  process  of  reasoning;  in  the 
latter,  there  is  no  process  of  thinking  at  all,  but  merely  a 
change  in  the  language  by  which  a  given  thought  is  ex-    * 
pressed.     The  former  is  the  preferable  view,  so  long  as  the 
subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition  are  viewed  in  the 
relation  of  whole  and  pait,  whether  by  the  inclusion  of 
the  subject  under  the  extension  of  the  predicate,  or  of  the 
predicate  in  the  comprehension  of  the  subject.     For  the 
inversion  of  the  relations  of  whole  and  part  is  sufficient  to 
constitute  a  new  judgment.     But  in  the  system  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  in  which  every  proposition  is  reduced  to  an 
equation,  or  rather  to  an  identification  of  object  between 
the  two  terms,  the  latter  view  seems  more  accurate ;   it 
being  manifestly  the  same  thing  to  identify  the  object 
thought  under  A  with  that  of  B,  and  that  thought  under 
B  with  that  of  A. 

To  opposition  and  conversion  must  be  added  a  third 
process,  that  of  the  immediate  consequence  of  one  equi- 
pollent  proposition  from  another.^  The  equipollence  in 
some  cases  can  only  be  determined  materially ;  and  the 
consequence  is  then  extralogical ;  as  in  the  instance  cited 
by  Wolf,  Titim  est  pater  Caii,ergo  Caiua  eatfilius  Titii; 
but  there  are  other  instances  in  which  the  consequence  is 
formal,  and  determined  solely  by  the  laws  of  thought. 
Thus,  by  the  principle  of  contradiction,  from  the  premise, 

1  See  Wolf.  PhUosophia  Bationa2is,  4  445;  Fries.  System  der  LogOc,  S  47. 
The  former  has  not  accurately  distin^niished  the  material  fVom  the  formal 
^es  of  this  consequence;  and  it  was,  probably,  this  confusion  that  led 
ikant  to  reject  the  inference  altogether. 


PROLEGOMENA    LOGICA. 


187 


All  A  is  B,  follows  the  immediate  inference,  No  A  is  not- 
B,  in  which  is  produced  a  change  of  quality  from  affinn- 
ative  to  negative.  In  this  way,  when  one  predicate  is 
affirmed  of  a  subject,  its  contradictory  may  always  be 
denied.  The  process  commonly  called  Conversion  by  Con- 
traposition, is  property  the  simple  conversion  of  this  equi- 
pollent proposition.* 

The  whole  of  the  preceding  observations  clearly  point 
out  the  view  in  which  Logic  and  Psychology  must  coincide 
concei-ning  the  nature  and  principles  of  the  Syllogism. 
The  foimer,  as  the  science  of  the  laws  of  pure  thinking,'^ 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  inferences  of  more  or  Icm 
probability  furnished  by  the  analogies  of  this  or  that  branch 
of  physical  science,  nor  even  with  the  general  constitution 
of  the  material  worid,  so  far  as  it  is  known  to  us  only 
empirically  as  a  fact.    Its  only  province  is  with  those  infer- 
ences which  are  necessitated   by  the   laws  of  thought; 
which,  certain  data  being  furnished,  we  cannot  but  d^raw 
as  consequences.     That  the  premises  of  a  syllogism  neces- 
sarily imply  and  contain  the  conclusion,  is  so  far  from' 
being  an  imperfection  in  Logic,  that  it  is  a  necessary  con- 
sequence of  the  supposition  that  thought  is  governed  by 
laws  at  all.     And  in  accordance  with  this  conclusion.  Psy- 
chology teaches   us   that   thought   is   representative   and 
reflective,  not  preaentative  and  intuitive ;  that,  having  no 
positive  operation  beyond  the  field  of  possible  experience, 
its  laws  can  only  be  analytical,  and  its  processes  must  lead 
not  to  the  acquisition  of  new  knowledge,  but  to  the  mod- 
ification  of  the  old.     It  only  remains  to  exemplify  this 
result  by  applying  it  to  the  ordinary  forms  of  the  logical 
syllogism. 

1  This  has  I>een  remarked  by  Fries  ih  49,  e.),  and  recently  by  Mr.  Kars- 
lake  {Aids  to  the  Study  of  Logic,  p.  65). 


I 


188 


All  M  is  some  P. 
All  S  is  some  M. 
.*.  All  S  is  some  P. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 

FlR.  1. 

No  M  is  any  P. 

All  S  is  some  M. 
.-.  No  S  is  any  P. 


¥\e.  2. 

No  P  is  any  M. 
All  S  is  some  M. 
.'.  No  S  is  any  P. ' 


Fig.  3. 

All  M  is  some  P. 
All  M  is  some  S. 
.*.  Some  S  is  some  P. 


No  M  is  any  P. 
*  All  M  is  some  S. 
.*.  Some  S  is  not  any  P. 


The  above  examples  will  suffice  as  specimens  of  the  dif- 
ferent forms  of  affirmative  and  negative  reasoning  admitted 
by  the  three  Aristotelian  figures.  The  fourth  figure  might 
be  easily  subjected  to  the  same  treatment ;  but  it  is  pref- 
erable to  regard  its  moods  as  inverted  forms  of  the  first. 
On  inspection  of  these  specimens,  it  appears,  that  the 
Principle  of  Identity  is  immediately  applicable  to  affirm- 
ative moods  in  any  figure,  and  the  Principle  of  Contradic- 
tion to  negatives.  In  Barbara,  for  example,  the  minor 
term  all  S  is  identical  with  a  part  of  M,  and  consequently 
with  a  part  of  that  which  is  given  as  identical  with  all 
M,  namely,  some  P.  In  Darapti,  the  minor  term  some  S 
is  identical  with  all  M,  and  consequently  with  some  P. 
The  i)rinciple  immediately  applicable  to  both  is  the  axiom, 
that  what  is  given  as  identical  with  the  whole  or  a  part 
of  any  concept,  must  be  identical  with  the  whole  or  a  part 
of  that  which  is  identical  with  the  same  concept.  This 
may  be  briefly  expressed  by  the  Principle  of  Identity, 
Every  A  is  A.  In  Celarent,  Cesare,  and  Felapton,  some  or 
all  S,  being  given  as  identical  with  all  or  some  M,  is  dis- 
tinct from  every  part  of  that  which  is  distinct  from  all  M.* 

J  Under  the  system  of  a  quantified  predicate,  the  second  fi^re  admits 
of  affirmative  sylloj^isms,  which,  like  the  rest,  may  be  referred  to  the 
principle  of  Identity. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


189 


This  is  briefly  expressed  by  the  Principle  of  Contradiction, 
No  A  is  not-A. 

These  two  laws  govern  all  the  moods  of  Categorical 
Syllogism,  including  under  them,  as  subordinate  rules,  the 
dictum  de  omni  et  nuUo,  or  the  neariy  equivalent  axiom, 
nota  notce  est  nota  rei  ipsius  ;  as  well  as  the  distinct  ax- 
ioms which  have  been  framed  by  diflferent  logicians  as 
rules  of  the  second  and  third  figures.*     The  process  of 
Reduction,  which  is  property  and  necessarily  adopted  by 
those  logicians  who,  with  Aristotle  and  Kant,  acknowledge 
the  principle  of  the  first  figure  only,  now  becomes  unnece^'s- 
sary  and  inconsistent ;  inasmuch  as  all  the  syllogistic  fig- 
ures are  exhibited  as  equally  direct  exemplifications  of  the 
same  general  law.     For  the  same  reason,  the  distinction 
adopted  by  Kant  between  Syllogisms  of  the  Understanding 
and  Syllogisms  of  the  Reason,  in  addition  to  the  psych(^ 
logical    impropriety   of   distinguishing   two   faculties   of 
thought,'  is  now  shown   to  be  logically  untenable  also; 
the  processes  of  immediate  and  mediate  reasoning  being 
exhibited  as  cognate  acts  of  thought,  governed  by  the 
same  general  laws,  and  differing  only  in  their  material 
data. 

By  bearing  in  mind  what  has  been  above  said  of  the 
nature  of  thought  and  its  laws,  we  shall  also  be  enabled  to 
take  a  juster  view  of  a  process  more  or  less  misrepresented 
m  the  majority  of  logical  treatises,  Induction.  Scarcely 
any  logician  has  accurately  distinguished  between  Formal 
Induction,  in  which  the  given  premises  necessitate  the 

>  As  by  Lambert,  Neues  Organon,  part  f.  §  232;  Kant,  Logfk,  §  71  •  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  in  Mr.  Thomson's  Laws  of  Tf,ought,  p.  248,  where  they  are 
given  correctly  as  special  applications  of  a  more  general  principle. 

«0n  this  question,  see  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Discussions,  p.  17;  Cousin 
i«foiw  8ur  la  Philosophic  de  Kant,  p.  108;  Krug,  Logik,  ^  74.  ' 


190 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


Hi 


conclusion  in  conformity  with  tlie  laws  of  thought,  and 
Material  Induction,  in  which  the  conclusion  may  be  in- 
ferred with  more  or  less  probability  from  additional  data 
not  furnished  by  the  premises;  between  what  we  must 
know  as  thinkers,  and  what  we  may  know  as  investigators 
of  nature.    By  some  logicians,  Induction  is  treated  as  a 
Syllogism  in  Barbara,  with  the  major  or  minor  premise 
suppressed ;  the  advocates  of  this  view  overlooking  the 
fact,  that  the  suppression  of  either  premise  leaves  a°defi- 
ciency  to  be  supplied  independently  of  the  act  of  thought, 
and  thus  reduces  the  whole  process  from  formal  to  mate- 
rial; to  say  nothing  of  the  inversion  of  the  reasonincr  as 
actually  performed,  and  the  destruction  of  all  foundaUon 
for  the  syllogistic  process  from  univei-sals  to  particulars,  by 
making  every  universal  premise  itself  a  deduction  from  a 
higher  one.     By  others,  Induction  is  represented,  accord- 
mg  to  the  Baconian  view,  as  an  interrogation  of  nature, 
by  the  selection,  in  any  physical  investigation,  of  such 
phenomena  as  may  indicate  the  existence  of  a  general  law. 
Here  it  is  forgotten  that  the  fact  that  nature  proceeds  by 
uniform  laws  at  all  is  a  truth  altogether  distinct  from  the 
laws  of  thought,  and,  if  not  of  wholly  empirical  origin,.at 
least  one  which  cannot  be  ascertained  a  priori  by  the  pure 
understanding.     Others  again,  struck  by  the  physical  diffi- 
culty of  an  exhaustive  enumeration  of  individual  cases, 
endeavor  to  effect  a  compromise  between  material  proba- 
bility  and  formal  necessity,  by  describing  the  instances 
cited  as  representatives  or  samples  of  their  class ;  as  if  the 
nature   of  samples   and   representatives   could   be   made 
known  by  an  innate  principle  of  the  mind,  independently 
of  experience.    Even  the  wonderful  acuteness  of  Kant  in 
all  questions  between  matter  and  fonn  appears  to  have 
deserted  him  here;  and  by  describing  Induction  as  a  SyU 


PROLEGOMENA   LOQICA. 


191 


log^sm  of  the  judgment,  furnishing  a  logical  presumption 
of  a  general  conclusion,  he  not  only  encumbers  the  science 
with  an  extralogical  process,  but  neglects  altogether  the 
really  formal  reasoning  which  it  is  the  duty  of  the  logician 
to  take  into  account.* 

The  truth  is  that  there  are  two  totally  distinct  processes'^ 
confounded  under  the  general  name  of  Induction.     The 
Baconian  or  Material  Induction  proceeds  on  the  assumn- 
turn  of  general  laws  in  the  relations  of  physical  phenomena, 
and  endeavo,^  by  select  observations  and  experiments,  to 
detect  the  law  in  any  particular  case.     This,  whatever  be 
Its  value  as  a  general  method  of  physical  investigation,  has 
DO  place  in  Formal  Logic.     The  Aristotelian  or  Formal 
Induction  proceeds  on  the  assumption  of  general  laws  of 
thought,  and  inquires  into  the  instances  in  which,  bv  such 
laws,  we  are  necessitated  to  reason  from  an  accumulation 
of  particular  instances  to  a  general  or  partial  rule.     The 
process  in  this  case  may  be  affirmative  or  negative;  and  it 
18  governed,  like  other  formal  reasonings,  by  the  general 
laws  of  Identity  and   Contradiction.      Specimens'' of  its 
several  forms  may  be  exhibited  as  follows  : 


X,  Y,  Z,  are  some  B. 
X,  Y,  Z,  are  all  A. 
.'.  All  A  is  some  B. 


Affirmative  Induction. 


X,  Y,  Z,  are  some  B. 
X,  Y,  Z,  are  some  A. 
.•.  Some  A  is  some  B. 


X,  Y,  Z,  are  not  any  B. 
X,  Y,  Z,  are  all  A. 
.*.  No  A  is  any  B. 


Negative  Induction. 


X,  Y,  Z,  arc  not  any  B. 
X,  Y,  Z,  are  some  A. 
.*.  Some  A  is  not  any  B. 


Other  moods  may  be  added  to  these,  by  varying  the 
quantity  of  the  predicate  in  the  major  premise.     By  assign- 

»  Two  distinguished  exceptions  to  tliis  general  error  must  however  bo 
nouced.    Aristotle's  account  of  Induction,  in  Anal.  Fr.  il.  23,  incomplete  as 


'Ft 


192 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


ing,  in  conformity  with  the  system  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  a 
definite  quantity  to  the  predicate  in  all  affirmative  propo- 
sitions, we  are  enabled  to  avoid  that  ambiguity  of  the 
copula  which  has  hitherto  been  the  main  defect  in  the 
logical  analysis  of  inductive  reasoning.^     The  relation  of 
whole  and  part  between  the  terms  of  the  proposition  being 
thus  dispensed  with,  the  subject  is  no  longer  represented 
as  at  one  time  contained  under,  at  another  constituting  iu 
predicate ;  but  each  term,  in  every  case,  is  equated,  or  iden^ 
tifiedas  to  its  object,  with  the  whole  or  a  part  of  the  other. 
Under  this  system  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to  distin- 
guish Induction  from  the  third  figure  of  Syllogism,  as  this 
figure,  with  a  definite  predicate,  will  admit  of  universal  as 
well  as  particular  conclusions.     Indeed,  every  Syllogism  in 
this  figure,  in  which  the  minor  premise  is  collectiv°e,  may 
be  regarded  as  a  logical  Induction.     In  this  point  of  view 
it  is  manifestly  governed  by  the  same  laws  as  the  syllogism, 
the  affirmative  moods  by  the  Principle  of  Identity,°and 
the  negative  by  the  Principle  of  Contradiction.    The  so- 
called  imperfect  Induction  is  altogether  extralogical.    The 
constituted  whole  can  in  thought  be  identijied  on\y  ^f/li\i 
the  sum  total  of  its  parts,  not  with  a  few  representatives; 
and  without  such  identification  no  inference  can  be  neces- 
sitated  by  the  laws  of  thought.     The  physical  difficulty  of 
adducing  all  the  members  of  a  given  class  is  a  purely  mate- 
rial consideration,  like  that  of  the  truth  of  the  premises  in 
a  syllogism,  and  is  assumed,  not  investigated,  by  the  logi- 
cian.    But  without  such  a  preliminary  datum,  we  have  no 

it  is  In  many  respects,  has  the  merit  of  adhering  accurately  to  the  formal 
view  of  the  process.  And  the  admirable  Article  on  Logic  by  Sir  W  Ham- 
ilton, in  x\o.  113  of  the  Edinburgh  Review  (reprinted  in  his  Di^us^om\ 
exhibits  for  the  first  time  the  logical  character  of  InducUon,  divested  of 
its  material  incumbrances  and  formal  perversions. 
*  See  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  I>iscussions,  p.  103. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOaiCA. 


193 


materials  for  drawing  a  universal  conclusion  by  logical 
Induction.  '^      ^ 

Thu8  far  we  have  shown  the  several  forms  of  mediate 
categorical  reasoning  to  depend  on  two  necessary  laws  of 
thought,  the  Principles  of  Identity  and  Contradiction.  A 
separate  examination  is  needed  to  ascertain  the  character 
of  the  Hypothetical  Propositions  and  Syllogisms,  which, 
as  I  am  mchned  to  think,  has  not  hitherto  been  accurately 
exhibited,  even  by  the  best  logicians  of  the  formal  school 

By  Kant  and  his  followers,  the  Hypothetical  Proposition 
«  desenbed  as  representing  a  form  of  judgment  essentially 
distinct  from  the  Categorical ;  the  latter  being  thoroughly 
assertonal,  the  former  problematical  in   its   constituent 
parts,  assertorial  only  as  regards  the  relation   between 
them     Two  judgments,  each  in  itself  false,  may  thus  be 
hypothetically  combined  into  a  single  truth ;  and  this  com- 
bination cannot  be  reduced  into  categorical  form.'    The 
Hypothetical  Syllogism,  in  like  manner,  is  a  form  of  rea- 
soning distinct  from  the  Categorical,  and  not  reducible  to 
^  being  based  on  a  different  law  of  thought,  namely,  the 
ogical  Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason,  a  ration,  ad  rJioruz- 
««m,  a  negatione  rationati  ad  mgatiomm  rationia  valet 
congeqtientia* 

rllT^  ''.f '.^'^  ''  'PP"'*^  *"  judgments,  I  have  before 
remarked  that  u  is  not  a  law  of  thought,  but  only  a  state- 
ment of  the  necessity  of  some  law  or  other.  As  applied 
to  sy  logisms,  it  has  the  same  character.  It  states  the 
fact,  that  whenever  a  condition,  whether  material  cause 
of  a  fact  or  formal  reason  of  a  conclusion,  exists,  the  con- 
ditioned  fact  or  conclusion  exists  also.    Thus  viewed,  it 

17 


iH 


194 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


195 


is  not  the  law  of  any  distinct  reasoning  process,  but  a 
statement  of  the  conditions  in  which  laws  of  nature  or 
of  thought  are  operative.     When  a  material  cause  exists, 
its  material  effect  follows,  and  the  phenomenon  indicates 
a  law  of   nature ;    when    a  logical  premise  is  given,  its 
logical  conclusion  follows,  and  the  result  indicates  a  law 
of  thought.      What  law,  must  in  each  case  be  determined 
by  the  particular  features  of  the  phenomenon  or  reasoning 
in  question  ;  but  a  statement  of  this  kind  is  distinguished 
from  laws  of  thought,  properly  so  called,  by  the  fact,  that 
it  cannot  be  expressed  in  a  symbolical  form :  we  require 
the   introduction   of   a  definite   notion,   Cause,   Reason, 
Condition,  or  something  of  the  kind,  which  is  a  special 
object  of  thought,  not  the  general  representative  of  all 
objects  whatever.     The  principle  in  question  is  thus  only 
a  statement  of  the  peculiar  character  of  certain  matters 
about  which  we  may  think,  and  not  a  law  of  the  form  of 
thought  in  general. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  relation  of  premises  and  conclusion 
in  a  syllogism  may,  like  any  other  relation  of  condition 
and  conditioned,  be  expressed  in  the  form  of  a  hypotheti- 
cal proposition  :  « If  all  A  is  B,  and  all  C  is  A,  then  all 
C  is  B;"  and  the  actual  assertion  of  the  truth  of  these 
premises  will  furnish  at  once  a  so-called  hypothetical  syllo- 
gism :  "But  all  A  is  B,  and  all  C  is  A,  therefore  all  C 
is  B."     This  was  observed  by  Fries,  who  hence  rightly 
maintains  that  analytical  hypothetical  judgments  are  for- 
raal  syllogisms.^     It  is  strange  that,  after  this,  he  should 
not  have  gone  a  step  further,  and  discovered  that  syn- 
thetical hypothetical  judgments  are  assertions  of  material 
consequences.     The  judgment,  « If  A  is  B,  C  is  D,"  asserts 
the  existence  of  a  consequence  necessitated  by  laws  other 

1  System  der  Logik,  ^  44. 


than  those  of  thought,  and  consequently  out  of  the  prov- 
ince of  Logic.  The  addition  of  a  minor  premise  and  con- 
elusion  in  the  so-called  hypothetical  syllogism,  is  merely 
the  assertion  that  this  general  material  consequence  is 
verified  in  a  particular  case. 

The  distinction  so  much  insisted  on  by  the  Kantians, 
of  the  problematical  character  of  the  two  members  of  a 
hypothetical  judgment,  is,  like  the  whole  Kantian  doctrine 
of  modality,  of  no  consequence   in  formal  Lo-ic       AH 
formal  thinking  is,  as  regards  the  material  character  of 
Its  objects,  problematical  only.     Formal  Conception  pro- 
nounces that  certain  objects  of  thought  may  possibly  exist, 
leavmg  their  actual  existence  to  be  determined  by  expe- 
nence.     Formal  Judgment  decides  on  the  possible  coex- 
istence of  certain  concepts ;  and  Formal  Reasoning,  on 
the  truth  of  a  conclusion,  subject  to  the  hypothesis  of  the 
truth  of  its  premises. 

To  state  that  this  hypothesis  is  in  a  certain  instance 
true,  adds  nothing  to  the  logical  part  of  the  reasoning  but 
only  venfies  the  empirical  preliminaries  which  the  logician 
m  every  case   assumes  as  given.      To  exhibit   a  formal 
consequence  hypothetically,  is  only  a  needless  reassertion 
of  the  existence  of  data  which  the  act  of  thought  presup- 
poses.    To  exhibit  a  material  consequence  hypothetically 
IS  not  to  make  it  formal,  but  only  to  assert  that,  in  a 
certain  given  instance,  a  consequence  not  cognizable  by 
Logic  takes  place.     The  sequence  of  «  C  is  D,"  from  «  A 
IS  B,"  is  not  one  whit  more  logical  than  it  was  before ;  it 
IS  only  stated  to  take  place  materially  in  the  present  case. 
The  omission  of  hypothetical  syllogisms  has  frequently 
been  deemed  a  defect  in  Aristotle's  Organon  ;    and  his 
l^rcnch  translator  takes  some  fruitless  pains  to  strain  his 
text,  ,n  order  to  make  out  that  he  does  in  fact  treat  of 


I 


196 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


197 


i 


P 


them.>    If  there  is  any  truth  in  the  preceJing  observa- 
tions, It  will  follow,  that  Aristotle  understood  the  limits 
of  Logic  better  than  his  critics ;  and  that  his  translator 
had  better  have  allowed  the  omission  as  a  merit  than  have 
attempted  to  deny  it  as  a  fault.     When  the  hypothetical 
proposition  states  a  formal    consequence,  the  rea8onin<r 
grounded  upon  it  may  always  be  reduped  to  categorical! 
When  It  states  a  material  consequence,  it  states  what  the 
logician,  as  such,  cannot  take  into  account.    Aristotle  is 
therefore  quite  right  in  saying,  that  in  this  case  the  con- 
elusion  IS  not  proved,  but  conceded.'     Syllogism  may  be 
employed  as  a  logical  proof  of  the  antecedent:  the  conse- 
quent IS  admitted  to  follow  on  grounds  which  the  logician, 
as  such,  does  not  investigate,  but  which  maybe  waiTanted 
by  the  principles  of  this  or  that  material  science. 

The  true  character  of  hypothetical  reasoning  is   lost 
sight  of  m  the  examples  commonly  selected  by  logicians, 
which  have  for  their  subject  a  proper  name,  and  indicate, 
not  a  general  relation  of  reason  and  consequent  between 
two  notions,  but  certain  accidental  circumstances  in  the 
history  of  an  individual.     The  adoption  of  this  type  has 
led  to  the  logical   anomaly,  that  the  propositions  of  a 
hypothetical  syllogism  are  generally  stated  without  any 
designate  quantity;  whereas  it  is  obvious  that,  wherever 
concepts  are  compared  together  in  any  form  of  reasoning, 
two  distinct  conclusions   may  follow,  according   to    tire 
quantity  assigned.     For  example,  to  the  premise,  « If  men 
are  wise,  they  will  consult  their  permanent  interests,"  we 
may  supply  two  minors  and  conclusions,  in  the  construc- 
tive form,  according  as  we  affirm  the  antecedent  of  aU 
men  or  of  some.    It  thus  becomes  necessary  to  distinguish 

»  St.  Hilairc,  Lo<jifpte  d'Aristote  TraduUe  en  Francais,  Preface,  p  U 
2  ^«a/.  Pnor.  i.  23,  11.  * 


between  two  different  kinds  of  apparently  hypothetical 
syllogisms,  -~  those  in  which  the  inference  is  from  a  gen- 
eral  hypothesis  to  all  or  some  of  its  special  instances,  and 
those  in  which  a  relation  between  two  individual  facts  is 
assumed  as  a  hypothesis  leading  to  a  singular  conclusion. 
The  former  contain  a  general  relation  of  determining  and 
determined  notion,  which   may  always   be  expressed  in 
three  terms;    the    occasional  employment  of  four   being 
only  an  accidental  variety  of  language.     Thus  the  general 
assertion,  '*If  any  country  is  justly  governed,  the  people 
are  happy,"  is  equivalent  to,  « If  any  country  is  justly 
governed,  it  has  happy  people."    This  we  may  apply  to 
si>ecial  instances ;    aU  countries,  some  countries,  or  this 
country,  being  asserted  to  be  justly  governed :  and  this 
is   properiy  hypothetical  reasoning.      The  latter   denote 
only  a  material  connection  between  two  single  facts,  either 
of  which  may,  to  certain  minds  possessed  of  certain  addi- 
tional knowledge,  be  an  indication  of  the  other;  but  the 
true  ground  of  the  inference  is  contained  in  this  additional 
knowledge,  and   not  in  the  mere  hypothetical  coupling 
of  the  facts  by  a  conjunction.     This  is  not  hypothetical 
rensoning ;  i.  e,,  it  is  not  reasoning/rom  the  hypothesis,  but 

from  other  circumstances  not  mentioned  in  the  hypothesis 
at  all.i 

1  This  may  be  made  clearer  by  an  example.  The  following  is  cited  by 
Fries  as  an  instance  of  a  hypothetical  proposition  not  reducible  to  cate- 
gorical form :  "  If  Caius  is  free  from  business,  he  is  writing  poetry  » 
This  may  be  interpreted  to  mean  either,  genemlly,  "  Whenever  Caius  is 
disengaged,  he  writes  poetry; "  or,  specially,  "  If  he  is  now  disengaged  he 
18  now  writing  poetry."  Under  the  former  interpretation,  it  Is  a  general 
hypothesis,  which  may  be  applied  as  a  major  premise  to  particular  in- 
stances; but  in  this  case  the  true  form  of  the  reasoning  is,  "All  times 
when  Caius  is  disengaged  are  times  when  he  writes  poetry;  and  the  pres- 
em  IS  such  a  time."    Under  the  latter  interpretation,  it  is  one  of  the  cases 

17* 


I 


*! 

)i:' 


(t  J 


198 


PKOLEOOMENA  LOQICA. 


It  thus  appears  that  the  only  hypothetical  judgmcn„ 
which  can  be  employed  as  the  real  major  premise  of  a 
syllogism  may  be  expressed  in  the  form,  "  If  A  is  B,  it  is 
C,"  where  A,  B,  and  C,  represent  concepts,  or  general 
notions.    The  complete  categorical  equivalent  to  this  is 
"Every  A  which  is  B  is  C,  because  it  is  B,"  which  admits' 
of  two  interpretations,  according   as  B  stands  for  the 
physical  cause  of  the  fact,  or  for  the  logical  reason  of  our 
knowing  It.    In  the  latter  case,  the  judgment  is  analytical, 
and  represents  a  disguised  formal  consequence,  with  B  as 
a  middle  term;   e.  g.,  "Every  man  who  is  learned  has 
studied,  because  he  b  learned."    Here  the  notion  of  study 
18  implied  in  that  of  learning,  and  the  major  premise  is, «  All 
learned  beings  have  studied."    The  hypothetical  proposi- 
tion  thus  becomes  a  complete  syllogism,  to  which  the  sub- 
sequent consequence  is  related  as  an  episyliogism.'    In  the 
former  case,  where  B  stands  for  a  physical  cause,  the  judg- 
ment is  synthetical,  and  indicates  a  material  consequence, 
which  It  requires  some  additional  knowledge  of  facts  to 

of  a  material  connection  of  two  facts  mentioned  in  the  text.  Now  in 
th,8  I^t  case  it  is  obvious  that  the  inference  is  really  made,  not  from  ll." 
hypothesis,  but  m>m  some  circumstan«  .cnown  to  the  ^a^oner.  b„T  o 
.ppearmg  m  the  proposition.  Any  man  being  asked. "  Why  do  on  infer 
that  Caius.  bemg  now  disengaged,  is  writing  poetry?"  would  repiy  "Z 
cause  he  toid  me  he  should  do  so; "  or  something  of  the  kind.  HL^ 
he  would  never  dream  of  „,plying,  "  Because  ./  he  is  now  disengagj^^ 
b  wntmg."  In  this  case,  then,  he  doe.  no.  reason  fron.  0.  l.yJL,l^ 
the  expressed  propositions  do  not  compose  a  syllogism.  ^^ 
1  Thus: 


Hiipolhetical  Si/Bcgism. 

It  any  man  Is  learned,  be  has 

studied : 
Some  men  are  learned; 
•.  Some  men  have  studied. 


Categorical  Analfsu. 
All  learned  beings  have  studied: 
All  learned  men  are  learned  be- 
ings; 

'.  All  learned  men  have  studied : 

Some  men  are  learned  men; 
•.  Some  men  have  studied. 


rROLEOOMENA   LOGICA.  I99 

reduce  to  formal ;  ..  g.,  «  All  wax  exposed  to  the  fire  melts, 
because  it  is  exposed."  Here,  on  material  grounds,  we 
know  that  we  cannot  supj.Iy  the  premise,  «A11  bodies 
exposed  to  the  fire  melt;"  but  only,  "All  bodies  soluble 
by  heat  and  exposed  to  the  fire  melt."  In  this  case  the 
consequence  is  extralogical,  and  requires  additional  data 
not  given  m  the  thought.  But  here,  also,  when  the  judg- 
ment ,n  question  is  employed  as  the  premise  of  a  ret 
soning,  the  conclusion  follows  categorically;  though  the 

foir t  "'"'^  """""''  ^  '*  "^-""''^  •»«  ""^"d  by  ^  Prosyl- 

The  Disjunctive  Judgment  is  usually  described  as  repre- 
senting a  whole  divided  into  two  or  more  parts  mutually 
exclusive  of  each  other;  and  the  Disjunctive  Syllogism  is 
supposed  to  proceed  either  from  the  affirmation  of  one 
member  to  the  denial  of  the  rest,  or  from  the  denial  of  all 

v'  ,T  iV/"!  ,''®^'°''»'°''  <^f  that  one,  by  the  Principle  of 
Excluded  Middle.'  ^ 

This  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  a  correct  analysis  of 
the  process,  unless  the  two  members  are  fonnaa^  stated 
as  contradictory.  The  Principle  of  Excluded  Middle  as- 
serts that  everything  is  either  A  or  not  A;  that  of  two 
contradictories,  one  must  exist  in  every  object;  as  the 
PrmcipU  of  Contradiction  asserts  that  they  cannot  both 
exist.  But  If  the  two  members  are  not  stated  as  contra- 
dictories, if  my  disjunctive  premise  is,  "All  C  is  either  A 

'  The  analysis  in  this  case  may  be  exhibited  thus: 


HypMetical  SyUogism. 

If  any  wax  is  exposed  to  the  flie, 

it  melts: 
This  wax  is  exposed  to  the  fire; 

•■■  This  wnx  melts. 

»..  •  •  *"»  yi-An.  mens. 

Kant,  SS  27  sqq.,  77,  78;  Krug,  H  57,  81,  85;  Fries,  §§  33,  59. 


Categorical  Eqmvalent. 
All  wax  exposed  to  the  fire  melts 

(because  exposed): 
This  wax  is  exposed  to  the  fire; 
This  wax  melts. 


200 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


or  B,"  I  make  the  material  assertion  that  All  C  which  is 
not  A  is  B.     If  then  I  reason,  "  This  C  is  not  A,»  therefore 
It  18  B,"  I  employ  the  Principle  of  Identity  in  addition  to 
that  of  Excluded  Middle.    Again,  if  I  maintain  that  No  C 
can  be  both  A  and  B,  I  make  the  material  assertion  that 
No  C  which  is  A  is  B ;  and  from  hence  to  reason,  "This  C 
is  A,  therefore  it  is  not  B,"  requires  not  the  Principle  of 
Excluded  Middle,  but  that  of  Contradiction.    In  the  first 
case,  the  Excluded  Middle  does  not  lead  directly  to  the 
conclusion,  but  only  to  the  contraposition  of  the  minor 
premise.     When  we  deny  this  C  to  be  A,  this  principle 
enables  us  to  assert  that  it  is  not-A,  and  hence  to  brincr  the 
reasoning  under  the  Principle  of  Identity.    But  in  th^sec- 
end  case,  in  which  one  of  the  opposed  members  is  affirmed, 
the  ground  on  which  we  deny  the  other  is  not  because 
both  cannot  be  false,  but  because  both  cannot  be  true. 

It  may  be  questioned   whether   this   second   inference 

IS   warranted   by   the  form   of  the   disjunctive   premise. 

Boethius  calls  it  a  material  consequence;^  and,  in  spite 

of  the  many  eminent  authorities  on  the  other  side,  I  am 

still  disposed  to  think  he  is  right.     But  let  us  grant  for  a 

moment  the  opposite  view,  and  allow  that  the  proposition, 

''AH  C  is  either  A  or  B,''  implies,  as  a  condition  of  its  truth, 

«  No  C  can  be  both."^     Thus  viewed,  it  is  in  reality  a  com- 

plex  proposition,  containing  two  distinct  assertions,  each 

of  which  may  be  the  ground  of  two  distinct  processes  of 

reasoning,  governed  by  two  opposite  laws.     Surely  it  is 

essential  to  all  clear  thinking  that  the  two  should  be  sepa- 

rated  from  each  other,  and  not  confounded  under  one  form 

1  The  indefinite  minor,  "But  it  is  not  A."  is  as  objectionable  in  this 
syllourism  as  m  the  conditional. 

2  De  Si/ll.  Hyp.  lib.  i.;  Opera,  p.  616;  Cf.  Galen;  Isagoge  Dial  p  11 
Aquinas,  Opusc.  xlviii.;  De  Enunciatione,  c.  xiv.;  Kn.-  Logik,  §  86. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


201 


by  assuming  the  Law  of  Excluded  Middle  to  be,  what  it 
is  not,  a  complex  of  those  of  Identity  and  Contradiction. 
Thus  distinguished,  the  moods  of  the  disjunctive  syllogism* 
are  mere  verbal  variations  from  the  categorical  forai,  and 
may  easily  be  brought  under  its  laws.^ 

The  preceding  discussion  may  appear  to  some  readers 
of  trifling  importance ;  and  some  apology  for  its  length 
may  be  thought  necessary.     I  believe  nothing  to  be  unim- 
portant, in  a  logical  work,  which  tends  to  mark  out  more 
accurately  the  nature  of  thought  and  its  laws,  to  exhibit 
more  precisely  the  formal  character  of  logical  processes, 
and  to  clear  the  subject  from  the  remaining  excrescences 
and  inconsistencies  with  which,  even  in  the  writings  of 
the  best  modern  Logicians,  it  is  still  occasionally  encum- 
bered.2    Either  Logic  is  not  worth  studying  at  all,  or  it  is 
worth  studying  in  the  utmost  completeness  and  exactitude 


1  Thus  : 

Modus  toUendo  ponens. 
Every  C  which  is  not  A  is  B. 
Every  \ 

Some  V  C  is  a  C  which  is  not  A. 
This    ) 
.'.  It  is  B. 


Modtis  ponendo  toUens. 
No  C  which  is  A  is  B. 
Every  1 

Some  [•  C  is  a  C  which  is  A. 
This    ) 
It  is  not  B. 


The  first  is  governed  by  the  Prmciple  of  Identity,  and  the  second  by  the 
Principle  of  Contradiction. 

«For  example:  Fries,  after  expressly  distinj-uishing  the  Principle  of 
Sufficient  Reason  from  the  other  Formulae  of  Thought,  as  not  being  a 
principle  of  philosophical  or  formal  Logic,  places  it  in  his  next  chapter  in 
a  coordinate  position  with  them,  as  the  distinctive  law  of  hypothetical  syl- 
logisms.  Krug  describes  it  in  one  place  as  the  highest  principle  of  syllo- 
gism in  general,  and  in  another  as  the  special  principle  of  a  single  class 
of  reasonings.  It  is  proper  to  speak  with  respect  even  of  the  errors  of  the 
great  philosopher  of  Konigsburg;  but  perhaps  even  Kant  was  in  some 
degree  biassed,  in  his  examination  of  logical  processes,  by  an  almost  pe- 
dantic love  of  reproducing  in  every  relation  his  four  Functions  of  Judg- 
ment,  and  by  the  strange  metaphysical  theory  which  deduced  the  three 
Ideas  of  Pure  Reason  from  the  three  kinds  of  dialectical  syllogism. 


ii).i 


I  i 


202 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


Of  Which  it  is  snsceptible.    The  length  to  which  these 
remarks  have  run  is  justified,  indeed  demanded,  by  the 
eminence  of  the  authors  from  whom  the  writer  has  ven- 
tured  to  dissent,  —  authors  whose  mere  assertions  in  mat- 
ters of  logical  science  are  not  to  be  lightly  regarded  nor 
hastily  departed  from.    Even  if  the  views  here  advanced 
should    be    found,   on    examination,  to    be   less  tenable 
than  the  author  believes  them  to  be,  they  will  not  have 
been  without  their  use,  if,  by  calling  the  attention  of  others 
to  one  or  two  of  the  weaker  defences  of  the  received  doc- 
trines of  Formal  Logic,  they  should  indirectly  lead  to  a 
more  satisfactory  vindication  of  the  positions  assailed. 
•  It  only  remains  to  sum  up  as  briefly  as  possible  the  re- 
sults of  the  present  chapter.    Formal  or  Logical  Necessity 
IS  dependent  on  one   negative  condition,  and  on  three 
positive  laws.     The  negative  condition,  or  sine  qua  non 
of  thought  in  general,  is  contained  in  the  Principle  of 
Sufficient  Reason,  which,  however,  in  this  relation,  belongs 
to  Psychology,  and  not  to  Logic ;  being  only  a  generll 
statement  of  the  conditions  under  which,  in  the  existing 
constitution  of  man's  mind,  thought  is  possible ;  —  its  de^ 
pendence,  that  is  to  say,  on  a  higher  thought,  or  on  a  fact 
of  intuition.     The  three   positive   laws,  or  fundamental 
principles,  assumed  by  Logic,  as  regulating  all  its  actual 
processes,  are  those  of  Identity,  of  Contradiction,  and  of 
Excluded  Middle ;  the  last,  however,  operating  in  most 
cases  in  subordination  to  the  other  two.     These  three  are 
the  highest  and  simplest  forms  of  identical  judgments,  to 
one  of  which   all  analytical  thinking  may  ultimately  be 
referred :  and  all  pure  thinking  may  be  shown,  on  psycho- 
logical grounds,  to  be  of  a  strictly  analytical  character. 
The  necessity  arising  from  these  laws  is  that  of  the  har- 
mony of  thought  with  itself, -of  its  conformity  to  its  own 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


203 


ruling  principles ;  as  the  forms  of  necessity  noticed  in  the 
previous  chapters  were  those  arising  from  the  relation  of 
thought  to  the  laws  and  condition  of  intuition,  —  the  re- 
quisite harmony  of  the  several  mental  faculties  one  with 
another.     These   two  harmonies   constitute  respectively 
Formal  and  Material  Truth.    Truth,  relatively  to  man, 
cannot  be  defined  as  consisting  in  the  conformity  of  knowl- 
e.lge  with  its  object ;  for  to  man  the  object  itself  exists 
only  as  it  is  known  by  one  faculty  or  another.    Material 
Truth  consists  rather  in  the  conformity  of  the  object  as 
represented  in  thought  with  the  object  as  presented  in 
intuition ;  and  of  this  no  general  law  or  criterion  can  be 
given ;  its  essence  consisting  in  its  adapting  itself  in  every 
case  to  the  diversities  of  this  or  that  special  presentation. 
But  Logical  Truth,  which  consists  in  the  conformity  of 
thought  to  Its  own  laws,  can  be  submitted  to  those  laws  as 
gener.al  and  sufficient  criteria ;  criteria,  however,  not  of  the 
real  and  existent,  but  of  the  thinkable  and  possible.    Of 
actual  truth  it  furnishes  one  element  only,  which  becomes 
truth  or  not  in  combination,  according  as,  upon  further 
examination,  it  is  found  to  be  in  conformity  or  at  variance 
with  the  coordinate  decisions  of  experience.    By  the  same 
cntena  we  shall  also  be  able  to  determine  the  logical  or 
extralogical  character  of  any  portion  of  the  contents  of 
existing  treatises  on  the  science ;  according  as  it  is  a  de- 
duction of  pare  thinking  from  given  materials,  or  a  mixed 
process,  combining  the  act  of  thought  with  the  acquisition 
of  further  empirical  data.     On  the  distinction  established 
between  material  and  formal  thinking,  some  further  obser- 
vations will  be  made  in  the  next  chapter. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


205 


§, 

I 


'1 

ill 

H 


CHAPTER    VII. 

ON  THE  MATTER  AND  FORM  OF  THOUGHT. 

The  distinction  adopted  between  Matter  and  Form  in 
common,  language,  relatively  to  works  of  Art,  will  servo 
to  illustrate  the  character  of  the  corresponding  distinction 
in  Thought.     The  term  Matter  is  usually  applied  to  what- 
ever is  given  to  the  artist,  and  consequently,  as  given,  does 
not  come  within  the  province  of  the  art  itself  to  supply. 
The  I'orm  is  that  which  is  given  in  and  through  the 
proper  operation  of  the  art.     In  Sculpture,  for  example, 
the  Matter  is  the  marble  in  its  rough  state  as  given  to 
the  sculptor;  the  Form  is  that  which  the  sculptor,  in  the 
exercise  of  his  art,  communicates  to  it.*     The  distinction 
between  Matter  and   Form   in  any  mental  operation  is 
analogous  to  this.    The  former  includes  all  that  is  given 
to,  the  latter  all  that  is  given  ^y,  the  operation.     In  the 
division  of  notions,  for  example,  whether  performed  by  an 
act  of  pure  thinking  or  not,  the  generic  notion  is  that 
given  to  be  divided  ;  the  addition  of  the  difference  in  the 
act  of  division  constitutes  the  species.     And,  accordingly, 
Genus  is  frequently  designated  by  logicians  the  material, 
Difference,  the  formal  part,  or  the  Species.     So,  likewise,  in 
any  operation  of  pure  thinking,  the  Matter  will  include  all 
that  is  given  to  and  out  of  the  thought;  the  Form  is  what 
j^is  conveyed  in  and  by  the  thinking  act  itself. 

1  See  Fries,  Si/stem  der  Logik,  S  19.     His  division  corresponds  to  the 
above,  though  based  on  a  somewhat  different  principle. 


The  same  analogy  may  be  carried  on  in  relation  to  what 
are  called  material  and  formal  processes  of  thinking.     It 
may  happen  on  certain  occasions  that  the  marble  given  to 
the  sculptor  is  insufficient  for  the  completion  of  the  statue. 
It  becomes  necessary,  therefore,  to  suspend  the  artistic 
process  itself,  in  order  to  obtain  additional  material ;  and 
this  provision  of  new  material  the  artist  does  not  under- 
tike  purely  as  a  sculptor.     So  in  relation  to  any  process 
of  thinking.     The  empirical  data  requisite  for  an  act  of 
conception,  judgment,  or  reasoning,  may  be  insufficient, 
and  require  the  addition  of  fresh  material  not  furnished 
by  the  mere  act  of  thinking.     The  operation  in  this  case 
is  one  of  mixed  or  material  thinking;  t.e.,  of  thinking  pre- 
ceded  by  an  appeal  to  experience  for  the  provision  of 
further  data ;  and  this  appeal  is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  the 
logician,  as   such.     Whereas,  if  the   materials   originally 
given  are  alone  sufficient  to  necessitate,  in  obedience  to 
the  laws  of  thought,  an  act  of  conception,  judgment,  or 
reasoning,  the  process  is  properly  distinguished  as  one 
oi  pure  or  formal  thinking. 

Notwithstanding  this  analogy,  it  is  in  many  respects  im- 
portant that  the  matter  and  form  of  a  thought  should  not 
be  confounded  with  material  and  formal  thinking  respect- 
ively.    Thinking  is  not  always  formal  because  its  product 
has  form,  nor  does  the  presence  of  a  form  in  the  antece- 
dent of  thought  always  necessitate  a  formal  process  in 
consequence.     The  sculptor,  to  continue  our  image,  may 
ultimately  complete  his  work  with  all  the  form  and  finish 
of  art :  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that  all  his  material 
must  have  been  given  to  him  at  once  in  the  fii-st  instance, 
^r  he  may  have  carved  with  exactness  one  subordinate 
figure  of  a  group :  it  does  not  therefore  follow  that  his 
material  is  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  complete  the  whole. 

18 


206 


PROLEGOMENA  hOQICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


!#' 


1 


The  present  chapter  is  intended  to  point  out  more  clearly 
the  distinction  and  relation  between  the  form  of  thought 
and  formal  thinking. 

The  antithesis  of  matter  and  form,  —  the  objective  and 
the  subjective,  —  the  variable  and  the  permanent,  —  the 
contingent  and  the  necessary,  runs  through  all  the  phenom- 
ena of  consciousness.     The  manifold  elements  presented 
by  any  object  of  consciousness  constitute  the  matter ;  the 
relations  which  the  mind,  acting  by  its  own  laws,  insti- 
tutes  between  the  several  elements  as  it  combines  them 
into  an  object,  constitute  the  form.^    In  this  point  of  view, 
Space  and  Time  are  called  by  Kant  the  Forms  of  the  Sensi- 
bility in  general,  external  or  internal ;  the  objects  of  the 
former  being  necessarily  regarded  by  the  mind  as  lying 
out  of  ourselves  in  Space,  the  objects  of  the  latter,  as 
succeeding  one   another  in  Time.     These   may  thus   bo 
regarded  as  the  subjective  conditions  under  which  sensi- 
bility in  general  is  possible.     The  same  antithesis  may  be 
carried   through  those   special   acts   of  consciousness,  in 
which  the  understanding  operates,  whether  in  conjunction 
with  the  presentative  faculties,  as  in  an  act  of  mixed  think- 
ing, or  representatively,  as  in  pure  thinking.     A  savage, 
to  adopt  an  illustration  of  KantV  sees  a  house  in  the  dis- 
tance, not  knowing  what  it  is.    It  is  thus  present  to  him 
only  as  an  intuition  in  space.    But  the  very  same  complex 
phenomenon  is  presented  to  a  man  who  knows  it  to  be 
a  building  designed  for  the  habitation  of  men.    To  the 
same  sensible  data  the  understanding  now  adds  its  own 
contribution,  by  which  the  several  presentations  of  sense 
are  combined  into  one  whole,  under  the  general  notion  of 

1  See  Kant,  Kritik  der  r,  V.  p.  32  (ed.  Rosenkranz). 
>  £/>gik,  Einleitung  v. 


207 


a  house.    The  sensible  attributes  here  constitute  the  mat- 
ter; their  union  in  a  concept  is  the  form. 

In  Thought,  as  in  Intuition,  there  is  thus  a  variable  and 
a  permanent,  an  objective  and   a  subjective  element,  a 
matter  given  to  the  thinker,  a  form  communicated  by  the 
thinking  act.     In  respect  to  the  matter,  concepts  differ  one 
from  another,  as  being  composed  of  this  or  that  variety 
of  given  attributes.     In  respect  of  the  form,  all  agree,  as 
being  a  collection   of  attributes   constituting  an  object. 
The  universal  conditions  under  which  attributes  are  con- 
ceived in  this  relation  have  been  pointed  out  in  the  last 
chapter,  as  the  Principles  of  Identity,  Contradiction,  and 
Excluded  Middle.     From  these  three  laws  we  may  deduce, 
with  some  amendment,  the  Forms  which  have  been  re- 
garded by  logical  writers  as  distinctive  of  the  Concept 
proper.!     The  concept  is  necessarily  conceived  as  one,  as 
one  out  of  many,  and  as  constituting  with  the  many  a 
universe  of  all  that  is  conceivable.     From  the  last  of  these 
three  conditions  it  follows  that  the  concept  must  possess  a 
generic  or  universal  feature,  by  which  it  is  characterized 
as  a  concept  in  general,  or  a  member  of  the  conceivable 
universe.     From  the  second  it  follows,  that  it  must  also 
possess  a  differential  or  peculiar  feature,  by  which  it  is  dis- 
tinguished from  all  others.     And  from  the  first  it  follows, 
that  these  two  features  must  be  united  in  a  single  whole. 
Hence  every  concept,  as  such,  must  possess  in  some  degree 
the  attributes  of  distinctness,  as  having  complex  contents ; 
of  clearness,  as  being,  by  one  portion  of  its  contents,  dis- 
tmguishable  from  other  notions ;  and  of  relation  to  a  pos^ 
sible  object  of  intuition,  inasmuch  as  the  unity  of  a  complex 

*  Sec  Kant,  LogOc,  §  2;  Fries,  System  derLogik,  §  20.    The  former  places 
the  form  of  a  concept  in  its  universality;  the  latter  adopts  the  same  view 
subdividing  universality  into  extension  and  comprehension. 


208 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


PKOI.K(iOMKNA   LOGIOA. 


I 


i; 


notion  depends  not  on  a  mere  juxtaposition  of  terms,  but 
npon  its  being  the  representative  of  one  object.*  These 
three  forms  may  be  otherwise  denominated  (for  the  differ- 
ence is  merely  verbal)  comprehension,  limitation,  and  ex- 
tension. As  having  complex  contents,  every  concept 
comjyrehends  certain  attributes;  as  distinguishable  from 
others,  it  is  limited  by  its  specific  difference ;  and,  as  rep- 
resentative of  a  class  of  possible  objects,  it  has  a  certain 
field  over  which  it  is  extended.  The  forms  of  the  concept 
proper  may  thus  be  indifferently  enumerated  as  Distinct- 
ness, Clearness,  and  Relation  to  an  object ;  or  as  Compre- 
hension, Limitation,  and  Extension. 

The  matter  and  form  of  Judgments  may  be  dis- 
tinguished in  the  same  manner  as  those  of  Concepts. 
Omitting  those  judgments  which  involve  merely  the 
enumeration  of  the  attributes  comprehended  in  a  concept 
(the  analytical  or  explicative  judgments  of  Kant),  which 
may  be  more  property  classed  as  acts  of  Conception ;  and 
confining  ourselves  to  those  in  which  the  contents  of  the 
given  concepts  are  distinct  from  each  other  (the  syntheti- 
cal or  ampliative '^xx^gmenU  of  Kant),  we  may  distinguish, 
as  before,  between  the  preexisting  materials,  which  must 
be  given  before  the  act  of  judging  takes  place,  and  the 
additions  contributed  by  the  act  itself. 

Thus,  to  take  an  example  adduced  in  a  former  chapter: 
If  I  poise  a  piece  of  gold  in  my  hand,  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  it  is  heavy,  the  presented  phenomena  belong  to 
distinct  acts  of  sensation.    The  evidence  of  sight  attests. 

1  Arist.  MdapK  vi.  12.  'E^i  ^iv  yi^  -rod  t^bp^ot  k^  X.vkIv  itoAAA  f.4^ 
ioTiv,  tray  ^^  Mpxv  bar4p<f  »ar4poy,  tv  8i,  5t«,.  {nrapxv  koI  t<£^  n  rh 
tnroK.l,.,voy  &  &,»pa,^os-  r6r.  yhp  %y  ylyy.ra.  ^^  r^rr^v  &  X.VKhs  Up^os. 
Ih^d  yd.  6.     -O  «'  Sp^e^hs  Xiyos  i<n\y  ,h  oh  avyiiat^  ^aS^dr^p  ^  'IW,, 


209 


tlie  presence  of  a  round,  yellow,  shining  bo.ly;  the  evi-, 
dence  of  touch,  or  rather  of  muscular  pressure,  attests  its 
weight.    To  unite  these  attributes  as  belonging  to  one 
and  the  same  thing,  is  an  act,  not  of  sensation,  but  of/ 
thought.      The   mere   sensation,  aided   by  the  concepts, 
presents  us  with  three  things -the  body  which  is  seen 
and  a  certain  temporal  and  local  juxtaposition  of  the  two' 
To  combine  the  present  attributes  as  belonging  to  one 
thing— to  pronounce  that  it  is  the  ffohl  which  is  heavy 
-IS  an  act  of  thought  constituting  a  judgment.    Here, 
then,  we  have  one  form  of  the  judgment  expressed  in  the 
copula,  "Gold  is  heavy:"  this  indicates  the  identification 
of  the  two  concepts  as  related  to  a  common  object ;  an 
identification  usually  known  as  the  Quality  of  the  Judg- 
ment.        . 

The  same  is  the  case  with  the  Quantify  of  Judgments. 
I  see  a  number  of  balls  lying  on  a  table,  and  pronounce  at 
once  that  they  are  all  white ;  I  see  another  collection,  and 
assert  m  like  manner  that  some  are  white  and  some  black 
Here  the  senses,  even  when  aided  by  the  concepts  in 
distinguishing  the  balls  as  such,  yet  present  to  us  only 
individual  objects.  This,  this,  and  this,  are  within  their 
province ;  but  they  know  nothing  of  all  or  some.  It  is  by 
an  act  of  thought  that  the  several  individuals  arc  regarded 
as  constituting  a  whole,  and  a  judgment  pronounced  con- 
cerning that  whole  or  a  portion  of  it. 

A  third  Form  of  the  Judgment,  as  indeed  of  all  thought, 
la  Limitation.  In  predicating  one  notion  of  another,  I  at 
the  same  time  necessarily  exclude  everything  to  which 
that  predicate  is  opposed,  and  thereby  limit  the  subject  to 
one  alone  of  those  contradictory  determinations  which 
make  up  the  universe  of  thought.  In  asserting,  for  exam- 
pie,  that  gold  is  heavy,  I  as  mnch  exclude  it  from  the  class 

18* 


210 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


'  InlRI 


!«: 


.•I , ' 


of  imponderables  as  I  include  it  in  that  of  bodies  pos- 
sessing weight.  The  canon  that  predicatio7i  is  limita- 
tion is  now  indeed  generally  admitted  as  an  axiom  in 
philosophy;!  and  the  various  metaphysical  systems  of 
modem  Germany,  since  the  days  of  Kant,  may  be  briefly 
described  as  so  many  attempts  to  evade  the  consequences 
of  this  principle,  by  constructing  a  philosophy  of  the  un- 
limited on  a  basis  independent  of  logical  predication. 

The  two  forms  of  Quantity  and  Quality  are  generally 
recognized  by  logicians  of  the  school  of  Kant.     To  these 
are  added  two  others,  delation  and  Modality/.    The  former 
of  these  includes  the  three  subdivisions  of  Categorical, 
Hypothetical,  and  Disjunctive,  and  is  necessarily  included 
among  the  forms  of  thought  by  those  who  adopt  Kant's 
theory  of  the  nature  of  these  three  kinds  of  propositions. 
But  the  view  which  has  been  taken  of  these  in  the  last 
chapter  precludes  the  admission  of  Relation  as  a  distinct 
form  from  Quantity  and  Quality.    Disjunctive  judgments 
have  there  been  treated  as  reducible  to  Categorical  forms ; 
and  Hypotheticals  as  containing,  not  a  judgment,  properly 
speaking,  but  a  consequence,  formal  or  material.    In  this 
case,  the  relation  is  not  between  the  diflferent  parts  of  a  sin- 
gle  judgment,  but  between  two  judgments,  one  dependent 
on  the  other.     The  judgment  proper  being  thus  confined 
to  the  categorical  form  only,  Relation  becomes  only  a  gen- 
eral  expression  for  the  connection  of  subject  and  predicate 
under  certain  conditions  of  quantity  and  quality,  and  thus 
is  not  a  special  form  of  judgment,  but  a  term  equivalent 
to  Form  in  general. 

1  Sec  for  example,  among  others,  Fichte,  Ueber  den  Grxtnd  unseres  Glau- 
b^  an  etne  gOttliche  Wdiregierung,  p.  16  (Werke,  y.  p.  157);  Gerichtliche 
Verantwortung,  p.  47  (  Werke,  v.  p.  2G5) ;  Bestimnwng  des  Menschen  (  Werke, 
ii.  p.  304);  Hegel,  Zoy,*:,  P.  i.  b.  ii.  eh.  2,  P.  ii.  ch.  2  (  Werke,  iv.  p.  26,  r. 
p.  70). 


PROLEGOMENA   LOQICA. 


211 


As  regards  Modality,  judgments,  according  to  Kant,  are 
of  three  kinds:  problematical,  assertorial,  and  apodeictical. 
The  first  are  accompanied  by  a  consciousness  of  the  bare 
possibility  of  the  judgment ;  the  second,  by  a  conscious- 
ness of   its   reality;    the   third,   by   a   consciousness   of 
Its  necessity.     Modality  is  thus  dependent  on  the  man- 
ner in  which   a  certain  relation  between   two  concepts 
is  maintained,  and  may  vary  according  to  the  state  of 
different  minds;  the  given  concepts,  and  consequently  the 
matter  of  the  judgment,  remaining  unaltered.^      These 
grounds  are  fully  sufticient  to  establish  modality,  in  the 
extent  to  which  it  is  acknowledged  by  Kant  and  by  Aris- 
totle,^  as,  in  a  psychological  point  of  view,  belonging  to 
the  form,  not  to  the  mamr,  of  judgment.    It  is  conveyed 
m  the  act  of  judging,  not  given  in  the  preliminary  mate- 
rials, and  affects  the  copula,  not  the  predicate.    But  the 
forms  cognizable  by  Psychology  must  not  be  confounded 
with  the  forms  cognizable  by  Logic.     The  latter  sciencTI 
is  not  concerned,  as  is  sometimes  maintained,  with  the   I 
Forms  of  Thought  in  general,  but  only  with  the  Forms 
of  Thought  as  related  to  pure  or  formal  thinking.     The   \ 
meaning  of  this  limitation  will  appear  more  cleariy  in  thej 
sequel.     In  this  point  of  view.  Modality  stands  on  a  very 
different  footing  from  Quantity  and  Quality.     In  cases 

1  Kant,  Logik,  S  30. 

«  Aristotle,  in  the  Be  Interprelatione,  ch.  12,  enumerates  four  modes  of 
judgment:  the  necessary,  the  impossible,  the  contingent,  and  the  possible. 
The  addition  of  the  true  and  the  false  is,  I  think,  founded  on  a  misinter- 
pretation. These  modes  he  reduces,  in  the  Prior  Analytics,  i.  2,  to  the  ne- 
cessary and  the  contingent  (roC  ^|  kviyKr,,  {,rdpxuy  and  rod  4yS4x^a^ai 
inrapx^y).  These,  with  the  addition  of  the  pure  judgment  (toC  {nrdpxety) 
correspond  to  the  division  of  Kant.  The  spurious  modes  admitted  in 
abundance  by  the  scholastic  logicians  are  not  forms  of  the  judgment,  but 
modifications  of  one  of  its  terms  only.  They  affect,  that  is,  the  subject 
alone,  or  the  predicate  alone,  not  the  relation  between  the  two. 


212 


PROLBaOMKNA   LOOICA. 


Where  a  modal  conclusion  is  drawn  from  modal  premises, 
It  IS  only  the  form  of  the  conclusion  a»  a  judgment  that 
differe  from  that  of  the  pure  syllogism :   its  relation  to 
the  premises  as  a  conclusion  from  them,  consequently 
the  entire  farm  of  th^  reasoning,  is  the  same  in  both 
Whereas,  by  the  substitution  of  a  negative  premise  for 
an  affirmative,  or  of  a  particular  for  a  universal,  the  con- 
clusiveness of  the  premises  as  necessitating  a  consequence, 
and  hence  the  whole  form  of  the  reasoning,  will,  in  most 
cases,  vanish  altogether.   For  this  reason.  Modality,  though 
psychologically  a  form  of  judgment,  is  not  one  of  those 
forms  that  properly  fall  within  the  province  of  Logic.    This 
will  be  made  clearer  when  we  come  to  treat  of  the  matter 
and  form  of  syllogisms.' 

As  conception  furnishes  the  material  for  an  act  of  judg- 
ment, so  judgment  furnishes  the  material  for  an  act  of 
reasoning.     The  JIatter  of  the  inference  consisU  in  the 
several  propositions  of  which  it  is  composed,  and  which 
vary  in  every  different  instance  :  its  Form  appears  in  the 
manner  in  which  those  propositions  are  invariably  thought 
as  connected  together  as  premises  and  conclusion.    This 
connection  consists  in  the  recognition  of  a  relation  of 
identity  or  contradiction  between  the  terms  as  given  in 
the  antecedent  and  those  connected  by  the  act  of  reason- 
Ing  in  the  consequent.    The  Forms  of  the  Syllogism  may 
thus  be  determined  by  the  following  question  :  Given  two 
judgments  (no  matter  what  may  be  their  material  signifi- 
cation), what  relations  must  exist  between  them  to  warrant 
us  in  inferring  a  third  judgment  as  their  consequent? 

In  the  first  place,  the  premises  and  conclusion  must 
stand  to  Mch  other  in  the  relation  of  condition  and  con- 

•  On  the  disputed  question  of  the  relation  of  Modms  to  Logic,  some  flir- 
ther  rcmarlcs  wiU  bo  found  in  the  JppewKr,  note  H. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


213 


ditioned.  As  the  predicate  of  a  judgment  limits  and 
determines  the  subject,  so  the  premises  of  a  syllogism 
must  limit  and  determine  the  conclusion.  Limitation  is 
thus  a  form  of  reasoning,  as  of  all  thinking ;  the  act  of 
reasoning  being  such  as  to  determine  the  mind  to  one 
actual  conclusion  out  of  two  contradictory  possibilities. 

In  the  second  place,  since  the  terms  of  the  conclusion 
are  not    compared    together    directly,  but  through    the 
medium  of  a  third,  it  is  necessary  that  this  third  Concept 
should  be  compared  with  each  of  the  others.    This  com- 
parison, as  we  have  seen  in  the  last  chapter,  results  in  a 
reLition  either  of  identity  or  contradiction ;  the  objects 
denoted  by  the  two  concepts  being  pronounced  identical 
when  the  premise  is  affirmative,  and  contradictory  when 
It  IS  negative ;  and  a  similar  relation  being  consequently 
inferred  to  exist  between  the  concepts  compared  together 
in  the  conclusion.    The  Forms  which  the  Syllogism  ex- 
hibits in  these  relations  are  those  of  Mood  andlfgure 
affirmative  or  negative,  which  show  us  what  relations  of 
Identity  or  contradiction  in  the  premises  of  a  Sylloc^ism 
may  legitimately  determine  a  similar  relation  in  the  con- 
elusion. 

Inferences,  as  well  as  judgments,  are  in  some  cases  the 
result  of  an  act  of  mixed  thinking;  of  reasoning,  that  is,  in 
conjunction  with  an  appeal  to  experience.  This  is  some- 
times distinguished  by  logicians  as  material  consequence: 
the  strictly  logical  operation  being  designated  formal.  In 
the  eariier  portion  of  the  present  chapter  it  has  been  neces- 
sary to  avoid  this  nomenclature;  the  object  havinrr  been 
to  show  that  in  every  act  of  thought,  pure  or  mixed,  the 
product  exhibits  the  distinct  features  of  a  matter  ..iven  to 
and  a  form  given  bg,  the  thinker.  The  matter  and  form 
01  thought  are  thus  by  no  means  coextensive  with  material 


214 


PROLEGOMENA   LO(JICA. 


«l 


l|l#' 


and  formal  thinking;  and  it  becomes,  therefore,  necessary 
to  examine  separately  the  propriety  of  these  last  expres- 
sions, and  to  determine  what  is  the  exact  sense  in  which 
Logic  is  defined  to  be  a  Formal  Science. 
P  The  distinction  between  formal  and  material,  or,  as  for 
tlie  present  it  is  better  to  term  them,  between  pure  and 
mixed  thinking,  has  not  in  general  been  consistently  fol- 
lowed  out  by  logicians.     They  have  allowed  the  existence 
of  material  consequences  in  which  the  conclusion  does  not 
follow  from  the  given  premises,  but  requires  additional 
data  from  experience;  and  these  they  have  rightly  regarded 
as  extralogical;  but  tliey  have  not  observed  that  the  same 
distinction  is  applicable  to  Apprehension  and  Judgment, 
as  well  as  to  reasoning;  that  there  are  pure  and  mixed 
concepts  and  judgments,  as  well  as  pure  and  mixed  rea- 
sonings; and  that  in  every  case  the  province  of  Logic  is 
with  the  first  only.     In  consequence  of  this,  the  province 
of  Logic  has  been  by  some  too  much  widened,  and  by 
others  too  much  narrowed.     On  the  one  side,  we  are  told 
that  it  can  remedy  indistinctness  of  apprehension  and  fal- 
sity  of  judgment  — a  pretension  which,  announced  without 
limitation,  is  peifectly  absurd;  and  on  the  other  side,  it 
has  been  described  as  concerned  with  the  operation  of  rea- 
soning only;  apprehension  and  judgment  being  considered 
only  in  subordination  to  tliis.     Keither  view  has  been  con- 
sistently carried  out.     The  advocates  of  the  former  ought 
to  have  included  within  the  province  of  Logic,  Induction, 
Analogy,  and  the  whole  field  of  probable  reasoning;  while 
the  advocates  of  the  latter  ought  to  have  exten'ded  the 
signification  of  the  term  reasoning;,  so  as  to  include  those 
forms  of  pure  thinking  which  are  governed  by  the  same 
laws  as  the  formal  syllogism. 
It  would  be  more  coiTect  to  distinguish,  with  regard  to 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


215 


all  the  three  operations  of  the  understanding,  between 
those  errors  which  arise  from  a  defect  in  the  thought  itself, 
and  those  which  arise  from  a  defect  in  the  corresponding 
experience.    For  example :  my  conception  of  a  particular 
flower  is  obscure,  when  I  have  not  noticed  it  so  closely  as 
to  be  able  to  distinguish  it  as  a  whole  from  certain  others ; 
it  is  indistinct,  when  I  know  it  as  a  whole,  but  have  not 
analyzed  it  so  minutely  as  to  be  able  to  enumerate  its 
botanical  characteristics.     In  these  cases  the  defect  is  em- 
pirical,  and  can  only  be  remedied  by  closer  attention  to 
the  individual  flowers  of  that  kind.    But,  on  the  other 
hand,  my  conception  may  be  obscure,  as  containing  attri- 
butes  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of  its  object  as  an 
individual  whole;  or  it  may  be  indistinct,  as  containing 
attributes  incapable  of  coexisting  with  each  other  as  parts 
of  a  whole.    Thus  we  may  be  told  to  conceive  a  flower  of 
no  color  at  all,  or  a  flower  which  shall  be  both  red  and 
white  on  the  same  part  of  the  same  leaf     In  these  cases 
the  defect  is  in  the  thought  itself;  and,  accordingly,  Logic 
18  competent  to  declare  the  supposed  object  inconceivable. 
Again,  a  judgment  may  be  empirically  false,  as  asserting  a 
combination  of  attributes  never  actually  found  in  experi- 
ence ;  as  if  it  is  asserted  that  a  horse  has  five  legs.    It 
may  be  logically  false,  as  coupling  together  attri butes'which 
contradict  each  other;  as  if  it  is  asserted  that  a  quadruped 
has  five  legs.     In  the  former  case,  I  can  contradict  the  as- 
sertion only  by  an  appeal  to  the  experience  of  all  who  are 
acquainted  with  the  animal ;  in  the  latter,  I  can  contradict 
n  on  logical  grounds,  as  false  in  the  thought  itself     An 
inference,  in  like  manner,  may  be  empirically  inconsequent, 
as  grounded  on  a  relation  of  phenomena  not  invariable  in 
nature ;  it  may  be  logically  inconsequent,  as  deduced  from 
premises  not  necessitating  it  by  the  laws  of  thought.    Thus, 


216 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


m 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


if  I  am  asked  whether  tliis  particular  fall  of  the  barometer 
is  a  ground  for  asserting  that  it  will  rain  within  twelve 
hours,  I  can  only  reply,  as  a  logician,  that  it  is  so,  if  all 
falls  of  the  barometer  are  so ;  but  whether  this  is  the  case 
in  flict,  cannot  be  decided  by  logic,  but  by  experience.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  it  be  expressly  stated  that  some  falls  only 
of  the  barometer  are  indications  of  rain  within  twelve  hours, 
I  can  at  once  decide  that  it  is  logically  inconsequent  to 
reason  from  a  merely  partial  rule  to  any  single  instance : 
the  rain  may  in  this  case  be  expected  with  more  or  less 
probability,  but  it  cannot  be  inferred  as  a  certainty. 

It  thus  appears  that,  in  all  the  three  operations  of  the 
understanding,  Logic  is  equally  competent  to  detect  their 
internal  vices,  as  thoughts  transgressing  their  own  laws; 
and  that  in  all  it  is  equally  incompetent  to  detect  their 
external  vices,  as  thoughts  inconsistent  with  experience. 
It  can  detect  the  inconceivability  of  a  notion,  the  self- 
contradiction  of  a  judgment,  the  inconsequence  of  a  con- 
( elusion,  as  not  necessitated  by  given  premises.    It  cannot 
supply  the  empirical  deficiencies  of  a  notion,  nor  determine 
the  real  existence  of  its  object;  it  cannot  ascertain  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  a  judgment  as  a  statement  of  a  fact ; 
it  cannot  decide  as  to  the  necessary  sequence  of  a  conclu- 
sion from  understood  premises,  or  the  probability  of  its 
truth  where  the  given  premises  are  insufficient  to  necessi- 
tate it  by  the  laws  of  thought.     It  remains  to  ascertain 
the  exact  meaning  of  the  expressions  fonnal  and  material 
thinUng,  as  applied  respectively  to  those  operations  which 
do  or  do  not  fall  within  the  province  of  Logic. 

Law  and  Form,  though  correlative  terms,  must  not,  in 
strict  accuracy,  be  used  as  synonymous.  The  former  is 
used  properly  with  reference  to  an  operation ;  the  latter, 
with  reference  to  its  product.     Conceiving,  Judging,  Rea- 


21T 


Boning,  are  subject  to  certain  laws ;  Concepts,  Judgments, 
Syllogisms,  exhibit  certain  forms.    But  the  laws  of  tliought 
are  not  always  competent  to  determine  its  form,  as  has 
been  already  shown  in  the  case  of  all  the  products  oV  mixed 
thinking.     In  a  synthetical  judgment,  for  example,  the 
laws  of  thought  can  determine  only  its  possible  truth,  which 
equally  implies  its  possible  falsehood ;  thus  leaving  it  alto- 
gether undecided  whether  the  form  of  the  judgmen't  should 
be  affirmative  or  negative,  universal  or  particular.     The 
form  in  all  these  cases  is  determined  by  that  universal  ten- 
dency of  the  human  mind,  which  has  been  noticed  in  a 
foi-mer  chapter,  the  tendency  to  regard  physical  phenomena 
fts  indicating  the  existence  of  a  substance  or  a  cause  similar 
to  that  of  which  we  are  directly  conscious  in  our  own  men- 
tal states  and  operations.     It  is  thus  that,  when  experience 
presents  certain  phenomena  in  juxtaposition,  the  mind  is 
invariably  led  to  regard  them  as  attributes  of  one  and  the 
same  substance ;  and  this  constitutes  the  form  of  all  mixed 
concepts  and  judgments.    And  in  like  manner,  when  one 
phenomenon  is  the  invariable  consequent  of  another,  the 
mind  is  irresistibly  led  to  regard  them  as  respectively  cause 
and  effi.»ct;  and  this  constitutes  the  form  in  all  cases  of 
mixed  inference.     The  same  tendencies  which  thus  co- 
operate with  the  presentations  of  experience  in  the  acts  of 
mixed  thinking,  cooperate  in  like  manner  with  the  laws  of 
thought  in  acts  of  pure  thinking.     In  the  former  case,  the 
attributes  are  given  as  empirically  related  as  intuitions; 
in  the  latter,  they  are  given  as  logically  related  as  thoughts; 
and  in  both  they  are  regarded  as  mutually  related  to  some' 
unknown  substance  or  cause.     But  that  these  tendencies, 
however  universal  or  irresistible,  cannot  properiy  be  re- 
garded as  laws  of  thought  or  of  intuition,  is  manifest  from 
the  fact,  that  they  furnish  no  criterion  for  determining  the 

19 


218 


PBOLEQOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


219 


:l 


legitimacy  or  illegitimacy  of  any  product.  Thoughts, 
whether  empirically  true  or  false,  whether  logically  sound 
or  unsound,  in  this  rcsi)ect  present  precisely  the  same 
features.  An  assertion,  false  in  point  of  fact,  or  self-con- 
tradictory in  point  of  thought,  contains,  as  regards  the 
supposed  relation  of  attributes  to  a  common  substance, 
precisely  the  same  form  as  one  logically  and  empirically 
valid.  The  Principles  of  Substance  and  Causality  are  thus 
rather  negative  conditions  than  positive  laws  of  thought. 
They  have  a  psychological  relation  to  thought  as  it  actu- 
ally exists,  explaining  and  accounting  for  the  fact  of  its 
invariably  assuming  a  certain  form ;  but  they  have  no  logi- 
cal relation  to  thought  as  it  ought  to  be,  and  furnish  no 
criterion  of  its  validity  in  any  special  instance. 

Logical  or  pure  thinking  is  not,  therefore,  called  formal, 
because  its  product  exhibits  a  form ;  for  the  coexistence 
of  matter  and  form  is  common  to  all  thought,  and  to  all 
spurious  imitations  of  thought.  But  the  justification  of 
the  terms  formal  and  material^  as  applied  to  pure  and 
mixed  processes  of  thinking,  is  to  be  found  in  the  circum- 
stance, that  in  tlie  former  the  act  of  thought  is  based  on 
the  form  only  of  the  preliminary  data,  without  reference 
to  the  particular  matter ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  matter 
is  necessarily  taken  into  account  in  every  process  of 
mixed  thinking.  To  an  act  of  logical  conception,  for  ex- 
ample, it  is  not  necessary  to  examine  in  any  case  the 
special  character  of  the  attributes,  as  having  been  actually 
combined  in  experience ;  but  only  that  they  should  be 
compatible  with  the  possible  existence  of  an  object  in 
space  or  time.  In  an  act  of  logical  judgment,  one  of  the 
given  concepts  being  always  comprehended  in  the  other, 
it  is  indifferent  of  what  special  attributes  either  is  com- 
posed, provided  they  possess  sufficient  clearness  and  dis- 


tinctness to   enable   the    mind    to    discern   the   relation 
between  them.     In  an  act  of  logical  reasoning,  the  validity 
of  the   conclusion   depends   solely  on   the   quantity  and 
quality  of  the  given  premises,  without  any   reference  to 
the  particular  terms  of  which  they  are  composed.     In  allTl 
so  long  as  the  formal  relation  of  the  data  remains  the    » 
same,  the  matter  may  be  changed  as  we  please,  without 
affecting  the   logical  value   of  the   thought.     In  mixed 
thinking,  on  the  other  hand,  the  matter  is  of  principal  im- 
portance.    To  determine  that  this  or  that  object  of  con- 
ception actually  exists,  that  this  or  that  judgment  is  in 
accordance  with  experience,  that  this  or  that  inference  is 
sufficiently  probable  to  furnish   a  reasonable   motive  to 
action,  we  require  to  be  guided  by  a  knowledge  of  the 
nature  and  circumstances  of  the  particular  object  in  ques- 
tion.   And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  all  examples  of  logical 
thinking  are  better  expressed  by  means  of  arbitrary  sym- 
bols than  of  significant  terms ;  not  that  it  is  in  any  case 
possible  to  think  without  some  matter  or  other,  but  be- 
cause it  is  wholly  indiflferent  what  matter  we  may  at  the 
time  be  thinking  about ;  and,  therefore,  by  employing  an , 
unmeaning  sign,  indifferently  representative  of  any  object' 
of  thought,  we  are  enabled  to  clear  the  process  from  any , 
accidental  admixture  of  material  knowledge,  and  to  ex-  i 
hibit  the  form  alone  in  its  proper  relation  to  the  laws  of  i 
thought.  ^ 

In  accordance  with  the  view  here  given  of  Form  and 
Formal  Processes,  it  will  be  proper  to  modify  slightly 
some  of  the  definitions  of  Logic  given  by  those  philos- 
ophers whose  views  have  been  principally  followed  in  the 
present  work.  Logic,  to  omit  less  accurate  views  of  its 
nature,  has  been  defined  as  the  Science  of  the  bare  Form 


220 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


of  Thought,!  or  as  the  Science  of  the  Formal  Laws  of 
Thought; 2— definitions   which,  though   substantially  ap- 
proaching   far  nearer  to   the   truth  than   any  antagonist 
view,  still  leave  something  to  desire  in  point  of  verbal 
accuracy.     The  term  formal  strictly  belongs  rather  to  the 
process  of  pure  thinking  than  to  the  laws  by  which  it  is  reg- 
ulated, or  to  the  science  which  takes  cognizance  of  thenT; 
and  Logic  is  not  the  science  of  the  Forms  of  Thought  in 
general,  but  only  of  such  as  are  subservient  to  other  pro- 
cesses of  formal  thinking.     Other  forms,  such  as  modality, 
fall  without  the  province  of  Logic,  and  within  that  of 
Psychology ;  to  which  latter  science,  indeed,  all  the  forms 
and  laws  of  thought  belong  in  their  relation  to  the  consti- 
tution of  the  thinking  subject.     To  Logic,  on  the  other 
hand,  belong  the  same  forms  and  laws  in  relation  to  those 
acts  and  products  of  pure  thinking  which  are  suggested 
by  the  one   and   governed   by  the   other.    If,  therefore, 
slightly  altering  the  language  of  the  above  definitions,  wj 
define  Logic  as  the  Science  of  the  Laws  and  Products  of 
Pure  or  Formal  Thinking,^  we  shall  express  with  tolerable 
accuracy  its  character  and  province,  according  to  the  views 
advocated  in  the  preceding  pages. 

1  Kant,  Logtlc,  Einleltunj!:  T- ;  HoflTbaner,  Logik,  S  17. 
'  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  Diacusitiom,  p.  119. 

8  This  coincides  nearly  with  the  definition  given  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
(Beid's  Works,  p.  698),  The  science  of  the  laws  of  thought  as  thought. 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

ON  POSITIVE  AND   NEGATIVE   THOUGHT. 

Logic  has  been  described  by  Kant  as  the  science  of  the 
necessary  laws  of  the  understanding  and  of  the  reason. 
Psychologically,  the  propriety  of  this  division  of  the  men- 
tal  faculties  has  been  called  in  question  by  eminent  critics.^ 
And  in  a  logical  point  of  view  it  is  untenable,  i^  as  I  have 
endeavored  to  show,  judgment  and  reasoning,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  logical  processes,  are  both  governed  by  the  same 
laws,  and  must  be  referred  to  the  same  faculty.    In  the 
present  chapter,  however,  it  is  proposed  to  examine  an- 
other  expression  of  the  same  definition,  and  to  inquire  in 
what  sense  the  Laws  of  Thought  can  properly  be  called 
necessary.      Kant  employed  this  term  to  distinguish  the 
laws  of  thought  in  general  from  those  of  thought  as  em-, 
ployed  upon  any  definite  class  of  objects ;  it  being  optional 
with  every  man,  and  therefore  contingent,  whether  he  shall 
exercise  his  understanding  on  one  class  of  objects  rather 
than  another.^    This  distinction  I  have  preferred  to  express 
m  other  words,  by  separating  pure  or  formal  from  mixed 
or  material  thinking;  but  the  Kantian  phraseology  may 
serve  to  introduce  a  subject,  the  right  understanding  of 
which  is  of  considerable  importance  in  Logic :  the  diflfer- 

I  Amonp:  others,  by  Sir  William  Hamilton  {Biscussions,  p.  17),  and  by  »f. 
Cousin  {L&^ns  sur  la  phUosaphie  de  Kant,  L.  vi.). 
*  Kant,  Logik,  Einleitung  I. 

19* 


222 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


223 


ence,  namely,  between  positive  and  negative  thinking. 
The  phrase  necessary  laws  of  thought,  if  such  language  is 
allowable,  ought  to  imply  that  we  cannot  think  at  all  ex- 
cept under  their  conditions ;  and  yet  it  is  notorious  that 
such  laws  are  daily  transgressed,  that  nothing  is  more  com- 
mon than  illogical  reasoning.  To  reconcile  the  language 
with  the  fact  is  the  object  of  the  following  observations. 

Illogical  reasoning  may  be  of  two  very  different  kinds. 
It  may  violate  the  laws  of  thought  in  cases  where  they  are 
applicable,  or  it  may  endeavor  to  extend  them  to  cases 
where  they  are  not  applicable.  The  oifence  in  the  former 
case  consists  in  attempting  to  draw  a  conclusion  opposed 
to  that  which  the  laws  require ;  in  the  latter,  in  attempt- 
ing to  draw  a  conclusion  where  none  can  be  legitimately 
inferred.  Thus  we  may,  verljally  at  least,  reason,  "All  A 
is  B ;  all  C  is  A ;  therefore  no  C  is  B."  Or  we  may  reason, 
"All  A  is  B;  some  C  is  not  A;  therefore  some  C  is  not 
B."  If  the  laws  of  thought  are  in  the  strict  sense  ne- 
cessary, i.  e,,  obligatory  upon  every  act  of  thinking,  it  will 
follow  that  these  supposed  reasonings  are  neither  of  them 
acts  of  thought  at  all. 

It  is,  of  coui-se,  always  possible  to  compose  a  verbal  rcjv 
resentation  of  a  thought  in  which  the  rules  of  Logic  shall 
be  violated,  and  to  understand  fully  the  meaning  of  each 
word  of  which  it  is  composed.  The  test,  however,  of  the 
reality  of  a  thought  does  not  lie  in  the  possibility  of  asser- 
Hon,  but  in  the  possibility  of  conception  ;^  in  the  power, 
that  is  to  say,  of  combining  the  given  attributes  in  a  single 
image  representative  of  an  individual  object  of  intuition.* 

1  Ov  ykp  vphs  rhy  r^a>  \Syoy  r}  iir<J«€i(it,  AXAi  vphs  thy  iy  if  t^wxi?*  ^^^^ 
oitZ^  avWoyiafi6s.     'Afi  yiip  tcriy  dytrrTjyai  irphs  rhy  K^m  A^oif,  iAAi  wpbs 
why  tffti  Xiyoy  ovk  if/.  —  Arist.  Anal.  Post.  I.  10,  6. 
I     *  It  will  be  necessary  here  to  bear  in  mind  what  has  been  observed  before, 


I  may  make  use  of  the  words  a  round  square,  or  a  bilinear 
figure;  but  the  terms  imply  no  conception,  because  the 
attributes  cannot  be  united  in  an  image.  These  words, 
therefore,  are  not  the  signs  of  thought,  but  only  express  the 
negation  of  any  object  on  which  thought  can  be  exercised.^ 

And  such,  in  ultimate  analysis,  will  be  seen  to  be  the 
case  with  all  verbal  combinations  in  which  the  laws  of 
formal  thinking  are  violated ;  whether  directly,  by  denying 
their  authority  in  cases  to  which  they  are  applicable,  or 
indirectly,  by  attempting  to  apply  them  to  cases  where 
they  are  not  applicable.  The  only  difference  between 
these  two  offences  is,  that  in  the  former  case  the  product 
is  no  thought  whatever ;  in  the  latter,  it  is  not  that  kind 
of  thought  which  it  professes  to  be. 

Let  us  suppose,  for  example,  a  syllogistic  conclusion! 
verbally  asserted,  the  reverse  of  that  which  the  laws  of  i 
thought  require ;  such  as,  "All  A  is  B,  all  C  is  A,  therefore! 
some  C  is  not  B."  This  reasoning  supposes  the  possibility^ 
of  conceiving  a  C  which  shall  at  the  same  time  be  B  and 
not  B.  Tried  by  this  test,  the  form  of  words  is  ascertained 
to  be  representative  of  no  thought  at  all. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  a  case  where  the  law  of  reasonin"* 
18  not  applicable,  as  in  the  apparent  syllogism,  « All  Y  is 
[some]  Z,  no  X  is  [any]  Y,  therefore  no  X  is  [any]  Z,"  the 
thought  is  annihilated  as  a  syllogism  only :  as  a  mere  judg- 
ment, the  concluding  proposition  may  or  may  not  be  true ; 
and  there  is  no  impossibility  in  conceiving  an  X  which  is 
neither  Y  nor  Z.  But,  as  a  syllogism,  it  maintains  that  X 
is  not  Z,  because  it  is  not  Y;  in  other  words,  that  nothing 

that  all  conception  implies  imajjinatlon,  though*  all  Imagination  does  not 
imply  conception.    See  p.  33. 

1  See,  on  this  subject,  an  excellent  note  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  edition  of 
iiod,  p.  377. 


224 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


41 


225 


\ 


which  is  not  Y  can  be  Z,  or  that  all  Z  is  Y;  —  an  assertion 
which  again  involves  a  contradiction  of  the  major  premise, 
which,  in  asserting  that  all  Y  is  some  Z  only,  implies  at 
the  same  time  that  some  Z  is  not  Y.  This  contradiction 
is  not  so  apparent  in  the  ordinary  form  of  the  affirmative 
proposition,  in  which  the  predicate  is  expressed  as  indefi- 
nite,  though  thought  as  particular ;  and  thus  the  elliptical 
and  imperfect  language  of  common  Logic  has  caused  to  be 
overlooked  the  important  truth,  that  illogical  thinking  is 
j  inrealltg  no  thinking  at  all. 

The  language  of  this  chapter  may  recall  to  the  mind  of 
the  reader  a  distinction  made  in  an  earlier  portion  of  the 
present  work,  between   positive  and  negative  ideas.    A 
comparison  of  the  two  cases  will  serve  to  show  that  the 
expression  negative  thinking,  or  negation  of  thought,  is 
properly  applicable  to  both,  though  in  different  relations 
and  on  different  grounds.     Positive  thinking  implies  two 
conditions :  firstly,  the  material  condition,  that  certain  at- 
tributes be  given  as  united  in  a  concept ;  secondly,  the 
formal  condition  that  the  concept  be  capable  of  individu- 
alization, i.  e.,  that  the  attributes  be  such  as  can  coexist  in 
an  object  perceived  or  imagined.     If  either  of  these  con- 
ditions be  wanting,  we  are  deficient  in  the  sine  qua  non  of 
actual  thought.    A  given  fonn  of  words  may  thus  in  two 
different  ways  be  void  of  a  thought  corresponding.     We 
may  be  unable  to  conceive  separately  one  or  more  of  the 
attributes  given,  or  we  may  be  unable  to  conceive  them  in 
combination.     The  former  is  the  case  when  we  have  never 
been  personally  conscious  of  the  said  attribute  as  presented; 
the  latter  is  the  case  when  the  several  presentations  are 
incompatible  with  each  other. 

From  defect  in  the  first  of  these  conditions,  a  man  bom 
blind  may  be  said  to  have  a  negative  idea  of  light,  which 


he  knows  only  as  something  different  from  darkness,  and, 
consequently,  of  the  various  colors,  which  are  different 
modifications  of  light ;  and  any  man,  in  like  manner,  has 
but  a  negative  idea  of  a  color  which  he  has  not  actually 
sceu.^     The  blind  man  may  be  able  to  distinguish  a  sphere 
from  a  cube,  by  touch ;  but  if  he  is  told  that  the  ball  which 
he  has  in  his  hand  is  white,  he  cannot  connect  the  word 
with  any  sensation  of  which  he  has  been  at  any  time  con- 
scious.    And  in  like  manner,  a  man  who  has  seen  white 
objects  only  has  no  idea  of  red ;  he  knows  it  only  as  some 
color  which  he  has  not  seen.     In  this  manner  it  is  that  we 
have  negative  ideas  only  of  many  of  the  objects  on  which 
men  most  boldly  speculate.     Such  is  the  case  with  all  our 
speculations  on  causality,  as  existing  apart  from  the  con- 
scious exertion  of  power ;  on  substance,  other  than  as  a 
conscious  self;  on  consciousness  in  general,  apart  from  the 
conditions  of  space  and  time.    Of  these  we  can  only  speak 
as  a  causality  which  is  not  our  causality;  as  a  substance 
different  from  our  substance  ;  as  a  consciousness  unlike  our 
consciousness.^    The  same  is  the  case  with  all  tlie  spec- 
ulations  of  our  reason   concerning  infinity  and   infinite 
attributes  as  such.     By  removing  the  condition  of  limi- 
tation, we  remove  the  only  condition  under  which  such 
attributes  have  ever  been  presented  to  our  consciousness. 
Further  speculation  is  not  thought,  but  its  negation. 

'  In  the  first  of  these  instances  the  nej^ative  Idea  is  so  obscure  as  to  be 
tantamount  in  its  actual  result  to  no  idea  at  all.  Still  the  corresponding 
state  of  mind  is  not  one  of  pure  quiescence,  or  mere  absence  of  thouj^^ht. 
A  blind  man  who  had  lived  all  his  life  among  a  nation  of  blind  men,  and 
who  had  thus  never  been  led  to  infer  the  existence  of  visible  objects  at  all, 
would  be  in  a  different  state  from  one  who  is  continually  told  of  things 
which  he  is  unable  to  see,  and  whose  mind  is  consequently  roused  to  an 
effort,  though  an  ineffectual  one. 

*  Cf.  Damiron,  Psj/chohgie,  vol.  ii.  p.  221. 


ill 


«i 


226 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


The  second  condition  fails  in  cases  of  illogical  thinking, 
all  of  which  may  be  shown  ultimately  to  annihilate  them- 
selves by  involving  a  contradiction.  And  in  these  cases 
the  attempt  to  individualize  the  thought  furnishes  at  once 
a  decisive  criterion  of  its  negative  character.  In  the  for- 
mer instances,  the  thought  is  only  ultimately  discovered 
to  be  unattainable  from  the  failure  of  every  attempt  to 
realize  it ;  in  the  present  case,  the  attributes  can  be  im- 
mediately determined  to  be  unthinkable,  as  mutually 
destroying  one  another.  The  former  may  be  distinguished 
as  materially  or  relatively  negative  from  the  absence  of 
the  requisite  data  for  thinking  ;  the  latter  are  formally  or 
absolutely  negative^  as  containing  data  which  offend  against 
the  universal  laws  of  human  thought.  The  former  might 
become  positive  if  man  were  furnished  with  a  new  sense, 
or  any  additional  faculty  of  intuition  ;  the  latter  could 
only  become  so  by  a  complete  inversion  of  the  existing 
constitution  of  his  mind.  The  negative  character  of  the 
first  is  shown  by  Psychology,  which  ascertains  empirically 
the  limitations  to  which  the  mind  is  subject  in  the  accu- 
mulation of  materials  for  thinking ;  the  negative  character 
of  the  second  is  shown  by  Logic,  which  lays  down  a  priori 
the  conditions  to  which  all  materials,  whencesoever  de- 
rived, must  be  subjected  in  the  formation  of  thought. 

It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  distinguish  these  two 
kinds  of  negative  thinking,  the  material  or  psychological, 
and  the  formal  or  logical,  from  each  other.  No  error  in 
philosophy  is  more  frequent  in  its  occurrence,  or  more  per- 
nicious in  its  results,  than  a  confusion  on  this  point.  Men 
are  apt  to  mistake  the  absence  of  the  materials  for  one 
thought  for  the  presence  of  materials  for  its  opposite ;  — 
to  imagine  that  it  is  all  one  to  be  unable  to  think  of  an 
object  as  existing,  and  to  be  able  to  think  of  it  as  not  ex- 


PROLEQOMENA   LOGICA. 


22T 


!  i 


isting;  —  to  fancy  that  certain  positions  are  condemned  by 
the  laws  of  the  understanding,  when  the  fact  is  only  that 
their  materials  have  not  been  given  in  an  intuition  ;  —  to 
suppose  that  to  be  rejected  by  reason  which  in  truth  has 
never  come  in  contact  with  reason  at  all. 

To  examine  in  detail  the  prominent  instances  of  the 
above  confusion,  which  are  plentifully  exhibited  by  some 
of  the  so-called  philosophers  of  the  present  time,  would 
require  a  work  of  a  higher  and  more  controversial  charac- 
ter than  the  present.  I  shall  content  myself  with  selecting 
two  examples,  one  ancient  and  one  modern,  as  specimens 
of  the  confident  manner  in  which  men  of  all  ages,  and 
under  all  religious  systems,  have  been  prone  to  dogma- 
tize upon  the  highest  matters  of  speculation,  upon  no 
better  basis  than  the  absence  of  all  materials  for  speculat- 
ing at  all. 

Aristotle's  well-known  argument,  to  prove  that  the  hap- 
piness of  the  gods  consists  in  contemplation,  is  based  on 
the  ground  that  we  cannot  attribute  to  them  moral  attri- 
butes in  the  only  way  in  which  such  attributes  come  within 
the  sphere  of  human  consciousness,  viz.,  under  the  limita- 
tions and  imperfections  consequent  upon  human  passioa 
and  human  error.  What  scope,  he  asks,  can  there  be  for 
fortitude,  where  there  is  no  pain  to  undergo ;  or  for  tem- 
perance, where  there  are  no  evil  desires  to  keep  in  check? ^ 
But  the  reasoning  is  incomplete.  Cotta,  in  Cicero,  pursu- 
ing the  same  principle  to  its  ultimate  consequences,  shows 
clearly  that  we  must  equally  deny  of  the  Deity  the  pos- 
BOflBion  of  any  intellectual  as  well  as  of  any  moral  quality. 
What  is  the  object  of  reason  and  intelligence  but  to  gain 
a  knowledge  of  that  which  is  obscure  ?  What  is  the  pur- 
pose of  contemplation  but  to  gain  a  closer  insight  into 


i 


s^. 


»  BOi.  Nic.  X.  8. 


228 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


the  nature  of  the  things  contemplated  ?  Intellectual  at- 
tainments have  the  same  relation  to  human  ignorance  that 
moral  virtues  have  to  human  frailty.^ 

The  error  of  both  these  reasonings  is  the  same :  it  con- 
sists in  mistaking  a  psychological  deficiency  for  a  logical 
impossibility.  To  determine  in  thought  that  certain  at- 
tributes cannot  exist  in  any  being  except  under  given  con- 
ditions of  manifestation,  it  would  be  necessary  that  we 
should  have  had  personal  experience  of  the  abrogation  of 
those  conditions,  and  of  the  absolute  destruction  of  the 
attributes  in  consequence.  But  such  an  experience  in  the 
present  case  is,  ex  hypothesis  impossible ;  the  conditions 
being  those  to  which  the  universal  human  consciousness  is 
subject.  To  pronounce  how  consciousness  exists  in  beings 
of  a  different  nature  from  ourselves,  it  would  be  necessary 
that  we  should  be  capable  of  possessing  their  nature  and 
faculties,  as  well  as  our  own,  and  of  comparing  the  two 
together  by  the  aid  of  a  third  power  independent  of 
either.  To  pronounce  that  certain  modes  of* consciousness 
cannot  exist  save  as  they  exist  to  us,  it  is  necessary  that 
we  should  have  personally  tried  every  other  possible  rela- 
tion of  modes  of  consciousness  to  a  conscious  subject. 
Until  human  experience  has  extended  thus  far,  to  limit  the 
province  of  faith  by  that  of  reason,  —  to  say  that  xchat  we 
cannot  compass  in  thought  we  may  not  believe  as  existing^ 
—  is  to  pass  from  criticism  to  dogmatism,  a  dognmtism  rest- 
ing its  claims  to  dictation  on  a  complete  ignorance  of  the 
matter  in  which  it  dictates. 

The  modern  Atheism  of  the  German  philosopher  Feuer- 
bach  is  based  on  a  similar  confusion.  It  assumes  that  the 
measure  of  what  man  is  to  believe  is  to  be  determined  by 
what  he  can  grasp  in  an  act  of  positive  thought ;  in  6ther 

1  Cicero,  De  Naiura  Deorum,  iii.  15. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


229 


words,  that  the  mere  absence  of  the  necessaiy  data  for 
thinking  at  all  is  tantamount  to  a  logical  determination  of 
the  non-existence  of  a  corresponding  object.  God,  accord- 
ing to  this  system,  is  but  humanity  deified  in  its  intel- 
lectual, or  moral,  or  physical  attributes,  according  to  the 
varying  condition,  characters,  and  wants  of  this  or  that 
people ;  but  in  all,  according  to  one  form  or  another  of 
Anthropomorphism. 

Falsehood  is  only  dangerous  from  its  possessing  a  certain 
portion  of  a  mutilated  truth.    The  one  element  of  truth 
which  underlies  the  Atheism  of  the  Essence  ofReligio^x^ 
is  the  fact,  that  finite  thought  can  only  be  positively  exer- 
cised on  finite  objects.     Thought,  on  its  positive  side,  is 
ultimately  tested   by  the   individualization   of  concepts. 
To  effect  this,  they  must  be  referred  to  the  representative 
image  of  some  actual  state  of  consciousness,  —  sensation, 
volition,  affection,  etc.    In  attempting  to  grasp  the  Deity 
as   an   object   of  positive  thought,  to   speculate   beyond 
what  is  revealed  to  us  of  the  divine  attributes  as  mani- 
fested in  relation  and  accommodation  to  human  faculties, 
man  can  only  bring  God  down  to  his  own  level,  and  exer- 
cise his  reason  on  those  analogous  attributes  of  which  he 
has  had  experience  in  his  personal  consciousness.     The 
error  consists  in  overlooking  the   religious  feelings   and 
affections,  as  a  distinct  class  of  psychological   facts,  co- 
ordinate  with,  not  subordinate  to,  the  thinking  faculty. 
The  history  of  mankind  in  general,  as  well  as  the  con- 
sciousness of  each  individual,  alike  testify  that  religion  is 
not  a  function  of  thought ;  and  that  the  attempt  to  make 

1  With  this  work,  and  others  of  the  same  author,  I  am  acquainted 
through  the  French  translation  by  M.  Ewcrbeck,  entitled,  Q,n\st<e  que  la 
BeUffion  d'apres  la  nouveOe  phzlosophie  AUemande. 

20 


230 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


it 


im^ 


IK 


it  so,  if  consistently  earned  out,  necessarily  leads,  firstly 
to  Anthropomorphism,  and  ultimately  to  Atheism. 

The  incompetency  of  such  reasoning  to  prove  its  con- 
clusion is  manifest  from  the  fact,  that  the  mental  phenom- 
ena on  which  alone  it  rests,  must,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  be  precisely  the  same,  whether  that  conclusion  be 
true  or  false.  If  human  thought  is  subject  to  laws  and 
limitations,  formal  and  material,  the  mode  and  the  sphere 
of  positive  thinking  must  be  such  as  those  laws  and  limi- 
tations require,  whether  there  exist  objects  beyond  it  or 
not.  But  the  hypothesis,  indispensable  to  the  rationalist, 
that  the  sphere  of  thought  and  that  of  being  are  coexten- 
sive, fails  altogether  to  account  for  the  phenomenon  of 
negative  thinking ;  to  explain,  that  is,  how  it  can  be  that 
man,  in  the  exercise  of  thought,  ever  finds  himself  encom- 
passed with  conditions  and  restrictions,  which  he  is  ever 
striving  to  pass,  and  ever  failing  in  the  effort ;  that  he  ever 
feels  himself  in  the  presence  of  yearnings  unsatisfied  and 
doubts  unsolved  ;  —  yearnings  which  countless  accessions 
to  the  domain  of  thought  have  left  as  vague  and  restless 
as  before ;  —  doubts  which  centuries  of  speculation  have 
made  no  progress  toward  answering.  These  and  such  like 
humiliating  truths,  altogether  inexplicable  on  the  arrogant 
assumption  of  a  human  God  contemplating  the  products 
of  his  creative  intellect,^  are  the  natural  and  necessary  fea- 
tures of  our  position,  if  we  believe  that  man,  as  individual 


1 "  Ueber  die  Natur  philosophiren,"  says  Schelling,  "  heisst  die  Natur 
schaffcn." 

"  Die  Lofrik,"  says  Hegel,  "  zeigt  die  Erhebung  der  Idee  zu  dcr  Stufo 
von  daraas  sic  die  Schopferin  der  Natur  wird."  In  the  same  spirit,  Logic 
is  declared  to  be,  "  Die  Darstellang  Gottes,  wie  er  in  seinem  ewigen.Wesen 
vor  der  Erschaffiing  dcr  Natur  und  eines  endlicben  Geistes  1st.' 

The  mock  thunder  of  Salrooneus  was  modesty  itself  to  this. 


» 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


231 


or  as  species,  is  but  a  lower  intelligence  in  the  midst  of 
the  works  of  a  higher;  a  being  of  finite  intuitions,  sur- 
rounded by  partial  indications  of  the  Unlimited,  of  finite 
thought,  contemplating  partial  revelations  of  the  Incom- 
prehensible. 


ii\ 


CHAPTER  IX. 

OP  LOGIC  AS  RELATED  TO  OTHER  MENTAL  SCIENCES. 

A  DIVISION  was  early  established  in  philosophy  between 
the  Logica  docens  and  the  Logica  utens  ;  the  one  con- 
cerned with  the  pure  laws  and  forms  of  thought,  the  other 
with  the  application  of  thought  to  this  or  that  object- 
matter.  The  relations  of  the  latter  it  is  not  ray  present 
purpose  to  examine.  Every  art  or  science,  in  so  far  as  it 
contains  reasonings  on  its  own  special  objects,  may  be  re- 
garded as  furnishing  an  instance  of  the  Logica  utens; 
and  in  this  point  of  view  Logic  has  no  special  affinity  with 
one  branch  of  knowledge  rather  than  another.  But  in 
relation  to  the  Logica  docens^  there  are  three  branches  of 
science,  real  or  apparent,  which,  from  community  of  object 
and  method,  as  well  as  from  historical  connection,  demand 
a  more  special  consideration. 

The  three  sciences  in  question  are  Grammar,  Psychology, 
and  Metaphysics.  Rhetoric,  from  an  association  with  Logic 
and  Grammar  in  the  mediaeval  Trivium,  might  also  bo 
thought  to  have  a  special  claim  on  our  attention.  But,  in 
truth.  Rhetoric  is  connected  by  community  of  object-matter 
rather  with  the  art  of  Dialectic,  as  exhibited  in  the  Topics 
of  Aristotle  and  the  Probable  Syllogisms  of  the  Scholastic 
Logic,  than  with  the  formal  science  as  treated  of  in  the 
present  work.  Its  relation  to  the  latter  is  only  by  way  of 
application,  inasmuch  as  logical  forms  may  bo  applied  in 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICl, 


233 


rhetorical  exercises ;  a  relation  which  reduces  it  to  a  level 
with  any  other  employment  of  the  Logica  utens.  With 
Psychology,  indeed,  its  connection  is  far  more  intimate, 
but  on  the  opposite  side  from  that  by  which  the  same  sci- 
ence is  related  to  Logic.  Logic,  as  the  science  of  the  laws 
and  products  of  the  understanding,  is  related  to  Psychology 
through  the  medium  of  the  speculative  and  discursive  fac- 
ulties. Rhetoric,  as  concerned  with  the  movement  of  the 
will,  is  related  on  the  side  of  the  emotional  and  practical 
faculties,  and  is  thus  correctly  described  by  Aristotle  as  an 
o&hoot  of  Dialectic  and  Moral  Philosophy. 

On  the  other  hand,  Psychology,  Metaphysics,  and  Gram- 
mar,  are  intimately  connected  with  the  faculties,  the  laws, 
and  the  instruments  of  the  universal  process  of  thought,— 
a  connection  which  has  been  recognized,  with  more  or  less 
clearness,  from  the  origin  of  Logic  to  the  present  time. 
The  Categories,  from  the  days  of  Aristotle  downwards, 
have  been  disputed  ground  between  Logic  and  Metaphys- 
ics, and  are  treated  of  by  the  Stagirite  himself  in  connec- 
tion with  both  sciences.  The  treatise  ir^pi  cp/ATymas,  whose 
title,  sorely  misnomered  by  various  translatoi-s,  might  be 
adequately  expressed  in  English  by,  "  Of  Language  as  the 
interpretation  of  Thought,"  ^  is,  in  the  eariy  portion,  devoted 
to  grammatical  definitions  and  distinctions.  Psychology 
also,  though  less  prominently  introduced,  claims  her  share 
in  the  multifarious  matter  of  the  Organon ;  in  the  account 
of  the  processes  of  sensation,  memory,  and  experience,  as 
subsidiary  to  induction. 

Were  we  indeed  to  start  from  the  whole  Organon  of 

1  For  various  interpretations  of  Interpretation,  Bee  M.  St.  Hilaire,  De  la 
Logique  d'Aristote,  p.  i.  ch.  10.  The  version  given  in  the  text  corresponds 
to  that  by  Isidore  of  Seville:  "  Omnis  elocutio  concept»  rei  interpres  est: 
Inde  perihermeniam  nominant  qoam  interpretationem  nos  appellamos." 

20* 


234 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOIOA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOOICA. 


235 


m 


Aristotle,  as  a  uniform  treatise  on  a  single  subject,  it 
would  be  difficult  to  accommodate  its  contents  to  any 
modern  classification  of  the  mental  sciences.  But  it  may 
fairly  be  questioned  whether  even  the  authority  of  the 
philosopher  himself  can  be  adduced  in  support  of  such  a 
proceeding.  While  we  cannot  help  admitting,  with  Sir 
William  Hamilton,^  that  the  incorrect  notions  which  have 
prevailed,  and  still  prevail,  in  regard  to  the  nature  and 
province  of  Logic,  are  mainly  to  be  attributed  to  the  au- 
thority of  the  father  of  the  science,  it  may  be  doubted  how 
far  that  authority  has  been  put  to  a  legitimate  use  by  his 
followers.  The  same  eminent  critic  to  whom  we  have 
just  referred  has  observed,  in  another  place,  that  there  is 
required  for  the  metaphysician  not  less  imagination  than 
for  the  poet ;  that  it  may,  in  fact,  be  doubted  whether 
Homer  or  Aristotle  possessed  this  faculty  in  greater  vigor.* 
The  two  authors  here  placed  in  juxtaposition  may  be  com- 
pared in  more  respects  than  that  of  their  mental  powers. 
The  influence  of  Homer  in  Poetry  has  been  similar  to  that 
of  Aristotle  in  Philosophy;  yet,  while,  from  the  Father  of 
Criticism  to  the  present  day,  there  has  never  been  wanting 
a  champion  to  maintain  against  all  impugners  the  unity  of 
design  of  the  Iliad,  and  its  exact  relation  to  a  beginning,  a 
middle,  and  an  end,  the  primary  argument  of  this  *'one 
entire  and  perfect  chrysolite"  has  been  almost  as  much 
disputed  among  critics  as  the  question  of  the  definition  of 
Logic.  Different  portions  of  the  poem  have  been  pro- 
nounced genuine  or  spurious,  according  to  this  or  that 
conception  of  the  poet's  design ;  and,  finally,  it  has  even 
been  maintained  that  the  model  of  all  succeeding  Epics  is 
little  more  than  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,  the  frag- 


^  DiscussionSf  p.  141. 


2  Bad's  Works,  p.  99. 


ments  of  distinct  rhapsodists.    The  Organon  of  Aristotle 
has  had  a  similar  fate.     Various  have  been  the  conjectures 
concerning  its  design  and  method.     Portions  have  been  at 
different  times  regarded  as  logical,  as  grammatical,  as  meta- 
physical ;  nor  have  there  been  wanting  critics  to  deny  the 
genuineness  of  this  or  that  part.     The  parallel  might  be 
carried  further.     The  different  portions  of  the  Iliad  are 
said  to  have  been  collected  and  arranged  in  the  time  of 
Pisistratus,  about  three  hundred  and  forty  years  after  the 
date  assigned  by  Herodotus  (rightly  or  wrongly)   to  the 
birth  of  the  poet ;  and  the  writings  of  Aristotle  are  gener- 
ally supposed  to  have  received  their  present  form  and  ar- 
rangement at  the  hands  of  Andronicus  of  Rhodes,  a  philos- 
opher who  flourished  about  three  centuries  later  than  the 
Stagirite.     I  am  not  indeed  aware  that  any  critic  has  been 
bold  enough  to  maintain  a  thoroughly  Wolfian  hypothesis 
of  the  origin  of  the  Organon ;  and  yet  there  are  not  want- 
ing grounds  on  which  a  not  very  different  theory  might  bo 
supported ;  not  indeed  as  regards  the  authorship,  but  cer- 
tainly as  regards  the  unity  of  design  of  the  work.    The 
title  by  which  the  collected  treatises  are  known  is  undoubt- 
edly of  recent  origin ;  it  is  not  found  in  Aristotle  himself, 
nor  in  any  of  his  earlier  commentators ;  and,  as  far  as  ex- 
isting evidence  can  determine,  it  appeai-s  not  to  have  been 
in  common  use  before  the  fifteenth  century .^    The  several 
treatises  themselves  are  invariably  mentioned  by  their  au- 
thor as  distinct  works  under  distinct  titles ;  and  even  after 
the  time  of  Andronicus,  commentaries  were  generally  writ- 
ten, not  on  the  Organon  as  a  whole,  but  separately  on  its 
constituent  parts.    If  from  the  books  we  turn  to  the  mat- 
ters of  which  they  treat,  the  result  is  the  same.     Logic,  as 
the  name  of  an  Art  or  Science,  does  not  once  occur  in  the 

*  St.  Ililafre,  De  la  Logiqne  d'Aristote,  vol.  i.  p.  19. 


236 


PBOLEQOMENA  LOQICA. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


237 


If 


wi-itings  of  Aristotle;  and  the  cognate  adjective  and  adverb 
are  used  in  a  peculiar  and  much  more  restricted  sense  than 
that  which  has  subsequently  been  given  to  them.  The 
names  sanctioned  by  the  philosopher  himself  such  as 
Analytic  and  Dialectic,  are  commensurate  with  portions 
only  of  the  Oiganon ;  the  division  of  Philosophy  into 
Logic,  Physics,  and  Ethics,  adopted  by  the  Stoics,  and 
sometimes  attributed  (on  questionable  grounds)  to  Plato, 
receives  no  sanction  from  the  Stagirite ;  indeed,  he  adopts 
a  classification  in  many  respects  at  variance  with  it,  dis- 
tinguishing theoretical  philosophy  from  practical  and  pro- 
ductive, and  dividing  the  first  into  three  branches,  Physics, 
Mathematics,  and  Theology.* 

Leaving,  then,  altogether  the  question  of  authority,  and 
adopting  the  formal  view  of  Logic  taken  in  the  preceding 
pages  as  the  only  one  which  promises  to  secure  for  the 
science  what  it  has  so  long  needed,  an  exact  definition  and 
a  determined  field  of  inquiry,  I  shall  proceed  to  examine 
the  relation  in  which  Logic,  as  thus  exhibited,  stands  to- 
wards the  cognate  sciences  of  Psychology,  Grammar,  and 
Metaphysics. 

Of  Psychology  something  has  already  been  said  in  the 
earlier  portion  of  the  present  Essay.  Logic  deals  with  the 
products  of  the  several  thinking  acts,  with  concepts,  with 
judgments,  with  reasonings,  as,  according  to  certain  as- 

1  Metaph.  T.  1.  Mr.  Karslakc  {Aids,  p.  10)  speaks  of  the  Organon  ai 
presentin;?  so  coherent  a  system,  that  the  assertion  that  it  contains  a  few 
only  of  Aristotle's  logical  works  is  doabtfal.  To  me  there  appears  little 
more  of  coherence  than  may  naturally  be  expected  in  distinct  writings  of 
the  same  author  on  any  question  of  Grammar,  Analytic,  Dialectic,  or 
Khetoric.  And,  as  far  as  we  can  conjecture  from  existing  evidence,  it  is 
most  probable  that  the  several  books  were  written  in  the  reverse  oi^der  of 
that  in  which  they  are  now  arranged.  See  Burgcrsdyck,  Inst.  Log.  Praef.; 
Fries,  Systaa  dor  Logik,  p.  15. 


Bumed  laws  of  thinking,  they  ought  to  be  or  not  to  be.^   It 
is  competent  to  test  the  validity  of  all  such  products  in  so 
far  as  they  comply  or  not  with  the  conditions  of  pure 
thought,  leaving  to  this  or  that  branch  of  material  science 
to  determine  how  far  the  same  products  of  thought  are 
guaranteed  by  the  testimony  of  this  or  that  special  experi- 
ence.   Thus  it  accepts,  as  logically  valid,  all  such  concepts, 
judgments,  and  reasonings,  as  do  not,  directly  or  indirectly, 
imply  contradictions ;   pronouncing  them  thus  far  to  be 
legitimate  as  thoughts,  that  they  do  not  in  ultimate  analy- 
sis  destroy  themselves.    That  they  will  be  also  accepted 
upon  an  appeal  to  experience,  it  does  not  decide ;  it  only 
recommends  them  as  qualified  for  further  examination.    It 
is  thus  competent  to  determine  the  possible  existence  of  a 
class  of  objects   corresponding  to  a  given   concept,  the 
necessary  truth  of  an  analytical,  and  \\iq  possible  truth  of  a 
synthetical  judgment,  the  formal  validity  of  a  conclusion 
as  necessarily  following  from  certain  assumed  premises. 
Questions  concerning  the  real  existence  of  this  or  that  class 
of  objects,  the  actual  truth  of  a  synthetical  judgment,  or 
of  a  conclusion  out  of  relation  to  its  given  premises,  it 
sends  up  for  judgment  to  the  tribunal  of  Experience. 

As  Experience  decides  on  the  relations  of  any  given  i 
product  of  thought  to  the  actual  phenomena  presented  by ' 
this  or  that  object  of  intuition,  so  Psychology  decides  on 
its  relations  to  the  actual  constitution  of  the  human  mind. 
Why  it  is  that  the  laws  of  pure  thinking  extend  thus  far 
and  no  further;  — what  are  the  mental  processes  prelim- 

»  "Die  ganze  reine  Logik  hat  es  mit  Verhaltnissen  des  Gedachten,  des  In- 
halts  unserer  Vorstellungen  (obglcich  nicht  speciell  mit  diesem  Inhalte 
selbst)  zu  thun;  aber  iiberall  nirgends  mit  der  Thdtiykeit  des  Denkens,  nir- 
gendfl  mit  der  psychologischen,  also  metaphysischen,  MogUchkeU  desscl- 
ben."—  Herbart,  Psychoiogie  ids  Wissenchafl.  Th.  U.  §  119. 


/ 


I 


238 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


I 


inary  and  subsidiary  to  thought,  and  the  nature  of  the 
thinking  act  itself  as  giving  rise  to  the  logical  products ; 
— whence  arises  the  phenomenon  of  illegitimate  thinking; 
—  the  nature  and  origin  of  various  impediments  and  errors 
to  which  thinking  and  other  mental  acts  are  subjected  in 
mankind  ;  —  the  relation  of  the  several  mental  acts  to  one 
or  more  faculties  of  mind,  and  the  value  of  such  distinction 
as  absolute  or  relative,  implying  a  notional  only,  or  an 
actual  separability ;  —  in  short,  all  inquiries  into  the  actual 
phenomena  of  man's  mental  constitution  and  their  expla- 
nation, form  the  object-matter  of  Psychology.^ 

From  this  it  appeal's  that  Psychology,  as  well  as  Phys- 
ical Science,  is,  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term,  empirical. 
It  inquires,  that  is  to  say,  what  are  the  actual  phenomena 
of  the  several  acts  and  states  of  the  human  mind,  and  the 
actual  laws  or  conditions  on  which  they  depend;  and  in 
this  sense  the  laws  of  thought  themselves  are  empirical, 
and  within  the  province  of  Psychology,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
a  matter  of  fact  and  experience  that  men  do  reason  accord- 
ing to  them.  Logic,  on  the  other  hand,  can  in  no  sense 
be  called  empirical,  inasmuch  as  the  actual  constitution, 
whether  of  the  world  within,  or  of  the  world  without,  is 
assumed  indeed  and  implied  in  its  researches,  but  in  no 
respect  described  or  investigated.  We  are  not  to  ascer- 
tain, as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  men  do  reason  in  this  or  that 
form,  as  governed  by  this  or  that  law ;  but,  on  the  assump- 
tion of  certain  laws,  we  are  to  determine  a  priori  the  forms 
which  legitimate  thinking  ought  to  exhibit,  w^hether  man- 
kind in  general  do  comply  with  them  or  not.'    Logic  is 

1  Much  of  this  is  distin (fished  by  Kant  as  Applied  Logic,  which  however 
he  allows  to  be  more  properly  referred  to  Psychology, 
s  Kant,  Logik,  Einleitang;  II.  4;  Drobisch,  Neue  Darstdlung  der  Logik, 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


239 


indeed  ultimately  to  be  referred  to  the  test  of  experience ; 
but  only  in  respect  of  its  conformity  with  facts  without 
its  province,  not  in  respect  of  the  coherence  of  its  parts 
within.     So  far  as  it  implies  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  men 
do  reason  in  syllogisms,  so  far  its  pretensions  maybe  tested, 
by  reference  to  the  empirical  truths  of  Psychology.     Soj 
far  as  it  asserts  that  the  legitimate  forms  of  the  syllogism 
are  such  and  such,  it  is  simply  deductive  a  priori,  and 
necessarily  valid  for  any  class  of  thinking  beinirs  whose! 
laws  are  such  as  it  presupposes.    An  empirical  science  may! 
contain  much  partial  truth,  though  omitting  many  impor- 
tant  phenomena   and   erroneously  accounting   for   many 
which  it  recognizes.    It  offera  much,  therefore,  for  enlarged 
experience  gradually  to  supply  and  correct.     An  a  priori' 
Science,  like  Logic,  is  tested  by  experience  only  with  refer- 
ence to  its  fundamental  hypotheses.    If  these  are  accepted, 
they  carry  with  them  the  whole  superstructure  of  details. 
If  these  are  rejected,  every  portion  of  the  science  falls  to 
the  ground  along  with  them. 

But  though  Logic  and  Psychology  have  thus  each  their 
respective  provinces  and  methods,  it  cannot  be  too  often 
repeated  that  neither  can  be  taught  as  a  science,  efficiently 
and  satisfactorily,  unless  in  connection  with  the  other.  We 
may  learn  by  rote  a  multitude  of  logical  rules,  and  fondly 
imagine  that  we  are  acquiring  an  art  which  will  enable  us 
to  think;  — a  course  of  Logic  being  in  fact  about  as  ne-' 
cessary  for  making  men  thinkers  as  a  course  of  Ethical 
Philosophy  for  making  them  honest,  9r  a  course  of  Optics 
for  enabling  them  to  see.  Or  we  may  analyze  iti  dhtione 
and  extra  dictionem  all  sorts  of  imaginary  fillacios  |)ro- 
pounded  by  imaginary  sophists,  and  dream  that  we  are 
forging  an  impenetrable  panoply  against  all  the  deceits 
of  the  world ;  —  as  if  we  could  bind  men  down  in  heavy 


I 


240 


PROLEGOMENA  LOUICA. 


\m 
III 


securities  to  lie  and  cheat  by  rule,  in  order  that  they  may 
be  detected  in  due  course  of  art.     Or  we  may  draw  up 
syllogisms  in  orthodox  mood  and  figure,  and  babble  about 
Laws  of  Thought,  and  never  dream  of  asking  what  is  the 
nature  of  Thought  as  a  process,  and  with  what  elements 
does  it  combine  in  the  actual  formation  of  this  or  that 
compound.     Or,  on  the  other  hand,  starting  from  confused 
or  erroneous  notions  of  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  hu- 
man mind,  we  may  blame  Logic  for  not  accomplishing  what 
no  science  can  accomplish,  and  deem  its  whole  contents  a 
tissue  of  jargon  and  imposture,  because  it  is  neither  able  to 
open  a  Royal  Road  to  the  Encyclopajdia,  nor  to  convert 
natural  folly  into  supernatural  wisdom.     It  may  safely  be 
asserted  that  nine-tenths  of  the  mistaken  judgments  to 
which  Logic  has  been  subjected  on  the  part  of  fiiends  and 
advei-saries,  unreasonable  eulogy  on  the  one  hand,  equally 
unreasonable  abuse  or  contempt  on  the  other,  have  been 
owing  to  its  treatment  out  of  relation  to  Psychology,  —  to 
its  having  been  expounded  and  studied  without  any  pre- 
liminary attempt  to  ascertain  what  are  the  nature  and 
limits  of  the  thinking  faculty,  and  what  character  its  laws 
and  products  ought  to  exhibit  in  conformity  with  the  con- 
stitution of  the  human  mind. 

With  Grammar  Logic  is  connected  through  the  medium 
of  the  universal  instrument  of  thought.  Language.  The 
practical  necessity  of  this  instrument  for  the  formation  as 
well  as  for  the  communication  of  thought,  has  been  noticed 
already ;  it  remains  to  inquire  in  what  different  ways  this 
their  common  object  is  dealt  with  by  Logic  and  Grammar 
respectively.  Universal  Grammar,  with  which  alone  we 
are  concerned  (the  history  and  idiomatic  peculiarities  of 
special  languages  being  obviously  unconnected  with  gen- 
eral Logic),  has  been  happily  defined  as  "  The  science  of  the 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


241 


relations  which  the  constituent  parts  of  speech  bear  to 
each  other  in  significant  combination."  ^  It  is  thus  con- 
cerned with  Language  primarily  and  essentially;  Logic, 
secondarily  and  accidentally.  The  former  has  given  certain 
articulate  sounds,  to  find  their  relation  to  certain  supposed 
counterparts  in  thought.  The  latter  has  given  to  deter- 
mine  the  necessary  relations  of  concepts  to  each  other; 
but  in  so  doing  it  is  compelled  secondarily  to  exhibit  the 
corresponding  relations  of  the  sounds  by  which  concepts 
are  represented. 

The  two  sciences  differ  also  in  the  extent  of  their  prov- 
inces.    Logic  considers  language  simply  as  the  instrument 
and  representative  of  thought.     Grammar  will  include  its 
relation  to  intuitions  and  emotions,  and  every  state  of  con- 
sciousness which  finds  its  expression  in  speech.*    Logic 
considers  language  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  indispensable  to 
thought,  and   accordingly  analyzes  speech  only  to  that 
point  at  which  it  is  representative  of  the  simplest  element 
of  thouglit,  the  concept.    Any  parts  into  which  a  concept 
may  be  divided,  which  are  not  themselves  concepts,  are 
beyond  its  province,  as  not  being  representative  of  a  com- 
plete thought,  nor  competent  instruments  alone  for  the 
performance  of  an  act  of  thinking.    Hence  all  syncate^ 
gorematic  words,  as  not  being  per  se  significant,  are  not 
recognized  by  Logic.  ^ 

In  Grammar  the  unit  of  thought  is  a  judgment,  both 
tenns  being  necessarily  represented  by  words.  Hence  the 
unit  of  speech  in  Grammar  is  a  proposition ;  the  oflice  of 
the  subordinate  parts  of  speech  being  to  limit  or  connect 

1  Sir  John  Stoddart,  Philosophy  of  Language,  pt.  I.  p.  21.  Universal 
Grammar  is  properly  a  science,  particular  Grammar  an  art,  as  is  observed 
by  Du  Marsais,  Encyclop€di€f  Art.  Grammaire,  p.  &12. 

*  See  Harris,  Hermes,  ch.  iii. 

21 


II 


If^^ 


'at: 


242 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


the  primary  parts  as  subjects  or  predicates  of  a  given 
assertion.^  Such  connections  and  limitations  may  be 
more  conveniently  effected  by  the  invention  of  words  ex- 
pressive of  relations  between  concepts,  than  by  the  use  of 
distinct  signs  for  every  new  concept  resulting  from  such 
relations ;  this,  however,  is  one  of  the  luxuries  only,  not 
one  of  the  necessaries  of  language,  and,  as  such,  is  not 
noticed  by  Logic.  Viewed  simply  as  an  element  of 
thought,  it  is  indifferent  whether  the  same  concept  bo 
expressed  by  a  combination  of  substantive  and  adjective, 
as  in  the  English  "four-footed  beast,"  or  the  German 
"  vierf  ussiges  Thier,"  by  the  interposition  of  a  preposition, 
as  in  the  French  "  bete  k  quatre  pieds,"  or  by  a  single  sub- 
stantive, such  as  the  classical  equivalent,  "quadruped." 

In  Logic  the  unit  of  thought  is  also  a  judgment,  but 
not  one  which  requires  a  verbal  representative  of  both  its 
constituent  parts.  Conception,  the  simplest  act  of  thought, 
consists  in  the  refemng  a  given  concept  to  possible  objects 
as  imagined.  Here  there  is,  in  the  psychological  sense 
of  the  term,  a  judgment;  i.  c,  a  consciousness  of  the  pres- 
ence of  the  objects  in  thought;  but  that  consciousness 
does  not  form  an  additional  concept,  nor  require  as  its 
necessary  exponent  a  second  verbal  sign.  Hence  the  unit 
of  speech  in  Logic  is  a  terra ;  such  being  a  sufficient  verbal 
instrument  for  the  performance  of  the  first  and  the  simplest 
act  of  thought. 

With  reference  to  the  second  operation  of  thought, 
judgment,  wherein  the  two  sciences  come  most  nearly  into 
contact,  the  following  distinction  is  important.  Grammar 
considei-s  words  objectively,  as  signs  of  things.      Hence 

1  For  a  further  illustration  of  this  doctrine,  not  universally  held  by  Gram- 
marians, the  reader  is  referred  to  an  article  by  the  present  author^  on  the 
Philosophy  of  Language,  in  the  North  British  Review,  No.  27. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


243 


the  distinction  of  tenses^  according  as  the  remote  or  repre- 
sented object  is  considered  as  contemporaneous  with,  or 
distant  in  time  from,  the  speaker.  Logic  considers  words 
subjectively,  as  signs  of  thoughts.  Hence  the  only  logical 
tense  is  the  present,  the  immediate  or  presented  objects 
being  necessarily  contemporaneous  with  the  act  of  con- 
sciousness by  which  they  are  now  thought  in  conjunction.^ 
It  is  sometimes  said  that  Logic  recognizes  two  only  of 
the  grammatical  parts  of  speech,  the  noun  and  the  verb, 
forming  the  two  terms  of  the  proposition  with  and  with- 
out time.*  It  would  be  more  correct  to  say  that  Logic, 
viewing  language  in  a  different  light  from  Grammar,  and 
analyzing  on  a  different  principle,  does  not  recognize 
the  grammatical  parts  of  speech  at  all.  The  simplest  ele- 
ments of  a  complete  assertion  in  Grammar  are  the  noun 
and  the  verb ;» the  latter  being  a  combination  of  attribute 
and  assertion.  Hence  the  grammatical  type  of  a  proposi- 
tion is  that  distinguished  in  scholastic  language  as  secundi 
a^acentis;  and  to  this  form  all  varieties  produced  by 

1  Sec  p.  71. 

«  "  Grammatici  enim,  considerantes  rocum  figuras,  octo  orationis  partes 
annumerant.  Phtlosophi  vero,  quorum  omnis  de  nomine  verl)oque  trac- 
tatus  in  significatione  est  constituta,  duas  tantum  orationis  partes  esse 
docucrunt:  quicquid  plenam  significationem  tenet,  siquidem  sine  tempore 
significat,  nomcn  vocantes;  verbum  vero,  si  cum  tempore."  —  Boethius, 
Int.  ad  Sj/U.  p.  561.  "  Et  sciendum  est  quod  Dialecticus  solum  ponit  duas 
partes  orationis,  scilicet  nomen  et  verbum.  Alias  autem  omnes  appellat 
sjTicatcgorematicas,  id  est  consignificativas."—  Petr.  Hisp.  SuttL  Log.  Tr.  i. 
Here,  as  in  the  De  Interpretatione  of  Aristotle,  the  type  of  the  logical  prop- 
osition is  the  form  distinguished  as  secundi  adjacentis,  the  verb  being 
neither  the  copula  alone,  nor  the  predicate  alone,  but  the  combination  of 
the  two,  however  expressed.  A  neglect  of  this  has  misled  many  commea- 
tators  and  critics  on  Aristotle,  from  Ammonius  to  the  present  day. 

*  "  In  all  languages  there  are  only  two  sorts  of  words  which  are  necessary 
for  the  communication  of  our  thoughts,  the  noun  and  the  verb."— Tooke, 
J>:v.  of  Furley,  ch.  3. 


244 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


IMA 


the  accidents  of  particular  languages  must,  in  Fnivereal 
Grammar,  be  virtually  reduced.*     In  Logic,  on  the  other 
hand,  for  the  purposes  of  opposition  and  conversion,  as 
well  as  from  the  necessity  of  assigning  a  quantity  to  both 
terms  of  the  proposition,  the  type  is  required  to  be  of  the 
form  term  adjacentis;  the  subject  and  predicate  being 
regarded  as  two  given  concepts,  the  objects  of  which  are 
identified  or  distinguished  by  means  of  the  copula.    Hence, 
in  every  case  in  which  the  proposition  is  exhibited  in  iu 
logical  form,  the  grammatical  verb  will  coiTcspond  not  to 
any  single  word  in  the  proposition,  but  to  a  combination 
formed  of  the  copula  and  the  quantified  predicate,  —  to 
all,  in  short,  that  is  asserted  of  the  subject.    The  predicate 
concept  may  thus,  in  different  points  of  view,  answer  to 
two  distinct  grammatical  relations.     Taken  by  itself,  it  is 
a  noun,  identified  in  certain  respects  with  another  noun  as  • 
the  subject.     Taken  in  its  predicate  character,  it  forms  a 
portion  of  the  verb,  the  remainder  being  supplied  by  the 
copula.    Those  logicians  who  maintain  the  copula  to  be 
the  logical  verb,  confound  the  accidents  of  particular  lan- 
guages with  the  essentials  of  language  in  general  as  a 
sign  of  thought.    With  them  the  verb  is  determined  solely 
by  the  subordinate  feature  of  its  personal  inflection,  not 
by  the  primary  characteristic  of  its  signification. 

With  regard  to  the  relation  of  Logic  to  Metaphysics, 
some  preliminary  verbal  explanation  is  necessary,  owing  to 

1  Hence  it  follows  that  the  copula  is,  piimmatically  speaking,  no  verb 
at  all.  It  fulfils  none  of  the  functions  of  that  part  of  speech ;  for  it  implies 
no  attribute,  and  cannot,  when  united  to  a  subject,  form  a  complete  asser- 
tion.  In  such  a  sentence  as  "  The  meadows  are  white  with  frost,"  the  true 
verb  is  not  the  copula,  but  the  copula  with  the  adjective,  are  white,  as  may 
>je  seen  by  substituting  the  Latin,  "  prata  canis  albicant  pruinis."  Whether 
this  can  be  expressed  in  one  word  or  not,  is  an  accident  of  this  or  that  Ian- 
guage,  and  is  Ixjyond  the  province  of  Universal  Grammar. 


PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA. 


245 


the  various  senses  in  which  the  latter  term  has  been  used. 
Among  modern  philosophei-s,  empirical  psychology,  which 
the  ancients  regarded  as  a  branch  of  physics,^  is  frequently 
classified   as   metaphysical.      Thus   the   contributions   of 
Reid  and  Stewart  to  the  inductive  science  of  the  human 
mind  are  not  unfrequently  spoken  of  as   Scotch   Meta- 
physics ;  a  nomenclature  which  the  latter  of  these  philoso- 
phers  has  in  some  degree  sanctioned  by  his  own  writings.* 
Such  a  classification  is,  however,  inconsistent  with  the  fun- 
damental  doctrines  of  the  Scottish  School.     It  has  been 
before  observed  that  one  of  their  leading  principles  is,  that, 
m  the  investigation  of  mind  as  well  as  of  matter,  phenom- 
ena  alone  are  the  legitimate  objects  of  science ;  the  sub- 
stance  and  essential  nature  of  both  being  beyond  the  reach 
of  human  faculties.     Whereas  Metaphysics  has  from  the 
earliest  days  been  distinguished  as  the  Science  of  Being  as 
Being,  in  opposition  to  all  inquiries  into  the  phenomena 
exhibited  by  this  or  that  class  of  objects.'    How  far  such 
a  problem  is  capable  of  solution  is  another  question ;  but 
the  mere  propounding  of  it  implies  an  object  totally  dis- 
tinct from  that  of  an  inquiry  into  the  faculties  and  laws 
of  the  human  mind. 

The  object  of  the  older  Metaphysics  has  been  distin- 

'  See  Hamilton  on  Reid,  p.  216. 

«For  instance:  "  Nothinfir  contributes  so  much  to  form  this  talent  as 
the  study  of  Metaphysics;  not  the  absurd  Metaphysics  of  the  Schools 
but  that  study  which  has  the  operations  of  the  mind  for  its  object  ''-Ek 
vients,  vol.  i.  ch.  2.  In  other  places  Stewart  has  noticed  this  phraseology 
as  a  loose  use  of  language,  and  has  attempted  to  account  for  it.  But  the 
term  ought  never  to  have  been  used  at  all. 

^Arist  Metaph,  iii.  1.    "E^.y  i^,„^^^^  ^„  ^  ^^^^^.  ^^  ^^  .  ^^  ^^  ^^ 
Toury  {nrdpxoyra  ,c«^'  abr6.    The  name  Metaphysics  is  of  much  later 
date,  but  Its  object  has  always  been  regarded  as  identical  with  that 
distinguished  by  Aristotle  as  First  Philosophy,  or  Theology,     Cf.  Wolf 
OtUoloyiay  ^  I.  * 

21* 


4: 


246 


PKOLECjIOMENA   L0(J1CA. 


f\ 
i  m 


Hid 


guished  in  all  ages  as  the  one  and  the  real,  in  opposition 
to  the  many  and  the  apparent.^  Matter,  for  example,  as 
perceived  by  the  senses,  is  a  combination  of  distinct  and 
heterogeneous  qualities,  discernible,  some  by  sight,  some 
by  smell,  some  by  touch,  some  by  hearing.  What  is  the 
thinr/  Itself,  the  subject  and  owner  of  these  several  qual- 
ities, and  yet  not  identical  with  any  one  of  them  ?  What 
is  it  by  virtue  of  wh  ch  these  several  attributes  constitute 
or  belong  to  one  and  the  same  thing?  Mind,  in  like  man- 
ner, presents  to  consciousness  so  many  distinct  states  and 
operations  and  feelings.  What  is  the  nature  of  that  one 
mind,  of  which  all  these  are  so  many  modifications?  The 
inquiry  may  be  carried  higher  still.  Can  we  attain  to  any 
single  conception  of  Being  in  general,  to  which  both  Mind 
and  Matter  are  subordinate,  and  from  which  the  essence 
of  each  may  be  deduced  ?* 

Ontology,  or  Metaphysics  proper,  as  thus  explained, 
may  be  treated  in  two  different  methods,  according  as  its 
exponent  is  a  believer  in  to  6v  or  in  ra  ovra,  in  one  or  in 
many  fundamental  principles  of  things.  In  the  former,  all 
objects  whatever  are  regarded  as  phenomenal  modifica- 
tions of  one  and  the  same  Substance,  or  as  self-determined 
effects  of  one  and  the  same  Cause.  The  necessary  result 
of  this  method  is  to  reduce  all  metaphysical  philosophy 
to  a  Rational  Theology,  the  one  Substance  or  Cause 
being  identified  with  the  Absolute,  or  the  Deity.  Accord- 
ing to  the  latter  method,  which  professes  to  treat  of  dif- 
ferent classes  of  Beings  independently,  Metaphysics  will 
contain  three  coordinate  branches  of  inquiry;  Rational 
Cosmology,  Rational  Psychology,  and  Rational  Theology.' 

1  Arist.  Metaph.  iii.  2. 

»  Wolf,  Phil.  Bal.  Disc.  Prcd.  k  73;  Herbait,  Allgemeine  Metaphysik,  \  27. 
'  Herbart,  Lehrbuch  zur  Philosophie,  ^  7;   AUyenmne  Metaphysik,  \  31. 
Anm. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOOICA. 


247 


The  first  aims  at  a  knowledge  of  the  real  essence,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  phenomena,  of  the  material  worid ; 
the  second  discusses  the  nature  and  origin,  as  distinguished 
from  the  faculties  and  affections,  of  the  human  soul,  and 
of  other  finite  spirits;*  the  third  aspires  to  comprehend 
God  Himself,  as  cognizable  a  prion  in  his  essential  nature, 
apart  from  the  indirect  and  relative  indications  furnished 
by  his  works,  as  in  Natural  Theology,  or  by  his  word,  as 
in  Revealed  Religion.  These  three  objects  of  metaphysi- 
cal inquiry  —  God,  the  Worid,  the  Mind  —  correspond  to 
Kant's  three  Ideas  of  the  Pure  Reason ;  and  the  object 
of  his  Critique  is  to  show  that,  in  relation  to  all  three, 
the  attainment  of  a  system  of  speculative  philosophy  is 
impossible. 

The  former  of  these  methods  is  the  bolder  and  the  more 
consequent;  and,  moreover,  the  only  one  which  can  be 
consistently  followed  by  those  who  believe  in  the  possi- 
bility of  a  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  For,  a  plurality 
of  real  objects  being  once  admitted  as  the  highest  reach 
attainable  by  human  faculties,  these  must  necessarily  be 
regarded  as  related  to,  and  limited  by,  each  other.  Ac- 
cordingly, this  method  has  been  followed  by  the  hardiest 
and  most  consistent  reasoners  on  metaphysical  questions ; 
by  Spinoza,  under  the  older  form  of  Speculation,  and  by 
Hegel,  after  the  Kantian  revolution.  But  thus  treated, 
metaphysiciil  speculation  necessarily  leads  to  Pantheism ; 

1  "  Man  findet  hier  die  Trennung  der  empirischen  von  der  rationalen 
Psycholojne;  die  erstc  durchlauft  die  einzelnen  son^enannten  Seelenvermo- 
gen ;  die  andre  spricht  uber  Natar  and  Ureprung  der  Seele,  iiber  Unster- 
blichkelt,  Zustand  nach  dem  Tode*  Unterschied  zwischen  den  Seelen  der 
Mcnschen,  der  Tliiere,  und  den  hohercn  Geistern."— Herbart,  AUgemeine 
Metaphysik,  §  29.  For  a  curious  account  of  theories  and  theorists  in 
rational  pt^ychologj,  see  Burton,  Anatomy  of  Melancholy,  P.  i.  sect.  i. 
Mem.  2,  Subs.  9. 


\\ 


248 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


and  Pantheism,  at  this  elevation,  is  for  all  religions  pur- 
poses equivalent  to  Atheism.^  The  method  is  thus  con- 
demned by  its  results ;  and  the  condemnation  will  not  be 
retracted  upon  a  psychological  examination  of  its  princi- 
ples. Its  fundamental  conception  is  not  thought,  but  its 
negation.  The  Thought  which  is  identified  with  Being  in 
general,  is  not  my  thought,  nor  any  form  of  consciousness 
which  I  can  personally  realize.^  My  whole  consciousness 
is  subject  to  the  conditions  of  limitation  and  relation  of 
subject  and  object.  A  system  which  commences  by  deny- 
ing this  relation,  starts  with  an  assumption  concerning  the 
possible  character  of  an  intelligence  other  than  human,  and 
consequently  incapable  of  verification  by  any  human  being. 
Yet  the  system  is  the  product  of  a  human  thinker,  and 
addressed  to  human  disciples. 

The  second  method  of  metaphysical  inquiry  is  less  pre- 
sumptuous, though  perhaps  also  less  consistent.  It  starts 
with  the  assumption  of  a  plurality  of  Beings,  thus  virtu- 
ally abandoning  the  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  This 
plurality  is  primarily  manifest  in  the  contrast  between  the 
Subject  and  the  Object  of  Consciousness,  between  self  and 


! 


i 


^  It  has  of  late  been  a  favorite  criticism  of  Spinoza  to  sny,  with  Hejjel, 
that  his  system  is  not  Atheism,  bat  Acosmism;  and  this  is  true  in  a  spccu> 
lative  point  of  view.  But  if  I  allow  of  no  God  distinct  from  the  a^<^p;ato 
of  the  Universe,  myself  included,  what  object  have  I  of  worship?  Or  if, 
according  to  the  later  manifestation  of  Pantheism,  the  Divine  Mind  is  but 
the  sum  total  of  every  finite  consciousness,  my  own  included,  what  rell- 
pous  relation  between  God  and  man  is  compatible  with  the  theory  ?  And, 
accordingly,  the  Pantheism  of  Ile^l  has  found  its  natural  development  in 
the  Atheism  of  Feuerbach. 

*  This  is  expressly  stated  by  an  eminent  disciple  of  Hep;el,  who  professes 
to  discover  in  Aristotle's  Metaphysics  an  anticipation  of  He^elianism: 
*'  La  pense'e  que  nous  venons  de  de'crire  est  la  pensee  absolue.  II  ne  s'ajjit 
pas  ici  de  la  pensee  subjective,  qui  est  une  fonction  psychologique  restreinte 
a  Tame  humaine." — Michelct,  Examen  deUx  Mtflaphpsique  d'AristUe^it.  276. 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


249 


not-self,  as  related  to  and  limiting  each  other.    But  the 
consciousness  of  the  relative  and  limited  suggests  by  con- 
trast  the  idea  of  the  absolute  and  unlimited ;   and  thus 
gives  nse  to  three  distinct  branches  of  metaphysical  spec- 
ulation: the  ego  being  identified  with  the  substance  of  the 
human  soul,  as  distinguished  from  its  phenomenal  modes; 
the  non-ego  being  identified  with  the  reality  which  under- 
lies the  phenomena  of  the  sensible  world ;  and  the  absolute 
or  unconditioned  with  the  Deity.^    Of  the  last  of  these 
three  branches,  that  commonly  known  as  Rational  Theol- 
ogy, which  endeavors  from  the  conception  of  God  as  an 
absolutely  perfect  Being  to  deduce  the  necessary  attributes 
of  the  Divine  Nature,  I  shall  say  nothing  in  this  place. 
The  question  of  the  relation  of  the  human  mind  to  reli- 
gious  intuitions  is  one  of  the  most  delicate  and  the  most 
diflScult  in  Psychology,  and  to  treat  it  adequately  would 
require  a  separate  volume.    On  the  two  latter  branches  of 
Metaphysics,  which  Kant  regarded  as  equally  unattainable 
with  the  first,  something  has  been  said  in  a  former  chapter. 
It  was  the  opinion  of  Kant,  as  well  as  of  Reid  and  Stewart, 
that  the  subject  of  mental  as  well  as  of  bodily  attributes  is 
not  an  immediate  object  of  consciousness;  in  other  words, 
that  in  mind,  as  well  as   in  body.  Substance  and  Unity 
are  not  presented,  but  represented.    Those  who  accept  this 
doctrine  are  only  consistent  in  fegarding  metaphysical  in- 
quiry in  all  its  branches  as  a  delusion.    But  a  philosophical 
examination  is  incomplete  unless  it  not  only  points  out 
the  truth,  but  likewise  explains  the  cause  of  error.     The 
weak  point  of  the    above   doctrine  is,  that  it  fails    in 


These  three  branches  of  Metaphysics  have  been  considered  somewhat 
more  in  detail,  by  the  present  author,  in  the  Article  Metaphifsics,  in  the 
eighth  edition  of  the  Enrp^loptedia  Britannica,  vol.  xiv.  pp.  C04  sqq.,  615  sqq 


250 


FBOLEGOMENA   XJOQICA. 


m  i 


explaining,  on  psychological  grounds,  how  the  supposed 
delusion  onginated.  Experience  furnishes,  if  not  the 
cause,  at  least  the  occasion  of  every  object  of  our  cogni- 
tion ;  and,  unless  upon  the  supposition  that  a  knowledge 
of  Unity  and  Substance  is  immediately  ffioen  in  one  phase 
at  least  of  consciousness,  it  is  impossible  to  account  for  its 
invention  in  any.  The  multifarious  phenomena  of  in- 
ternal as  well  as  of  external  sense,  present,  on  the  opposite 
hypothesis,  nothing  in  any  respect  analogous  to  the  sub- 
stance to  which  they  are  attributed,  —  nothing  that  can 
operate  in  any  way  even  as  the  occasional  cause  from 
which  the  existence  of  such  a  substance  could  be  suggested. 
Metaphysical  philosophy  may  contain  much  that  is  ground- 
less, much  that  is  deceptive ;  but  the  whole  analogy  of 
deception  and  hypothesis  in  other  branches  of  speculation 
leads  to  the  conviction  that  it  can  only  arise  from  rashly 
transfeiTing  to  new  relations  ideas  which  are  given  in  some 
relation  or  other. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  considering  the  whole  of  Meta- 
physics to  be  based  on  a  delusion,  and  its  ultimate  destiny 
to  be  utter  extinction,  we  shall  probably  come  nearer  to 
the  truth  if  we  regard  its  unsound  portions  as  based  on  a 
perverted  intuition,  and  anticipate  that  it  will  be  finally 
absorbed  in  that  science  to  which  the  intuition  in  its  orig- 
inal relation  properly  belongs.  If,  for  example,  it  should 
ultimately  be  made  manifest  that  to  the  material  world  we 
have  no  relation  except  through  the  various  phenomena 
of  sense,  but  that  in  the  mental  world  SelfJ  as  well  as  the 
phenomena  of  self,  is  an  immediate  presentation  of  con- 
sciousness, it  will  follow  that  in  the  former  we  have  no 
ground  for  maintaining  the  existence  of  things  other  than 
the  phenomena  presented ;  and  that  consequently,  in  this 
department,  Ontology,  as  distinct  fi'ora  Phenomenology, 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


251 


is  occupied  solely  with  chimeras  of  our  own  invention  : 
whereas.  Psychology,  being  called  upon  to  extend  its 
inquiries  from  the  phenomena  of  self  to  that  of  which 
they  are  phenomena,  will  legitimately  include  the  remain- 
ing  portion  of  those  problems  which  have  hitherto  been 
appropriated  to  Metaphysics. 

But  this  question  cannot  be  discussed  here.    My  present 
concern  is  only  with  the  relation  supposed  to  exist  between 
Metaphysics,  as  above  described,  and  Logic.    In  the  eariier 
form  of  Metaphysics,  which  prevailed  from  Aristotle  to 
Kant,  an  intimate  connection  was  supposed  to  exist  be- 
tween the  two  sciences.     The  Principles  of  Contradiction 
and  Excluded  Middle,  which  have  been  exhibited  in  a 
former  chapter  as  Laws  of  Thought,  are  found  in  the  met- 
aphysical as  well  as  in  the  logical  writings  of  Aristotle  ;i 
and  the  former,  together  with  that  of  Sufficient  Reason,  is 
placed  by  Wolf,  the  immediate  predecessor  of  Kant,  at  the 
head  of  Ontology .2    But,  after  the  Kantian  Critique,  this 
association  was  no  longer  possible.     Kant  showed  cleariy 
that,  without  synthetical  judgments  a  priori,  Metaphysical 
science  is  impossible ;  and  this  at  once  put  an  end  to  all 
attempts  which  had  hitherto  been  made  to  elicit  a  science 
of  Being  from  the  laws  of  formal  thinking,  which  are  the 
foundation  of  Logic.    The  two  sciences,  thus  divorced,  be- 
come apparently  united  again  in  the  system  of  Hegel ;  but 
the  union  is  apparent  only.    For  the  Hegelian  Logic  is 

I  For  the  principle  of  Contradiction  8ee  Arist.  Metaph.  iii.  3.  x.  5;  AnaJ. 
Pr.  ii.  2;  Anal.  Post.  i.  11.  For  that  of  Excluded  Middle,  see  Metaph.  iil. 
7,  ix.  4;  AnaL  Pr.  i.  1;  Anal.  Post.  i.  2,  ii.  13.  They  may  also  be  traced 
to  Plato.  See  Phcedo,  p.  103;  Bepublic,  iv.  p.  436;  Sophist,  pp.  250,  252. 
They  are  given  more  explicitly  in  the  Second  Alcihiades,  p.  139;  but  this 
dialogue  is  generally  considered  spurious. 

«  Cf.  Wolf,  Ontologia,  ^§  27, 29, 56, 71,  498. 


252 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


|l«*l 


based,  not  ou  an  acknowledgment,  but  on  a  defiance  of 
the  Laws  of  Tliought.  It  is  a  Logic  of  the  Reason,  of 
which  the  fundamental  position  is,  that  the  Laws  of  the 
Understanding  are  applicable  to  finite  objects  only,  and 
that  Thought  in  relation  to  the  infinite  is  free  from  their 
dominion.  Logic  thus  returns,  as  regards  its  object,  not  to 
the  Aristotelian  Analytic,  but  to  the  Platonic  Dialectic,  as  a 
science  of  the  Ileal  and  the  Absolute ;  though  the  method 
pursued  is  opposed  to  Plato  as  much  as  to  Aristotle.*  On 
the  other  hand,  in  proportion  as  we  adhere  more  closely  to 
the  formal  view  of  Logic,  the  separation  of  that  science 
from  Metaphysics  becomes  more  complete.  An  eminent 
advocate  of  that  view,  who  is  far  from  adopting  Kant's 
opinion  of  the  impossibility  of  Metaphysics,  expresses  his 
conviction  of  the  very  different  objects  and  methods  of 
the  two  sciences,  by  likening  the  union  of  Metaphysics  and 
Logic  to  a  lecture  on  the  Integral  Calculus  and  the  Rule 
of  Three.^  And  there  is  much  truth  implied  in  this  some- 
what overstrained  comparison.  With  formal  Logic,  Meta- 
physics stands  rather  in  opposition  than  in  connection. 
The  former  is  the  science  of  the  ultimate  laws  of  the 
thinking  subject ;  the  latter,  of  the  ultimate  realities  of 
the  objects  about  which  we  think. 

Metaphysical  inquiry,  if  capable  of  a  successful  prose- 
cution, may  furnish  a  criticism  or  explanation  of  certain 
forms  of  thought  assumed  by  Logic ;  for  a  form  of  thought 
implies  a  certain  relation  between  given  objects,  —  a  re- 
lation which  might  be  further  elucidated  if  the  nature  of 
objects  in  general  could  be  satisfactorily  determined.  Thus 
we  have  seen  that  the  form  of  logical  judgments  and  rea- 

* 

1  On  the  contrast  between  the  methods  of  Plato  and  Hegel,  see  Trendel- 
enbarg,  Logische  Untentuchungen,  i.  p.  SO. 
'  Herbart,  Lehrbuch  zur  Philosophies  Vorrede  zur  zwdten  Ausgaht, 


PROLEGOMENA   LOGICA. 


253 


sonings  contains  by  implication  those  negative  notions  of 
substance  and  cause,  the  investigation  of  which  is  the 
special  object  of  metaphysical  inquiries.  The  science  of 
Metaphysics,  therefore,  if  it  could  be  constructed  on  a  solid 
basis,  would  furnish  a  criticism  of  those  principles  which 
are  tacitly  acknowledged  in  every  mental  process.  But, 
for  the  purposes  of  formal  Logic,  such  a  criticism  is  not 
needed.  It  is  sufficient  for  that  science  to  accept  the  prin- 
ciples in  the  obscure  form  in  which  they  are  acknowledged 
by  common  thought  and  common  language ;  especially  as, 
being  indiflferently  implied  in  sound  and  unsound  thinking, 
they  furaish  no  criterion  by  which  we  can  distinguish  the 
one  from  the  other. 

This  view  is  confirmed  by  the  history  of  philosophy 
down  to  the  present  time.     While  Logic,  from  the  days 
of  Aristotle,  has  been  in  possession  of  a  scientific  method 
and  a  definite  contents,  whose  truth,  whatever  opinion  may 
be  entertained  of  their  utility,  no  critic  has  succeeded  in 
impugning;  Metaphysics  has,  from  the  same  period,  been 
equally  conspicuous  as  the  changing  Proteus  of  philosophy, 
whose  concealed  wisdom,  sought  after  by  ceaseless  efforts 
of  strength  and  countless  varieties  of  artifice,  has  invaria- 
bly eluded  the  inquiries  of  his  worshippers.    The  union 
of  the  two,  so  far  from  contributing  to  the  scientific  com- 
pleteness of  the  former,  has  only  served  to  mar  its  beauty 
and  simplicity  by  extralogical  details,  and  to  misrepresent 
its  true  purpose  and  value  by  obscure  intimations  of  deeper 
mysteries  lying  hid  beneath  its  apparent  surface.     On  the 
other  hand,  in  proportion  as  the  true  character  of  Logic 
as  a  science  has  become  better  known  and  appreciated,  it 
has  gradually  been  separated  from  Metaphysics,  and  been 
associated  with  Psychology.    As  the  science  of  the  laws  of 
thought,  it  is  absurd  to  expect  that  its  object  and  character 

22 


Wi 


V 


mj$ 


254 


PROLEGOMENA   LOOICA. 


can  be  rightly  estimated  by  those  who  are  unacquainted 
with  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  understanding  itself  — 
with  its  relation  to  the  cognate  faculties  and  operations  of 
the  human  mind,  —  with  its  legitimate  province  and  duties. 
It  is  only  in  this  connection  that  we  can  hope  to  see  Logic 
finally  freed  from  the  unsightly  excrescences  with  which 
it  has  hitherto  been  deformed,  yet  still  retaining  a  clearly 
defined  portion  of  valuable  scientific  truth,  and  cultivated 
in  a  spirit  of  enlightened  appreciation  and  criticism,  equally 
removed  from  the  blind  veneration  of  the  idolater  and  the 
blind  hostility  of  the  iconoclast.  It  is  only  in  this  connec- 
tion that  the  boundaries  of  the  two  sciences  can  be  clearly 
marked  out,  and  those  portions  of  psychological  matter 
and  phraseology  whose  random  introduction  has  contrib- 
uted so  much  to  deface  and  obscure  the  pages  of  logical 
treatises,  can  become  of  inestimable  value  as  part  and 
parcel  of  a  cognate  and  complementary,  but  by  no  means 
identical  study.  And  if,  in  this  association,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  abase  considerably  the  once  towering  ambi- 
tion of  the  Art  of  Arts  and  Science  of  Sciences,  the  loss  is 
more  than  compensated  by  the  substitution  of  a  humbler 
indeed,  but  more  attainable  and  more  serviceable  aim,  — 
the  knowledge  of  the  distinct  provinces  to  be  assigned  to 
Thought  and  Experience  respectively,  of  the  true  value  of 
each  within  its  province,  and  its  worse  than  uselessness 
beyond;  —  the  knowledge  of  ourselves  and  our  faculties, 
of  our  true  intellectual  wealth,  the  nature  of  its  tenure, 
and  the  conditions  of  its  lawful  increase.  By  such  culti- 
vation alone  can  we  hope  to  see  Logic  finally  exhibited  in 
its  true  character,  and  estimated  at  its  true  value ;  neither 
encumbered  with  fictitious  wealth  by  a  spurious  utilitari- 
anism, nor  unprofitably  buried  in  the  earth  of  an  isolated 
and  barren  formalism. 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX. 


Note  A,  p.  84. 


It  is  much  to  be  rej^retted  that  Dr.  Whcwcll,  who  has  made  good  use 
of  Kantian  principles  in  many  parts  of  his  "  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive 
Sciences/*  has  not  more  accurately  observed  Kant's  distinction  between 
the  necessary  laws  under  which  all  men  think,  and  the  continf^ent  laws 
under  which  certain  men  think  of  certain  things.  His  neglect  of  this 
distinction  has  given  a  seeming  advantage  to  the  empirical  arguments 
of  his  antagonist,  Mr.  Mill,  who  is  thus  enabled  apparently  to  decide  the 
question  at  issue  by  what  is  in  reality  no  more  than  an  argumentum  ad 
hominem.  Thus  Dr.  Whewell  says,  of  certain  discoveries  of  physical  laws, 
"  So  complete  has  been  the  victory  of  truth  in  most  of  these  instances, 
that  at  present  we  can  hardly  imagine  the  struggle  to  have  been  necessary. 
The  very  essence  of  these  triumphs  is  that  they  lead  us  to  regard  the  views 
we  reject  as  not  only  false,  but  inconceivable."  In  this  relation,  it  is  obvi- 
ous that  the  inconceivability  is,  with  reference  to  the  human  mind,  merely 
contingent,  and  relative  to  the  particular  studies  of  particular  men.  Before 
the  days  of  Copernicus,  men  could  not  conceive  the  apparent  motion  of 
the  sun  on  the  heliocentric  hypothesis :  the  progress  of  science  has  re- 
Yersed  the  difficulty;  but  the  progress  of  science  itself  is  contingent  on 
the  will  of  ceruin  men  to  apply  themselves  to  it.  By  thus  endeavoring 
to  exalt  inductive  laws  of  matter  into  a  priori  laws  of  mind,  Dr.  Whewell 
has  unintentionally  contributed  to  give  an  undue  plausibility  to  the  oppo- 
site theory,  which  reduces  all  laws  of  mind  into  the  mere  associations  of 
this  or  that  material  experience. 

But,  on  psychological  grounds,  it  would  seem  as  if  the  point  of  separa- 
tion between  a  priori  principles  and  empirical  generalizations  ought  not  to 
be  very  difficult  of  determination.  The  difference  is  not  one  of  degree,  but 
of  kind ;  and  the  separation  between  the  two  classes  of  truths  is  such  that 
no  conceivable  progress  of  science  can  ever  convert  the  one  into  the  other. 

22* 


258 


APPENDIX. 


That  which  is  inconceivable,  not  accidentally  from  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances of  certain  men,  but  universally  to  all,  must  be  so  in  consequence 
of  an  orij^inal  law  of  the  human  mind ;  that  which  is  universally  true 
within  the  field  of  experience  indicates  an  original  law  of  the  material 
world.  No  transformation  of  the  one  into  the  other  is  possible,  unless  the 
progress  of  science  can  change  mind  to  matter  or  matter  to  mind.  It  is 
therefore  incumbent  on  the  philosopher  who  would  extend  mathematical 
certainty  to  the  domain  of  physical  science,  to  confirm,  in  every  instance, 
bis  theory  by  a  psychological  deduction  of  his  principles,  as  Kant  has 
done  in  the  instances  of  Space  and  Time. 

Dr.  Whewell  lays  much  stress  on  clearness  and  distinctness  of  conceptions 
as  the  basis  of  the  axiomatic  truths  of  physical  science.  But  the  clear- 
ness or  distinctness  of  any  conception  can  only  enable  us  more  accurately 
to  unfold  the  virtual  contents  of  the  concept  itself;  it  cannot  enable  us  to 
add  o  priori  any  new  attribute.  In  other  words,  the  increased  clearness 
and  distinctness  of  a  conception  may  enable  us  to  multiply  to  any  extent 
our  analytical  judgments,  but  cannot  add  a  single  synthetical  one. 
Without  something  more  than  this,  the  philosopher  has  failed  to  meet  the 
touchstone  of  the  Kantian  question :  How  are  synthetical  judgments  a  priori 
possible  f 

The  spirit  of  Dr.  Whewell's  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive  Sciences  is 
beyond  all  praise.  In  these  days  of  Positivism  and  Empiricism  it  is  re- 
freshing to  find  a  writer  of  such  vast  attainments  in  the  details  of  physical 
science  comprising  them  under  such  truly  philosophical  principles.  But 
it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  accuracy  of  his  theory  has  been  in  some 
instances  vitiated  by  a  stumble  on  the  threshold  of  the  Critical  Philosophy. 
The  distinction  laid  down  by  Kant  between  the  synthetical,  or,  properly, 
geometrical,  and  the  analytical  or  general  axioms,  seems  to  have  been 
altogether  overlooked.  Thus,  almost  at  the  outset  of  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Inductive  Sciences,  the  analytical  judgment,  "  If  equals  are  added  to 
equals,  the  wholes  are  equal,"  is  given  as  a  condition  of  the  intuition  of 
magnitudes;  ^  and  the  same  oversight  runs  through  the  Essay  on  Math- 
ematical Reasoning,  in  which  he  speaks  of  "  self-evident  principles,  not 
derived  in  any  immediate  manner  from  experiment,  but  involved  in  the 
very  nature  of  the  conceptions  which  we  must  possess,  in  order  to  reason 
upon  such  subjects  at  all."  The  very  nature  of  the  conceptions,  however 
clearly  apprehended,  can  give  rise  only  to  analytical  judgments. 

And  such,  I  think,  may  be  shown  to  be  the  character  of  all  the  mechan- 
ical axioms  derived  from  the  idea  of  Force.  Of  force,  apart  from  the 
cooscious  exertion  of  will,  we  have  no  positive  conception  per  sej  we  know 

1  Book  ii.  ch.  Ix. 


APPENDIX. 


259 


it  only  by  its  effects.  Of  equal  forces  we  have  no  positive  conception 
beyond  that  of  the  protluction  of  equal  eflTects.  To  assert,  therefore,  that 
equal  forces  will  balance  each  other  at  the  two  extremities  of  a  lever,  is  to 
assert  no  more  than  that  effects  universally  equal  will  be  equal  in  any  par- 
ticular case.^ 

But  to  establish  Mechanics  as  an  a  priori  science  upon  the  idea  of  force, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  commence  with  some  axioms  at  least  of  a  syntheti- 
cal character,  analogous  to  the  geometrical  principles,  "  Two  straight  lines 
cannot  enclose  a  space;"  or,  "  If  a  straight  line  meets  two  straight  lines,  so 
as  to  make  the  two  interior  angles  on  the  same  side  together  less  than  two 
right  angles,  the  two  straight  lines  will  meet  if  produced." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  do  not  think  that  Dr.  Whewell  has  hitherto  suc- 
ceeded in  establishing,  in  the  science  of  Mechanics,  a  system  of  a  priori 
synthetical  truths  derived  from  the  idea  of  force  as  distinct  from  those 
which  are  mere  applications  of  the  mathematical  intuitions  of  time  or 
space.  But  as  regards  mere  hypothetical  mechanics,  such  a  system  is  not 
inconceivable.    A  more  exact  psychological  analysis  of  the  intuitive  fac- 


1  We  must  distinguish  between  the  general  theoretical  statement  of  this  axiom 
and  its  practical  application  to  any  given  object.  In  Geometry,  the  axiom,  "  If 
equals  are  added  to  eqnals  the  wholes  are  equal,"  is  a  mere  analytical  judgment 
derived  from  the  principle  of  Identity ;  but  to  ascertain  whether  two  given  mag- 
nitudes are  equal,  is  a  question  of  experiment  or  observation.  So  in  Mechanics, 
the  axiom  that  bodies  acting  with  equal  forces  to  turn  a  lever  in  opposite  direc- 
tions will  retain  it  in  equilibrium,  is  analytical;  and  as  thus  stated,  it  is  unneces- 
sary to  add  either  that  the  directions  of  both  forces  must  be  perpendicular,  or 
the  arms  of  the  lever  equal.  But  in  any  special  application  of  the  axiom  there 
arises  at  once  the  question,  How  can  we  ascertain  that  any  two  given  forces  are 
equal  as  forces  acting  upon  the  lever?  If  the  force,  for  example,  be  gravity,  and 
two  equal  weights  be  suspended,  one  perpendicularly,  the  other  obliquely,  the 
whole  weight  of  the  latter  does  not  act  to  turn  the  lever  in  opposition  to  the 
former,  and  the  hypothesis  of  the  axiom  is  violated ;  the  forces  not  being  in 
that  relation  equal.  Or  if  both  are  suspended  perpendicularly,  but  at  unequal 
distances  from  the  fulcrum,  the  moments,  or  forces  in  relation  to  the  lever,  are 
not  equal.  The  axiom,  as  stated  by  Dr.  Whewell,  "  If  two  equal  forces  act  per- 
pendicularly  at  the  extremities  of  equal  arms  of  a  straight  line,"  has  the  appear- 
ance of  a  synthetical  judgment,  by  comprehending  under  one  formula  the  mere 
analysis  of  the  notion  of  equal  forces,  and  the  empirical  determination  of  equal- 
ity in  any  particular  instance.  If  by  equal  forces  is  meant  forces  equal  in  effect 
on  the  lever,  the  axiom,  as  stated  by  Dr.  Whewell,  is  tautological ;  if  the  mean- 
ing is,  forces  equal  in  their  effects  in  some  other  situation^  the  axiom  is  empirical 
only,  and  not  even  universally  true.  But,  except  by  its  effect  in  some  situation 
or  other ^  what  test  have  we  of  the  magnitude  of  a  force? 


260 


APPENDIX. 


ulties  may  possibly  establish  the  existence  of  other  sabjcctivo  conditions 
of  intuition  besides  those  of  space  and  time,  and,  consequently,  of  other 
synthetical  jud«;ment3  a  priori  besides  those  of  Geometry  and  Arithmo- 
tic.i     But  when  the  same  theory  comes  to  be  applied,  not  to  hypothetical 
rigid  bodies  without  weight,  but  to  the  actual  phenomena  of  natural 
agents,  as  in  the  "  Demonstration  that  all  matter  is  heavy,"  and,  verbally 
at  least,  in  speaking  of  the  incoixceivability  of  the  prc-Copernican  astron- 
omy, we  see  at  once  that  the  boundary  is  overleaped  which  separates  the 
necessary  laws  of  thought  from  the  generalized  phenomena  of  matter. 
This  absolute  boundary  is  sufficiently  marked.    No  matter  of  fact  can,  in 
any  possible  state  of  human  knowledge,  he  a  matter  of  demonstration.^     Nay, 
even  supposing  such  a  demonstration  possible,  it  would  not  add  one  tittle 
to  the  evidence  of  the  fact,  as  such,  in  the  eyes  of  any  one  but  an  egoist. 
By  him  it  would  be  accepted  as  an  additional  proof  that  what  are  com- 
monly considered  as  phenomena  of  the  non-ego,  are  really  only  modifica- 
tions of  the  percipient  mind,  and  governed  solely  by  mental  hiws.    But  to 
the  Realist  it  would  at  most  only  suggest  the  possibility  of  a  preestablished 
harmony  between  the  laws  of  mind  and  matter,  —  a  suggestion  which 
would  require,  in  every  special  case,  to  be  verified  by  the  empirical  exam- 
ination of  the  latter.    Mental  laws,  which  alone  determine  conceivability, 
are  primarily  operative  only  on  mental  objects,  and  are  applicable  to 
external  things  only  on  the  hypothesis  of  their  conformity.    This  hypoth- 
esis can  only  be  verified  empirically.    That  every  triangle,  for  example, 
has  its  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles,  is  strictly  true  only  of  the  perfect 
triangle  as  contemplated  by  the  mind.    That  this  bit  of  paper  lying  before 
me  has  its  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles,  is  only  true  on  the  supposition 
of  its  being  a  perfect  triangle;  and  the  truth  of  this  supposition,  in  any 
possible  state  of  perfection  of  human  senses  and  instruments,  can  only  be 
determined  empirically.    It  remains  always  conceivable  that  there  may  be 
an  error  in  the  measurement,  and  that  the  paper  may  not  have  exactly 
two  right  angles.    The  probability  of  such  an  error  may  be  diminished  to 
any  degree,  according  to  the  perfection  of  our  means  of  measurement; 
but  no  approximation  of  this  kind  can  ever  become  absolute  certainty. 

It  is  not  without  some  hesitation  that  I  have  ventured  thus  far  to  crit- 
icize a  work  which  I  believe  to  be,  in  its  whole  spirit  and  conception,  by 
far  the  most  valuable  contribution  of  modem  times  to  the  philosophy  of 
the  physical  sciences.    To  those  who  would  survey  this  branch  of  knowl- 

1  Per8<mality  may  perhaps  be  specified  as  another  condition  of  this  kind,  and 
the  d  priori  principles  of  morals  as  consequent  upon  it.  On  this  I  have  remarked 
at  greater  length  in  the  Bampton  Lecturen,  Lectg.  III.  and  VII. 

3  Compare  Hume,  Eamy  on  the  Academical  PkHoaophy^  Part  iL 


APPENDIX. 


261 


edge  In  a  sound  philosophical  spirit,  alike  removed  from  the  idealism  of 
Schelling  and  from  the  positivism  of  Comte,  the  writings  of  Dr.  Whewell 
are  especially  valuable.  To  those  who  believe,  with  the  present  writer, 
that  the  future  hopes  of  speculative  philosophy  rest  on  the  possibility  of 
a  union  of  the  critical  principles  of  Kant  with  the  sober  practical  spirit 
which  is  characteristic  of  English  thinkers,  the  writings  of  the  same 
author  afford  one  of  the  most  cheering  assurances  that  the  spirit  of  phi- 
losophy, under  all  its  discouragements,  is  not  yet  extinct  in  this  country. 
With  this  declaration,  the  spirit  that  has  dictated  the  preceding  criticism 
will  not,  I  trust,  be  misunderstood.! 


Note  B,  p.  128. 

That  Berkeley  was  fully  aware  of  the  inconsequence  of  the  conclusions 
which  ilume  afterwards  attempted  to  draw  from  his  principles,  is  manifest 
ftnom  the  third  Dialogue  between  Hylas  and  Philonous,  in  which  he  meets 
by  anticipation  the  argument  of  the  skeptic,*  by  maintaining  that  we  are 
directly  conscious  of  our  own  being.  He  is  wrong,  indeed,  in  calling  this 
consciousness  Befledion ;  this  term  being  properly  applicable  only  to  at- 
tention directed  to  our  internal  phenomena  ;  —  an  attention  which  does 
not  make  known,  but  presupposes,  the  attending  self.  But  when  he 
asserts,  "I  know  or  am  conscious  of  my  own  being;  and  that  I  myself 
am  not  my  ideas,  but  somewhat  else,  a  thinking,  active  principle,  that 
perceives,  knows,  wills,  and  operates  about  ideas,*'  he  states  the  true 
ground  on  which  we  may  refute  the  skeptical  conclusions  of  Hume.  In- 
deed, this  part  of  the  Dialogue  wants  little  more  than  a  more  complete 


1  Ttie  preceding  note  remains  nearly  as  it  appeared  in  the  first  edition  of  this 
work,  published  in  1851.  Since  that  time,  some  additional  remarks  on  the  matter 
in  question  have  ajjpeared  in  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Discussions,  p.  323  (8econd 
edition,  p.  335),  in  Dr.  Whewell's  Letter  to  the  Author  qf  Prolegomena  Logica, 
and  in  the  Author's  pamphlet  in  reply,  entitled,  The  Limits  of  Demonstrative 
Science  considered.  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  view  is  substantially  the  same  as  my 
own;  and  I  cannot  help  regarding  this  independent  coincidence  as  a  confirma- 
tion of  my  original  criticism.  At  the  same  time  I  feel  bound  to  express  my  ac- 
knowledgments to  Dr.  Whewell  for  the  instruction  which  his  Letter  has  afforded 
me,  and  for  the  liberal  and  courteous  tone  in  which  his  objections  are  urged. 

2  This  part  of  Berkeley's  Dialogue  is  meant  as  an  answer  to  Locke,  Essay,  B. 
II.  ch.  28,  i  6,  but  the  same  reasoning  is  also  valid  against  Hume. 


i 


262 


APPENDIX. 


exposition  of  the  natare  of  the  will  to  anticipate  in  principle  the  position 
aftenvards  talcen  ag:ainst  the  great  skeptic  by  Maine  de  Biran. 

The  weak  side  of  Berkeley's  Idealism  is  not  to  be  found  in  its  relation 
to  Hume,  but  in  its  relation  to  Fichte.  The  object  proposed  by  Berkeley 
was  to  get  rid  of  the  contradictions  and  difficulties  contained  in  the  notion 
of  matter  as  existing  distinct  from  mind,  and  thus  to  leave  the  existence 
of  minds,  divine  and  human,  beyond  question.  For  this  purpose  he 
availed  himself  of  two  arguments,  one  of  which  was  borrowed  from  the 
Cartesian  philosophy,  the  other  was  added  by  himself. 

The  Cartesians,  denying  the  possibility  of  any  direct  influence  of  matter 
upon  mind  or  of  mind  upon  matter,  explained  the  phenomena  of  percep- 
tion by  the  hypothesis  of  Divine  Assistance  and  Occasional  Causes.  Ac- 
cording to  this  theory,  the  mental  phenomena  of  sensation  are  not  pro- 
duced by  any  direct  action  of  body  upon  mind,  bat  by  the  immediate 
agency  of  God,  who  produces  certain  sensations  in  the  conscious  mind, 
upon  the  occasion  of  certain  corresponding  movements  in  the  bodily 
organism.!  Berkeley,  while  denying  the  existence  of  matter,  and  there- 
fore rejecting  the  supposition  of  a  bodily  occasional  cause,  retained  the 
Cartesian  theory  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  the  presence  of  ideas  in  the 
mind  is  caused  by  the  direct  agency  of  the  Deity.  Thus  he  says,  "  When 
in  broad  daylight  I  open  my  eyes,  it  is  not  in  my  power  to  choose  whether 
I  shall  see  or  no,  or  to  determine  what  particular  objects  shall  present 
themselves  to  my  view ;  and  so  likewise  as  to  the  hearing  and  other  senses ; 
the  ideas  imprinted  on  them  are  not  creatures  of  my  will.  There  is,  there- 
fore,  some  other  iviU  or  spirit  that  produces  them."  « 

With  this  argument,  which  represents  God  as  the  efficient  cause  of  our 
ideas,  Berkeley  combined  another,  in  which  the  Deity  is  regarded  as  a 
constantly  perceiving  mind.  Accepting,  as  allowed  on  all  hands,  the 
opinion  that  sensible  qualities  cannot  subsist  by  themselves,  and  rejecting 
the  oi-dinary  hypothesis  of  their  existence  in  an  insensible  substratum,  he 
concluded  that  they  must  therefore  exist  in  a  mind  which  perceives  them, 
and  that  they  have  no  existence  apart  from  being  perceived.    If,  therefore, 

1  This  theory  is  hinted  at  by  Descartes,  Principia,  1.  il.  J  88,  and  more  fblly 
elaborated  by  De  la  Forge,  Traiti  de  f esprit  de  Vhomme^  oh.  xvi. ;  Malebranche, 
Jieclierche  de  la  V&ritiy  1.  vi.  p.  ii.  cb.  8;  Entretiens  tur  la  Metaphysique,  Ent. 
vii.  Compare  Laromigui^re,  Legons  de  PhUoaophie,  p.  ii.  1.  9,  and  Hamiltou, 
Lectures  on  Metaphysics^  p.  208. 

S  Priiunples  qf  Human  Knowledge^  S  xxix.  Compare  H  Ivii.  Ixli.  In  S  Hii.  he 
expressly  refers  to  some  modern  philosophers,  i.  «.,  the  Cartesians,  a^  agreeing 
with  liim  in  making  God  the  immediate  cause  of  all  thinga. 


APPENDIX. 


263 


they  continue  to  exist  when  we  do  not  perceive  them  (and  that  they  do  so 
is  the  irresistible  conviction  of  all  men),  they  must  be  perceived  by  some 
other  mind.  Hence  the  continuous  duration  of  things  implies  the  exist- 
ence of  a  constantly  percipient  mind  ;  that  is,  of  God.i 

The  relation  between  the  divine  and  the  human  mind,  as  thus  conceived, 
may  be  adapted  either  to  a  presentative  or  to  a  representative  theory  of  ideal- 
ism. We  may  hold  that  the  ideas  perceived  at  any  particular  time  by  a 
given  man  arc  numerically  one  with  those  constantly  perceived  by  tho 
Divine  Mind ;  or  we  may  regard  them  as  having  only  a  specific  identity, 
the  former  being  the  copy,  and  the  latter  the  archetype.  Under  the  first 
hypothesis,  the  divine  ideas  are  presented  to  us  as  the  direct  objects  of  our 
perception ;  under  the  second,  they  are  represented  by  similar  ideas  excited 
in  ourselves.  The  former  thcorj',  though  susceptible  of  various  develop- 
ments in  detail,  is  in  principle  that  of  Vision  in  God,  and  is  accordingly 
distinctly  maintained  by  Malebranche,  who  asserts  that  a  thousand  men 
can  see  the  same  individual  object,  namely,  the  intelligible  extension  which 
is  perceived  in  God.2  Berkeley,  by  rejecting  the  theory  of  Malebranche, 
was  logically  driven  to  the  representative  hypothesis,  though  his  language 
occasionally  wavers  between  the  two.* 

But  to  make  this  hypothesis  the  foundation  of  a  theistic  argument,  it  is 
necessary'  to  retain,  as  Berkele}'  in  fact  did  retain,  the  supposition  of  a  real 
distinction  iKJtween  the  idea  or  object  perceived  and  the  mind  perceiving. 
The  idea,  though  existing  only  as  perceived  and  in  the  act  of  perception, 
must  yet  not  be  identified  with  that  act,  nor  regarded  as  a  mere  modifica- 
tion or  mode  of  being  of  the  percipient  mind.  If  this  simpler  form  of 
representationism  be  once  adopted,  the  legitimate  inference  is  not  Theism, 
but  Pantheism.  The  ideas  of  which  I  am  conscious  being  admitted  to 
exist  only  as  modes  of  my  own  being,  it  is  concluded,  by  parity  of  reason- 
ing, that  the  archetypal  world  exists  only  in  the  form  of  various  modes  of 
the  being  of  God. 


V ;, 


1  Principles  (if  Human  Knowledge^  H  xc.  xci. ;  Second  Dialogue  between  Hylas 
and  Philanous,  sub  init. 

t  See  his  R^ponse  au  lAvre  des  vraies  et  des/ausses  Idies^  eh.  xiii. 

S  I  must  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  Professor  Webb,  the  author  of  "  The 
Intellectualism  of  Locke,"  both  for  the  instruction  derived  from  his  able  and  in- 
teresting work,  and  also  for  some  unpublished  communications  on  Berkeley's 
philosophy,  of  which  1  have  availed  myself  in  revising  this  note  for  the  present 
edition.  At  the  same  time  I  am  unable  to  agree  with  him  in  regarding  Locke's 
and  Berkeley's  theory  of  ideas  as  identical  with  that  of  Arnauld,  in  which  the 
representative  idea  is  regarded  as  a  modification  of  the  mind.  Indeed,  in  Berke- 
ley's system  the  relation  of  substance  and  mode  has  properly  no  place. 


264 


APPENDIX. 


And  such  is  in  fact  the  fonn  which  Idealism  assamcs  in  the  hands  of 
Fichte  and  Schelling.  The  theory  of  perceptions  essentially  representative^ 
which  virtually  re^^ards  the  act  and  its  immediate  object  as  produced  by 
the  inherent  power  of  the  mind  itself,  was  not,  in  Amauld's  hands,  carried 
into  any  consequences  beyond  those  required  by  his  controversy  with 
Malebranche.  But  a  similar  theory  in  the  hands  of  the  German  philos- 
ophers became  the  basis,  first,  of  an  absolute  £;;oism,  and  finally,  of  an 
absolute  Pantheism.  Consciousness  being  only  possible  in  the  form  of 
this  or  that  special  modification,  it  is  but  one  step  further  to  regard  the 
true  substance  as  an  unmodified  substratum  existing  out  of  consciousness, 
though  manifested  only  in  the  consciousness  of  its  several  modes.  We 
have  thus  the  Absolute  Ego  of  Fichte,  and,  by  a  still  further  generalization, 
the  Absolute  Being  of  Schelling,  which,  as  the  one  substance  from  which 
personal  and  impersonal  phenomena  alike  proceed,  may  indifferently  be 
called  Ego  or  God ;  the  conscious  self  and  the  objects  of  its  consciousness 
being  but  opposite  modes  of  the  Divine  One  and  All. 

Nor  will  the  Idealism  of  Berkeley,  however  opposed  to  these  conclu- 
sions, offer  any  effectual  bartier  against  them.  The  distinction  between 
ideas  existing  as  objects  in  the  mind,  and  ideas  existing  as  modes  of  the 
mind,  is  too  slight  to  stand  against  that  tendency  to  simplification  which 
forms  at  once  the  chief  virtue  and  the  chief  vice  of  philosophical  specula- 
tion. The  natural  judgment  of  mankind,  which  affirms  the  knowledge 
of  an  external  world  existing  independently  of  perception,  being  once 
abandoned,  the  only  question  which  remains  is,  how  to  account  for  the 
phenomena  on  the  simplest  hypothesis.  And  the  simplest  hypothesis  is 
that  which  postulates  only  one  real  existence  underlying  the  multiplicity 
of  phenomena,  the  hypothesis  whose  various  subordinate  theories  ^ 
finally  convei^  in  Pantheism. 

These  consequences  can  only  be  avoided  by  abandoning  the  Idealistic 
theory,  and  substituting  a  Natural  Realism,  Dualism  though  it  be.  Admit, 
with  Berkeley,  that  the  real  things  are  those  very  things  which  I  see  and 
feel  and  perceive  by  my  senses ;  but  deny  his  other  main  position,  that  the 
mind  perceives  only  its  own  ideas.  We  may  thus  open  the  way  for  the 
direct  recognition  in  consciousness,  first  of  our  own  organism  as  extended, 
and  secondly  of  an  external  world  in  relation  to  that  organism .^  On  this 
theory  we  may  get  rid  of  the  metaphysical  distinction  between  pheiwmena 
|ind  noumenaj  or  between  representations  and  things  in  themselves.  The  im- 
mediate object  of  perception  is  the  thing;  and  the  representation  is  not 
opposed  to  the  unperceived  thing  in  itself,  but  to  the  presentationf  or  thing 
as  given  in  immediate  relation  to  the  conscious  subject. 

1  See  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  edition  of  EeieTs  WorhSf  Notes  D  and  D*. 


APPENDIX. 


265 


Another  weak  point  of  Berkeley's  philosophy  is  his  theory  of  the  nature 
of  Belief.  He  considers  that  real  things  differ  from  chimeras  in  being 
more  vivid  and  clear,  and  not  dependent  on  the  will.  This  accords  with 
Hume's  definition  of  Belief,  "A  lively  idea,  related  to  or  associated  with 
a  present  impression."  But  the  will  is  completely  inactive  in  a  dream; 
and  phantasms  may  be  as  lively  and  vivid  when  excited  by  a  fiction  as  by  a 
true  relation.  The  truth  is  that  Belief  cannot  be  defined,  being  presup- 
posed in  all  consciousness.  Every  act  of  consciousness  is  a  judgment, 
and  therefore  a  belief  in  the  presence  of  its  object:  the  question  of  reality 
or  unreality  depends  upon  where  and  how  we  judge  it  to  be  present.  If  an 
object  present  to  the  imagination  is  declared  to  be  present  to  the  sense,  the 
judgment  is  false;  but  the  object  is  unreal  only  if  by  real  we  mean  sensible. 
All  presentations,  as  such,  may  be  called  real  relatively  to  their  proper 
intuition,  and  unreal  relatively  to  any  other.  The  further  question,  which 
of  our  intuitions  indicate  the  presence  of  external  objects,  and  which  are 
merely  affections  of  the  mind  or  the  sensitive  organism,  is  one  which, 
however  important  on  the  realist  hypothesis,  is  out  of  place  m  a  system 
of  idealism. I 


Note   C,  p.  131. 

The  following  is  Sir  William  Hamilton's  analysis  of  the  causal  judg- 
ment, as  the  result  of  the  mental  law  of  the  conditioned.  "  The  phenom- 
enon is  this :  —  When  aware  of  a  new  appearance,  we  are  unable  to  conceive 
that  therein  has  originated  any  new  existence,  and  are,  therefore,  constrained 
to  think  that  what  now  appears  to  us  under  a  new  form  had  previously 
an  existence  under  others,  —  others  conceivable  by  us  or  not.  These  others 
(for  they  are  always  plural)  are  called  its  cause;  and  a  cause  (or,  more 
properly,  causes)  we  cannot  but  suppose;  for  a  cause  is  simply  every  thing 
without  which  the  effect  would  not  result;  and  all  such  concurring,  the 
eflfect  cannot  but  result.  We  are  utterly  unable  to  construe  it  in  thought 
as  possible  that  the  complement  of  existence  has  been  either  increased  or 
diminished.  We  cannot  conceive,  either,  on  the  one  hand,  nothing  be- 
coming something,  or,  on  the  other,  something  becoming  nothing.  When 
God  is  said  to  create  the  universe  out  of  nothing,  we  think  this  by  sup- 
posing that  he  evolves  the  universe  out  of  nothing  but  himself;  and,  in 


1  For  some  remarks  on  this  question,  see  the  Author's  article  Metaphysics^  in 
the  eighth  edition  of  the  Encyclopcsdia  BritaniUca^  p.  613. 

23 


266 


APPENDIX. 


like  manner,  we  conceive  annihilation  only  by  conceiving  the  creator  to 
withdraw  his  creation,  by  withdrawing  his  creative  energy  from  actuality 
into  power." 

"  Our  judgment  of  causality,"  he  continues,  "simply  is :  —  We  necessa- 
rily deny,  or,  rather,  are  unable  to  affirm  in  thought-,  that  the  object  which 
we  apprehend  as  beginning  to  be,  really  so  begins;  but,  on  the  contrary, 
affirm,  as  we  must,  the  identity  of  its  present  sum  of  being  with  the  sum 
of  its  past  existence.  And  here  it  is  not  requisite  for  us  to  Itnow,  or  even 
to  be  able  to  conceive,  under  what  form  or  under  what  combination  this 
quantum  previously  existed;  in  otlier  words,  it  is  unnecessary  for  us  to 
recognize  the  particular  causes  of  this  particular  effect.  A  discovery  of 
the  determinate  antecedents  into  which  a  determinate  consequent  may  bo 
refunded,  is  merely  contingent,  —  merely  the  result  of  experience ;  but  the 
judgment  that  every  event  should  have  its  causes,  is  necessary,  and  im- 
posed on  us  as  a  condition  of  our  human  intelligence  itself.  This  necessity 
of  so  thinking  is  the  only  phenomenon  to  be  explained.  The  question  of  phi- 
losophy is  not  concerning  the  cause,  but  concerning  a  cause."  ^ 

Such  is  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  statement  of  the  phenomenon.  The  follow- 
ing is  his  explanation  of  it. 

"  The  phenomenon  of  Causality  seems  nothing  more  than  a  corollary 
of  the  law  of  the  Conditioned,  in  its  application  to  a  thing  thought  under 
the  form  or  mental  category  of  Existence  Relative  in  Time.  We  cannot 
know,  wo  cannot  think  a  thing,  except  under  the  attribute  of  Existence ; 
we  cannot  know  or  think  a  thing  to  exist,  except  as  in  Time;  and  wo 
cannot  know  or  think  a  thing  to  exist  in  Time,  and  think  it  al)soluteIy  to 
commence  or  terminate.  Now  this  at  once  imposes  on  us  the  judgment  of 
causality.  Unable  positively  to  think  an  absolute  commencement,  our 
impotence  to  this  drives  us  backwards  on  the  notion  of  Cause;  unablo 
positively  to  think  an  absolute  termination,  our  impotence  to  this  drives  us 
forwards  on  the  notion  of  EJ^cct."  "  We  are  compelled,"  he  continues, 
"  to  believe  that  the  object  (that  is,  the  certain  quale  and  quantum  of  being 
whose  phenomenal  rise  into  existence  wo  have  witnessed)  did  really  exist, 
prior  to  this  rise,  under  other  forms  (and  by  form,  Ije  it  observed,  I  mean 
any  mode  of  existence,  conceivable  by  us  or  not).  But  to  say  that  a  thing 
previously  existed  under  different  forms,  is  only  to  say  in  other  words 
that  a  thing  had  rarises.  (It  would  be  here  out  of  place  to  refUte  the  error 
of  philosophers  in  supposing  that  anything  can  have  a  single  cause;  — 
meaning  always  by  a  cause  that  without  which  the  effect  would  not  have 
been.  I  speak  of  course  only  of  second  causes,  for  of  the  Divine  causa- 
tion wo  can  pretend  to  no  conception.")* 


1  DiscussionSt  pp.  609, 610  (2d  edition). 


S  DiscusiionSy  pn.  618,  621. 


APPENDIX. 


267 


To  these  extracts  fVom  Sir W.  Hamilton's  Discussions  maybe  added  a 
short  passage  from  the  Appendix  to  his  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  containing 
his  latest  explanation  of  his  theory .i    "  Causation  is,  therefore,  necessarily 
within  existence;  for  we  cannot  think  of  a  change  either  from  non-exist- 
ence to  existence,  or  from  existence  to  non-existence.     The  thought  of 
power,  therefore,  always  precedes  that  of  creation,  and  follows  that  of 
annihilation;  and  as  the  thought  of  power  always  involves  the  thought 
of  existence,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  the  thoughts  of  creation  and  annihila- 
tion go,  the  necessity  of  thinking  a  cause  for  these  changes  exemplifies 
the  facts,  —  that  change  is  only  from  one  form  of  existence  to  another, 
and  that  causation  is  simply  our  inability  to  think  an  absolute  commence- 
ment or  an  absolute  termination  of  being.    The  sum  of  being  (actual  and 
potential)  now  extant  in  the  mental  and  material  worlds,  together  with  that 
in  their  Creator,  and  the  sum  of  being  (actual  and  potential)  in  the  Creator 
alone,  before  and  after  those  worlds  existed,  is  necessarily  thought  as  pre- 
cisely the  same.    Take  the  instance  of  a  neutral  salt.    This  is  an  effect, 
the  product  of  various  causes,  —  and  all  are  necessarily  powers.    We  have 
here,  1.  an  acid  involving  its  power  (active  or  passive)  of  combining  with 
the  alkali;  2.  an  alkali,  involving  its  power  (active  or  passive)  of  combin- 
ing with  the  acid;  3.  (since,  as  the  chemical  brocard  has  it,  'Corpora  noa 
agunt  nisi  soluta')  a  fluid,  say  water,  with  its  power  of  dissolving  and 
holding  in  solution  the  acid  and  alkali;  4.  a  translative  power,  say  the 
human  hand,  capable  of  bringing  the  acid,  the  alkali,  and  the  water,  into 
correlation,  or  within  the  sphere  of  mutual  affinity.    These  (and  they 
mi^'ht  Imj  subdivided)  are  all  causes  of  the  effect;  for,  abstract  anyone, 
and  the  salt  is  not  produced.    It  wants  a  coefficient  cause,  and  the  con- 
currence of  every  cause  is  requisite  for  an  effect." 

In  describing  the  a!)ove  four  conditions  as  all  in  different  ways  causes  of 
the  effect.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  will  probably  meet  with  the  concurrence  of 
most  of  his  readers;  but  the  further  statement,  that  these  causes  are  aU 
forms  under  which  the  effect  previously  existed,  will  probably  strike  them 
as  being  at  least  verbally  different  from  the  common  view.    Most  men 
would  readily  admit  that  the  acid,  and  the  alkali,  and  the  portion  of  water 
necessary  for  combining  them,  are  but  previous  forms  of  the  salt  itself; 
but  they  would  hesitate  to  admit  the  hand  or  its  action  into  the  same  list. 
I.I  other  words,  they  would  allow  that  the  earlier  and  the  later  substances 
nre  identical  in  the  material  particles  of  which  they  are  composed;  but 
they  would  Insist  on  distingmshing  these  particles  from  the  efficient  cause 
by  which  the  composition  is  effected.    But  when  the  identity  is  stated  in 
this  way,  the  judgment  assumes  a  totally  new  character.    Whether  it  be 

1  Page  690. 


268 


APPENDIX. 


I 


true  or  not  that  we  cannot  conceive  the  quantity  of  existetice  to  be  increased 
or  diminished,  there  is  at  any  rate  no  such  inability  as  re;rards  the  quantity 
of  matter.  It  may  be  true  as  a  fact  that  no  material  atom  has  been  added 
to  the  world  since  the  first  creation;  but  the  assertion,  however  true,  is 
certainly  not  necessary.  The  power  which  created  once  must  be  conceived 
as  able  to  create  again,  whether  that  ability  is  actually  exercised  or  not. 

The  same  conclusion  is  still  more  evident  when  we  proceed  from  the 
consideration  of  matter  to  that  of  mind.  Of  matter  we  maintain  that  the 
creation  of  new  portions  is  perfectly  conceivable,  as  a  result  at  least,  If 
not  as  a  process ;  of  mind  we  believe  that  such  creation  actually  takes 
place.  Every  man  who  comes  into  the  world  comes  into  it  as  a  distinct 
individual,  having  a  personality  and  consciousness  of  his  own;  and  that 
personality  is  a  distinct  accession  to  the  number  of  persons  previously 
existing.  Whatever  may  be  thought  concerning  the  material  particles  of 
which  my  body  is  composed,  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  I,  as  a  person, 
hatl  a  previous  existence  in  the  personality  of  my  parents,  however  I  may 
i*egard  them  as  the  causes  of  my  Ijcing. 

If,  then,  we  are  to  identify  the  effect  with  the  sum  of  its  causes,  we  miuit 
rise  aliove  the  conceptions  of  matter  as  matter  and  of  mind  as  mind,  and 
rise  to  the  highest  abstraction  of  existence  in  general,  which  is  not  any 
particular  existence.  "The  sum  of  Iwiing  (actual  and  potential)  now  ex- 
tant in  the  mental  and  material  worlds,  together  with  that  in  their  Creator, 
and  the  sum  of  being  (actual  and  potential)  in  the  Creator  alone,  before 
and  after  those  worlds  existed,  is  necessarily  thought  as  precisely  the 
same."  This  assertion  involves  a  previous  question:  Is  Being  in  this 
abstract  form  necessarily  thought  as  a  sum  at  all^  or  indeed  necessarily 
thought  in  any  way  ? 

It  is  admitted  that  we  not  only  can  conceive,  but  actually  know  by 
experience,  the  origination  of  new  forms  of  existence:  it  is  questioned 
whether  these  forms  are  regarded  as  new  existences.  But  strip  off  the 
form,  and  what  is  left  to  constitute  the  existence?  The  world,  as  a  world, 
is  not  identical  with  its  Creator;  the  Creator,  as  a  Creator,  is  not  identical 
with  the  world.  The  identity,  if  it  is  admitted  at  all,  can  only  be  admitted 
as  regards  an  unmodified  substratum  of  existence  in  general,  which  is  no 
existence  in  particular.  But  existence,  as  an  abstract  substratum  of  this 
kind,  is  to  human  thought  absolute  zero :  thus  far  the  Hegelian  paradox  is 
true;  pure  being  is  pure  nothing.  When  we  have  abstracted  from  the 
world  all  that  distinguishes  it  as  a  world,  and  from  the  Creator  all  that 
dit^tinguishes  him  as  a  Creator,  we  have  nothing  left  to  constitute  the  iden- 
tity of  existence.  From  the  mere  general  statement  that  cause  and  effect 
both  exist,  wo  have  no  more  right  to  say  that  they  are  the  some  existence. 


i 


APPENDIX. 


269 


than,  fVom  the  general  statement  that  they  both  appear,  we  have  a  right 
to  say  that  they  are  the  same  phenomenon. 

Our  conception  of  existence,  as  of  appearance,  is  not  singular,  but 
plural.  We  are  not  conscious  of  existence  in  general,  but  of  existing 
things ;  as  we  are  not  conscious  of  appearance  in  general,  but  of  apparent 
objects.  The  two  may  not  indeed  be  always  regarded  as  coextensive. 
Diversity  of  phenomena  docs  not  always  imply  diversity  of  existence;  but 
neither,  on  the  other  hand,  does  it  always  imply  identity  of  existence.  The 
primary  fact  of  consciousness,  the  distinction  between  the  ego  and  the  non- 
eyo,  is  a  distinction,  not  of  phenomena,  but  of  realities.  I  know  myself  as 
a  distinctly  existing  being; —  indeed,  it  is  probably  from  that  knowledge 
that  my  conception  of  being,  as  distinguished  from  appearance,  is  derived; 
—  and  I  know  the  external  worid  as  something  different  from  myself. 
Arguing  by  analogy  from  this  primary  conviction,  I  believe  every  man  to 
be  a  distinct  being  from  every  other  man  and  from  all  the  other  objects 
around  him;  and  I  believe  that  every  new  person  that  comes  into  the 
world  is,  as  a  person,  a  new  existence.  How  far  the  same  distinction  may 
be  extended  to  impersonal  objects  is  another  question ;  for  in  these  we 
have  no  immediate  knowledge  of  any  principium  individualionis,  constitut- 
ing a  single  reality  out  of  this  or  that  aggregate  of  phenomena.  But  if 
we  are  unable  to  affirm  the  existence  of  such  a  principle,  we  are  also 
unable  to  deny  it;  and  hence  we  are  not  justified  in  asserting  that  all  phe- 
nomena are  but  different  modes  of  one  and  the  same  reality. 

From  this  point  of  view,  the  conception  of  potential  existence,  on  which 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's  theory  mainly  depends,  vanishes  altogether.  If  our 
conception  of  existence,  like  all  other  conceptions,  is  subject  to  the  con- 
ditions of  plurality  and  difference,  —  if  we  have  no  conception  of  being  at 
all  except  in  the  form  of  this  being  as  distinguished  from  that,  —  it  fol- 
lows that,  where  the  definite  characteristics  of  this  or  that  being  are 
absent,  the  being  itself  has  no  existence  in  any  form.  The  mere  possi- 
bility of  the  existence  of  a  man  is  not  the  existence  of  a  man  under  an- 
other form;  for  the  man,  as  such,  has  no  existence  except  in  the  particular 
form  by  which  he  is  actually  constituted.  To  say  that  everything  which 
begins  had  a  previous  existence  in  another  form,  is  to  say  that  the  form  is 
no  part  of  the  existence;  —  a  position  which  necessarily  leads  us  back  to 
the  Eleatic  theory  of  the  unity  of  all  things,  and  identifies  Existence  with 
Indifference. 

If  these  objections  are  tenable,  the  common  statement  of  the  causal 
judgment,  in  which  the  cause  is  regarded  as  something  different  from 
the  effect,  is  more  accurate,  and  more  in  accordance  with  the  philosophy 
of  the  Conditioned,  than  that  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  in  which  the  cause  Is 

23* 


270 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX. 


271 


4 

1 


i 

I 


It  iaetiticml  with  the  effect.  Both  statements  equally  repudiate 
akMudity  of  supposinj?  existence  to  have  ori{;inateU  fVora  absolute 
»;  for  lioth  alike  suppose  that  nothin;;  can  bepn  to  exist  unless  some- 
thinc  had  previously  existed.  The  question  between  them  is  merely  this : 
Is  MBrnmUkuty  a  different  existence,  or  only  the  same  existence  in  another 
form? 

Keitber  on  the  one  supposition  nor  on  the  other  do  wo  obtain  any  pos- 
itive conception  of  the  nature  of  Causation,  beyond  that  which  is  Aimished 
lif ,  tmi  limited  to,  our  own  volitions.  Mere  temporal  antecedence  of  one 
thiols  to  another  is  not  the  whole  of  causation,  any  more  than  the  mcro 
antcvwlence  of  the  same  thin^  under  other  forms.  Wo  are  compelled  still 
to  ask,  what  is  that  peculiar  relation  between  antecedent  and  consequent, 
by  which  the  one  gives  birth  to  the  other,  or  is  changed  into  the  other? 
Tbe  oritnnation  of  the  consequent  by  the  antecedent,  and  the  evolution  of 
the  actual  from  tho  potential,  alike  require  a  further  cause  to  account  for 
i;  and  this  caui»ative  energy,  call  it  by  what  name  you  will,  — power, 
iMcy,  —  still  remains  absolutely  unknown,  but  is  still  supposed  as 
alMolttteiy  indispensable. 


Note  D,  p.  143. 

following  is  Mr.  Mill's  argument  for  the  subjection  of  the  human 
win  to  the  law  of  physical  causation :  **  To  the  universality  which  man- 
li^l  are  agreed  in  ascribing  to  the  Law  of  Causation,  there  is  one  claim 
of  exception,  one  disputed  case,  that  of  the  Human  Will;  the  detcrmi- 
natious  of  which  a  hirge  class  of  metaphysicians  are  not  willing  to  regard 
as  following  the  causes  called  motives,  according  to  as  strict  la^'s  as  those 
which  they  suppose  to  exist  in  the  world  of  mere  matter.  This  contro- 
verted point  will  undergo  a  special  examination  when  we  come  to  treal 
particularly  of  the  Logic  of  the  Moral  Sciences.  In  the  mean  time  I  may 
remark,  that  those  metaphysicians  who,  it  must  be  observed,  ground  the 
main  part  of  their  objection  upon  tho  supposed  repugnance  of  the  doc- 
trine in  question  to  our  consciousness,  seem  to  me  to  mistake  the  fact 
which  consciousness  testifies  against.  What  is  really  in  contradiction  to 
consciousness,  they  would,  I  think,  on  strict  self-examination,  find  to  be 
the  application  to  human  actions  and  volitions  of  the  ideas  involved  in 
the  common  use  of  the  term  Necessity;  which  I  agree  with  them  in  think- 
ing highly  objectionable.    But  if  they  would  consider  that  by  saying  that 


a  man's  actions  necessarily  follow  from  his  character,  all  that  is  really 
meant  (for  no  more  is  meant  in  any  case  whatever  of  causation)  is  that 
he  invariably  does  act  in  conformity  to  his  character,  and  that  any  one 
who  thoroughly  knew  his  character  could  certainly  predict  how  he  would 
act  in  any  supposable  case;  they  probably  would  not  find  this  doctrine 
cither  contrary  to  their  experience  or  revolting  to  their  feelings.    And  no 
more  than  this  is  contended  for  by  any  one  but  an  Asiatic  fatalist."  i 
lit     And  no  more  than  this,  we  might  add,  is  needed  to  construct  a  system 
of  fatalism  as  rigid  as  any  Asiatic  can  desire.    But  we  must  proceed  to 
Mr.  Mill's  further  remarks  in  the  Logic  of  the  Moral  Sciences.    In  this 
latter  portion  of  his  work,  the  author  has  done  little  more  than  repeat  his 
belief  that  the  law  of  causality  applies  in  the  same  strict  sense  to  human 
actions  as  to  other  phenomena,  involving  in  both  cases,  not  constraint,  but 
**  invariable,  certain,  and  unconditional  sequence;  "  so  that,  "  given  the 
motives  which  are  present  to  an  individual's  mind,  and  given  likewise  the 
character  and  disposition  of  the  individual,  the  manner  in  which  he  will 
act  may  be  unerringly  inferred :  that  if  we  knew  the  person  thoroughly, 
and  knew  all  the  inducements  which  are  acting  upon  him,  we  could  fore- 
tell his  conduct  with  as  much  certainty  as  we  can  predict  any  physical 
event."    He  adds  a  distinction,  intended  to  rescue  his  theory  from  the 
charge  of  fatalism,  as  usually  implied  in  the  term  Necessity.    "That 
Word,  in  its  other  acceptations,  involves  much  more  than  mere  uniformity 
of  sequence;  it  implies  irresistibleness.    Applied  to  the  wiU,  it  only  means 
that  the  given  cause  will  bo  followed  by  the  effect,  subject  to  aU  possibil- 
ities of  counteraction  by  other  causes;  but  in  common  use  it  stands  for 
the  operation  of  those  causes  exclusively  which  are  supposed  too  power- 
ftil  to  be  counteracted  at  all."    "  The  causes,  therefore,"  he  continues, 
"  on  which  action  depends,  are  never  uncontrollable;  and  any  given  effect 
is  only  necessary  provided  that  the  causes  tending  to  produce  it  are  not 
controlled.    That  whatever  happens  could  not  have  happened  otherwise, 
unless  something  had  taken  place  which  was  capable  of  preventing  it,  no 
one  surely  needs  hesitate  to  admit."  a 

That  there  is  some  fundamental  weakness  in  the  above  theory,  appears 
almost  on  the  surface,  fVom  the  fact  that  so  acute  a  thinker  as  Mr.  Mill  can 
imagine  that  he  has  saved  the  principle  of  causality  from  the  charge  of 
fatalism  by  this  concluding  sentence.  That  whatever  happens  could  not 
have  happened  otherwise,  unless  something  had  taken  place  capable  of  pre- 
venting it,  is  indeed  in  one  sense  a  perfectly  harmless  position,  but  also  a 
perfectly  unproductive  one.    It  is  the  mere  truism  of  the  Nursery  Rhyme: 


1  Miirs  Loffie,  vol.  I.  p.  419. 


f  Mill's  Logic,  book  vi.  chap.  2. 


270 


APPENDIX. 


regarded  as  identical  with  the  effect.  Both  statements  equally  repudiate 
the  absurdity  of  supposing  existence  to  have  originated  from  at>soIute 
zero;  for  both  alike  suppose  that  nothing  can  begin  to  exist  unless  some- 
thing had  previously  existed.  The  question  between  them  is  merely  this : 
Is  this  something  a  different  existence,  or  only  the  same  existence  in  another 

form? 

Neither  on  the  one  supposition  nor  on  the  other  do  we  obtain  any  pos- 
itive conception  of  the  nature  of  Causation,  beyond  that  which  is  Aimished 
by,  and  limited  to,  our  own  volitions.  Mere  temporal  antecedence  of  one 
thing  to  another  is  not  the  whole  of  causation,  any  more  than  the  mere 
antecedence  of  the  same  thing  under  other  forms.  We  are  compelled  still 
to  ask,  what  is  that  peculiar  relation  between  antecedent  and  consequent, 
by  which  the  one  gives  birth  to  the  other,  or  is  changed  into  the  other? 
The  origination  of  the  consequent  by  the  antecedent,  and  the  evolution  of 
the  actual  from  the  potential,  alike  require  a  further  cause  to  account  for 
them;  and  this  causative  energy,  call  it  by  what  name  you  will,  — /wuw, 
^ort,  tendency,  —  still  remains  absolutely  unknown,  but  is  still  supposed  as 
absolutely  indispensable. 


APPENDIX. 


271 


Note  D,  p.  143. 

The  following  is  Mr.  Mill's  argument  for  the  subjection  of  the  human 
will  to  the  law  of  physical  causation :  "  To  the  universality  which  man- 
kind are  agreed  in  ascribing  to  the  Law  of  Causation,  there  is  one  claim 
of  exception,  one  disputed  case,  that  of  the  Human  Will;  the  determi- 
nations of  which  a  large  class  of  metaphysicians  are  not  willing  to  regard 
as  following  the  causes  called  motives,  according  to  as  strict  laws  as  those 
which  they  suppose  to  exist  in  the  world  of  mere  matter.  This  contro- 
verted point  will  undergo  a  special  examination  when  we  come  to  treat 
particularly  of  the  Logic  of  the  Moral  Sciences.  In  the  mean  time  I  may 
remark,  that  those  metaphysicians  who,  it  must  be  observed,  ground  the 
main  part  of  then:  objection  upon  the  supposed  repugnance  of  the  doc- 
trine in  question  to  our  consciousness,  seem  to  me  to  misUke  the  fact 
which  consciousness  testifies  against.  What  is  really  in  contradiction  to 
consciousness,  they  would,  I  think,  on  strict  self-examination,  find  to  be 
the  application  to  human  actions  and  volitions  of  the  ideas  involved  in 
the  common  use  of  the  term  Necessity;  which  I  agree  with  them  in  think- 
ing highly  objectionable.    But  if  they  would  consider  that  by  saying  that 


a  man's  actions  tiecessarHj,  follow  from  his  character,  aU  that  is  really 
meant  (for  no  more  is  meant  in  any  case  whatever  of  causation)  is  that 
he  mvariably  does  act  in  conformity  to  his  character,  and  that  any  one 
who  thoroughly  knew  his  character  could  certainly  predict  how  he  would 
act  in  any  supposable  case;  they  probably  would  not  find  this  doctrine 
either  contrary  to  their  experience  or  revolting  to  their  feelings.    And  no 
more  than  this  is  contended  for  by  any  one  but  an  Asiatic  fatalist."! 
.  %     And  no  more  than  this,  we  might  add,  is  needed  to  construct  a  system 
of  fatalism  as  rigid  as  any  Asiatic  can  desire.    But  we  must  proceed  to 
Mr.  Mill's  further  remarks  in  the  Logic  of  the  Moral  Sciences.    In  this 
latter  portion  of  his  work,  the  author  has  done  little  more  than  repeat  his 
belief  that  the  law  of  causality  applies  in  the  same  strict  sense  to  human 
actions  as  to  other  phenomena,  involving  in  both  cases,  not  constraint,  but 
"invariable,  certain,  and  unconditional  sequence;"  so  that,  "given  the 
motives  which  are  present  to  an  individual's  mind,  and  given  likewise  the 
character  and  disposition  of  the  individual,  the  manner  in  which  he  will 
act  may  be  unerringly  inferred :  that  if  we  knew  the  person  thoroughly, 
and  knew  all  the  inducements  which  are  acting  upon  him,  we  could  fore^ 
tell  his  conduct  with  as  much  certainty  as  we  can  predict  any  physical 
event."    Ho  adds  a  distinction,  intended  to  rescue  his  theory  from  the 
charge  of  fatalism,  as  usually  implied  in  the  term  Necessity.    "  That 
Word,  in  its  other  acceptations,  involves  much  more  than  mere  uniformity 
(  f  sequence;  it  implies  irresistibleness.    Applied  to  the  wiU,  it  only  means 
that  the  given  cause  will  bo  followed  by  the  effect,  subject  to  aU  possibil- 
Ities  of  counteraction  by  other  causes;  but  in  common  use  it  stands  for 
the  operation  of  those  causes  exclusively  which  are  supposed  too  power- 
ful to  be  counteracted  at  all."    "  The  causes,  therefore,"  he  continues, 
"  on  which  action  depends,  are  never  uncontrollable;  and  any  given  effect 
is  only  necessary  provided  that  the  causes  tending  to  produce  it  are  not 
controlled.    That  whatever  happens  could  not  have  happened  otherwise, 
unless  something  had  taken  place  which  was  capable  of  preventing  it,  no 
one  surely  needs  hesitate  to  admit."  * 

That  there  is  some  fundamental  weakness  in  the  above  theory,  appears 
almost  on  the  surface,  ftx>m  the  fact  that  so  acute  a  thinker  as  Mr.  Mill  can 
imagine  that  he  has  saved  the  principle  of  causality  fVom  the  charge  of 
fatalism  by  this  concluding  sentence.  That  whatever  happens  could"^not 
have  happened  otherwise,  unless  something  had  Utken  place  capable  of  pre- 
venting it,  is  indeed  in  one  sense  a  perfecUy  harmless  position,  but  also  a 
perfectly  unproductive  one.    It  is  the  mere  truism  of  the  Nursery  Rhyme: 

1  Miirs  Logic,  vol.  i.  p.  419.  «  Mill's  Logic,  book  vi.  chap.  2. 


'I' 


k. 


272  APPENDIX. 

"  There  wt8  an  old  woman  lived  under  a  hill, 
And  if  she '«  twt  gmie^  she  lives  there  gtill." 

Examine  it  closer,  and  the  question  at  once  arises,  Whence  is  this  counter- 
acting something  to  come?  If  from  myself,  from  a  self-determined  act  of 
free  will,  this  concedes  the  whole  question  at  issue.  If  from  an  act  of  will 
determined  by  preexisting  causes,  or  altogether  from  without,  I  am  still 
in  the  iron  grasp  of  Necessity.  If  the  preventing  circumstance,  come 
whence  it  may,  comes  as  the  certain  sequence  of  antecedent  phenomena,  i 
am  still  the  slave  of  circumstances ;  if  otherwise,  the  whole  resembUince 
between  moral  and  physical  causation  vanishes. 

But  let  us  go  up  to  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  theory  itself.  The 
conduct  of  a  man,  we  are  told,  is  the  invariable  consequent  of  motives 
present  to  his  mind ;  so  that,  given  the  motives  and  the  man's  character, 
we  could  certainly  predict  the  action.  Character,  it  must  be  observed,  is 
not  here  to  l>e  understood  in  Aristotle's  sense,  as  a  disposition  caused  by  a 
series  of  voluntary  acts;  it  must  be  something  coeval  with  the  tirst  act  of 
so-called  volition.  At  the  earliest  period  at  which  I  am  capable  of  acting, 
I  possess  a  character  of  some  sort;  and  that  character,  together  with  the 
motives  presented,  determines  certainly  how  I  shall  act. 

The  plausibility  of  the  theory  arises  from  an  ambiguity  in  the  terra 
motive.    In  knowing  the  phenomena  present  to  a  man's  mind  at  the  mo- 
ment of  any  act  of  volition,  is  it  included  that  we  are  to  know  their  relation 
to  his  mil  ?    If  so,  the  supposed  prediction  is  a  mere  liegging  of  the  ques- 
tion.  When  I  know  how  he  will  be  inclined  to  act,  I  know  how  he  will  act. 
If  not,  the  advocate  of  the  doctrine  must  succumb  to  the  sophism  of  the 
Assinus  Buridani,  and  concede  that  the  unfortunate  animal,  between  two 
bundles  of  hay  exactly  alike,  must  starve.    The  solution  of  this  sophism, 
supposing,  of  course,  that  the  ass  in  that  instance  represents  a  voluntary, 
and  not  merely  a  spontaneous  agent,  is  likewise  the  solution  of  Mr.  Mill's 
argument.    What  is  meant  by  two  bundles  of  hay  exactly  alike?    They 
must  be  indistinguishable  by  sight,  smell,  touch,  and  so  forth.    But  are 
objects  exactly  similar  as  regards  the  senses,  therefore  exactly  similar  as 
regards  the  will?    A  lump  of  salt  and  a  lump  of  sugar  may  be  similar  to 
the  eye :  are  they  therefore  similar  to  the  palate  ?    If  taste  is  not  dependent 
upon  another  sense,  why  may  not  will  be  independent  of  all  the  senses? 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  two  bundles  of  hay  are  to  be  exactly  similar, 
as  motives  in  relation  to  the  will,  the  argument  amounts  to  the  mere  truism, 
that  if  the  ass  does  not  choose  one  he  will  choose  neither. 

Exactly  the  same  fallacy  runs  through  Mr.  Mill's  theory  of  the  causality 
of  actions.    The  so-called  motives  are  either  a  set  of  phenomena  viewed 


APPENDIX. 


273 


in  their  relation  to  the  will,  or  viewed  out  of  that  relation.    If  the  former 
the  argument  has  long  ago  been  refuted  by  Reid.i     The  strongest  motive 
prevails ;  but  I  only  know  the  strength  of  motives  in  relation  to  the  will 
by  the  test  of  ultimate  prevalence ;  so  that  this  means  no  more  than  that 
the  prevailing  motive  prevails.     I  have  no  measure  of  strength  but  its 
effects.    I  only  know  certain  things  to  be  motives  at  all  by  the  fact  of 
their  ultimate  prevalence.    If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  phenomena  are  con- 
sidered out  of  their  relation  to  the  will,  my  consciousness  testifies  at  once 
that  my  actions  are  not  subject  to  the  same  invariable  sequence  as  physical 
changes.    I  know,  that  is,  whenever  I  lift  my  arm  to  my  head,  that  it  is  at 
that  moment  in  my  power  not  to  lift  it;  and  that,  the  antecedent  circum- 
stances being  precisely  the  same,  I  may  decide  not  to  do  so  at  any  future 
time.    But,  says  Mr.  Mill,  this  decision  of  the  will  is  itself  a  new  antece- 
dent.*  Certainly,  a  new  antecedent  to  the  act ;  but  with  what  propriety  can 
it  be  called  a  new  antecedent  to  itself?    The  question  is  not  whether  the 
act  of  motion  follows  certainly  upon  that  of  volition,  but  whether  the  act 
of  volition  follows  certainly  upon  antecedent  circumstances.    The  former 
sequence  depends  on  purely  physical  laws;  and  the  preventing  causes, 
such  as  a  stroke  of  paralysis,  are  purely  physical  also.    But  if  the  latter 
sequence  is  invariable  also,  we  admit,  not  one  new  phenomenon,  but  mil- 
lions; since  an  opposite  determination  of  the  will  can  only  come  in  with 
its  determinant,  and  the  determinant  of  that  determinant,  and  so  on,  ad 
infinitum.    For  to  suppose  that  two  opposite  volitions  can  follow  from  the 
same  determinant  is  incompatible  with  the  whole  hypothesis  of  causality. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  sequence  of  volition  from  given  antecedents  is 
variable,  what  becomes  of  the  power  of  predicting  a  man's  actions?   The 
contingency  of  a  single  link  affects  all  the  subsequent  portion  of  the 
chain. 

In  reply,  then,  to  the  question.  Are  our  volitions,  like  other  events,  the 
result  of  causes?  Certainly  not,  in  the  only  intelligible  senses  of  the 
term.  I  have  only  two  positive  notions  of  causation:  one,  the  exertion 
of  power  by  an  intelligent  being;  the  other,  the  uniform  sequence  of  phe- 
nomenon B  from  A.  (A  may  here  stand  for  a  single  phenomenon,  or  a 
group;  for  that  antecedent  or  sum  of  antecedents  which  constitutes  the 
Sufficient  Beason.)    The  former  hypothesis  is  Fatalism.    If  my  will  results 

1  Active  Powers,  Essay  iv.  ch.  4,  p.  610,  ed.  Hamilton. 

t  Mr.  Mill  says,  "  The  wish  is  a  new  antecedent."  If  this  term  is  meant  to  be 
synonymous  with  will,  it  would  be  an  improvement  in  language  to  change  it;  if 
it  is  meant  to  be  synonymous  with  desire,  the  confusion  of  desire  with  will  viti- 
ates his  whole  argument. 


iil 


i 


i 


1 1 1 


274 


APPENDIX. 


fVom  the  coercion  of  some  other  intelligence,  I  am  the  slave  of  Destiny. 
The  latter  hypothesis  is  Determinism,  a  necessity  no  less  rij^id  than  fatal- 
ism, besides  beinj;  at  variance  with  the  whole  testimony  of  consciousness 
and  with  the  experience  of  every  day.    Besides  these  two,  there  is  no 
alternative  but  to  admit,  in  the  fullest  sense,  the  freedom  of  the  will,  by 
denying  the  applicability  of  the  principle  of  causality  to  human  actions. 
"  This  objection,  if  not  removed,"  says  Mr.  Mill,  "  would  be  fatal  to  the 
attempt  to  treat  human  conduct  as  a  subject  of  science."    Be  it  so.    It  is 
better  to  accept  the  consequence  than  to  admit  the  alternative.    But  it  is 
fatal  only  according  to  Mr.  Mill's  view  of  science.    Ethology,  as  ho  con- 
ceives it,  in  relation  to  individuals,  as  the  science  of  characters  as  they  must 
he  according  to  laws  of  physical  and  mental  causation,  I  do  believe  to  be, 
in  its  idea  and  pretensions,  chimerical;  but  Ethics,  as  the  science  of  such 
characters  as  they  ought  to  be  according  to  the  laws  of  moral  obligation, 
remains  undisturl)ed,  or,  rather,  more  securely  established.   It  seems  to  bo 
forgotten  by  writers  of  this  school  that  these  two  systems  are  absolutely 
exclusive  of  each  other;  that  physical  causation  and  moral  obligation 
cannot  in  perfection  exist  side  by  side;  and  that  where  they  do  coexist, 
each  must  be  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  the  other.    In  proportion  as  we  extend 
the  domain  of  Necessity,  we  must  diminish  that  of  Duty;  and  Necessity, 
notwithstanding  all  that  Mr.  Mill  has  advanced,  I  still  believe  to  be  the 
inevitable  result  of  subjecting  moral  acts  to  the  laws  of  physical  causa- 
tion.   But  Ethology,  in  relation  to  classes  of  men,  as  affected  by  national, 
professional,  educational,  physiological,  or  even  moral  circumstances,  may, 
notwithstanding,  attain  to  a  vast  amount  of  important  practical  principles 
and  rules,  though  still  subject  to  the  influence  of  individual  contingency. 
The  actuary  of  an  insurance  company,  if  he  were  to  predict  the  duration 
of  life  of  any  one  individual  on  the  books  of  his  office,  would  in  all  probar 
bility  guess  wrong;  —  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  true,  mainly  from  his  igno- 
rance of  physical  circumstances ;  but  as  a  matter  of  theory  also,  if  we 
allow  that  the  individual  in  question  may  falsify  the  prediction  by  a  volun- 
tar}-  act  of  suicide.    But  if  the  same  experiment  is  tried  on  a  sufficiently 
large  scale,  opposite  errors  will  counteract  each  other,  and  the  general 
approximate  result  attains  almost  to  a  moral  certainty.    The  general  re- 
sults of  Ethology,  as  applied  to  classes,  are  dependent  in  a  great  degree 
on  similar  circumstances,  and  may  attain  to  the  same  or  a  higher  amount 
of  practical  utility. 

In  the  course  of  the  above  remarks  I  have  purposely  avoided  touching 
on  a  subject  alluded  to  by  Mr.  Mill,  the  compatibility  of  man's  free-'.viU 
with  God's  foreknowledge.  This  question  is  insoluble,  because  we  have 
nothing  but  negative  notions  to  apply  to  it.    To  enable  us  to  determine 


APPENDIX. 


275 


the  exact  manner  in  which  an  Infinite  Intelligence  contemplates  succession 
in  time,  it  would  be  necessary  that  our  intelligence  should  be  infinite  also 
In  this,  as  in  all  other  revelations  of  God's  relation  to  man,  we  must  bo 
content  to  believe,  without  aspiring  to  comprehend.  The  fact  of  God's 
foreknowledge  is  all  that  is  revealed  to  us :  the  manner  He  has  left  in 
darkness,  and  we  cannot  enlighten  it.  But  we  are  not  justified  in  rejecting 
what  we  can  comprehend  because  we  do  not  understand  its  possible  rela- 
tion to  what  we  cannot.i  That  no  conceivable  amount  of  information 
cotihl  enable  a  being  of  human  constitution  to  predict  with  certainty  the 
acts  of  another,  is  established  by  the  same  evidence  of  consciousness  by 
which  we  know  that  there  is  a  human  constitution  at  all.  How  far  the 
same  conclusion  can  be  transferred  to  other  orders  of  finite  beings,  still 
less  to  an  Infinite  Intelligence,  we  have  no  data  for  determining. 

The  Necessitarian  theory  has  recently  been  stated  anew,  in  two  works, 
both  of  high  ability  and  reputation,  but  written  in  very  different  spirits 
and  with  very  different  purposes.  The  author  of  the  first  of  these  works, 
while  professedly  writing  in  the  name  and  in  support  of  the  principles  of 
Necessitarianism,  strenuously  asserts,  at  the  same  time,  the  apparently 
opposite  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  and  the  responsibility  of  man, 
and  writes  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  reconciling  these  seemingly  con- 
flicting beliefs.  The  author  of  the  second  work  pushes  his  principles  to  a 
conclusion  which  cannot  be  otherwise  understood  than  as  exonerating 
human  actions  from  all  voluntariness,  and  their  agents  from  all  responsi- 
bility. The  former  of  these  works,  Dr.  McCosh's  "  Method  of  the  Divine 
Government,"  is  one  from  which  I  cannot  dissent  without  extreme  reluc- 

I  "Sed  quia  jam  Deum  a/jnoscentes,  tam  immensam  in  eo  potestatem  esse  per- 
clpimus,  ut  nefas  esse  putemus  exiMimare,  aliquid  unquara  a  nobw  fieri  posse, 
quod  ante  non  ab  ipso  fuerit  praeordinatum ;  facile  possumus  nos  ipsos  magniii 
difficultatlbus  intricare,  si  banc  Dei  pneordinationera,  cum  arbitrii  noetri  liber- 
tate  conciliare,  atque  utramque  simul  comprehendere  couemur. 

*♦  nils  vero  dob  expediemus,  si  recordemur  mentem  nostram  es8e  finltam ;  Dei 
autem  potentiam,  per  quam  non  tantum  omnia,  qua  sunt  aut  esse  possunt,  ab 
«temo  pnescivit,  sed  etiara  voluit  ac  praeordinavit,  esse  infinitam:  ideoque  banc 
qidem  4  nobis  satis  attingi,  ut  clare  et  distiucte  percipiamus  ipsam  in  Deo  esse; 
non  autem  satis comprehendi,utvideamu8  quo  pacto  liberas  homiuum  actione^ 
indeterminatas  relinquat;  libertatis  autem  et  indifferentia  qua  in  nobis  est,  nos 
Itaconscios  esse,  ut  nihil  sit,  quod  evidentiuset  perfectius  comprehendamus.  Ab- 
surdum  enim  esset,  propterea  quod  non  comprehendimus  unara  rem,  quam  sci- 
mus  ex  naturasua  nobis  esse  debere  incomprehensibilem,  de  aliSL  dubitare,  quam 
Intime  comprehendimus,  atque  apud  nosmet  ipsos  experimur."  —  Descartes 
Priticipia,  P.  J.  40, 41.  * 


JM 


276 


APPENDIX. 


tance,  regarding  it,  as  I  do,  as  one  of  the  most  valuable  contributions  to 
Christian  philosopiiy  which  the  present  age  has  produced.  With  many  of 
the  author's  remarks  on  the  present  question  I  fully  concur,  and  in  others 
I  am  inclined  to  hope  that  the  difference  between  us  is  more  verbal  than 
real.  But  there  arc  some  of  his  statements  which,  even  if  not  substan- 
tially erroneous  in  themselves,  may  lead  to  eiTor  from  their  language  and 

its  associations. 

Dr.  McCosh  takes  his  position,  as  a  Necessitarian,  on  the  ground  "  thnt 
the  principle  of  cause  and  effect  reigns  in  the  domains  of  mind  as  in  the 
territories  of  matter." »  Thus  ho  considers  the  doctrine  of  Necessity  to 
be  founded  "on  one  of  the  very  intellectual  intuitions  of  man's  mind, 
which  leads  us,  in  mental  as  in  material  phenomena,  to  anticipate  the 
same  eflTects  to  follow  the  same  causes."  Of  this  intellectual  intuition  ho 
says,  in  another  part  of  his  work,  "  In  regard  to  any  one  thought  or  feel- 
ing, we  affirm  that  it  must  have  had  a  cause  in  some  property  of  the  mind, 
or  in  some  antecedent  state  of  the  mind,  or  in  the  two  combined.  It  is  by 
an  intuition  of  our  nature  that  we  believe  that  this  thought  or  feeling 
could  not  have  been  produced  without  a  cause,  and  that  this  same  cause 
will  again  and  forever  produce  the  same  effects.  And  this  intuitive  princi- 
ple leads  us  to  expect  the  reign  of  causation,  not  only  among  the  thoughts 
and  feelings  generally,  but  among  the  wishes  and  volitions  of  the  soul."* 

I  cannot  help  thinking  that  what  Dr.  McCosh  here  describes  as  an  intu- 
itive principle  of  the  mind,  is  in  fact  a  combination  of  two  principles, 
differing  both  in  their  nature  and  in  their  origin.  That  a  given  phenome- 
non, whether  material  or  mental,  "  could  not  have  been  produced  without 
a  cause,"  is  one  assertion  ;  that  "  this  same  cause  will  again  and  forever 
produce  the  same  effects,"  is  another.  Setting  aside  for  the  moment  what 
we  know  empirically  of  the  uniformity  of  nature,  it  is  perfectly  conceiv- 
able that  the  worid  might  have  been  so  constituted  that  there  should  be 
no  regularity  in  the  succession  of  events,  but  that  the  same  cause  which 
at  one  time  is  followed  by  a  particular  effect  should  at  another  have  no 
such  consequence.  The  latter  portion,  therefore,  of  Dr.  McCosh's  princi- 
ple is  not  entitled  to  rank  among  the  original  intuitions  of  the  mind, 
because,  even  if  experience  assures  us  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  never  is 
violated,  we  have  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  that  it  may  be. 

But  when  the  knowledge  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  is  discarded,  what 
remains  to  constitute  the  intuitive  principle?  How  much  or  how  little  is 
implied  in  the  mere  conviction  that  every  phenomenon  must  have  a  cause 
on  the  particular  occasion  of  its  occurrence,  if  we  know  nothing  about 


1  Appendix,  p.  541. 


a  p.  276. 


APPENDIX. 


277 


similiarity  of  recurrence?  In  the  first  place,  with  regard  to  voluntary  and 
involuntary  phenomena  alike,  it  is  implied  that  some  other  phenomenon 
has  immediately  preceded.  This  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  sub- 
jection of  our  consciousness  to  the  law  of  time.  In  the  next  place,  with 
regard  to  voluntary  actions  alone,  of  which  I  am  the  cause,  it  is  implied 
that,  at  the  moment  of  doing  them,  I  am  conscious  of  being  able  to  abstain 
from  them;  and  this  is  an  immediate  consciousness  of  poiver,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  term.  In  the  third  place,  with  regard  to  involuntary  occur- 
rences, there  is  the  assumption  of  an  unknown  something  in  the  antecedent 
phenomenon  analogous  to  the  productive  power  in  voluntary  agents. i 
This  unknown  something,  however,  is  not  power  in  the  only  form  in  which 
we  are  conscious  of  it;  nay,  it  is  the  direct  negation  of  it;  for  power  is 
positively  conceived  only  in  the  form  of  ability  to  choose  between  two 
altematives.2 

It  seems,  then,  that  the  apparent  universality  of  the  axiom,  "  Every  event 
must  have  a  cause,"  is  partly  due  to  the  ambiguity  of  its  terms.  Define 
clearly  what  is  meant  by  a  cause,  and  the  general  axiom  is  at  once  divided 
into  two  special  ones.  I  am  the  cause  of  my  actions,  inasmuch  as  I  do 
them  voluntarily,  with  a  power  at  the  same  time  to  abstain  from  them. 
In  this  sense  we  cannot  speak  of  a  cause  in  relation  to  the  phenomena  of 
matter.  It  is  not  in  this  sense  that  the  heat  of  the  fire  is  the  cause  of  the 
melting  of  the  wax.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  sense  in  which  Hume  and 
Brown  define  a  cause,  it  is  applicable  to  material  phenomena,  but  not  to 
voluntary  actions.  A  cause,  in  the  sense  of  these  philosophers,  means 
some  one  invariable  antecedent,  or  group  of  antecedents,  the  presence  of 
which  is  always  followed  by  the  phenomenon  in  question.  In  this  sense, 
it  cannot  be  asserted  that  the  determinations  of  the  will  have  a  cause, 
meaning  that  the  will  is  always  determined  in  a  similar  manner  by  the 
presence  of  similar  antecedent  chrcumstances.    Or,  tliirdly,  if  we  discard 


1  See  above,  p.  184. 

«  Dr.  McCoeh,  p.  526,  maintains  that"  power  is  implied  in  our  very  idea  of  sub- 
stance," and  that  "this  power,  these  properties  of  substances,  are  permanently 
in  tliem,  and  ready  to  be  exercised  at  all  times."  But  power,  in  this  sense,  is  not 
an  idea  distinct  from  the  actual  sequence  of  the  effect;  it  is  merely  that  sequence 
viewed  hypothetically.  When  I  speak  of  the  power  of  fire  to  melt  wax,  that 
power  not  being  in  actual  exercise,  I  mean  no  more  than  that  the  melting  would 
follow  if  the  wax  were  exposed  to  it.  In  this  sense  we  know  nothing  of  power 
or  property  except  as  the  manifestation  of  an  eflTect,  hypothetical  or  actual. 
Moreover,  power  in  this  sense,  as  a  permanent  property,  involves  the  empirical 
idea  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  as  well  as  the  mere  conception  of  a  substance 
w  existing. 

24 


278 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX. 


279 


the  conception  of  invariability,  the  axiom  indeed  becomes  universol,  but 
does  not  amount  to  an  assertion  of  a  cause.  It  then  asserts  positively  no 
more  than  that  every  phenomenon  has  some  other  preceding  it;  i.  c,  that 
no  given  phenomenon  can  be  conceived  as  standing  at  the  begmnmg  of 
all  time.  The  unknown  something,  which  we  term  power  in  the  cause  to 
produce  its  effect,  can  neither  be  included  in  this  universal  assertion  nor 
referred  to  an  original  intuition  of  the  mind;  for  there  can  be  no  mtuition 
of  that  which  is  unknown,  and  no  universality  in  that  which  is  denied  of 
one  class  of  actions  in  the  only  sense  in  which  it  is  affirmed  of  another. 

But  it  is  urged  on  the  other  side  that  human  actions  can  be  calculated 
beforehand,  and  thercfon)  are  clearly  subject  to  the  operation  of  lav.. 
«  We  anticipate,"  says  Dr.  McCosh, "  the  voluntarj'  actions  of  mankmd, 
as  wc  anticipate  their  judgments.    No  doubt  we  are  at  times  mistaken  in 
the  one  case  as  in  the  other  in  our  anticipations,  but  we  do  not  in  these 
cases  conclude  that  the  voluntary  actions  of  mankind  have  had  no  cause, 
any  more  than  we  infer  that  their  judgments  have  had  no  cause  ;  we  con- 
clude merely  that  we  did  not  know  the  cause,  and  that  if  we  had  known 
the  full  cause,  we  could  have  certainly  anticipated  the  result.    There  are 
statistics  of  the  voluntary  actions   of  mankind  -  as  of  crimes,  for  in- 
stance-which  are  as  accurate  as  the  laws  of  mortality." »     This  state- 
ment would  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  a  theory  of  complete  indifference, 
which  regards  the  will  as  entirely  uninfluenced  by  motives  up  to  the  time 
when  its  choice  is  made ;  but  it  does  not  meet  the  objections  of  those  who, 
while  fully  allowing  the  influence  of  motives,  yet  maintain  that  that  in- 
fluence is  different  in  its  nature  from  any  relation  of  material  phenomena, 
and  therefore  should  not  be  called  by  the  same  name.    Doubtless  there 
are  -encral  anticipations  to  be  drawn  from  mental  inclinations  no  less  than 
from  physical  successions.    If  I  throw  a  piece  of  wax  into  the  fire,  I  ex- 
pcct  that  it  will  melt.    If  I  offer  money  to  an  avaricious  man,  I  expect 
that  he  will  take  it.    The  question  is:  Is  the  expectation  in  both  <:as«8 
equally  certain?  or  is  the  difference  only  such  as  can  be  accounted  for  by 
our  greater  or  less  knowledge  of  circumstances?    To  assume  this  is  to 
be-  the  entire  question;  and,  on  the  strength  of  this  assumption,  to  call 
both  relations  by  the  common  name  of  causation,  is  only  to  confound  to- 
gether two  different  things  under  an  ambiguity  of  language^ 

\  "  IMn  moral  reasoning  it  be  mere  mockery  to  use  the  language  of  demon- 
rtration,  and  to  build  up  systems  by  trains  of  d  prion  reasoning  upon  a  siugle 
principle;  it  is  assuredly  not  less  absurd  to  affect  the  forms  of  induct  ve  proof 
in  political  speculation.  Every  political  as  well  as  every  moral  principle  pracU- 
cally  involves  the  determinaUon  of  the  wUl.  and  thereby  becomes  at  once  sepa- 


wh  H  ;f^  ^^  '''"'•''  "^'  '^^^'^""^  ^^  ^  selMrtnntp  of  the  will; 
which,  if  it  means  anything,  means  a  power  of  resisting  or  yieldin<r  to 
the  motives  presented  to  it,  and  of  resisting  at  one  time  and  yielding  at 
another,  the  concurrent  circumstances  being  identical  on  both  occasions 
Is  there  anything  similar  to  this  in  the  relation  of  a  physical  cause  to  its 
effect?    If  not,  why  call  two  dissimilar  things  by  the  same  name^ 

In  the  other  work  to  which  I  have  above  alluded,  Mr.  Buckle's  "  Histor.- 
Of  Cn^ilization  in  England,"  the  "statistics  of  the  voluntary  actions  of 
mankind     are  adduced  to  prove  a  further  conclusion,  which*  not  merely 

h  m  ftx,mal  personal  responsibility.  Rejecting  "  the  metaphysical  dogma 
of  free-will,  as  resting  on  the  fallible  testimony  of  consciousness,  Mr. 
Buckle  maintains  that  the  actions  of  men  "vary  in  obedience  to  the 
changes  in  the  surrounding  society;  "  and  "that  such  variations  are  the 
result  of  large  and  general  causes,  which,  working  upon  the  aggregate  of 
society,  „.ust  produce  certain  consequences,  without  regard  to  the  volition 
of  those  particular  men  of  whom  the  society  is  composed."  2  And  in 
applying  this  doctrine  to  particular  cases,  he  carries  it  out  so  consistently 
as  to  maintain,  "that  suicide  is  merely  the  product  of  the  geneml  condl- 

ullt  I7n1 ""'  Tl  "'  - vestigations  in  which  we  consider  the  immutable  rela- 
tions of  physical  phenomena.  That  the  will  is  influenced  by  motives  noTne 
p..tends  to  deny;  but  to  compare  that  influence  to  a  physical  ca^r^low^ 
by  an  unvaried  physical  effect,  is  only  to  confound  thinV  essentia.ry'dl^^r  nt 
and  must  ever  end  ,n  metaphysical  paradox  or  practical  folly." -Sedgwick 
I>^scour.eo.tneS.ui^^^  University  of  CanU^,,e,  ,.  SI,  Mt^  edulon.        ' 

T»  e  above  remarks  were  written  before  the  publication  of  Dr.  McCosh's 
recent  work  on  the  "  Intuitions  of  the  Mind."  I  do  not  flnd  any  substantial  dif 
ference  between  tbe  author's  view,  as  stated  in  this  later  work,  and    1  at  previ 
ously  given  in  the  "  Method;  "  though  there  are  some  expressions  which  tend  to 
confirm  my  suspicion  that  the  difference  between  us  is  more  verbal  ZlZ^ 
Thus  he  asserts  (p.  472,  that  "causation  in  the  will  is  entirely  differe'f^om 
causation  another  action;"  a  statement  in  which  I  fully  concur^on^rn" 
the  propriety  of  calling  the  former  by  this  name  of  causation  at  ^ll.    If  tC  ^s 
a  causation,  though  of  a  diffen^ut  kind,  in  mora,  as  well  .,  i„  physical     c7on 
».e  generic  notion  of  cause  should  be  the  same  i„  both,  the  specific  features  alone' 
be.ng  different,  as  distinguishing  this  kind  of  cause  from  that   But  can  any  un" 
vocal  generic  notion  be  pointed  out,  amounting  to  an  adequate  conception  of 
ca  sation  as  such?    If  not,  the  definition  of  causation,  as  a  common  genus,  I 
not  the  same  in  both,  and  we  have  not  the  subdivisions  of  a  generic  noUon  bu^ 
only  the  different  senses  of  au  equivocal  term  ' 

8  p.  21. 


I 


280 


APPENDIX. 


tion  of  society,  and  that  the  inclivirlual  felon  only  carries  into  effect  what 
is  a  necessary  consequence  of  preceding  circumstances."    "  In  a  given 
state  of  society,"  he  continues,  "a  certain  numl^er  of  persons  nmst  put 
an  end  to  their  own  life.    This  is  the  general  law ;  and  the  special  question 
as  to  who  shall  commit  the  crime  depends  of  course  upon  special  laws, 
which   however,  in  their  total  action,  must  obey  the  lar^^  social  law  to 
which'they  are  all  subordinate.    And  the  power  of  the  larger  law  is  so 
irresistible,  that  neither  the  love  of  life  nor  the  fear  of  another  world  caa 
avail  anything  towards  even  checking  its  operation."  i     This  conclusion 
he  endeavors  to  support  by  the  evidence  of  statistics,  "  a  branch  of  knowl- 
edge  which,  though  still  in  its  infancy,  has  already  thrown  more  light  on 
th^  study  of  human  nature  than  all  the  sciences  put  together."  a 

It  is  surprising  that  this  acute  writer  should  not  have  seen  that,  in  oppos- 
ing the  evidence  of  statistics  to  that  of  consciousness,  he  is  comparing 
together  two  witnesses  who  are  not  speaking  of  the  same  thing.    Tlie 
fact  to  which  consciousness  bears  witness  is  the  freedom  of  our  own  per- 
Bonal  actions.    The  fact  which  the  statistical  evidence  is  adduced  to  prove 
is  the  recurrence,  within  certain  limits  of  greatest  and  least  frequency,  of 
actions  distributed  over  an  entire  community.    The  former  evidence  tells 
us  nothing  directly  concerning  the  actions  of  societies;  the  latter  tells  us 
nothing  directly  concerning  the  actions  of  individuals.    Nay,  it  is  precisely 
because  the  individual  actions  are  not  reducible  to  any  fixed  law,  or  capa- 
ble  of  representation  by  any  numerical  calculation,  that  the  statistical 
averages  acquire  their  value  as  substitutes.    No  one  dreams  of  applying 
statistical  averages  to  calculate  the  period  of  the  earth's  rotation,  by 
showing  that  four  and  twenty  hours  is  the  exact  medium  of  time,  com- 
paring  one  month's  or  one  year's  revolutions  with  another  s.    It  is  only 
where  the  individual  movements  are  Irregular  that  it  is  necessary  to  aim 
at  a  proximate  regularity  by  calculating  in  masses.    To  what  cause  the 
individual  irregularity  is  due,  whether  to  the  complexity  and  minuteness 
of  the  physical  conditions  of  the  problem,  or  to  the  presence  of  moral 
conditions  and  fn^e  agency,  -  whether  it  indicates  contingency  in  the  facts 
themselves,  or  only  a  defect  in  our  means  of  calculatmg,  -  this  ,s  a 
question  which  can  only  be  answered  by  an  acquaintance  with  the  indl- 
vidual  objects  under  examination,  and  which  gains  no  elucidation  from 
the  statistics  of  large  classes.^ 

1  pp.  25, 2o.  „,  .    -       J  1 

3  Some  good  remarks  on  the  fallacy  of  this  kind  of  reasoning  will  be  found  In 

the  Rev.  W.  B.  Jones's  Assize  Sermon.  The  liespomibility  qfMan  to  the  Law  qf 

God.  Oxford,  1859,  p.  16. 


APPENDIX. 


Note   E,  p.  145. 


281 


sir  W.  Hamilton,  in  connection  with  Iiis  fhnnr^  ^r  *i,        ^ 
causal  judgment,  maintains  that  the   chc  1  of  ,1.^  '"'  T''  "'  *'« 

both  equally  inconceivable;  n^o^ZTZ^JJ^^^^^^    T'^'^  "' 
diately  or  mediatPiv  thn  ♦    *•  ^"^  ^^  ^^^e,  imme- 

Imperative,  fiives  a  decisive  p«.po„dem„ce  to  tl,e  doctrine  ZtZZ 
over  the  doctrine  of  fate.    We  are  tr^  ,„  .  .  •)•      """"^  "^  f'^'dom 
oar  actions."  1  "* '"  "=''  "^  "*  "«  accountable  for 

,  ™'  f""^'  "'°.:''"'  '""''=""*^  ^''™'"''"  '"  'he  mode  of  masoning  1,  in 
to  conclusion  similar  to  that  previously  arrived  at  hv  !(•„„.   '^''""K'  "  "» 

.ley,  with  the  view  of  showing  that  each  is  in^istible  in  its  attack  nZ 
the  other.    Kant,  too    like  .Sir  w  iio»i.  .  "P"" 

iih—  I  T'  Hamilton,  maintains  that  the  fact  of 

iberty  Is  guaranteed  by  the  testimony  of  the  morul  law.  who  e  C«elr 
toU  Imperative  <Ao«  sHalt  uecssaHly  implies  a  corresponding"  L^^" 
Kant,  however  denies  that  the  liberty  as  a  fact  can  claim  the  diLT^  «. 
mony  Of  consciousness;  for  conscLusness  In  his  philosophy  is  itait^o 

T,^TT"  """""^  '"  '•""'  """^  "'-'  ^"ereas  the  Ledom  Sal 
.n^d  by  the  moral  law  is  a  purely  transcendental  idea,  s^bStf^ 

^on  that  we  are  no.  directly  conscious  of  self  as  a  reality,  b^  only  of 
te  «ve™i  modes  and  affections.  If  my  fi,.t  consclousne  s  n^Iathl  "o 
TO  It  on  is  not  that  of  myself  as  willing,  but  only  of  will  as  a  phermenor 
-:f  in  the  judgment  "  I  will "  there  is  no  consciousness  of  7,  Z^ot 

tK^Z'/'     ^    ^  ''^  ««r*o/6„.  ,.  „.  p.  66.  ed.  Ro«nkr.az. 
A«,a  rfcr  r.  y.  p.  414;  M^apn  ^  «««.  p.  92;  Xr.  *,^.  k.  p.  224. 

24* 


282 


APPENDIX. 


tern,  —  to  this  phenomenon  of  volition  I  am  compelled  by  the  principle  of 
causality  to  suppose  an  antecedent  determining  phenomenon;  and  to  that 
ajjain  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 

But  this  conclusion  is  no  longer  forced  upon  ns,  if  we  admit  the  exist- 
ence of  an  immediate  consciousness,  not  merely  of  the  phenomena  of 
mind,  but  of  the  personal  self  as  actively  and  passively  related  to  them. 
We  thus  obtain  for  the  fact  of  liberty  not  merely  the  indirect  testimony 
of  consciousness  through  the  medium  of  the  moral  law,  but  the  direct 
testimony  by  the  presence  of  the  fact  itself.    I  am  conscious  not  merely 
of  the  phenomenon  of  volition,  but  of  myself  as  producing  it,  and  as 
producing  it  by  choice,  with  a  power  to  choose  the  opposite  alternative. 
In  this  case  I  am  not  compelled  to  go  back  to  any  prior  cause  whatever. 
I  need  not  suppose  a  prior  intelligent  cause;  for  my  only  positive  notion 
of  such  a  cause  is  myself  determining,  which  does  not  imply  myself  deter- 
mined.    I  need  not  suppose  a  prior  phenomenal  cause;  for  I  am  conscious 
of  the  influence  of  motives  as  inclining  only,  not  as  necessitating.    The 
whole  point  at  issue  thus  turns  on  the  following  question :  Can  the  fact  of 
consciousness  expressed  in  the  judgment  I  will,  be  analyzed  into  a  relation 
of  phenomena  subject  to  the  law  of  causality?    Is  the  principle  which  we 
invariably  apply  to  the  sequence  of  one  phenomenon  on  another  also 
applicable  to  the  relation  of  any  phenomenon  to  the  one  given  cause, 

myselft 

Sir  William  Hamilton  lays  much  stress  on  the  impossibility  of  conceiv- 
ing an  absolute  commencement.    If  by  this  is  meant  that  I  cannot  con- 
ceive myself  standing  at  the  beginning  of  all  time,  out  of  all  relation  to 
any  antecedent  series  of  phenomena,  it  is  undeniably  true.    But  is  such  a 
conception  needed  to  render  the  scheme  of  Liberty  comprehensible?    Is 
it  not  sufficient  for  me  to  know  that  none  of  the  chronological  antecedents 
stand  to  my  volition  in  the  parUcular  relation  of  a  determining  cause? 
And  this  is  the  case  if  it  is  neither  given  as  an  active  power  coercing,  nor 
as  a  passive  phenomenon  invariably  preceding.    To  say  that  some  antece- 
dent or  other  must  go  before  my  will,  is  only  to  say  that  I  do  not  stand  at 
the  beginning  of  all  time;  but  does  this  imply  some  one  antecedent  which 
is  invariably  followed  by  volition,  or  some  active  power,  necessitating  in 
each  particular  case?    If,  on  the  presence  of  the  antecedent,  or  group  of 
antecedents,  A,  my  voUtion  sometimes  takes  place  one  way,  and  some- 
times another,  it  is  not  determined  in  the  same  manner  as  physical  phenom- 
ena.   If  there  is  not  always  present  some  conscious  being,  exerting  his 
power  over  my  will,  it  is  not  determined  in  the  same  manner  as  it  deter- 
mines its  own  volitions.    But,  excepting  these  two  senses,  what  is  meant 
by  determining  cause  f 


APPENDIX. 


283 


I  there  then,  extant  any  definition  of  will  which  does  not  imply  another 
w.  preceding?  Perhaps  not;  but  the  fault  lies  only  in  the  autho.  of  the 
defi  „t.ons.  To  „.f„te  a  given  definition  does  not  prove  the  non-existence 
of  the  thmg  defined.  If  liberty  itself  is  a  simple  fact  of  consciousness! 
the  error  lies  m  the  attempt  to  define  it  at  all.  The  definition  will  neces! 
sanly  involve  a  circle,  and  upon  that  circle,  and  not  on  the  fact,  the  anta- 
omst  reasons.    But,  then,  if  the  definition  and  the  fact  of  consciousness  a^ 

l^M  !  '°"^'.'* '"'"^  ^'^^  ^«^> »«'  ^he  latter.  Now,  consciousness  tells 
me  not  that  my  unU  wills,  but  that  /«,/«.  fa  it  necessary  to  the  conceiv- 
abUuy  Of  the  fac.  that  I  should  be  able  to  analyze  it  intT  two  constHueL 
elements,  -  to  place  an  abstract  /  on  one  side,  and  an  abstract  will  on  the 
other  ;  thus  literally  fulfilling  the  satirical  dirt^ction  for  the  turbulent 
Puntans  bunal,  by  laying  John  apart  from  Lilbum  and  Lilburn  from 
John?  >V  many  other  state  or  act  of  mind  bear  a  similar  analysis?  Can 
I  in  any  case  separate  the  state  from  the  mind  and  the  mind  from  the 
state;  or  give  any  definition  which  does  not  virtually  repeat  itself  ?  But 
is  it  correct,  on  that  account,  to  call  states  which  I  experience  every  day 
In  consciousness  inconceivable  f 

If.  indeed,  the  freedom  of  the  will  be  supposed  to  mean  an  absolute  indif- 
ference to  and  independence  of  motives,  such  a  liberty  would  be  not  only 
Inconceivable  as  a  fact,  but  worthless  as  a  principle  of  moral  action.    But 
such  IS  not  the  liberty  to  which  consciousness  bears  witness;  nor  is  such  a 
liberty  required  as  the  only  alternative  against  fatalism.    The  influence  of 
motives  on  the  will  is  not  denied;  only  it  is  maintained  that  influence  is 
not  necessary  determination;  and  that  motives  are  not  causes,  in  any 
proper  sense  of  the  latter  term.    Thus  interpreted,  I  believe  the  scheme  of 
hberty  is  inconceivable  only  if  the  determinist  argument  is  unanswerable- 
and  its  answer  is  what  I  have  attempted  in  this  and  the  preceding  note' 
If  the  attempt  to  establish  a  contradictory  conclusion  fails,  liberty,  though 
not  definable,  is  surely  as  conceivable  as  any  other  simple  datum  of  con- 
sciousncss. 


Note  F,  p.  146. 

That  oureariiest  notion  of  Causality  arises  from  the  fact  given  in  the 
determination  of  our  own  volitions,  is  suggested  by  Locke,  and  established 
beyond  all  question  by  Maine  de  Biran.  But  then  arises  the  question :  By 
What  process  do  wc  transcend  our  personal  consciousness,  and  acknowl- 
edge, in  relation  to  the  changes  of  the  sensible  world,  the  operation  of 


I.  J; 


284 


APPENDIX. 


causes  other  than  ourselves?  This  process  is  called  by  De  BIran  and 
Royer-Collard  a  Natural  Induction,  a  term  severely  criticized  by  M.  Cousin. 
Were  the  process  really  inductive,  he  arjjues,  we  must  believe  every  cause 
in  nature  to  be,  like  ourselves,  voluntary,  conscious,  and  free;  and  even 
then  the  belief  in  question  mij^ht  perhaps  be  regarded  as  universally  true 
within  the  limits  of  experience,  but  could  never  rise  to  the  character  of  a 
necessary  truth.  For  a  more  satisfactory  explanation,  M.  Cousin  has  re- 
course to  the  principle  of  causality,  which  he  regards  as  a  necessary  law 
of  the  reason,  by  virtue  of  which  it  disengages,  in  the  fact  of  conscious- 
ness, the  necessary  element  of  causal  relation  from  the  contingent  element 
of  my  personal  production  of  this  or  that  particular  movement.  This 
necessity,  which  compels  the  reason  to  suppose  a  cause  whenever  the 
senses  or  the  consciousness  present  a  phenomenon,  is  the  Principle  of 
Causality  .1 

It  is  obvious  to  ask,  What  do  we  gain  by  the  principle  of  causality  thus 
supposed?  Does  it  explain  in  any  degree  the  nature  of  that  power  which 
we  are  supposed  to  attribute  to  inanimate  objects  ?  Does  it  explain  how 
we  divest  our  original  notion  of  the  attribute  of  personality,  and  what  is 
left  when  we  have  done  so?  Does  it  furnish  the  slightest  hint  or  help  for 
investigating  the  true  character  of  efficient  causes?  By  no  means.  The 
principle  itself  is  a  mere  statement  of  the  fact,  that  we  do  invariably  sup- 
pose a  cause  of  physical  changes,  and  that  we  cannot  but  do  so.  It  offers 
no  psychological  explanation  of  the  fact ;  it  merely  gives  it  the  name  of  a 
principle  of  reason.  It  does  not  give  us  any  positive  notion  of  the  cause 
in  question;  this  remains,  we  know  not  what,  — a  something  different 
from  our  own  causality,  and,  as  such,  supposable  perhaps,  but  inconceiv- 
able. It  does  not  tell  us  how  we  can  attain  to  a  more  positive  knowledge. 
Not  by  the  senses ;  for  these  present  to  us  only  successive  phenomena. 
Not  by  the  internal  consciousness;  for  this  informs  us  only  of  personal 
causation.  Not  by  the  reason;  for  this  only  tells  us  in  general  terms  that 
there  is  a  cause,  but  furnishes  no  means  of  observing  and  distinguishing 
its  character  and  varieties.  The  cause  of  physical  changes  still  remains, 
like  the  subject  of  physical  attributes,  a  negative  idea,  ajc  ne  sais  quoi. 

Nor  does  M.  Cousin's  theory,  any  more  than  that  of  De  Biran,  explain 
how  we  get  rid  of  the  personal  element  with  which  all  intuitive  causality 
is  involved.  It  only  says  that  we  do  so,  and  that  we  must  do  so.  The 
term  Induction,  employed  by  De  Biran  and  Royer-Collard,  is  indeed  objec- 
tionable, whether  it  be  taken  in  the  Aristotelian  or  in  the  Baconian  sense. 
The  former  is  objectionable,  inasmuch  as  our  personal  acts  are  not  sup- 


1  Coun  de  PhUosophie,  Le^on  19. 


APPENDIX. 


285 


posed  to  constitute,  or  even  adequately  to  represent,  the  whole  body  of 
causal  relations.    The  latter  is  objectionable;  for  the  same  acts  cannot  be 
selected  instances  showing  diverse  operations  of  a  law,  but  must,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  be  all  of  one  kind.    But  this  objection  affects  only  the 
anguage,  and  not  the  basis  of  the  theor>^.  indeed,  the  two  philosophers 
in  question  have  expressly  stated  that  their  natural  induction  must  be 
carefully  distinguished  from  that  of  physics.i     But  in  point  of  language 
the  phrase  pn>,op/e  of  reason  is  equally  objectionable;  partly  as  tending^'to 
check  all  further  psychological  investigation  into  a  point  bv  no  means  as 
yet  satisfactorily  explained,  and  partly  as  opening  the  way  to  the  thousand 
extravagances  of  ontological  speculation,  by  concealing  the  purely  neg- 
ative character  of  the  notion  of  physical  power.   On  M.  de  Biran's  theory 
says  M.  Cousin,  anthropomorphism  becomes  the  universal  and  necessar^ 
law  of  thought.2     It  might  be  replied,  that  in  all  cases  where  the  presenta- 
tton  is  given  by  internal  consciousness  only,  anthropomorphism  is  in  fact 
the  condition  and  the  limit  of  all  positive  thinking. 

I  conceive,  therefore,  that  there  is  nothing  in  M.  Cousin's  theoiy  which 
dispenses  with  the  obligation  of  a  further  psychological  examination  of 
the  origin  and  character  of  the  supposed  principle  of  causality,  such  as  I 
have  attempted  in  the  text  of  the  present  work.  Whether  that  explana- 
tion Itself  be  right  or  wrong,  must  be  judged  by  others;  but,  whatever 
may  be  its  fate  in  this  respect,  I  shall  deem  its  purpose  sufficiently  an- 
swered  if  it  serves  to  call  the  attention  of  philosophers  to  a  point  hitherto 
too  much  neglected  in  speculation  -  the  important  distinction  between 
positive  and  negative  iutuitioua  and  thoughts. 


Note  G,  p.  148. 


In  the  controversy  concerning  the  existence  of  a  Moral  Sense,  the  ques- 
tion at  Issue  has  suffered  considerable  misrepresentation  from  the  want  of 
an  accurate  distinction  between  intuitive  or  prescntative  consciousness 
whose  object  is  an  Individual  thing,  act,  or  state  of  mind,  and  reflective  or 
representative  consciousness,  whose  Immediate  object  Is  a  general  notion 
or  principle.    Stewart,  for  example.  In  his  Life  of  Adam  Smith,  observes : 

^(Etarrw  de  Maine  de  Biran,  vol.  Iv.  p.  893;  Joulfroy's  Reid,  voLiv.  pp.  383, 
8  (Euvre*  de  Maine  de  Biran,  voL  iy.  Fr6&ee  de  rEditeur,  p.  xxxyL 


286 


APPENDIX. 


tt 


"It  was  the  opinion  of  Dr.  Codworth,  and  also  of  Dr.  Oarke,  that  moral 
distinctions  are  perceived  by  that  power  of  the  mind  which  distinffuishea 
truth  from  falsehood.    This  system  it  was  one  great  object  of  Dr.  Hutch- 
eson's  philosophy  to  refute,  and  in  opposition  to  it,  to  show  that  the  words 
right  and  wrong  express  certain  agreeable  and  disagreeable  qualities  in 
actions,  which  it  is  not  the  province  of  reason,  but  of  feeling,  to  perceive; 
and  to  that  power  of  perception  which  renders  us  susceptible  of  pleasure 
or  of  pain  from  the  view  of  virtue  or  of  vice,  he  gave  the  name  of  the 
Moral  Sense."    The  same  philosopher,  in  his  Philosophical  Essays,  en- 
deavors to  obviate  Hume's  deductions  from  Hutcheson's  theory,  by  falling 
back,  in  some  degree,  upon  the  views  of  Cudworth  and  Clarke,  and  refer- 
ring the  origin  of  our  notions  of  right  and  wrong  to  reason  instead  of  sense. 
"Tastes  and  colors,"  said  Hume,  "  and  all  other  sensible  qualities,  lie  not 
in  the  bodies,  but  merely  in  the  senses.    The  case  is  the  same  with  beauty 
and  deformity,  virtue  and  vice.''    To  this  Stewart  replies :  "  The  decisions 
of  the  understanding,  it  must  be  owned,  with  respect  to  moral  truth, 
differ  from  those  which  relate  to  a  mathematical  theorem,  or  to  the  result 
of  a  chemical  experiment,  inasmuch  as  they  are  always  accompanied 
with  some  feeling  or  emotion  of  the  heart;  but  on  an  accurate  analysis  of 
this  compounded  sentiment  it  will  be  found  that  it  is  the  intellectual  judg- 
ment which  is  the  groundwork  of  the  feeling,  and  not  the  feeling  of  the 

judgment." 

In  a  Lecture  on  Moral  Relations,  by  the  late  Professor  Mills,  the  differ- 
ent opinions  concerning  our  perception  of  Morality  are  summed  up  as 

follows : 

"  1.  Some  ascribe  our  apprehension  of  it,  with  Hutcheson,  to  a  peculiar 
internal  sense,  similar  in  its  operations  to  the  external  senses,  and  con- 
found  moral  perception  with  taste;  this  is,  strictly  speaking,  the  theory 

of  a  moral  sense. 

"2.  Others  attribute  moral  perception,  not  to  any  peculiar  sense,  but 
yet  to  a  peculiar  faculty  of  the  understanding  distinct  from  its  general 
powers,  and  they  appear  to  identify  conscience  with  the  moral  faculty. 

"  3.  Many  deny  the  existence  of  a  peculiar  moral  faculty,  and  maintain 
that  moral  principles  are  apprehended  by  the  same  powers  of  the  intellect 
which  perceive  other  kinds  of  truth. 

"4.  The  Utilitarian  theory  implies  that  moral  relations  are  ascertained 
and  embraced  by  the  operations  of  the  discursive  faculty  only."  i 

The  whole  controversy  may  be  considerably  cleared  by  distinguishing 
Moral  Facts  from  Moral  Principles.    Facts  of  all  kinds  are  presented  to,  and 

1  Essays  and  Lectures  by  the  late  Rev.  W.  Mills,  p.  204. 


APPENDIX. 


287 


perceived  by,  different  faculties  of  intuition,  similar  in  the  manner  of 
Iheir  operation  to  the  perceptions  of  sense;  and  hence,  with  some  allow- 
ance for  metaphor,  we  may  speak  of  internal  or  external  senses.^  Is  it 
then  asked  whether  we  discern  morality  in  individual,  acts  by  the  same 
faculties  by  whicli  we  discern  other  qualities  of  individual  objects  pre- 
sented to  us?  But,  of  these  qualities,  some  arc  visible,  some  audible,  and 
so  on.  Is  it  meant  that  an  act  can  literally  be  seen,  heard,  smelt,  felt  or 
tasted,  to  be  virtuous  or  vicious  ?  If  not,  the  perception  of  the  moral  char- 
actcr  of  acts  is  a  distinct  presentation,  and,  as  such,  to  be  referred  to  a 
distmct  faculty;  though,  being,  as  will  appear,  an  object  of  internal,  not 
of  external  perception,  it  is  not,  like  the  external  senses,  connected  with  a 
distinct  bodily  organ. 

The  question,  whether  right  and  wrong  are  apprehended  by  the  same 
powers  of  the  intellect  which  perceive  other  kinds  of  truth,  is  only  appli- 
cable to  the  general  concepts  or  prindples  through  which  morality  is  repre- 
sented as  an  object  of  thought.    Truth  and  Falsehood  can  be  distinguished 
in  representative  knowledge  only;  and  all  such  knowledge  is  most  con- 
veniently  classified  by  reference  to  the  single  faculty  of  the  Understanding. 
The  same  power  of  thought  may  inquire  into  the  ground  of  various  pre- 
sentations; it  may  investigate,  for  example,  why  one  object  is  white,  why 
another  is  harmonious,  why  a  third  is  sweet,  why  a  fourth  is  beautiful, 
why  a  fifth  is  virtuous;  but  in  all  such  investigations,  the  fact  of  a  given 
object  possessing  a  given  quality  must  be  presupposed  as  the  groundwork 
of  the  investigation.    The  distinction  between  a  true  and  a  false  theory  of 
morals  will  be  determined  by  the  same  test  as  that  between  truth  and 
falsehood  in  any  other  inquiry  —  its  agreement  or  not,  with  the  facts  as 
given  in  intuition. 

It  thus  appears  that  a  power  of  discerning  right  and  wrong  in  individ- 
ual acta  must  be  allowed  as  the  presentative  basis,  without  which  no 
system  of  Moral  Philosophy  is  possible.    Such  a  power,  thus  limited,  it  is 

1  This  has  been  observed  by  Aristotle,  whose  account  of  the  Practical  Sen4ie,  or 
Intelligence,  is  in  this  reppect  more  accurate  than  that  of  modem  philosophers. 
Kal  Tip  Ti,y  irp<i,Ta>y  Bpwv  koI  riv  4(rxdrwy  yovs  i<rr\  koI  oh  \6yos,  Kcd  6  /xh 
Karh  TO  J  &vo6fl^fis  ru>y  ^Kiy^ruy  Zpu,y  koX  irpaJrwi/,  b  5'  iy  rah  irfKucriKcus 
rov  iffxarov  nal  4ybt  xofJifyov  Kal  rrjs  ir4pas  irpord- 
tr^ws-  ipx<d  ykp  rov  ol  HvtKa  atnai-  U  r&y  ko^'  liKaara  y^  rh  KaSt6\ov. 
To{rru>y  oly  J^x^ty  Sc?  aXff^riiTiy,  atrri  «'  itrrl  yovs.  —  Eth.  Nic.  vi.  11. 
Compare  Pol.  I  2:  lovro  ykp  wphi  t5aAo  Cv«  "tois  aybpdirois  tStoy,  rh  fi6yoy 
iya^ov  Kal  KOKOv  Kal  Binalov  Kal  iiSiKov  koI  ra>y  &\J^toy  aia^ri<riy  ^x^iy. 
These  passages  may  serve  as  a  qualification  of  Smith's  assertion,  that  the  word* 
moral  sense  is  of  very  late  formation. 


288 


APPENDIX. 


impossible  for  the  Utilitarian  to  explain  away  by  any  theory  of  association 
or  education.  Education  may  corrupt  and  pervert  our  presented  ideas, 
but  it  cannot  originate  them :  it  may  teach  me  to  regard  an  act  as  right 
which  is  really  wrong,  or  vice  versa,  but  it  cannot  create  the  original  im- 
pression of  either.  To  deny,  with  Locke  and  Paley,  the  existence  of  a 
moral  sense,  l)ecause  one  man  holds  to  be  wrong  what  another  holds  to  be 
right,  is  like  denying  the  existence  of  a  faculty  of  sight,  because  a  man 
with  the  jaundice  sees  all  objects  yellow.  The  existence  of  the  faculty  is 
shown  by  our  approving  or  disapproving  at  all ;  it  cannot  therefore  be 
disproved  by  the  fact  of  our  sometimes  approving  or  disapproving  wrongly. 
The  opposite  error  of  Hume,  in  holding  that  virtue  and  vice  exist  in  the 
sense  only,  lies  in  a  confusion  of  the  subjective  feeling  of  approbation 
with  the  objective  quality  which  gives  rise  to  it.  The  same  confusion 
has  taken  place  with  regard  to  the  secondary  qualities  of  body.  Heat  and 
color,  as  sensations,  exist  only  in  a  sentient  being;  but  that  such  sensations 
originate  from  nothing  at  all  in  the  bodies  themselves,  is  an  absurdity  long 
ago  exploded,  if  indeed  ever  seriously  maintained. 

This  presentation  of  right  and  wrong,  however,  is  by  no  means  accurately 
exhibited  in  the  account  commonly  given  of  moral  sense.  It  is  not  correct 
to  describe  our  perception  of  the  moral  character  of  actions  in  general  as 
coordinate  with  or  including  the  judgment  of  our  own  conduct  in  particu- 
hir.i  Right  and  wrong  are  not  directly  presented  to  me  in  any  other  actions 
than  my  own.  If  I  see  a  murder  committed  in  a  puppet-show,  I  have  all 
the  same  presented  phenomena  as  if  I  see  a  murder  committed  by  a  man. 
I  do  not  feel  the  same  moral  disapprobation,  because  I  do  not  attribute  to 
the  puppet  the  same  internal  consciousness  of  obligation  as  to  the  man.  But 
this  consciousness  is  not  presented  except  in  the  case  of  my  own  acts,  and, 
from  these,  is  transferred  representatively  to  other  men,  whose  mental  consti- 
tntion  I  believe  to  be  in  this  respect  similar  to  my  own.  The  intuitive  faculty 
is  properly  limited  to  the  approbation  or  disapprobation  of  my  personal  acts ; 
and  to  this  personal  consciousness  must  thus  be  traced  the  original  notions 
of  Right  and  Wrong,  as  of  Cause,  and  of  Substance,  and  of  all  internal 
phenomena.  Hence,  if  the  terms  Moral  Sense  and  Conscience  be  used  ac- 
cording to  the  ordinary  philosophical  distinction,  it  will  be  more  correct  to 
describe  Moral  Sense  as  an  extension  of  Conscience,  than  Conscience  as  a 
limitation  of  Moral  Sense.^ 

1  As  is  done  by  Bishop  Sanderson,  in  his  Pralectionea  de  OMlfjatione  Conacien- 
tiaiy  as  well  as  by  Shaftesbury,  Hutcheson,  and  most  of  the  advocates  of  a  moral 
aeuse,  and  still  more  by  Smith,  in  his  theory  of  Sympathy. 

8  This  is  exactly  the  reverse  of  the  theory  of  Adam  Smith,  who  maintains  that 
our  judgments  concerning  the  morality  of  our  own  acts  is  entirely  derived  from 


: 


APPENDIX. 


Note  H,  p.  212. 


289 


The  difference  between  the  relations  of  the  several  Forms  of  Thou-rht  u> 
Psycholoa^  and  to  U>Sic  has  not  hitherto  been  accurately  marked  "ps^ 
^.onfst  l''J  """ ''  ~'-»""-'«0  '>y.  »<"  eiven  to,  the'act  of  think^^ 

tolTf       h"™'  ""• '"  •""  ""'"*''  »'■  '"o  P-^""-  B»'  '^<^  Psycho. 

flmher  process  of  pu«  or  formal  thinking  is  affected  by  them.  In  its 
psychologic.,  relation,  modality  is  cleariy  one  of  the  forms  of  jud.Jnenr 
The  necessaj  judgment,  "A  m^  be  B,"  exp,.sscs  the  existence  of'a  J' 

the  contingent  judgment,  whose  full  expression  is,  "A  mayor  r«ay  not^ 

\  tT  IrTV  °'  ""'' """  "'  ""^  "'"" '  ''■"""' '"«  P-*  Judgment, 
A  w  B,    states  the  fact  of  an  existing  connection,  without  takin"  int<^ 

•coount  the  question  of  law  at  all.  The  psychological  question  is°this: 
Is  the  presence  or  absence  of  a  law  connecting  the  terms  of  a  judgment 
^ven  roor  f^  the  act  of  judging?  Is  it  part  of  the  given  phenomena  or  a 
m«ner  m  which  the  mind  regaMs  them?  In  other  words.  Is  modal!  y  an 
affecnon  of  the  predicate,  or  of  the  copuU?  Do  I  in  thought  decide  on 
the  actual  connection  of  A  with  a  given  nece^ry-B,  or  on  the  necessarv 
connection  of  A  with  a  given  B  ?  In  the  former  le,  he  J^^^L 
to  the  matter  of  the  judgment,  in  the  latter,  to  the  form  ^ 

The  true  answer  to  this  question  is  sufficiently  plain.   If  sensible  experi- 
ence is  incompetent  to  furnish  the  notion  of  identity  between  two  phenom- 

m1  "  ^"  ''  ""•"■"P"""'  'o  '»""■'''  *«  Of  necessary  or  contingent 
Mentity.  These  are  additional  products  of  the  act  of  thought;  experience 
having  only  presented  the  phenomena  in  a  constant  or  variable  juxtaposi- 
Hon  Nay,  further,  the  hypothesis  that  modality  is  gi^  m  the  predicate 
Of  a  judgment  not  t},ongU  i„  ,he  copula,  becomes,  in  ultimate- analysis, 
destrucve  of  ..self.  For,  if  in  though,  we  connect  A  with  what  is  gij. 
«  necessanly  B,  this  implies  that  B  has  p„,viously  been  thought  as  nfcT 
»nly  connected  with  some  subject  or  other.  A  «.essa,^.B  has  no  intelli- 
gible sense  except  in  notation  to  some  previous  judgment,  "  C  ,„„..  fe  B." 
The  Identification  of  A  with  B,  then,  takes  place  through  the  medium  of  C; 

T^^^Z!T^  "  """"•    ■™''  '""'^  *■*  '"""  •»  f"  "  to  assert,  "  Were 

ojTu  rl  r      1  "^T""'""™  """  ""  »'"  •!«''-.  he  could  no  more  think 
duo    ofTh    L  ■  "'""  """'"'^  "'  "'"■""  """•  <»"■  -"""»'"«  -d  eon. 

ZocT:j::'Z^:  '^''""""^  "^"^^ «""  •^■^'' «--  "^^^^  --"^  -^  "erom.- 

25 


290 


APPENDIX. 


APPENDIX. 


291 


and  the  supposition  that  modality  can  be  given  as  an  affection  of  the 
predicate,  implies  that  it  has  been  previously  thought  as  an  affection  of  the 
copula.  This  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  psychological  position  of  mo- 
dality as  a  form  of  the  judgment.  But,  thus  admitted,  it  is  indispensable 
that  it  should  be  expressed  in  the  copula,  and  not,  as  is  frequently  done, 
left  to  be  gathered  from  our  knowledge  of  the  matter.  A  judgment  of 
the  form  "A  is  B,"  whatever  notions  may  be  expressed  by  the  terms, 
can  never  be  thought  as  other  than  a  pure  or  assertorial  judgment.  An 
apodeictical  or  problematical  judgment  requires  a  different  statement  of 
the  copula  relation,  "A  must  be  B,"  or  "A  may  be  B." 

On  the  other  hand,  the  criticism  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  though  accurately 
expressed  in  relation  to  one  process  of  thought  only,  may  be  so  extended 
as  to  be  decisive  as  regards  the  exclusion  of  modality  from  Logic. 
"  Necessity,  Contingency,  etc.,"  he  says,  "  are  circumstances  which  do  not 
affect  the  logical  copula  or  the  logical  inference.  They  do  not  relate  to  the 
connection  of  the  subject  and  predicate,  of  the  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent, as  terms  in  thought,  but  as  realities  in  existence;  they  are  met- 
aphysical,  not  logical  conditions.  The  syllogistic  inference  is  always 
necessary;  is  modified  by  no  extraformal  condition;  is  equally  apodicUc 
in  contingent  as  in  necessary  matter."  ^ 

As  regards  the  syllogistic  inference,  these  remarks  are  strictly  accurate, 
and  would  be  conclusive  against  any  modality  proposed  as  a  form  of 
reasoning.    Were  a  distinction,  for  example,  set  up  between  syllogisms  in 
which  the  conclusion  necessarily  follows  from  the  premises,  and  syllogisms 
in  which  it  may  be  inferred  with  more  or  less  probability,  the  latter  would 
rightly  be  condemned  as  extralogical  —  the  true  syllogistic  inference  being 
always  necessary.    As  regards  the  copula  in  judgments,  the  criticism 
cannot  be  accepted  as  verbally  accurate  unless  we  distinguish  the  logical 
copula  from  the  psychological.     That  modality  relates  to  realities  in 
existence,  is  not  conclusive;  for  quantity  and  quality,  in  all  synthetical 
judgments,  do  the  same  in  the  same  degree,  and  yet  are  rightly  classed  as 
forms  of  thought.    But  if  we  extend  the  distinction  between  formal  and 
material  thinking,  so  as  to  embrace  judgment  and  conception,  as  well  as 
reasoning,  it  is  clear  that  the  copula  is  always  necessary  in  analytical  or 
formal  judging,  as  the  inference  is  always  necessary  in  formal  reasoning. 
Material  judgments,  however,  cannot  be  entirely  excluded  (Vom  Logic,  in 
so  far  as  they  furnish  data  for  formal  reasoning.    They  are  admissible, 
however,  only  in  relation  to  this  latter  process;  and  hence  those  forms  of 
judgment  only  are  rightly  to  be  regarded  as  logical  which  affect  the  formal 
inference  derivable  from  them.   This  is  the  case  with  quantity  and  quality, 

1  DUcussions^  p.  148. 


but  not  with  modality:  the  latter  affects  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  not 
•s  a  conclusion,  in  its  relation  to  the  premises,  but  only  in  itself,  as  a  prop- 
osition. For  this  reason,  it  is  logically  preferable  to  exclude  modality  as 
a  form,  and  to  treat  it  as  if  it  affected  the  predicate  only  of  the  judgment. 
The  logfajj  copula  thus  becomes  in  every  instance  assertorial  only  and  if 
this  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  psychological  copula,  the  remarks 
of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  may  be  regarded  as  appUcable  to  the  whole  of  Logic 
and  to  eveiy  process  of  thought.  ' 


THE    END. 


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